Per curiam. The prosecutor, as heir at law, is entitled to the writ; because, although he has a good title as against every one but the lord, still he has a right to insist upon admittance, to make him a complete copyholder. He may wish to be put upon the homage, or to be put in nomination for various offices, or to surrender to the use of his will; and he has a right to require to be admitted in the present instance, that he may surrender to Martha Winter, the mortgagee.

Peremptory mandamas awarded.

The KING v. The Lord of the Manor of BONSALL and ADAM
WOLLEY, Steward of the said Manor.

Semble, that coparceners are entitled to be admitted to copyhold tenements as one heir, and upon the payment of one set of fees.

A RULE nisi had been obtained for a mandamus, directed to the defendants, commanding them to admit Richard Ward, or the coparceners and heirs of one Samuel Richardson, deceased, to a copyhold, close, or parcel of land con sisting of about six acres and a half, situate and lying within the manor of Bonsull, which were duly surrendered to the use of Samuel Richardson, and his heirs, according to the custom of the manor. It appeared, by the affidavits in support of the rule, that Samuel Richardson, subsequently to making his will, purchased the copyhold tenement in question, and that it was duly surrendered to the use of him and his heirs forever; that he died on the 20th of January, 1823, without having republished his will, leaving Catherine Richardson, and her three sisters his coheiresses at law, *who thereby *174] became entitled to the copyhold tenement, subject to a fine of 2s., payable to the lord. They applied at a court baron to be admitted, and the steward demanded for himself fees to the amount of 34l. 13s. 4d. They tendered a sum of 8l. 13. 4d. It appeared further, that they had agreed to sell the premises to Richard Ward; and that they had been prevented from completing such sale, in consequence of the refusal of the steward to admit them. The affidavits in answer stated, that Samuel Richardson, purchased the premises in 1818, and that previously to that time they had been held as two several and distinct copyhold tenements by two persons, as tenants in common, although Samuel Richardson, had been admitted to them as one tenement. The steward insisted, that the four coheiresses should be admitted separately as tenants in common for their respective shares to two tenements, upon the payment by each of two sets of fees. They on the other hand insisted, that as coparceners they were entitled to be admitted as one heir, and they tendered two sets of fees for the whole.

Attree v.

The Attorney General, and N. R. Clarke, now showed cause. Scutt, & East, 476, is an authority to show that the premises must be considered as consisting of two tenements, and that the steward is entitled to two sets of fees at least; and although for some purposes several coparceners constitute but one heir, yet, for the purpose of admittance to copyholds, they are rather in the situation of tenants in common than joint tenants. They have not an entirety of interest; but between themselves, to many purposes, *175] they have, in judgment of law, *several freeholds, and there is no survivorship between them; they can therefore only be entitled to sur render payment of several sets of fees in respect of their separate interests The reason given for considering the copyhold interest of tenants in common

as distinct tenements, viz. that otherwise there might always be a tenant living, and that the lord might never have a fine, applies with equal force to the case of coparceners, inasmuch as the heir of a coparcener becomes a coparcener with the survivors, and there might, therefore, always be a coparcener living. Besides, the case of Rex v. Rennet, 2 T. R. 197, is an authority to show that the court will not grant a mandamus to admit a party claiming by descent.

Campbell, contra, contended, that a sum double that which the steward could lawfully claim had been tendered to him; for as Samuel Richardson, had been admitted to the whole of the premises as one tenement, the steward had no right now to consider them as two: Garland v. Jekyll, 2 Bing. 273, and as all the coparceners make but one heir and one tenant, they were entitled to be admitted, on payment of one fine to the lord and one fee to the steward. Watkins on Copyholds, 277. (He was then stopped by the court.)

ABBOTT, C. J. I am of opinion that this rule ought to be made absolute. The case of Rex v. Rennett, was overruled in this court in the late case of Rex v. The Brewers' Company, where the court held that a mandamus would lie to compel the admittance of an heir. As to the other question, whether coparceners are entitled to be admitted as one heir, as at present advised, I think that the lord is bound to admit them as one heir, and [*176 on the payment of such fees as ought to be paid by a single heir. And I entertain considerable doubts whether the steward, after admitting them as one heir, can insist upon taking their surrenders separately; but on that I pronounce no decided opinion. This rule must be made absolute for a mandamus to the defendant, to admit the coparceners on payment of the lawful fees. If the defendants wish to raise the question as to what are the lawful fees upon the admittance of coparceners, or on the surrenders afterwards made by them, they may do so by setting out the facts in a return to the mandamus. BAYLEY and HOLROYD, J., concurred, and intimated a strong opinion that coparceners were entitled to be admitted as one heir, and upon the payment of one set of fees.

