the Greek theology difclofed, I fhall present him with a paraphrafed tranflation of two books of Plotinus: the first of which is infcribed, That Intelligibles are not external to Intellect, and concerning the Good, and the other, Concerning intelligible Beauty. I have particularly chosen these, not only because they admirably unfold the depths of the Platonic philofophy and theology; but because the first relates to the vifion of the fupreme, explaining the wonderful manner in which it is accomplished; and the fecond defcribes the method of becoming united with the intelligible world. The Platonic reader will find in these books (if I have done juftice to their divine author), inftances of fublimity beyond all comparison with any other writings; and fpecimens of a profundity of thought unequalled by any other philofopher. I am fenfible that the great labour I have employed in the tranflation, will be, moft probably, loft on the prefent generation: but though I write with no views nor defires of popular renown, yet I flatter myself with the approbation of more equitable pofterity. The fifth book, therefore, of the fifth Ennead of Plotinus is as follows:

"Is it poffible any one can think that true intellect, poffeffing true being, can at any time be deceived, and believe in things which have no real exiftence? Certainly no one. For how could it be intellect, if it is ever liable to deception? It is requifite, therefore, that it fhould always understand, and that nothing fhould ever be concealed from it, like thofe natures that are fubject to oblivion. But it is likewife neceffary that knowledge should refide in its effence, not like one imagining or doubting, or deriving information from another. Nor yet again, like knowledge collected from demonstration. For though it is granted that fome things are collected by demonstration, it cannot likewise be denied that fomething is of itself known to intellect, at the same time that reafon dictates, that all knowledge is efïential to its nature. But it is now neceffary to enquire after what manner we must distinguish the effential knowledge of intellect, and that which it obtains by investigation. Likewife from whence the certainty is dederived to intellect, of its effential knowledge? From whence its faith is derived, that it is in fuch a condition? Because about things offered to the fenfes, the belief of which appears more certain, it is usual to doubt whether they poffefs their apparent nature in the fubject things, or in certain paffions only; where certainly the judgment of intellect, or, at least, of thought, is required. For though it should, perhaps, be granted, that the natures of fenfible objects are contained in their fubject bodies, yet what is known by fenfe, is nothing more than an image of the object; for sense cannot apprehend the thing itself, fince it abides external to its perception. But intellect when it understands and apprehends intelligibles, if it knows thefe as fomething different from itself, after what manner is it connected with them? For it may happen that it shall not meet with them, and confequently that it may not understand: or perhaps then at laft when it meets with them it will immediately underftand, and thus it will not always poffefs intellection. And if it fhould be, faid, that intelligibles are conjoined

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with intellect, it remains to enquire what fuch a conjunction means. Befides the intellections themselves will be certain figures: and, if this is the cafe, they will be adventitious, and nothing more than certain pulfations. But after what manner will intellect be figured; and what will be the form of intelligibles? Laftly, from this hypothefis intelligence will be like fenfe, a perception of externals. After what manner then do these difagree among themselves? Shall we fay in this, that one of them comprehends leffer concerns? Alfo, how can intellect know that it perceives fomething in reality? Or how will it be able to judge that this is good, or beautiful, or juft? For every one of these will be different from intellect, nor will it contain the principles of judging by which it believes, but these alfo will be external to its effence; and in the fame manner truth. Again, intelligibles themselves, are either deftitute of fenfe, life and intellect, or they poffefs intellect. If they poffefs intellect, they will equally contain both, and this will be the true and first intellect. But of this also we enquire how it contains truth, intelligible itself, and intellect. Whether fubfifting in the fame and together, or in some other manner? But if intelligibles themselves are destitute of intellect and life, we must enquire what they are. For they are neither certain propopofitions, nor axioms, nor dictions. For if this were the case they would affirm something of other things, but would not be things themselves: as if they should say, that what is juft is beautiful, when at the fame time juftice itself is different from the beautiful itself. But if they fhould confider as simple effences, the just itself, and the beautiful itself, apart from each other: in the first place, intelligible itself will not be a certain one; but every intelligible will be separate from others. In which cafe we must enquire where they are, and in what places they are separately disposed: afterwards in what manner intellect every where running round in a difcurfive proceffion, is able to find thefe : alfo how it abides: and again, how it abides or perseveres in the fame; and what form or figure it is endued with. Unlefs, perhaps, intelligibles are fituated like certain images formed from gold, or from fome other matter by a statuary or painter. But if this be the cafe, intellect in its perceptions will be the fame as fenfe. Besides in what respect among these, is this intelligible, justice, but that, fomething else. Lastly, this is the most powerful objection of all viz. if any one fhould entirely admit, that these are extrinfical, and that intellect fpeculates them as having an external pofition, it neceffarily follows that intellect does not poffefs the truth of these, but is deceived in the contemplation of each. For the object of its contemplation will be truly external: it will therefore behold them depriv ed of their intimate poffeffion, and containing only their images in a knowledge of this kind. Since, therefore, it does not poffefs truth itself, but only contains certain images of truth, it will poffefs what is falfe, and have nothing of truth. If then it knows that it contains only what is falfe, it muft undoubtedly confefs itself to be deftitute of truth: but if it is ignorant of this, and thinks that it participates of truth, when at the fame time it is deftitute of its poffeffion, it is deceived by a twofold fallacy, and is very far diftant from

