nals, to ascertain whether an act was passed in accordance with constitutional requirements, it cannot act on anything not found in the journals, nor presume that any such requirement has been omitted, unless the fact affirmatively appear in the journals.People v. McElroy, (Mich.) 750. 2. Under Const. Mich. art. 4, § 19, providing that "every bill and joint resolution shall be read three times in each house before the final passage thereof," the reading of a bill and substitute twice by the titles, and only once at length, is sufficient.-Id. TAXATION. See, also, Towns, 7-14. For bridge purposes, see Bridges, 7-9. drainage purposes, see Covenants; Drainage. highway purposes, see Highways, 2. Liability of vendor, see Vendor and Vendee, 4, 5. Of railroads, see Railroad Companies, 8, 9. 1. Pub. Acts Mich. 1885, No. 153, § 11. STATES AND STATE OFFI. subd. 6, providing that the personalty of CERS. Appropriations-Warrants. an estate in the hands of executors or administrators shall be assessed to them in the town where deceased last dwelt until notice be given that the estate has been Under the act approved March 31, 1887, distributed, is not, as to forest products, to provide for "selling of all unsold lots and repealed by subdivision 4 of the same sec lands belonging to the state of Nebraska tion, which provides that forest products lying and being in the city of Lincoln, shall be assessed to the owner or the perand to provide for the appropriation of son having control of them in the townfunds arising from said sale," a sale of the ship or ward where they may be, or by sublots and lands mentioned was had, the division 1, which provides that goods and amount of the sale being $78,878; a part chattels situate in a township other than of which was cash in hand, a part in notes where the owner resides shall be assessed due in one year, and the residue in notes in the town where situate, if the person due in two years. Held, that by the terms having control occupies a store, mill, dockof the act there was an absolute appropria-yard, piling ground, etc., for use, in contion of $78,878; upon which warrants could be drawn to carry into effect the purpose of the act.-State v. Babcock, (Neb.) 316. Statutes. nection with the property, but all the subdivisions should stand and be construed together.-Avery v. Dewitt, (Mich.) 39. 2. By Michigan tax law, 1885, (Pub. Acts No. 153,) real property includes land and appurtenances, and is to be assessed where situate, and is to be valued, described, and Construction, see Attachment, 6; Bridges, 5; assessed, and may be paid or redeemed, Counties, 6; Taxation, 18. Repeal, see Trespass, 12; Writs, 2. by separate parcels. Personalty is to be assessed in the town in which the owner is an inhabitant, and "forest products" where they may be. A partnership is deemed to reside where its business is principally conducted. Standing timber on several distinct tracts, owned separately from the land, was assessed in a gross sum, on the roll of personal property taxes, by the town in which it was situated, but which was neither the place of business of the firm owning it, nor the residence of either of its members. He'd, that the timber was not "forest products," and not assessable as personalty, but as realty.Fletcher v. Township of Alcona, (Mich.)36. 3. Certain persons agreed with a corporation to sell and convey to it certain described land for a sum named, of which a small portion was paid down. The corporation agreed in the same writing to pay the balance of the price on certain specified days, with interest, payable annually, and was given possession of the property. It also agreed to pay the taxes on said property. Held, that the debt thus arising from the corporation purchaser was an assessable credit, under Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 11, § 4, defining "credits" as meaning and including "every claim and demand for money or other valuable thing, and every security or sum of money receivable at stated periods, due or to become due, and all claims and demands secured by deed or mortgage, due or to become due." GILFILLAN, C. J., dissents.-State v. Rand, (Minn.) 835. Assessment and levy. 4. Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 11, § 113, as amended by Laws 1881, c. 5, § 1, providing for assessing taxes on property for past years in which such taxes had not been assessed, does not authorize the including in such assessment of penalties for such years. -State v. Winona & St. P. Land Co., (Minn.) 166. 