the balance remaining in their possession is subject to garnishment by creditors refusing to receive payment. Äffirming 39 N. W. Rep. 767.-Greene & Button Co. v. Marshall, (Wis.) 643. 3. Personal property under the control of the garnishee, but situated outside of the state where suit is brought, and particularly when in transit by a common carrier, cannot be reached by garnishment.-Montrose Pickle Co. v. Dodson & Hills Manuf'g Co., (Iowa,) 705. Inter vivos. GIFTS. Plaintiff's assignor deposited money of his own with defendant, who agreed to keep it until the assignor's wife should take it to California, where he was then going. Various sums were sent to the assignor by defendant, and after the wife's death defendant paid certain debts, and promised to pay the assignor the balance. Held, that letters of the assignor to his wife, promising to repay her a part of the money which had been sent him, and referring to the money as hers, did not show a gift to the wife, so as to prevent plaintiff's recovery.-McGraw v. Lapham, (Mich.)245. GRAND JURY. Summoning and impaneling. made, need not be followed, where only the precise number required to fill the panel is present.—Id. GUARDIAN AND WARD. Agreements between. A surviving partner, who was executor under the will of the deceased partner, was also tenant in common with him of certain mill property, and assumed to be guardian of the decedent's only son. On the day the latter became of age, or about that time, the surviving partner entered into agreements with the heir, who was without any experience in the management of property, authorizing the former to make certain improvements of the tenant in common property, and to charge therefor certain gross sums mentioned therein. Other agreements of like nature were made shortly after. These all assumed that the interest of deceased in the firm was worthless, and amounted to an assignment by the heir to the surviving partner of the rents and profits in consideration of making advances. In reality the firm had a large surplus, in which the interest of deceased was over $100,000. Held, that the agreements were fraudulent, and not binding on the heir.-Perrin v. Lepper, (Mich.) 859. HIGHWAYS. See, also, Bridges. Repairs-Injuries to adjoining prop erty. 1. Code Iowa, § 4256, as amended by chapter 42, Acts 21st Gen. Assem., provides that, where grand jurors are required, "the panel shall be called," and the names en1. Acts 21st Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 87, tered on the record, etc.; also that, if the amending section 989 of the Code, and fornumber of the panel be reduced to a less bidding the road supervisor to destroy or number than required, "the court may injure the ingress or egress to any proporder the sheriff of the county to summon erty, does not forbid him to make street a sufficient number of qualified persons improvements which shall cause a ditch to complete the panel." Held that, one of about six inches in depth, in front of the seven selected jurors having been dis- dwelling and office of a practicing physicharged before the jury was impaneled, the cian, who has for some time at his own excourt might order the sheriff to select one pense kept the street level; nor will equity of those not drawn to take his place. interfere to prevent such slight inconvenSEEVERS, C. J., and ROBINSON, J., dissentience. - Randall v. Christiansen, (Iowa,) ing. State v. Gurlagh, (Iowa,) 141. 2. In Iowa, it is no objection to an indictment found at a term not the first term of the year that the grand jury were not summoned to appear on the first day of the term.-State v. Standley, (Iowa,) 815. 3. In Iowa, where venire was issued for a grand jury before January 1, 1887, but the jury was not impaneled until after the first Monday in January, 1887, the number was properly selected in accordance with Acts 21st Gen. Assem. c. 42.-Id. 4. Code Iowa, § 4256, as amended by Acts 21st Gen. Assem. c. 42, § 3, requiring that from the number appearing to serve as grand jurors a selection by lot shall be v.40N.w.-63 703. Taxes and assessments. 2. Taxes for highway purposes under the tax law of Michigan of 1882 can only be assessed by the supervisors upon the certificate of the township clerk that the proposed tax has been voted by the proper authorities of the township, and a levy not appearing to have been so voted is void.Sage v. Stevens, (Mich.) 919. HOMESTEAD. See, also, Public Lands, 1. Election, see Descent and Distribution. Rights of minor heirs, see Public Lands, 1. | without fault on his part, attacked by dewife, see Vendor and Vendee, 13. Liability for debts. 1. A homestead may be sold in satisfaction of a judgment rendered before its acquisition, unless purchased with funds derived from the sale of a homestead previously acquired. Lamb v. McConkey, (Iowa,) 77. Selection. 2. The fact that a husband moves into a house on premises deeded to his wife, by him in payment of a debt, is not evidence of a homestead selection by him.--Meigs v. Dibble, (Mich.) 935. Conveyance. 3. Under the Wisconsin statute, (2 Tayl. St. 1871, c. 134, § 24,) a mortgage of a homestead by a married man, without the signature of the wife is invalid, though the wife is living apart from her husband when the mortgage is executed.-Herron v. Knapp, Stout & Co. Company. (Wis.) 149.* 4. A mortgage (not for purchase money) of his homestead, by a married man, with out his wife's signature, is void, and does not become valid when the premises afterwards lose their homestead character. Alt v. Banholzer, (Minn.) 830.