suit, as there could be but one suit on such 13. A judgment of divorce, and making distribution of property, is a final judg ment; and a modification made more than a year after rendition, by incumbering land given to plaintiff with a lien for the payment of a sum to defendant, and providing for the sale of the land unless plaintiff mortgage it to a trustee to secure the sum, is without jurisdiction and void.-Thompson v. Thompson, (Wis.) 671. Vacating. I make the affidavit of his own free will; and that perjury could not well be predicated upon it.-Cleveland Iron Min. Co. v. Husby, (Mich.) 168. 18. Where a judgment has expired pending an action for equitable relief, a renewed money judgment may be recovered, though the equitable judgment is released.-Dole v. Wilson, (Minn.) 161. 19. A judgment creditor who accepted the bare statements of his debtor as to his property, and as to the good faith of the parties in respect to a record incumbrance, without resorting to proceedings for the discovery of fraud, and to reach concealed property, is not entitled to equitable relief to satisfy a judgment which has expired by statutory limitation.-Id.* Assignment. 20. An assignee of a judgment on which the attorneys who recovered it issued execution, having recognized and acquiesced in their acts in the matter, is bound by the sheriff's paying to such attorneys the money collected on the execution.-Gill v. Truelsen, (Minn.) 254. 21. When attorneys recovering a judgment have a lien on it for services and disbursements in the action, and the judgment has been collected by the sheriff, the latter may, if the attorneys give him notice of the lien, and require him so to do, retain the amount of the lien out of the money so collected, when the money is demanded by an assignee of the judgment.-Id.* 14. Pending an appeal, counsel for the respondents, who were non-residents, requested the clerk to inform them when the case would be reached, and relied on receiving such information. The clerk gave them no notice, owing to a statement made in open court by the appellant that the matter was in process of settlement, and that no trial would be had until the last day of the term, at which time appellant called up the case, and obtained a reversal of the order. Held, that the court might set aside the judgment at the following term, under Rev. St. Wis. § 2832, providing that a judgment obtained through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect may be set aside within one year See Assignment for Benefit of Creditors, 8. thereafter.-Black v. Hurlbut, (Wis.) 673. 15. Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 64, § 96, providing that, after the transcript of the judgment of the municipal court of St. Paul has been filed in the district court, the judgment, so far as relates to its enforcement, shall be exclusively under the control of the district court, does not deprive the municipal court of jurisdiction of its own judgments after transcript filed, so that it cannot vacate them.-Crosby v. Farmer, (Minn.) 71. 16. Courts of general jurisdiction have the authority to vacate their own judgments at any time during the term at which they were rendered, and before rights have become vested thereunder. - Harris v. State, (Neb.) 317. Equitable relief. 17. A bill in equity to obtain a new trial at law will not be entertained on an affidavit of an important witness for the prevailing party, impeaching his own evidence, it appearing that such witness was ignorant, and knew little English; that he was in the employ of the other party, and did not See Courts. Judicial Sales. Jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction, see Appeal, 1-6. state courts, see Usury, 2. JURY. Custody and conduct, see Criminal Law, 15-17. Competency of jurors. 1. A juror who entertains a prejudice against a liquor seller to such an extent that he cannot give his testimony the same credit that he would that of a person not engaged in such business is not a competent juror against a liquor seller sued for damages for the death of a person caused by an intoxicated person.-Brockway v. Patterson, (Mich.) 192. 2. In an action for damages for sale of liquor to a minor, one who testifies that he trial in another court, asked to have the case set down for trial by the court at a later day, which was done, and trial had by the court, without any objection or exception by defendant, and there is no record of any application by him to have the trial adjourned, he cannot object in the appellate court that he did not voluntarily waive his right to jury trial. - Hudson v. Roos, (Mich.) 467. believes that "a minor is as able to buy a | defendant's counsel, being engaged in a glass of beer or whisky as a man forty years old," and that he does not think it is a good law, and is not in favor of it; or one who testifies that he is not exactly in favor of enforcing the law, but thinks "they should go according to law if it was a minor, "-is incompetent as a juror, though he states that he thinks he can render a verdict in accordance with the law and evidence.-Theisen v. Johns, (Mich.) 727. 3. A juror may be properly asked whether he is in favor of stringent prohibitory laws, or is prejudiced against the sale of liquor.-Id. 4. An objection that one summoned as a juror had served as a grand juror within the year prior to the summons will not be considered, where it does not appear from the record that he was not one of the regular panel.