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from truth. For it is on this account, as I think, that truth is not to be found in fenfible objects but opinion alone: because opinion is converfant in receiving, from whence its name is derived. On this account it receives fomething different from itself, fince that alfo is different from which it poffeffes what it receives. If then truth is not refident in intellect, fuch an intellect cannot be truth, nor a true intellect, nor intellect at all: nor indeed will truth be refident in any other place.

Hence it is not proper either to inveftigate intelligibles feparate from intellect, or to confefs that the figures of things only are contained in intellect, or to deprive it of truth, while we admit it is ignorant of intelligibles, and that the objects of its intellection have no existence in the order of things. But it is neceffary to attribute all things to true intellect, if it is requisite to induce knowledge and truth; to preserve beings themselves; and that knowledge by which the effence of every thing is known; and no longer to acquiesce in the resemblances and images of things, as when we alone understand the particular mode of existence, and not the real effence of a thing; in this cafe neither poffeffing the object itself, nor dwelling with it, nor confpiring into one with its naturë. For intellect indeed truly knows, nor is any thing concealed from its effential intelligence, nor is it liable to oblivion, nor does it wander by investigation, but it contains truth, and the feat of things in its effence, and is ever vital and intelligent. All which properties, indeed, ought to refide in the most blessed nature, or where can any thing honourable and venerable be found?

Hence it neither requires demonstration, nor the faith of perfuafion, that intellect is thus effentially intelligent: for it is entirely manifest to itself, and there is nothing more worthy of faith than its own effence. So that it contains real truth, not confonant to any other but to itself, nor does it pronounce and exift any thing befides itself: and that which it is, it pronounces. Who then can confute it? And from whence can he bring his confutation? For the argument which is adduced muft revolve into the fame with the former. And although it is employed as different, it is nevertheless referred to the thing proposed by the first argumentator, and is with it entirely one and the same. For nothing can be found more true than truth.

This one nature intellect therefore is all beings: it is truth: it is a great deity: or rather it is not any particular god: but is defervedly every deity. And fuch is the nature of this fecond divinity, appearing to beholders, before they furvey that fuperior God, who is feated in fublimer majefty on the illuftrious throne of intellect, depending from his ineffable nature. For it is highly proper that he should not subsist in an inanimate seat, nor again immediately occur to us moving in the circular chariot of foul, but that an ineftimable beauty should wonderfully fhine before his appearance, as before the presence of a mighty king. For to fuch as advance to his intuition it is ordained VOL. II, Ii . that

that lefler things fhould first occur and afterwards that fuch as are greater fhould gradually prefent themselves to the view; and that fuch as furround the king fhould be more royal, and the reft in a degree proportionate to their diftance from his ineffable glory. But after all thefe, the mighty king himself, suddenly shines forth to the view: while the reft venerate the king, in a fuppliant manner; fuch I mean as do not depart from thence till they have proceeded to the last spectacle of all, like thofe who are satisfied with the fplendor of the attendants on majefty. Another king, therefore, reigns in this intelligible world, and his attendants are different from his nature. But this fupernal king does not rule over foreign fubjects, but he poffeffes a juft and natural government, and a true kingdom: fince he is himself the king of truth, and is naturally the lord of his offspring the univerfe, and of the divine company of immortal gods. Hence he is the king of a king, and of kings, and is called by a jufler name, the father of the gods. Whom indeed Jupiter in this refpect imitates, fince he does not acquiefce in the contemplation of his Father, but proceeds beyond this to his grand-fire, as to an energy in the very fubfiftence (wiraos) of his effence.