5. A credit consisting of part of the purchase price of land formerly owned in common, should not be listed as a whole against the vendors, even though all live in the same taxing district, but the interest of each should be listed against him. So, on a citation against all the vendors to show cause why they should not pay the tax, it is error to enter judgment for the whole amount against those who were served and have appeared.-State v. Rand, (Minn.) 835. 6. The Michigan tax act of 1885 provides that for purposes of taxation a firm shall be treated as an individual, and, whenever the name of an owner or occupant of property is required to be entered on the assessment roll, if such property is owned or occupied by a firm, the firm name shall be used. Held, that an assessment against the firm of James H. Hill & Sons, composed of James H., Wilbur H., and Arthur Hill, by the name of James H. & Arthur Hill & Co., was not invalid, no prejudice being shown.-Hill v. Graham. (Mich.) 779. 7. Under the Michigan tax act of 1885, § 11, subd. 4, (Sess. Laws 1885, p. 177,) providing that forest products shall be assessed in the township where they may be, except that, where they are in transit to some place within the state, they shall be assessed at such place, an instruction that if the owners were driving the logs towards their destination, or were breaking the rollways and jams for that purpose, or were working on them, in the ordinary way, with a view of driving them towards their destination, or as many of them as the stage of water would permit, then they would be in transit; but if the logs were not in the stream, were not actually started down, but were in unbroken piles, waiting the breaking up of the river or rise of water, or some future event, before starting, the mere intent of the owners, without acts showing their present purpose to drive, would not justify the jury in regarding them as in transit,-is sufficiently favorable to the theory that they were in transit.-Id. Collection. 8. Act Mich. 1885, No. 153, § 107, provides that "no injunction shall issue to stay the proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes under this act." Held, that the act, having provided in section 42 that the tax may be paid under protest, and recovered by action if illegally assessed, is not unconstitutional, as taking from the circuit courts the power granted by Const. Mich. art. 6, § 8, to issue writs of injunc tion to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.-Eddy v. Township of Lee, (Mich.) 792. 9. Although act Mich. 1885, No. 153, § 107, prohibits an injunction against the collection of taxes, it is error to dismiss, on demurrer, a bill praying "that the taxes may be held and decreed to be illegal and void," in order to remove the cloud upon the title, notwithstanding the bill further asks an injunction against their collection, as the first relief may be granted, though the injunction cannot.-Id. Application. 10. Under Const. Mich. art. 8, § 4, establishing a board of state auditors to examine and adjust all claims against the state not otherwise provided for by general law, and the statute making it the duty of the county treasurer to pay over all state taxes, and forbidding the mingling of accounts, and Laws 1885, § 77, requiring the auditor general to draw his warrant on the state treasurer for any moneys due the county, state taxes levied by the board of supervisors without objection, and collected by the county treasurer, belong to the state; and the county, in an action therefor by the auditor general, cannot set up, by way of counter-claim, a demand of its own against the state.-People v. Van Tassel, (Mich.) 847. Sale for non-payment. 11. The Michigan tax law of 1885 not being retroactive, a sale under it for taxes of previous years is void; nor can Laws 1887, act No. 17, authorizing sales under the provisions of the law of 1885 for taxes, levied before its passage, validate such a sale previously made.-Hall v. Perry, (Mich.) 324; McNaughton v. Martin, (Mich.) 326. 12. Under tax act Minn. 1881, § 4, providing that the auditor shall offer for sale each piece or parcel of land, separately, in the order and by the description contained in the judgment book, and section 5, requiring him to execute to the purchaser of any piece or parcel a certificate in a certain form, | tion 4212.-Finn v. Wisconsin River Land and authorizing several tracts to be in- Co., (Wis.) 209. Icluded in one certificate, a certificate including several tracts must show that each tract was separately bid off for a certain price in the manner required, and one reciting that all the property described in it (several separate tracts) was sold for a certain sum, purports a sale en masse, and is void. Following Farnham v. Jones, 19 N. W. Rep. 83.