-State v. Standley, (Iowa,) 815. Summoning and impaneling. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. Appeal from, see Appeal, 6, 16. Procedure. 1. Where a justice of the peace, in a cause tried by jury, recites in his docket that the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a specified sum, instead of entering the verdict itself in his docket, it is error without prejudice.-Dye v. Russell, (Neb.) 416. 5. Where the county commissioners select 60 names of persons proportionately from the several precincts of the county from which the petit jurors are to be drawn by the clerk of the court, etc., a motion to quash the panel, on the ground that one of the commissioners had an action pending in court to be determined by a See Railroad Companies, 16–20. jury, should be overruled, in the absence of a showing of partiality or unfairness, or that any of the persons thus selected were dict of the jury it is unnecessary for the 2. Where a judgment is based on a verjustice to make findings of fact.-Id. Killing Stock. Laches. Neglect to sue, see Bastardy, 1, 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT. Release of obligations, see Release and Discharge. favorable to such commissioner.-North- See Certiorari, 2; Equity, 6; Judgment, 19. eastern Neb. Ry. Co. v. Frazier, (Neb.) 604. 6. After a juror has denied on his voir dire that he has said he believed respondent to be guilty, it may be shown by other witnesses that the juror had made such statement.-People v. Evans, (Mich.) 473. 7. It is permissible to ask a juror which party he would favor, if the testimony were evenly balanced, so as to ascertain his bias for the purpose of peremptory challenges. -Township of Otsego Lake v. Kirsten, (Mich.) 26. Challenges. 8. Where it is evident that the sentiment of the community is unfavorable to respondent, it is error to overrule his challenge to a juror who admits that people have been talking in his presence about the facts in the case, and the state of public sentiment in regard to it, though the juror believes that he has not been influenced thereby.-People v. Evans, (Mich.) 473. 9. Error in overruling a good challenge for cause is not cured by a peremptory challenge, where the parties exhaust all their peremptory challenges. Theisen v. Johns, (Mich.) 727. Right to jury trial. The relation. 1. A company owning land, on which they were operating quarries, erected buildings thereon, designed as boardinghouses for their employes. They made a contract with plaintiff to "run" these houses, he to furnish them with necessary furniture, bedding, etc., board the company's men for $4.50 per week each, and pay the company a monthly rent for the houses. The mode of payment was that the company deducted each man's boardbill out of his wages, and paid it over to plaintiff, less the amount due them for rent. The number of men employed by the company varied at different times, and they neither agree to furnish plaintiff any particular number of boarders, nor that all their employes should board with him. Plaintiff was to give his time and personal attention to the supervision of the houses. 10. Where a bill of exceptions shows Held, that this was a lease of the houses. that, when a case was called for jury trial, | and created the relation of landlord and tenant, and not of master and servant, and 8. On the issue whether defendant had therefore the possession of the houses was made a material alteration in a lease in plaintiff, and a subsequent agreement after its execution, it appeared that two securing the company for advances to copies were originally executed, one of plaintiff, but so as not to interfere with the which plaintiffs kept, but which was not efficient management of the houses, and produced in evidence. Plaintiff's attorney containing certain terms and conditions on testified that he examined the lease after which plaintiff would have a right to con- execution, and a word therein was not tinue the business, did not change that re- then erased as now. The evidence showed lation.-Lightbody v. Truelsen, (Minn.) 67. that after the lease was executed the lessor objected to a clause, and by agreement the Rights and liabilities. that the insertion, with the word in quesclause was erased and a new one inserted; tion erased, expressed the new agreement, but, without such erasure, would contain the thing objected to; also the erasure appeared to be made with the same pen and ink as the insertion. The erasure would be plainly against defendant's interests. Held, that a finding that defendant wrong3. Where a lessor is justified in re-enter-Boston Block Co. v. Buffington, (Minn.) fully made the erasure would be reversed. ing and taking possession, the lessee can- 361 not recover damages for loss of a portion 2. Gen. St. Minn. Supp. 1888, c. 75. § 38a, releasing tenants from further liability for rent in case the premises are rendered untenantable by fire, etc., does not terminate the lease of a tenant who resumes occupancy after repairs, and continues to pay rent, which is accepted by the landlord without objection.-Boston Block Co. v. Buffington, (Minn.) 361. 9. Code Iowa, § 2014, providing that any of the term, or for injury to his business; Holding over. but if the lessor, in making the re-entry, destroyed the lessee's property, or did un-person in possession of land with the necessary damage thereto, he would be liable therefor.-Bergland v. Frawley, (Wis.) 372. Leases. 