* 5. The covenants of title in a mortgage on the homestead executed by the husband alone, which, by statute, is absolutely void, will not operate as an estoppel against the mortgagor or his assigns.-Id. 6. The fact that the husband and wife are subsequently divorced will not validate a mortgage of the homestead executed by the husband alone.-Id. Murder. HOMICIDE. 1. On a trial for murder in the second degree malice can be implied only in cases where the killing alone is shown. Where the evidence shows all the circumstances by the testimony of an eye-witness, it is error for the court to instruct the jury that, where the fact of killing is established, without any excuse or explanatory circum stances, malice is presumed, and the crime would be murder in the second degree. Vollmer v. State, (Neb.) 420.* 2. Approximately malice is that condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief, the existence of which condition is inferred from acts done, or words spoken. See Harris v. State, 8 Tex. App. 91, cited in Carr v. State, 23 Neb. 749, 37 N. W. Rep. 630.-Id. Justifiable homicide. 3. Where, on trial for murder, the undisputed evidence shows that defendant was, ceased with a loaded gun while in the public highway, and that deceased advanced after repeated warnings to desist until within three rods of defendant, threatening to kill him, and was in the position of firing when defendant shot him, there is no issue for the jury as to the necessity of a retreat, or the possibility of avoiding the assault by any other reasonable means than by taking life, and it is error to qualify an instruction otherwise correctly stating the law of self-defense by including in it that question.-People v. Macard, (Mich.) 784.* 4. It appearing that at the time of the attack defendant was talking with a neighbor in the highway, whose person and horse could shelter, and that his house was near were the only objects behind which he by, it is error to refuse to charge that if, by attempting to reach his house, he would be exposed to the range of his assailant's gun, he was not obliged to take the risk, and that he was not required to take shelter of the body or horse of the neighbor, as the law would not warrant him in exposing the life or property of others to peril to avoid the necessity of self-defense.-Id. 5. A person knowing his life to be threatened, and believing himself to be in danger to remain at home in order to avoid an asof death or great bodily harm, is not obliged sault, but may arm himself sufficiently to repel an anticipated attack, and pursue his legitimate avocations; and if, without himself, he may use any weapon he may fault, he is compelled to take life to save have secured for that purpose, and the homicide is excusable.-Id. 6. Under the facts of the case, the jury should have been instructed that if the attack upon defendant was so sudden, fierce. and violent as to require self-defense, and defendant was without fault in bringing ice or ill-feeling be entertained towards on the assault, it was immaterial what mal deceased.-Id. 7. The instruction that "no person has the right to take the life of another on the grounds of self-defense, unless-First, the life of such person is in danger, or such person is in danger of suffering great and permanent bodily injury; second, if such person's life or body is in danger, as last above stated, yet there is a reasonable is the duty of such person to escape and means of escape from the assault, then it save the life of his adversary, " is erroneous, because it omits the element of reasonable grounds for the belief of such danger. Vollmer v. State, (Neb.) 420.* Assault with intent to kill. 8. On an information charging the statutory offense of assault with intent to commit murder, conviction may be had for as sault with intent to do great bodily harm | and that they shall be subject to regulation less than murder. - People v. Prague, (Mich.) 243. Evidence. 9. On a trial for murder, a medical witness is not qualified to give an opinion that the symptoms indicated poison by arsenic, when he has never seen a case, or had any experience in cases, of arsenical poisoning, and all that he knows on the subject is de rived from scientific books and medical instruction.-Soquet v. State, (Wis.) 391. 10. A witness for the state having testified that he saw deceased go towards the place of the homicide with a gun, that he told him not to take his gun, and that when he heard the shot fired he stood up in his wagon to look, the court properly refused to allow him to be asked, on cross-examination, if he did not think at the time that deceased had shot defendant.-People v. Macard, (Mich.) 784. by ordinance, and construct their roads on the most approved plan, an ordinance requiring a street-railway company to construct its road in a certain manner, and on certain streets becomes a part of its charrequired to surrender its franchise by a proter, and, upon non-compliance, it may be ceeding in the nature of a quo warranto. State v. Madison Street Ry. Co., (Wis.) 487. HUSBAND AND WIFE. See, also, Divorce; Dower; Homestead. Wife's separate estate, see Mechanics' Property rights. 1. When the property of the husband is sold on a mortgage, the wife has the same right as any other person to purchase it and hold it free from any liability on account of her husband's debts, provided she do so in good faith, with her own money. 11. On cross-examination of a witness for the state, who admits having had trouble with defendant, it is not error to refuse the further inquiry whether he and defendant's mother were not also at vari--Houston v. Nord, (Minn.) 568. ance about a business matter.