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actions of persons occupying confidential relations
with each other, as defined by the Title on TRUSTS.2
1 This provision is new.

* See Jaques v. Methodist Ch., 17 Johns., 548; Fry v. Fry,
7 Paige, 461.

S80. A husband and wife cannot by any contract with each other alter their legal relation, except that they may agree to an immediate separation, and may make provision for the support of either of them and of their children during such separation.

Beach v. Beach, 2 Hill, 260; 1 Sharsw. Black., 441, and
note.

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tion.

$81. The mutual consent of the parties is a suffi- Considera cient consideration for such an agreement as is mentioned in the last section.'

A special consideration is now necessary to support such
an agreement (Cropsey v. M'Kinney, 30 Barb., 47).

$82. A husband and wife may hold real or per- May be sonal property together, jointly or in common..

The contrary was held under the Acts of 1848 and 1849

in Goelet v. Gori, 31 Barb., 314.

joint-tenants, etc.

$83. Neither husband nor wife, as such, is answer- Neither able for the acts of the other.

This provision is new, but manifestly just, under the
present state of the law.

answerable for the acts of the other.

wife.

S84. If the husband neglects' to make adequate Support of provision for the support of his wife, any other person may, in good faith, supply her with articles necessary for her support, and recover the reasonable value thereof from the husband.2

If the husband and wife separate by consent, and the
husband, by agreement, secures to her a separate
maintenance, suitable to their circumstances, he is
not liable for anything furnished to her, so long as
he performs such agreement (Calkins v. Long, 22
Barb., 97, and cases there cited).

Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb., 558. This obligation
is not founded merely upon a supposed agency of
the wife (Read v. Legard, 6 Exch., 636; see Sykes
v. Halstead, 1 Sandf., 483).

Abandon

ment of

S85. If the wife abandons the husband, he is not

2

husband by liable for her support' until she offers to return, un

the wife.

less she was justified, by his misconduct, in abandoning him.

'Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4 Denio, 46, and cases there

cited.

'McGahay v. Williams, 12 Johns., 293.

TITLE II.

PARENT AND CHILD.

CHAPTER I. By birth.

II. By adoption.

CHAPTER I.

CHILDREN BY BIRTH.

SECTION 86. Legitimacy of children born in wedlock.

87. Legitimacy of children born out of wedlock.

88. Who may dispute the legitimacy of a child.

89. Obligation of parents for the support and education of their

children.

90. Custody of legitimate child.

91. Custody of an illegitimate child.

92. Allowance to parent.

93. Parent cannot control the property of child.

94. Remedy for parental abuse.

95. When parental authority ceases.

96. Remedy when a parent dies without providing for the support of his child.

97. Reciprocal duties of parents and children in maintaining

each other.

98. When a parent is liable for necessaries supplied to a

child.

99. When a parent is not liable for support furnished his

child.

100. Husband not bound for the support of his wife's children

by a former marriage.

101. Compensation and support of adult child.

102. Parent may relinquish services and custody of child.

SECTION 103. Wages of minors.

104. Right of parent to determine the residence of child.

105. Parent not liable for acts of child.

106. Wife in certain cases may obtain custody of minor children.

$86. All children born in wedlock are presumed Legitimacy to be legitimate.

Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y., 139

$87. All children of a woman who has been married, born within ten months after the dissolution of the marriage, are presumed to be legitimate. But if during such period she marries again, and afterwards has a child, it is presumed to be her legitimate offspring by the second husband.

of children born in wedlock.

Legitimacy

of children

born out of

wedlock

S88. The presumption of legitimacy can be dis- Who may dispute the puted only by the husband or wife, or the descendant legitimacy of one or both of them. Illegitimacy, in such case, may be proved like any other fact.

$ 89. The parent entitled to the custody of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstances.1 If the support and education which the father of a legitimate child is able to give are inadequate, the mother must assist him to the extent of her ability.

