ceedings in the city of London. "Mansion-house. Yesterday Mr. Prince, a common councilman, with Captain Antrim, of the ship Lloyd's waited upon the lord mayor elect, (who sat for the lord mayor) to request his lordship's advice as to the disposal of three orphan children who had been brought on shore under the following melancholy circumstances. Captain John Antrim stated, that on the 31st of July last, he sailed from Honduras. Before he departed from that settlement he consented to receive on board one of the families of the unfortunate Poyais' settlers, the remnant of whom had sought the protection of the British authorities at Honduras, and had received all the succour which the governor had it in his power to give them. [*25

The unfortunate creatures who had survived the effects of their short residence at the desert swamp to which they had been taken, were sent back by the different vessels which sailed from Honduras. The family which Captain Antrim consented to receive, consisted of Thomas Chalmers, his wife and three children. The husband and wife when received on board were both ill with the fever, and died in the course of the passage. The captain said he had landed the three orphans, who were utterly destitute, at Poplar, and he now requested his lordship's advice as to the best means of getting them provided for. The captain then handed in the following certificate to his lordship." The libel then set out a certificate of the governor of Honduras, that the persons in question were received on board from motives of charity. It then stated some questions put by the lord mayor elect and the answers given to them, and the final advice of the lord mayor, that application should be made to the parish officers to relieve the children. It then proceeded as follows. Mr. Prince observed, that the captain, in consequence of his charity in receiving the poor emigrants, had himself caught the fever, and had narrowly escaped, He stated, that above 200 of the victims of delusion had returned from the Mosquito shore to Honduras in a state of utter destitution and of disease, which terminated the sufferings of a great part of them soon after. They must have all died, but for the charity of the people, and the authorities of Honduras. The poor creatures had been led by MGregor to expect a land where they would live in the greatest plenty, where every thing was flourishing, and but litttle labor would be required; it was mentioned to them, as a mark of the improvement of the place, that a fine theatre had been established, and [*26 other establishments formed, indicative, not merely of civilization and comfort, but of luxury. Captain Antrim mentioned a charge which the poor creatures had preferred to him against MGregor. Most of those who sailed from Leith were poor people, who had by their frugality saved small sums of money of from 15. to 301. MGregor learned the property which the settlers had with them, and telling them that Scotch money would not pass at the settlement, persuaded them to give it all up to him, and take his draughts for the amount upon his bankers at Poyais. The savings were all given up to him, and it is, perhaps, unnecessary to add, that the settlers on their arrival at the houseless wilds of Poyais found that no such thing as a banking house was in existence. Captain Antrim regretted that he had not arrived sooner, as another ship had sailed, with settlers for the same place just before his arrival, who he feared would also fall a sacrifice. He had thought it his duty to make the statement publicly, that the poor might be put on their guard." The second count stated, as inducement, that certain persons had emigrated from Great Britain to Poyais, on the Musquito Shore in America, with the intention of forming a settlement there, and on their arrival at Poyais, the emigrants had undergone great sufferings from sickness, disease, and other accidents, whereof some of the emigrants had died, and many others had been thereby compelled to remove to Honduras, and from thence had returned to Great Britain; and that shortly before the committing of the grievances by the defendants, in that and the following count men

