IX. ART. ty. Therefore those who believe that there is nothing imputed to Adam's pofterity on the account of his fin, but this temporary punishment of their being made liable to death, and to all thofe miferies that the fear of it, with our other concerns about it, bring us under, fay that this is enough to justify the comparison that is there ftated and that thofe, who will carry it on to be an exact parallel, make a ftretch beyond the phrafeology of the Scripture, and the use of parables, and of the many comparisons that go only to one or more points, but ought not to be ftretched to every thing. 10. the whole Old Tefta ment. Mat. iii. 7. 1 Theff. ii. 16. Luke xxiii. 40. 1 Cor. xi. : These are the things that other great divines among us have opposed to this opinion. As to its confonancy to the Article, those who oppofe it do not deny, but that it comes up fully to the highest fenfe that the words of the Article can import: nor do they doubt, but that those who prepared the Articles, being of that opinion themfelves, might perhaps have had that fenfe of the words in their thoughts. But they add, that we are only bound to fign the Articles in a literal and grammatical fenfe: fince Ex. xxxii. therefore the words, God's wrath and damnation, which and through are the higheft in the Article, are capable of a lower fenfe, temporary judgments being often fo expreffed in the Scriptures, therefore they believe the lots of the favour of God, the fentence of death, the troubles of life, and the corruption of our faculties, may be well called God's wrath and damnation. Befides, they obferve, that the main point of the imputation of Adam's fin to his pofterity, and its being confidered by God as their own act, not being exprefsly taught in the Article, here was that mo1 Pet. iv. 17. deration obferved, which the compilers of the Articles have fhewed on many other occafions. It is plain from hence, that they did not intend to lay a burthen on men's confciences, or oblige them to profefs a doctrine that seems to be of hard digeftion to a great many. The last prejuRom. xiv. dice that they offer againft that opinion is, that the foftening the terms of God's wrath and damnation, that was brought in by the followers of St. Auftin's doctrine, to fuch a moderate and harmless notion, as to be only a lofs of heaven, with a fort of unactive fleep, was an effect of their apprehending that the world could very ill bear an opinion of fo ftrange a found, as that all mankind were to be damned for the fin of one man: and that therefore, to make this pafs the better, they mitigated damnation far below the reprefentation that the Scriptures generally give of it, which propose it as the being adjudged to a place of torment, and a state of horror and mifery. Rom. xiii. 2. 2 Cor. vii. 3. Joh. viii. 10, 11. 23. Thus IX. Thus I have fet down the different opinions in this ART. point, with that true indifference that I intend to obferve on fuch other occafions, and which becomes one who undertakes to explain the doctrines of the Church, and not his own; and who is obliged to propofe other men's opinions with all fincerity, and to thew what are the fenfes that the learned men, of different perfuafions in these matters, have put on the words of the Article. In which one great and conftant rule to be obferved is, to reprefent men's opinions candidly, and to judge as favourably both of them and their opinions as may be to bear with one another, and not to disturb the peace and union of the Church, by infifting too much and too peremptorily upon matters of fuch doubtful difputation; but willingly to leave them to all that liberty, to which the Church has left them, and which the ftill allows them. ARTICLE ARTICLE X. Of Free-Will. The Condition of an after the Fall of Adam is fuch that he cannot tun and prepare himself by his own natural frength and good works to Faith and calling upon God. Wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the Grace of God by Chzift preventing us, that we may Have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will. WE E fhall find the fame moderation observed in this Article, that was taken notice of in the former; where all disputes concerning the degree of that feeblenefs and corruption, under which we are fallen by the fin of Adam, are avoided, and only the neceffity of a preventing and a cooperating grace is afferted, against the Semipelagians and the Pelagians. But before we enter upon that, it is fitting first to state the true notion of free-will, in fo far as it is neceffary to all rational agents, to make their actions morally good or bad; fince it is a principle that seems to rife out of the light of nature, that no man is accountable, rewardable, or punishable, but for that in which he acts freely, without force or compulfion; and fo far all are agreed." Some imagine, that liberty muft fuppofe a freedom to do, or not to do, and to act contrariwife at pleasure. To others it seems not neceffary that fuch a liberty fhould be carried to denominate actions morally good or bad: God certainly acts in the perfecteft liberty, yet he cannot fin. Christ had the most exalted liberty in his human nature, of which a creature was capable, and his merit was the highest, yet he could not fin. Angels and glorified faints, though no more capable of rewards, are perfect moral agents, and yet they cannot fin: and the devils, with the damned, though not capable of farther punishment, yet are ftill moral agents, and cannot but fin: fo this indifferency to do, or