Rule absolute.

RULES OF COURT.

Trinity Term, 5 Geo. 4. 1824.

IT IS ORDERED, that no affidavit shall hereafter be used in support of a motion for a new trial in any case, whether criminal or civil, unless such affidavit shall have been made before the expiration of the first four days of the term following the trial, if the cause be tried in vacation and before the expiration of the first four days after the return of distringas, if the cause be tried in term, without the special permission of the court for that purpose. *IT IS ORDERED, that in all cases where a rule for a special jury shall have been obtained for the trial of any cause in the county of [*177 Middlesex, and notice for summoning the same shall be given; such notice, together with the distringas, shall be left at the office of the sheriff of the said county before seven o'clock in the evening next, but one before the day on which such jury shall be required to attend, unless such jury shall be required

to attend on a Monday, and then before seven in the evening, of the preced ing Friday; and that all notices of countermand for summoning special juries shall be left at the said office before twelve o'clock at noon of the day immediately preceding the day for which the jury was to have been summoned. By the court.

MEMORANDA.

In this term Stephen Gaselee, and Robert Spankie, of the Inner Temple, and John Adams, of the Middle Temple, Esquires, Barristers at Law, were called to the degree of Serjeant, and gave rings with the motto, "Bonis legibus, judiciis gravibus."

Mr. Justice Richardson, having in the vacation preceding this term resigned in consequence of ill health, Mr. Gaselee, was appointed a Puisne Judge of the Court of Common Pleas in his stead, and took his seat accordingly on the 5th day of July.

*GUTHRIE and BUNYON, Assignees of the Estate and Effects of SAVERY, a Bankrupt, v. FISK and PATTERSON, two of the Directors of the NORWICH Union Society, for the Insurance of Lives and Survivorships.†

Where a private act of Parliament, entitled "an act to enable a certain insurance society to sue and be sued in the name of their secretary,' ,"enacted that they might commence all actions and suits in his name as nominal plaintiff: Held, that this did not enable the secretary to petition on behalf of the society for a commission of bankruptcy against their debtor.

ASSUMPSIT for money had and received by the defendants, to and for the use and on the account of Savery, and for money due on an account stated with him before he became a bankrupt. There were also counts for money paid by the plaintiffs, as assignees, for the use of the defendants, for money had and received by the defendants, to and for the use and on account of the plaintiffs, as assignees, and for money due on an account stated with the plaintiffs, as assignees, since the bankruptcy. Plea, the general issue, and notice of set-off. At the trial before Abbott, C. J., at the London sittings, before Michaelmas term, 1822, the plaintiff's were nonsuited. A rule nisi was obtained to set aside the nonsuit and for a new trial; and on cause being shown, a question arose on the validity of the commission, and the court directed the facts to be stated for their consideration in the form of a special case,

which was as follows: By the act of the 53 G. 3, c. 216, entitled "An [*179 act to enable the Norwich Union Society, for insurance against loss by fire, to sue in the name of their secretary, and to be sued in the names of their directors, treasurers, and secretary," after reciting, among other things, that several persons had formed themselves into a society, under the name of the Norwich Union Society, for insurance against loss by fire, and that difficulties had arisen, and might, from time to time, arise in recovering debts due to the society, and in recovering debts owing by the said society to the individuals members thereof, and other persons dealing therewith, and that it was therefore expedient that such individuals, members, and other persons, should be thereby enabled to commence and prosecute suits and actions at law, and to sue out execution upon judgments obtained by them against such directors and officers of the said society as were thereinafter mentioned,─It was enacted that all actions and suits to be commenced or instituted by or on behalf of the said society, against any person or persons, or body politic or corporate, should and lawfully might be commenced or instituted, and prosecuted in the name or names of the secretary, or secretaries for the time being, of the society, as a nominal plaintiff or plaintiffs, for and on behalf of the society, and that all actions and suits to be commenced or instituted against the society, should be commenced, instituted, or prosecuted against any one or more of the directors, or against the treasurer or treasurers, or against the secretary or secretaries for the time being, of the society, as the nominal defend[*180 ant or defendants for and on behalf of the society. And by the 53 G. 3, c. 215, entitled "An act to enable the Norwich Union Society, for the insurance of lives and survivorships, to sue in the name of their secretary, and to be sued in the names of their directors, treasurers, and secretary," the same enactsments and provisions were made for and on behalf of the Norwich Union Society, for the insurance of lives and survivorships, as were made in the act hereinbefore set forth for and on behalf of the Norwich Union