-Brown v. Setzer, (Minn.) 70. Tax titles. 13. Where a tax-roll contains no certificate of the supervisor, and it is not shown that leaves claimed to have been cut from the roll contained such certificate, a sale based thereon is void.-Newkirk v. Fisher, (Mich.) 189. 14. A tax deed, based on a sale for taxes for a year in which the property was not returned, is void.-Id. 15. A "state assignment certificate," executed pursuant to Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 11. § 89, is only evidence of title when accompanied by proof of service of the notice of the expiration of the time of redemp: tion as required by Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, 121; and the burden of proof of service of such notice rests upon the party asserting title in fee under the certificate.-Muller v. Jackson, (Minn.) 565. 16. In Minnesota, the holder of the state's lien on real estate for taxes, acquired by 19. Plaintiffs went upon the land a number of times every year, to see whether trespasses were being committed, to look over the timber, and to run out lines for roads to get out timber. Roads were built, and timber was cut by plaintiffs during each winter, to be used for fence-rails and fire-wood, etc., on plaintiffs' farm, which adjoined the land. Plaintiffs' occupancy during the winters was open and continuous, and in the usual manner that timber lands are occupied. Held, that the possession was adverse, and that the land was at no time vacant and unoccupied, within the meaning of Rev. St. Wis. § 1188, as amended by Laws 1880, c. 309, § 2, which prescribes a limitation of three years for the commencement of an action to recover vacant and unoccupied lands sold for taxes.-Id. Redemption. 121, proof of publication of a notice of the 20. Under Gen. St. Minn. 1878, c. 11, § expiration of the time of redemption is inadmissible without first proving that it is addressed to the party in whose name the land was assessed, and that it had been delivered to the sheriff for service, and that he had made return thereon to the county auditor.-Muller v. Jackson, (Minn.) 565. Tender. purchase of the real estate at a void tax Effect of, see Railroad Companies, 17. sale, cannot, independent of the "occupy ing claimants'" law, defend his possession though he enter with the acquiescence of See Larceny. Theft. Time. Computation, see Indians, 2; Practice in 17. Under the Minnesota "occupying claimants' law," (chapter 75, Gen. St. 1878, § 16.) the interest to be allowed for taxes paid is 7 per cent. per annum. The sum which the judgment in favor of the owner See Quieting Title. requires him to pay the occupant, under Title. section 17, as a condition to the issuing of Tax titles, see Taxation, 13-19. execution, does not bear interest.-Id. 18. Rev. St. Wis. § 4212, prescribing rules for determining what constitutes adverse possession by one claiming title under a written instrument, merely supplies certain conditions of actual adverse possession, and does not exclude others; and section 1190, providing that the possession of land, and the extent thereof, within the meaning of previous sections prescribing the limitation of actions to recover land sold for taxes, "shall be governed by the rules prescribed for determining an adverse possession by a person claiming title founded upon a written instrument," does not exclude the idea of adverse possession of a character other than that prescribed by sec Torts. See Assault and Battery; Bastardy; Death by Wrongful Act; Deceit; Libel and Slander; Malicious Mischief; Negligence; Nuisance; Replevin; Trespass; Trover and Conversion. Measure of damages, see Damages, 6-13. TOWNS. See, also, Bridges; Highways; Municipal Corporations; Poor and Poor-Laws; School and School-Districts. Action against, see Practice in Civil Cases, 1. Organization. protest, specifying the grounds of protest, 1. Act Wis. (Laws 1883, c. 292,) providing if the tax is illegal, for the reason stated, that upon the resolution of the electors of plaintiffs may recover for taxes paid under towns which contain an unincorporated vil-protest of the inclusion of taxes voted by lage of not less than 1,000 inhabitants they the town board for establishment of lost may exercise all powers conferred on vil- section corners, and the building of a town lages by Rev. St. c. 40, and acts amendatory hall.—Id. thereof, except those which would conflict with the provisions of law relative to towns and town boards, is not void for uncertainty.-Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. Brown, (Wis.) 482. 2. Const. Wis. art 11, § 3, making it the duty of the legislature, and empowering it, to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages, does not deprive it of power to legislate for the control and government of unincorporated villages, and, the act not purporting to incorporate the villages, it is not unconstitutional.-Id. 3. The provision in the act making it applicable only to towns containing villages of a certain population, does not make it special or render it obnoxious to Const. art. 4, 23, providing that the legislature shall establish but one system of town and county government.-Id.* Division. 4. The legality of the division of a township consisting of two governmental towns, cannot be raised in an action attacking the validity of a tax on the ground that the assessment rolls for the old township did not contain the lands included in the new one. -Mills v. Township of Richland, (Mich.) 183. Officers. 5. In an action by a township against its treasurer for funds unaccounted for, defendant's books and the evidence of members of the board who examined the accounts are admissible.-Township of Otsego Lake v. Kirsten, (Mich.) 26. 6. It is beyond the scope of the authority of the township board, on settlement with the treasurer, to take notes payable at a future day for an amount less than that found due, and the board's acceptance of such notes will not stay the township's right of action on the treasurer's bond. Id. Taxation. 7. Under How. St. Mich. § 1327, providing that the highway tax shall be within the limit prescribed by section 1326, subd. 5, viz., not to exceed 50 cents on each $100 of valuation, according to the assessment roll for the last preceding year, the assessment is to be made against the several parcels of property according to the same valuation, and not that of the current year. Mills v. Township of Richland. (Mich.) 183. 8. Under tax law Mich. 1882, § 42, providing for recovery of taxes paid under 9. The statute providing that the board of review shall consist of the supervisor and two other members appointed by the township board, that vacancies may be filled by the township board, and that a majority shall constitute a quorum, the fact that the indorsement of the assessment roll is signed by the supervisor, and one of those shown to have been appointed, and by a third person, as board of review, does not affect the validity of the assessment; it having been reviewed by a quorum of the board.-Id. 10. In an assessment roll made by a township supervisor under the Michigan tax law of 1882, it will be presumed that the assessment was made at the true cash value, as required by section 15, and as defined by section 17.-Id. 11. Under How. Mich. §§ 671, 750, authorizing the township board to vote taxes to defray the ordinary township expenses, which the township has at its annual meeting refused or neglected to vote, the board may vote a tax to pay a debt owing to another town, and for a special fund for con tingent expenses.-Id. 12. The township board cannot, on its own responsibility, vote a tax to establish lost section corners; How. St. Mich. § 509, authorizing the board of county supervisors to provide for their establishment, when necessary, by the employment of a surveyor, but only where a majority of the Voters vote to raise the necessary sum.-Id. 13. The township board cannot, on its own responsibility, vote a tax for building a town hall; How. St. Mich. § 672, prohibiting such tax, except by vote of the township in a prescribed manner.-Id. 14. Under Laws Wis. 1883, c. 292, providing that, upon the resolution of the electors of towns which contain an unincorporated village of not less than 1,000 inhabitants, they may exercise powers conferred on villages by Rev. St. c. 40, and acts amendatory thereof, taxes levied by a town after organization under the act, for the support of the village government, are not invalid on the ground of public policy, though property outside of the village on which the tax falls is not directly benefited by it. - Land, Log & Lumber Co. v. Brown, (Wis.) 482. Actions. 15. Under Rev. St. Wis. § 824, providing that no action on a claim for which a money judgment only is demandable, shall be maintained against a town, unless a statement of the claim has been filed to be laid before the board of audit, nor until 10 days after the next annual meeting, an action against a town, on orders issued by another town for which it has become liable, cannot be sustained where such statement has not been filed; the amendment by Laws 1882, c. 163, excepting town orders from the operation of section 824, having reference only to orders issued by the town sought to be charged.