4. Where a store covers the whole of the lot upon which it stands, a lease of the building, "together with all and singular the benefits, liberties, and privileges to the said premises belonging," covers the entire premises, and not the building alone. Chesebrough v. Pingree, (Mich.) 747. 5. After the termination of a lease, a second lease, for the term of three years, was drawn up in duplicate, one copy being signed by the lessees and the other by the agent of the lessor, and left with the lessees. Afterwards one copy was delivered to the agent, and was signed by the lessor, but was not delivered to the lessees, nor were they informed of the signature. Held, that the lease was not binding upon the lessees, the agent having no written authority, as required by How. St. Mich. & 6179, for the creation of an interest in land for a term exceeding one year.-Id. assent of the owner is presumed to be a tenant at will until the contrary is shown," changes the common-law rule that, where a tenant for years holds over, and continues to pay rent, a tenancy from year to year is established; and, in the absence of special contract, a mere tenancy at will is thus created.-O'Brien v. Troxel, (Iowa,) 704. 10. Where a building occupied under a void lease of the premises and building liabilities of the parties arise from holding is destroyed by fire, the only rights and over, and, the rent being payable in monthly installments, the lessees are not liable for rent beyond the month in which the building was destroyed.-Chesebrough v. Pingree, (Mich.) 747. Rent. 11. Knowledge of a sublessee, who was in possession of the premises, of an assignment of rents, does not bind the lessee, where at the time he obtained it he was not acting as agent of the lessee.-Trulock v. Donahue, (Iowa,) 696. 12. Indexing and recording a mortgage, which contains an assignment of rents, as a land mortgage only, is not constructive notice of the assignment to third persons. 6. Where co-lessees stipulate to surrender the lease on the happening of a certain contingency, each lessee is the agent of the other to make the surrender when the contingency happens.-Bergland v. Fraw--Id. ley, (Wis.) 372. 7. A stipulation in a lease that the lessees should surrender the premises to the lessor whenever he desired to make certain improvements thereon is not a condition which, on re-entry by the lessor, determines the lease, but a covenant, the breach of which gives the lessor a right of action for damages only.-Id. LARCENY. What constitutes. 1. To constitute the crime of larceny by false token, within the meaning of Pen. Code Minn. § 415, where the false token is a written instrument, it need not be such as, if genuine, would be of legal validity. -State v. Henn, (Minn.) 564. they were from plaintiff.-Guth v. Lubach, 2. Defendant ordered an overcoat and pantaloons of a tailor, and, when finished, tried on and approved the coat, but did not take them away, as he said he hadn't quite 2. Laws Mich. 1885, p. 354, § 3, providing money enough to pay for them. After that, in suits for publication of libels in wards, in the absence of the owner, he ap-newspapers, only actual damages proved plied to an employe for the garments, who can be recovered, if it appear that the pubgot them while defendant counted out his lication was in good faith, did not involve money; but, as he did not have quite a criminal charge, was due to mistake, and enough, he asked the employe to go with that a retraction was published, is unconhim to his room, and receive the pay. On stitutional, as depriving persons of all adetheir way he asked the employe to wait at quate remedy for injuries to reputation the foot of a flight of stairs while he went caused by the publication of charges inup to get his key, and disappeared, and volving moral turpitude, but not technicwas not seen again that night, though ally criminal, and for which injuries no researched for. Neither did he return in the traction can effect a remedy.-Park v. The morning, as he said he would do, to get his Detroit Free Press Co., (Mich.) 731. old coat, which he had left at the store. Held, that he was guilty of larceny.-State v. Hall, (Iowa,) 107.* Indictment. ing the contents of a legal document, it is 3. On the question of mistake in reporterror to charge that such care as reporters usually use is the standard by which to de3. An indictment for larceny under Pen. termine the newspaper's liability. ReportCode Minn. § 415, which provides for sev-ers must use such degree of care as is reaeral distinct acts or ways by which a per- sonably sure to prevent mistake.-Id. son may commit or be guilty of larceny, Privileged communications. some of which were not larceny at common law, should charge the act constituting the alleged larceny so as to inform the accused in which way he is charged with having committed the offense.-State v. Henn, (Minn.) 564. Evidence. 4. The publication by newspapers of pleadings or other proceedings in civil cases, before trial, is not privileged.-Id. Action-Evidence. 5. Evidence that various persons called plaintiff's attention to the libelous publicaextent to which the public had taken notion sued on is admissible as showing the tice of the article.-Id. License. 4. On a trial for larceny, an instruction that the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is presumptive evidence of guilt, and that if the jury is "satisfied, from all the evidence, * * * that the possession of defendant was a guilty pos- Liquor licenses, see Intoxicating Liquors, session," then he should be convicted, is erroneous, as under it defendant could be found guilty of receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen,-a crime with which he was not charged.