1

At present the mother is released from this obligation,
if indeed it exists at common law (see Raymond v.
Loyl, 10 Barb., 483; Pray v. Gorham, 31 Me., 241;
Tilton v. Russell, 11 Ala., 497; Com. v. Murray, 4
Binn., 487), by marrying again (Williams v. Hutchin-
son, 5 Barb., 122; Wilkes v. Rogers, 6 Johns., 576,
578, 593). This exception is inconsistent with the
control now given to the wife over her own property.

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legitimate

$90. The father1 of a legitimate unmarried minor Custody of is entitled to its custody, services and earnings; but child. he cannot transfer such custody or services to any other person, except the mother, without her written consent, if she is living and capable of consent. If the father is dead, or is unable, or refuses to take the

Custody of an illegitimate child.

Allowance

to parent.

Parent cannot control

same, or has abandoned his family, the mother is entitled thereto.5

1

Cartlidge v. Cartlidge, 2 Swabey & Tristram, 567; Peo

ple v. Humphrey, 24 Barb., 521.

Emery v. Kempton, 2 Gray, 257.
Laws of 1862, 345, ch. 172, § 6.

4 Regina v. Clarke, 7 Ell. & Bl., 186; People v. Boice, 39
Barb., 307.

At present the mother's right of guardianship is termi nated by her re-marriage, or by the child's attaining the age of fourteen (Williams v. Hutchinson, 5 Barb., 122; 3 N. Y., 321; Freto v. Brown, 4 Mass., 675; Worcester v. Marchant, 14 Pick., 512). This distinction is incompatible with the spirit of the statutes of 1848, 1860, and 1862, which have to a great extent released married women from the control of their husbands.

$91. The mother of an illegitimate unmarried minor is entitled to its custody, services and earnings.

S92. The supreme court may direct an allowance to be made to the parent of a child, out of its property, for its past' or future support and education, on such conditions as may be proper, whenever such direction is for its benefit."

* Matter of Bostwick, 4 Johns. C., 100; Matter of Kane,

2 Barb. Ch., 375.

Maberly v. Turton, 14 Ves., 499; Simon v. Barber, 1
Taml., 22.

'Wilkes v. Rogers, 6 Johns., 577, 578.

Matter of Burke, 4 Sandf. Ch., 617.

$93. The parent, as such, has no control over the

the proper property of the child.

ty of child.

Remedy for parental abuse.

Combs v. Jackson, 2 Wend., 153; 7 Cow., 36; Fonda v.

Van Horne, 15 Wend., 631; Hyde v. Stone, 7 id., 354.

$94. The abuse of parental authority is the subject of judicial cognizance in a civil action brought by the child, or by its relative within the third degree, or by the supervisor of the town where the child resides; and when the abuse is established, the child may be freed from the dominion of the parent, the parent

punished, and the duty of support and education enforced.

This provision is in part new.

S95. The authority of a parent ceases:

1. Upon the appointment by a court of a guardian

of the person of the child;

2. Upon the marriage of the child; or,

3. Upon its attaining majority.

When parental authority

ceases.

when a

without

providing

port of his

S96. If a parent chargeable with the support of a Remedy child dies, leaving it chargeable to the town, and parent dies leaving an estate sufficient for its support, the super- for the sup visor of the town may claim provision for its support child. from the parent's estate by civil action, and for this purpose may have the same remedies as any creditor against that estate, and against the heirs, devisees and next of kin of the parent.

S97. It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children, of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding.

The provisions of the Poor Laws declare the duty of
parents and children to support each other (1 R. S.,
614, § 1); but it is held that the obligation on the part
of children is purely statutory, and no other remedy
exists except that provided by proceedings under those
laws (Edwards v. Davis, 16 Johns., 281). It is the
object of this section to recognize the obligation as a
ground of legal liability independent of those provi-
sions. On the part of parents, the obligation is not now
merely statutory (Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb., 558).
But in England it has been so held (Shelton v. Springett,
11 C. B., 452; Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W., 488).

Reciprocal parents and

duties of

children in maintain

ing each

other.

When a

parent is liable for

$98. If a parent neglects to provide articles necessary for his child who is under his charge, according necessaries to his circumstances. a third person may in good faith a child.

supplied to

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