But let us now afcend to the one itself, which is indeed truly one, not like other things which at the fame time that they are many, are alfo one through the participation of unity. For we must now receive one itself, which is not one by participation, like fuch things as are not more truly one than many. We must likewife affert that the intelligible world is more one than other things, and that nothing is nearer than this to unity itself: at the fame time that it is not purely one..

But for the prefent we defire to contemplate, if poffible, the nature of the pure and true one, which is not one from another, but from itself alone. It is therefore here requifite, to transfer ourselves on all fides to one itself, without adding any thing to its nature, and to acquiefce entirely in its contemplation; being careful left we fhould wander from him in the leaft, and fall from one into two. But if we are lefs cautious we shall contemplate two, nor in the two poffefs the one itself; for they are both pofterior to unity. And one will not fuffer itself to be numerated with another, nor indeed to be numbered at all: for it is a measure free from all menfuration. Nor is it equal to any others, fo as to agree with them in any particular, or it would inherit fomething in common with its connumerated natures; and thus this common something, would be fuperior to one though this is utterly impoffible. Hence neither effential number, nor number posterior to this, which properly pertains to quantity can be predicated of one: not effential number whofe effence always confifts in intellection; nor that which regards quantity, fince it embraces unity, together with other things different from one. For the nature pertaining to number which is inherent in quantity, imitating the nature effential to prior numbers, and looking back upon true unity, procures its own. effence,.

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effence, neither difperfing nor dividing unity, but while it becomes the duad, the one remains prior to the duad, and is different from both the unities comprehended by the duad, and from each apart. For why should the duad be unity itself? Or one unity of the duad rather than another, be one itself? If then neither both together, nor each apart is unity itself, certainly unity which is the origin of all number, is, different from all these; and while it truly abides, seems after a manner not to abide. But how are those unities different from the one? And how is the duad in a certain respect one? And again, is it the fame one, which is preserved in the comprehenfion of each unity? Perhaps it must be said that both unities, participate of the first unity, but are different from that which they participate: and that the duad so far as it is a certain one participates of one itself, yet not every where after the same manner: for an army, and a house are not fimilarly one; fince these when compared with continued quantity, are not one, either with refpect to effence, or quantity. Are then the unities in the pentad, differently related to one, from thofe in the decad? But is the one contained in the pentad, the fame with the one in the decad? Perhaps alfo if the whole of a small ship, is compared with the whole of a large one, a city to a city, and an army to an army, there will be in these the same one. But if not in the firft instance, neither in these. However, if any farther doubts remain, we must leave them to a subsequent difcuffion. But let us return to unity itself, afferting that it always remains the fame, though all things flow from it as their inexhauftible fountain. In numbers, indeed, while unity abides in the fimplicitly of its effence, number producing another is generated according to this abiding one. But the one which is above beings, much more abides in ineffable ftation. But while it abides, another does not produce beings, according to the nature of one for it is fufficient of itself to the generation of beings. But as in numbers the form of the first monad is preserved in all numbers, in the first and fecond degree while each of the following numbers do not equally participate of unity; fo in the order of things, every nature fubordinate to the first, contains fomething of the firft, as it were his veftige or form in its effence. And in numbers, indeed, the participation of unity produces their quantity. But here the veftige of one gives effence to all the feries of divine numbers, fo that being itself, is as were the footstep of ineffable unity. Hence he who afferts that rea, which is a denomination declarative of effence, is derived from row, that is, one, will not perhaps deviate from the truth. But that which is called Toor, that is, being, firit of all fhining forth from the depths of unity, and as it were not far proceeding from thence, is unwilling to advance beyond its original, but abides converted to its most interior retreats, where it becomes effence, and the effence of all things, and that which pronounces thefe; containing itself as it were in its labouring with found; and declaring by its speech that it flows from one and indeed roo, thus pronounced, fignifies its origin as much as poffible. So that what becomes eoia, that is effence, and eru or tube, initate

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