-State v. Tucker, (Iowa,) 725. Lease. See Landlord and Tenant, 4-8. Of railroad, see Railroad Companies,7. LIBEL AND SLANDER. What actionable. 1. Words spoken, that one "used" his daughter, are capable of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendoes in a complaint for slander, that he committed adultery and incest with her; and words, in connection with them, when spoken by the daughter's husband, that "the children are not mine; they are from him," may mean that the husband disclaimed the paternity of his wife's children, and asserted that 1, 2. Liens. See, Mechanics' Liens. Attorney's lien, see Attorney and Client, 2. Life Insurance. See Insurance. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Adverse possession. 1. Actual possession of one-quarter of a quarter section of land, under a registered patent for the whole, is not possession of the whole, as against a senior patentee of another part of the quarter section.-Turner v. Stephenson, (Mich.) 735.* 2. Possession of land by a grantor, and by those claiming under a second deed for the land, executed by him while in possession, and after the first deed had been recorded, will not be presumed adverse to the first grantee, without proof of ouster, or of some unequivocal act amounting to an open denial of his title. 34 N. W. Rep. 128, followed.-Schwalbach v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Wis.) 579. the note out of the operation of the statute.-Drake v. Sigafoos, (Minn.) 257.* 9. The maker of notes agreed in writing to procure and send to the payee, at his place of residence in another state, certain harrows; the payee "to pay the freight on the same, and indorse $50 on the notes." Held, that the indorsement, as affecting the limitation of an action on the notes, was to be made when the freight reached its destination, and not at the time of shipping, or at the date of the contract.-Sutton v. Lamb, (Mich.) 457. 3. Where a patent is granted to an Indian under 18 U. S. St. at Large, 420, providing that land so acquired by an Indian shall not be subject to alienation for five years, a deed executed by the patentee within the 10. The time of indorsement is not affive years is void, and possession under such fected by the fact that the harrows sent by deed is not such adverse possession as will defendant did not correspond to those deavoid a deed made by the patentee to an- scribed in the contract. the harrows havother after the five years have elapsed.-ing_been accepted, and the indorsement Taylor v. Brown, (Dak.) 525. made.-Id. Running of the statute. 4. A complaint before a justice, charging a crime, on which warrant is not issued and delivered to an officer for service until after the expiration of the statutory period, is not a commencement of prosecution, so as to prevent the statute of limitations from running. SHERWOOD. C. J., dissenting.. People v. Clement, (Mich.) 190. 5. Under the Michigan married woman's act of 1855, a married woman is relieved from all disability to sue, and the statute of limitations will run against her, though she was married while an infant, and had remained married up to the time of the action. King v. Merritt, 34 N. W. Rep. 700, followed. - Douglass v. Douglass, (Mich.) 177. 6. The statute of limitations on a town order issued before the passage of Laws Wis. 1881, c. 240, prohibiting an action on a town order to be brought till 30 days after demand, began to run at the date of issue, though under the law in force at that time an action on such order could be maintained only after presentment and refusal of payment.-Schriber v. Town of Richmond, (Wis.) 644. 11. Under Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 66, § 24, providing that no acknowledgment or promise shall toll the statute unless contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged, no promise can be inferred from the fact that, when presented with a statement of account, defendant asserted that he had paid $10 on it for which he had not been credited, for which plaintiff then gave him credit. If such payment had been made, the burden would be on plaintiff to show that it had been made within six years.-Erpelding v. Ludwig, (Minn.) 829. Pleading. 12. A complaint in an action commenced in March, 1887, which alleges that the services sued for were performed between the months of September and December, 1873, but fails to allege that any time was fixed for payment, shows on its face that the cause of action did not accrue within the statutory period of six years, and is bad on demurrer; nor is it aided by an averment that the sum sued for became due in September, 1884, that being but a conclusion of law.-Tucker v. Lovejoy, (Wis.) 627. Burden of proof. 13. On the issue of limitation the burden is on plaintiff to show that the cause of action accrued within the statutory time. Ayres v. Hubbard, (Mich.) 10. LOGS AND LOGGING. 1. One having possession of logs as bailee is an "owner" within the meaning of Rev. St. Wis. § 3337, giving compensation to an owner for driving logs of another which have become intermingled with his own.Wisconsin River Log-Driving Ass'n v. D. F. Comstock Lumber Co., (Wis.) 146. 2. It is immaterial, as to compensation, whether the intermingling took place before or after the commencement of the drive.-Id. |