In pursuance of the king's warrant issued ten days before the end of Trinity term, three of the Judges of this court sat, as on former occasions, on the 8th of July, and the following days until Saturday, the 17th of July, inclusive; and all the Judges sat on Monday, the 25th of October, and the following days, until the first day of Michaelmas term. During that period, this and the following cases were argued and decided.

Society, for insurance against loss by fire. The defendants are, and at the time of making out the deposition of bankruptcy hereinafter mentioned, were two of the directors of the Norwich Union Society, for the insurance of lives and survivorships; and the same persons are likewise directors of the Norwich Union Society, for insurance against loss by fire. Savery, before his bankruptcy, was a marine insurance broker at Bristol, and agent at that place for both the said Norwich Union Societies, and as such agent was in the habit of corresponding with, and rendered his accounts to one Samuel Bignold, who held the office of secretary to both the said Norwich Union Societies. On the 10th of June, 1820, a commission of bankrupt was issued against Savery, upon the petition of the said Samuel Bignold, who was described in the petition as secretary to the Norwich Union Society, for insurance against loss by fire; which petition stated, that Savery was indebted to the said society in 1007. and upwards, for premiums of insurance against fire, had and received by him, Savery, to the use of the said society; and upon this petition a commission of bankrupt issued against Savery, under the great seal, bearing date on the same day.

*Tindal, for the plaintiffs. *181] Two questions arise in this case; first, whether it was competent to the secretary of the Norwich Union Society to petition for the commission of bankruptcy; and, secondly, if it was not, whether these defendants can make the objection. Upon the true construction of the act it was competent for the secretary to sue out the commission. The act is to be considered in the nature of a remedial act, and therefore, should be construed so as to meet any difficulty, the removal of which the legislature may be supposed to have contemplated. The preamble recites, that difficulties have arisen, and may, from time to time, arise, in recovering debts due to the society," and the object of the act was to remove those difficulties. Now the only effectual mode of recovering a debt may be by suing out a commission of bankruptcy. The literal meaning of the enacting clause certainly does not include that mode, but the secretary may take out execution, and a commission of bankruptcy has been defined to be an action and execution in the first instance, Twiss v. Massey, 1 Atk. 67, ex parte Freeman, 1 V. & B. 41: and although in ex parte Brown, 2 Ves. jun. 68, it is said to have greater powers than an execution at law, yet that does not alter the definition, and in ex parte Elton, 3 Ves. 238, Lord Eldon certainly says it is not to be considered as an "execution at law;" but the reason which he assigns is, that the distribution of the effects under it is equitable. From these cases it is very reasonable that a statute, meant to remove difficulties in suing, should extend to petitioning for a commission. To hold *182] otherwise would be a very narrow construction of the act. In Com. Dig. Parl. (R 10) it is said, "every statute ought to be construed according to the intent of the Parliament ;" and in (R 13)" the judges expound a case within the mischief and cause of an act, to be within the statute by equity, though it be not within the words." That principle, applied to this case, is decisive in favor of the plaintiffs. But, secondly, these defendants cannot object to the commission; they are sued as directors of the life insurance company, but they are also directors of the company for insuring from fire, on behalf of which company the commission issued; they are, therefore, estopped from disputing it. Jacaud v. French, 12 East, 317. [Bayley, J. There is this difficulty in the way of that position; if the defendants were compelled to pay the money sought to be recovered in this action, and afterwards the commission should be superseded, and a valid one issued, they might be compelled to pay it over again.]

F. Pollock, contra. With respect to the first and principal question, it is well known that the statutes relating to bankrupts are in the first instance construed strictly as to originating the jurisdiction. But when a good commission is established, then they are construed remedially, and therefore,