-Id. Trial-Instructions. Wife's separate estate. 2. Evidence that a husband was employed as night-watchman at $9 or $10 per month; that his wife from her earnings in washing had saved $80; that she requested her husband to buy lots, it being suggested that she could pay for them with her separate earnings; and that she requested the title to be taken in the name of an infant 12. Where, on a trial for murder in the second degree, there is some evidence which, if believed by the jury, would tend to show that the accused was guilty of manslaughter, it is error for the court to instruct the jury that, if they should find from the evidence that the accused did not kill the deceased maliciously and purpose-child, so as to provide a home for the ly, they should acquit. It is the province of the jury to pass upon the whole case, and say whether the accused, if guilty, was guilty of murder in the second degree or manslaughter. - Vollmer v. State, (Neb.) 420. 13. The trial court in its charge should inform the jury that the law presumes every man innocent until proven guilty, whether special request for such an instruction is made or not; and an instruction that all the material facts essential to constitute the alleged crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant can be convicted, is not the equivalent of the proposition.-People v. Macard, (Mich.) 40 Ñ. W. 784. children, which was done, -is sufficient to show the lots to be the wife's separate property, and not liable for the husband's debts.-Callahan v. Powers, (Neb.) 292. 3. In replevin, by a married woman, for the possession of personal property levied on by the sheriff under execution against her husband, it was shown that the property was purchased by and for her with means furnished by herself and with the aid of her father. Held, that the property so purchased was not subject to seizure on final process against the husband, even though in the management of the property the husband was permitted to have charge of it in connection with others employed for that purpose, and even though the property was listed for taxation in his name. HORSE AND STREET RAIL- Taggart v. Fowler, (Neb.) 954.* Charters and franchises. Under Rev. St. Wis. § 1862, providing that municipal corporations may grant to street-railway companies, under whatever law formed, the privileges of its streets, on such terms as its authorities may prescribe, 4. Where a married woman owns and occupies a farm, the mere fact that her husband lives with her on the farm, and assists in its cultivation and management, will not warrant an inference that the ownership of the crops vested in him.— Heartz v. Klinkhammer, (Minn.) 826. 5. Where a wife executes a deed of her land, leaving the name of the grantee, the amount of consideration, and the date blank, and delivers it to her husband for the purpose of enabling him to sell and convey the land, the deed, duly filled up, in the hands of a bona fide grantee, who purchased from the husband, and paid the consideration, will be sustained.-Reed v. Morton, (Neb.) 282. 6. Where the wife knowingly uses a part or all of the consideration received therefor in her business, she will thereby ratify the sale.-Id. 7. In Dakota, a married woman, who, with her husband, executes a mortgage upon her land, with covenants of seisin, quiet possession, and warranty, as security for a loan, is estopped from setting up title acquired after a foreclosure sale thereunder, though the mortgage is a mere lien, conveying no estate in the land.-Yerkes v. Hadley, (Dak.) 340. Wife's power to contract. 8. How. St. Mich. §§ 6295-6297, remove the common-law disability of a married woman to contract in reference to her separate estate only, and do not make her liable on a contract made jointly with her husband for improvements on land owned by them jointly.-Speier v. Opfer, (Mich.) 909.* 9. The Michigan married woman's act (How. St. §§ 6295-6299) does not authorize a husband and wife to enter into a contract of partnership between themselves so as to render themselves jointly liable for the contracts of the firm.-Artman v. Ferguson, (Mich.) 907.* INDECENT ASSAULT. Indictment. INDIANS. Property rights. under 18 U. S. St. at Large, 420, providing 2. The day of the date of the patent is to be included in the computation of the five years, and a deed executed by the patentee on the fifth anniversary of the date of the patent is not within the five years, and is valid.-Id. INDICTMENT AND INFOR- Amendment, see Bigamy, 1. Indorsing names of witnesses. 1. Leave to indorse on the information the names of additional witnesses, who reside in a distant state, without a sufficient showing that they were unknown before, is not error, when no continuance is requested.-People v. Perriman, (Mich.) 425. 2. The names of witnesses on whom the state relies to prove the charge against one accused of crime should be indorsed on the information as early as practicable after the discovery of the witnesses, and in all 1. Pen. Code Minn. § 245, entitled "In-cases before the day set for the trial of the decent assault," provides that any person case. REESE, C. J., dissents.- Gandy v. who takes indecent liberties not amount- State, (Neb.) 302. ing to rape, an attempt to commit rape, or an assault with such intent, with or on the person of any female without her consent, or, if she be under the age of 10, without regard to consent, is guilty of felony. Heid, that one may be convicted of such crime under an indictment charging an assault with intent to carnally know and abuse; Gen. St. 1878, c. 114, § 19, authorizing a conviction for any offense necessarily included in the one charged in the indictment.