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tioned, an application was made to the lord mayor elect of the city of London, at the Mansion House, *in the said city, by certain persons, to wit, *27] one Mr. Prince and one Captain Antrim, relative to certain children of the said emigrants; yet the defendants, further contriving and maliciously intending, &c. The count then set out, that part of the libel contained in the first count, beginning with the words, Mr. Prince observed, that the captain, in consequence of his charity, &c." The third count was similar to the last, and set out that part of the libel beginning with the words “ Captain Antrim mentioned a charge," &c. Plea first, not guilty; secondly, to the whole declaration, that on the 13th of October, 1823, at the Mansion House, &c., one Mr. Prince, a common council man, with Captain Joshua Antrim, of the ship Lloyds', did wait upon the lord mayor of the said city of London elect, who sat for the lord mayor, to request his lordship's advice as to the disposal of three orphan children, who had been brought on shore, as stated in the said supposed libels; and the said Joshua, on that occasion, then and there did make such statements, and mention such charge, circumstances, matters, and things, and hand to his lordship such certificate as in the said supposed libels are respectively mentioned; and the said lord mayor elect did then and there ask such questions, and made such statements, as in the said supposed libels are also in that behalf mentioned, to which questions such answer was given as therein is mentioned; and the said Mr. Prince did also make such observations as therein are mentioned; and the said report in the said newspaper was and is a true, fair, and correct account of the said proceedings before the said lord mayor elect, and what took place on that occasion, and the several facts and circumstances therein detailed and adverted to are likewise true; and the said report contains no false or untrue *28] statement or allegation whatever, wherefore the defendant published, &c. Third plea, that the report, or account in the said newspaper, of the said proceedings at the said Mansion House, whereof the said supposed libels in the declaration mentioned were and are composed, was and is a true, fair, and correct report and account of the said proceedings, and which proceedings did actually take place at the said Mansion House, as is stated in the said supposed libels, to wit, at, &c. Fourth plea, that the several matters and things in the libels contained were and are true in fact. There then followed pleas similar to the two last, pleaded separately, to the first and second counts of the declaration; and replication, &c., de injuria sua.

At the trial before Abbott, C. J., at the London sittings after last Michaelmas term, the jury found that the libel did contain a true, fair, and correct report of the proceedings which had taken place before the lord mayor elect, but that the facts stated in the libels were not true. In last Hilary term the plaintiff had obtained a rule nisi for liberty to enter up judgment, notwithstanding the verdict found for the defendant upon those pleas, which alleged that the libel contained a true account of the proceedings before the lord

mayor.

Scarlett, and E. Laws, now showed cause against the rule. The circumstance disclosed in the plea found for the defendants, that the publication was a correct account of proceedings which took place before a magistrate, is an answer to the action. It rebuts the presumption of malice, which, in ordinary cases, arises from the publication of any matter injurious to the reputation of another, and, upon that ground it has been held lawful to publish 291 the proceedings of courts of justice, even though they contain matter injurious to the feelings of individuals. Rex v. Wright, 8 'T. R. 293, Curric v. Walter, 1 Bos. &. Pul. 525. Assuming that the magistrate had no jurisdiction over the subject matter brought before him, and that the question is to be considered as if the matter had been communicated to the lord mayor elect in his private character in the presence of the defendants; still this publication is justifiable within the rule laid down in Lord Northampton's case,

12 Rep. 133, because the defendants, at the time of publishing the slander, mentioned the name of the person from whom they heard it.

Denman, F. Pollock, and R. V. Richards, contra. The question as to the right of publishing judicial proceedings does not arise. The lord mayor elect was not sitting in a judicial capacity, or inquiring into any matter over which he had jurisdiction as a magistrate. But even if the matter had been within his jurisdiction, the defendants would not have been justified in publishing what passed, as it was a mere ex parte proceeding, Rex v. Fisher, 2 Campb. 563. And if this is to be considered as a case where the slanderous matter was first stated in the presence of the defendants to the lord mayor elect in his private character, then the defendants were not justified in publishing it in writing or print, although at the time of the publication they stated the name of the person from whom they heard it; because, with respect to a great part of the matter published by them, they give the plaintiff no right of action against any other person. With respect to all that *part which charges the plaintiff with having deluded the persons [*30 who emigrated, no action would lie against the person who merely uttered it; but it became actionable when reduced into writing or print, and that was the act of the defendants.. It may even be questionable, whether any action would be maintainable against the original utterer of the other words, which charges the plaintiff with having, by false pretences, got possession of the money of the emigrants; for unless they import that the fraud was committed in this country they do not charge an offence within the stat. 30 G. 2, c. 24. It is quite clear, however, that as to the other part of the slander no action would be maintainable against the parties who uttered it. Now, in Lord Northampton's case, the naming of the original author of the slander is considered a justification for the person who repeats it, because the party repeating it thereby gives the party slandered a right of action against another person. That reason does not apply here, and therefore, this case does not fall within that rule: besides, it is quite clear that an action is maintainable against a person who maliciously repeats slander, although he names his author at the time. Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East, 426. The jury, by their verdict, have found that the defendants published maliciously. Besides, here the libel does not profess to give the evidence verbatim, but a mere summary of the case. That is not a justifiable publication. Lewis v. Waller, 4 B. & A. 605.