-Schriber v. Town of Richmond, (Wis.) 644. TRESPASS. What constitutes. 1. In trespass quare clausum fregit the complaint alleged no specific acts, but the facts were that defendant entered plaintiff's premises on the day before the action was brought, and removed a gate and a post, and drove three stakes in the ground. Defendant justified under a right of way over the locus in quo, wrongfully obstructed by the gate. On the trial plaintiff disclaimed recovery as to the gate, but proved the driving of the stakes, and the removal of the post, which he alleged was set at the end of the way on the line between his land and defendant's. Defendant proved the right of way, that the post obstructed it, and that the stakes were set on a line of the way to mark it. He'd, that the court properly directed a verdict for defendant. -Joyce v. Conlin, (Wis.) 212. 2. Defendant had the right to drive stakes on the line of the way to define its limits, if he did no unnecessary damage. Id. Parties. 3. As joint trespassers are each severally liable, it is immaterial that some of them are not made parties.-Heartz v. Klinkhammer, (Minn.) 826. Evidence. 4. In a trial for trespass quare clausum, defendant having entered plaintiff's land, and removed a gate and a post, and having proved that he had a right of way which the gate and post obstructed, plaintiff cannot prove, after defendant has closed his evidence, that the post was set as a part of the gate he intended erecting at that point. as the evidence should have been offered in chief.-Joyce v. Conlin, (Wis.) 212. 5. Nor was it error to exclude plaintiff's testimony that, at the time he bought the land, the way, as traveled, was of a different width from that given by the deed under which defendant claimed.-Id. 6. In trespass for carrying away plaintiff's grain, where defendants justify under authority from plaintiff's husband, receipts given by third persons to said husband for such grain, whose proceeds he volunteered to use in part to pay debts connected with the expenses of the farm, are incompetent and immaterial, since his offer would be no defense to the action, and the receipts as to plaintiff are mere hearsay.Heartz v. Klinkhammer, (Minn.) 826. 7. In trespass for entering on plaintiff's premises, and carrying away her grain, where defendants justify under the authority of plaintiff's husband, the fact that some of defendants had been present at the trial of the husband for removing other grain, where plaintiff's right of ownership was fully discussed, is competent to prove defendants' knowledge and willfulness, and warants an instruction on exemplary damages. -Id. Damages. 8. Where the evidence shows that the trespass complained of was committed in a wanton and oppressive manner, by entering on the premises at an early hour on a Sunday morning, and digging up the soil with offensive haste, against plaintiff's protest, a verdict for $250 is not excessive.Koenigs v. Jung, (Wis.) 801. 9. Rev. St. Wis. § 4269, provides that the owner of the government title to land, who has taken timber there from after his title has been divested, shall be liable to the extent of the highest market value of the timber. The amendatory act of 1882 adds the following: "Provided, that when the defendant shall have, in good faith, *** entered upon the land, believing his title to be valid, and shall have cut the timber therefrom under such circumstances, then plaintiff shall recover only the actual damages sustained by reason of such cutting. "Held, that a tax-title claimant, who never acquired actual possession, could not recover the full penalty, where defendant, the former owner, had no notice when he took the timber of the recording of the tax deed. - Fleming v. Sherry, (Wis.) 375. 10. The certificate of the register of deeds, showing no tax deed of record, made about two years after the record of the tax deed, is sufficient evidence, in the hands of one believing it correct, to bring him within the amendment to Rev. St. Wis. § 4269, which lessens the liability for cutting timber in the case of a former owner, who acts in good faith, "believing his title to be valid."-Id. 11. An instruction that defendant must not only have removed the timber in good faith, believing that he had a valid title to the land, but also that he must have good reason so to believe, was erroneous.-Id. 12. Rev. St. Wis. § 4254, limits a recovery against the personal representatives of a trespasser to the damages actually sus |