-State v. West, (Minn.) 249. Verdict. 2. A verdict of "guilty of an indecent assault" sufficiently describes the offense of taking "any indecent liberties with or on the person of any female," etc., which is made a felony by Pen. Code Minn. § 245, entitled "Indecent assault. "-Id. 3. Under How. St. Mich. § 9549, which provides that the prosecuting attorney shall indorse on the information the names of the witnesses known to him at the time of filing, and, at such time before trial as the court may prescribe, shall indorse thereon the names of such other witnesses as shall then be known to him, the name of a witness known to the prosecuting attorney when an information is filed, but omitted from the indorsement by mistake, may, in the discretion of the court, be indorsed on the information, even after the jury has been impaneled, and the opening statement made, in a case where the witness in question has been produced on the preliminary examination, and is known to the respondent's counsel to be the most important witness for the people.-People v. Evans, (Mich.) 473 Duplicity. Insolvency. 4. If an indictment attempts to charge two offenses, but one of them insufficiently, See Assignment for Benefit of Creditors; Bankruptcy; Fraudulent Conveyances. it is not, therefore, double; to be so, it must set out each sufficiently.-State v. Henn, (Minn.) 564. 5. An objection to an indictment on the Instructions. ground of duplicity should be taken by de- See Homicide, 12, 13; Trial, 6–13. murrer, or by motion on the trial to compel the prosecution to elect on which charge he will proceed. It cannot be taken by objection to the admission of any evidence under the indictment.-Id. INFANCY. INSURANCE. See, also, Marine Insurance. 1. In an action for breach of contract to See, also, Guardian and Ward; Parent and insure, plaintiff testified to an agreement Child. Contracts-Disaffirmance. 1. During his minority, plaintiff purchased a machine, and defendant became surety for the price, taking a mortgage on the machine to indemnify himself. Afterwards plaintiff sold the machine without defendant's knowledge. The purchase money was paid when due by defendant. The parties then had a settlement, by which plaintiff receipted for his distributive share of the estate, of which defendant was administrator, and defendant released all his claims against plaintiff. Held, under Code Iowa, § 2238, providing that an infant is bound on all his contracts unless he disaffirm them within a reasonable time after attaining his majority, that plaintiff might disaffirm the settlement, and recover his distributive share.-Leacox v. Griffith, (Iowa.) 109.* 2. Thirty-two days after attaining majority is a "reasonable time" within which a contract made in infancy may be disaffirmed, under Code Iowa, § 2238.-Id.* INJUNCTION. To restrain attachment, see Attachment, 9. collection of taxes, see Taxation, 8. liquor nuisance, see Intoxicating Liq uors, 11, 12. Wrongs prevented. 1. A person in possession of land, claiming title, is entitled to an injunction against an intruder who threatens to enter and dispossess him for the purpose of laying out a public street.-Diamond Match Co. v. Village of Ontonagon, (Mich.) 448. Against county boards. 2. A suit to prevent the board of auditors of Wayne county, Mich., from exercising inhibited powers of raising money for public works, is properly brought by the attorney general at the relation of individuals resident in the county.-Taggart v. Board of Auditors, (Mich.) 852. with defendant's agent to write a policy for $500 for six months, to take effect at a certain time, for a certain premium to be paid. Defendant's agent testified to the same facts, except as to the time the policy was to take effect; but insisted that he sug gested to plaintiff that the company might be unwilling to take the risk after he reported it. The agent never wrote the policy, nor did the company refuse to carry the risk until after loss occurred, and plaintiff had demanded the policy. Held that, though no premium were paid, there was a valid contract.-Campbell v. American Fire Ins. Co., (Wis.) 661. 2. The objection that plaintiff's proof of loss was not made in the manner required by the policies issued by defendant, and as would have been required by the policy had one been issued according to the agree ment, is no defense, defendant having denied all liability on the ground that it had never insured or agreed to insure plaintiff's property.-Id. 3. It appearing that defendant's agent had never questioned plaintiff as to what the building contained besides the property to be insured, defendant cannot show that plaintiff did not disclose that it contained other property, in the absence of allegations of fraudulent concealment.-Id. Application. 4. Plaintiff's agent represented that a clause, made a part of the policy furnished by his company, was not in the policies issued by another company, knowing the assertion to be false. The agent invited defendant to compare his proposed contract with that of the other company, leaving his blank form for that purpose. Afterwards defendant applied and was insured in plaintiff's company. Held, that he could not avoid the contract because of the false statement. DICKINSON, J., dissenting.American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co. v. Wilder, (Minn.) 252. 5. A copy of an application for insurance, which does not contain a copy of the |