ABBOTT, C. J. I am of opinion, that the rule for entering the judgment for the plaintiff, notwithstanding the verdict found for the defendants on [*31 some of the issues, ought to be made absolute. My judgment in this case is founded entirely upon the matters stated upon the record. It does not appear by the record that the libel gives an account of any thing which took place before the magistrate, whilst he was acting in his judicial character, or even in the discharge of his magisterial functions. The question, therefore, does not necessarily arise in this case, whether it be lawful to publish a correct report of proceedings which take place in the course of a judicial enquiry, or even of any enquiry before a magistrate acting in the discharge of his official duty. The allegation in the libel is, that an application was made to the magistrate, sitting for the lord mayor, for his advice as to the disposal of some orphan children; but the libel itself proceeds to state matter which goes far beyond what any application of that kind would warrant. It charges the plaintiff with having deceived the persons whom he had induced to emigrate, and with having, by false pretences, got possession of all their money. Assuming that the parties who originally uttered this slander might be justified by the occasion and purpose with respect to which it was uttered, it by no means follows that these defendants would be justified in republishing the slander so unnecessarily uttered, on the ground that their publication was only a true, fair, and correct report of what had taken place; for it is by no

means true that the publication of every matter which passes even in a court of justice, however truly represented, is, under all circumstances and with whatever motive published, justifiable. It has been said, however, that this is a privileged publication; because the defendants only professed to repeat that which they heard another person say, and they name that person at the time when they repeat it, and that this case falls within the rule laid *32] down in Lord Northampton's case. Now it is to be observed that that was a case of oral slander: this is the case of slander reduced into writing or print by the act of the defendants. It is thereby rendered more injurious, and part of it has thereby become actionable, which before was not so. There may, therefore, be a material distinction in this respect between merely repeating slander and publishing it in writing or print. I do not mean, however, to pronounce any decided opinion upon that point, because, admitting the law to be correct, as laid down in Lord Northampton's case, in its fullest extent, and assuming that it applies to written as well as to oral slander, I think that this case does not fall within it. The rule there stated is this: "If I. S. publish that he hath heard J. N. say that I. G. was a traitor or thief, in an action on the case, if the truth be so, he may justify. But if J. S. publish that he hath heard generally, without a certain author, that J. G. was a traitor or thief, there an action on the case lieth against J. S., for this, that he hath not given to the party aggrieved any cause of action against any but against himself who published the words." Now, this case falls short of the rule there laid down in two particulars; the first is, that with respect to a considerable part of the matter published no action would be maintainable against the party who uttered it. I allude to that part which charges the plaintiff with having, by false representations, induced the persons alluded to to emigrate. It is perfectly clear, that if the words published by the defentlants had only been spoken no action would be maintainable in respect of them, unless the plaintiff could show that he had thereby sustained a special damage. The other particular in which this case falls short of the rule laid down in Lord *Northampton's case is, that here the defendants do not offer themselves *33] as witnesses to prove the uttering of the words. The rule is, that "if J. S. publish that he heard J. N. say.' In that case J. S. offers himself as a witness to prove that J. N. did utter the slander; but here the defendants do not say that they heard Captain Antrim repeat the slander, and, therefore, they do not offer themselves as witnesses, and do not bring themselves within the rule laid down in Lord Northampton's case. I am of opinion, therefore, that it is no answer to the action that the matter published by the defendants was a correct report of what actually took place in the presence of the magistrate, inasmuch as it appears that he was not then called upon to act either in a judicial or magisterial capacity; and, secondly, that this is not a privileged publication, on the ground that the defendants, at the time of publication, named the party who originally uttered the slander. The rule for entering judgment for the plaintiff, non-obstante veredicto, must be made absolute.