not to do, cannot be the true notion of liberty. A truer one seems to them to be this, that a rational nature is not determined as mere matter, by the impulfe and motion of other bodies upon it, but is capable of thought, and, upon confidering the objects fet before it, makes reflection, and fo chooses. Liberty there fore X. fore seems to confift in this inward capacity of thinking, ART. and of acting and choofing upon thought. The clearer the thought is, and the more conftantly that our choice is determined by it, the more does a man rife up to the higheft acts, and fublimeft exercises of liberty. A queftion arifes out of this, whether the will is not always determined by the understanding, fo that a man does always choofe and determine himself upon the account of fome idea or other? If this is granted, then no liberty will be left to our faculties. We muft apprehend things as they are proposed to our understanding; for if a thing appears true to us, we muft affent to it; and if the will is as blind to the understanding, as the understanding is determined by the light in which the object appears to it, then we feem to be concluded under a fate, or neceffity. It is, after all, a vain attempt to argue against every man's experience: we perceive in ourselves a liberty of turning our minds to fome ideas, or from others; we can think longer or fhorter of thefe, more exactly and fteadily, or more lightly and fuperficially, as we please; and in this radical freedom of directing or diverting our thoughts, a main part of our freedom does confift: often objects as they appear to our thoughts do fo affect or heat them, that they do feem to conquer us, and carry us after them; fome thoughts feeming as it were to intoxicate and charm us. Appetites and paffions, when much fired by objects apt to work upon them, do agitate us ftrongly; and, on the other hand, the impreffions of religion come often into our minds with fuch a fecret force, so much of terror and fuch fecret joy mixing with them, that they feem to mafter us; yet in all this a man acts freely, because he thinks and choofes for himfelf: and though perhaps he does not feel himself fo entirely balanced, that he is indifferent to both fides, yet he has ftill fuch a remote liberty, that he can turn himself to other objects and thoughts, fo that he can divert, if not all of the fudden refift, the prefent impreffions that feem to mafter him. We do alfo feel that in many trifles we do act with an entire liberty, and do many things upon no other account, and for no other reafon, but because we will do them; and yet more important things depend on thefe. Our thoughts are much governed by thofe impreffions that are made upon our brain: when an object proportioned to us appears to us with fuch advantages as to affect us much, it makes fuch an impreffion on our brain, that our animal fpirits move much towards it; and thofe thoughts that anfwer it arife oft and ftrongly upon us, X. ART. till either that impreffion is worn out and flatted, or new and livelier ones are made on us by other objects. In this depreffed ftate in which we now are, the ideas of what is ufeful or pleasant to our bodies are ftrong; they are ever fresh, being daily renewed; and, according to the different conftruction of men's blood and their brains, there arifes a great variety of inclinations in them. Our animal fpirits, that are the immediate organs of thought, being the fubtiler parts of our blood, are differently made and fhaped, as our blood happens to be acid, falt, sweet, or phlegmatic and this gives fuch a bias to all our inclinations, that nothing can work us off from it, but fome great ftrength of thought that bears it down: fo learning, chiefly in mathematical fciences, can fo fwallow up and fix one's thought, as to poffefs it entirely for fome time; but when that amufement is over, nature will return and be where it was, being rather diverted than overcome by fuch fpeculations. The revelation of religion is the propofing and proving many truths of great importance to our understandings, by which they are enlightened, and our wills are guided; but these truths are feeble things, languid and unable to ftem a tide of nature, especially when it is much excited and heated: fo that in fact we feel, that, when nature is low, these thoughts may have some force to give an inward melancholy, and to awaken in us purpofes and refolutions of another kind; but when nature recovers itself, and takes fire again, thefe grow lefs powerful. The giving those truths of religion fuch a force that they may be able to fubdue nature, and to govern us, is the defign of both natural and revealed religion. So the queftion comes now according to the Article to be, whether a man by the powers of nature and of reafon, without other inward affiftances, can fo far turn and difpofe his own mind, as to believe and to do works pleasant and acceptable to God. Pelagius thought that man was fo entire in his liberty, that there was no need of any other grace but that of pardon, and of propofing the truths of religion to men's knowledge, but that the ufe of these was in every man's power. Those who were called Semipelagians thought that an affifting inward grace was neceffary to enable a man to go through all the harder fteps of religion; but with that they thought that the first turn or converfion of the will to God, was the effect of a man's own free choice. In oppofition to both which, this Article afferts both an affifting and a preventing grace. That there are in ward |