BAYLEY, J. There is a great distinction between oral and written slander. No action is maintainable for words spoken, unless they impute to a man a crime for which he is punishable by law, or that he has an infectious disorder; or unless they are spoken of him in his office, profession, or business. But an action is maintainable for slander either written or printed, provided the tendency of it be to bring a man into hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Now, here, the report of the matter stated by Captain Antrim, is calculated to bring the plaintiff into hatred; it is, therefore, actionable when reduced into writing. *34] The greater part of the matter *charged, if merely spoken, would give no cause of action to the plaintiff; and it may be questionable whether any action could be maintainable even in respect of that part which charges the plaintiff with having obtained the money of the emigrants, under false pretences, for unless they were defrauded of the money in this kingdom it VOL. X-4

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would not be a case within the statute of the 30 G. 2, c. 24; and there being no false token, it would not be an offence at common law. This, therefore, may be considered as a case where either wholly or in part the matter charged became actionable, from the circumstance of its having been written or printed by the act of the defendants, and, therefore, if the plaintiff cannot maintain this action against the defendants he has no remedy whatever. According to the rule laid down in Lord Northampton's case the party is excused, because, by naming the person from whom he heard the slander, he gives the party slandered an action against another; but here the defendants gave the plaintiff no action against any other person. The reason of the rule does not apply to the present case. This being a case, therefore, where the matter published by the defendants is actionable, and no action can be maintained in respect of a part, if not in respect of the whole, against any other person, it follows that it must be maintainable against the defendants, or otherwise the plaintiff would be without any remedy.

HOLROYD, J. I am also of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, notwithstanding the verdict found for the defendant on some of the issues, for that finding does not afford any answer to the action. The count alleges that the defendants, maliciously *intending to injure the character of the plain[*35 tiff, published the libel. The pleas state, that that libel contains a true account of some proceedings which took place before the lord mayor elect. But it appears by the libel, that those proceedings were not in any way connected with the judicial or magisterial character of the lord mayor elect. The jury have found by their verdict on the other issues, that the facts stated in the libel were untrue. The question therefore, is, whether a person falsely and maliciously publishing matter, (for after verdict it must be taken to have been done maliciously,) is justified in so doing because it is a correct account of what was said by others. I am of opinion that such a plea is no answer to the action. It gives no ground of action against any other person. It does not state who heard the slander repeated. It therefore gives the plaintiff no means of establishing by evidence his right of action against another. Part of the matter alleged would not be actionable at all, if the words were only spoken, unless there were special damage. It comes to this, if Mr. Prince, and Captain Antrim had, themselves, caused the matter to be printed, an action might be maintained against them; but they only made an oral statement before the lord mayor, and that is not actionable. But it has been printed by another, and he says, that he is not liable to an action, because at the time that he printed it he disclosed in the publication itself the name of the person from whom he heard it; but if the action be not maintainable against him, the party of whom the slander has been published in a manner which the law considers injurious, will have no remedy against any person. In Maitland v. Goldney, the declaration contained a charge against the defendants, that they published the slander with the knowledge that the person who had originally uttered it was satisfied that it was untrue. [*36 defendants justified, by showing that they had named the original author at the time when they published the slander; and Lord Ellenborough, said, "that the fact of such previous uttering was merely used by the defendants as a pretence for publishing the same slander; that shows malice in the defendants, and an injury to the plaintiffs." The opinion of that learned Judge was, that an action would lie against a person who maliciously repeated slander, even though he named his author at the time. Now, in this case the jury by their verdict found that the defendants published the slander maliciously; and, therefore, our decision in this case accords with the opinion of Lord Ellenborough. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action.

The

LITTLEDALE, J. I am of the same opinion. I think that the lord mayor elect had no legal authority to inquire into the matter brought before him by