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Species of relief.

Relief in

case of forfeiture.

S1830. As a general rule, compensation is the relief or remedy provided by the law of this state for the violation of private rights, and the means of securing their observance; and specific and preventive relief may be given in no other cases than those specified in this Part of the CIVIL CODE,

S1831. Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful or fraudulent breach of duty.

Spaulding v. Hallenbeck, 39 Barb., 78; Clute v. Robison,

2 Johns., 595, 614; Davis v. West, 12 Ves., 475; Sanders v. Pope, id., 282; Northcote v. Duke, Ambler, 513; 2 Eden, 314; Woodman v. Blake, 2 Vern., 222; Hay. ward v. Angel, 1 id., 222; Popham v. Bampfield, id., 83; Wallis v. Crimes, 1 Ch. Ca., 90; see Skinner v. White, 17 Johns., 357; De Forest v. Bates, 1 Edw., 394. Though this doctrine, especially as applied to contracts, is one in its origin of purely equitable cognizance, it is now to be applied in all actions, and to be considered in estimating damages, as well as in granting specific relief (see Spaulding v. Hallenbeck, 39 Barb., 78).

1

TITLE II.

COMPENSATORY RELIEF.

CHAPTER I. Damages in general.
II. Measure of damages.

CHAPTER I.

DAMAGES IN GENERAL.

ARTICLE I. General principles.
II. Interest as damages.
III. Exemplary damages.

ARTICLE I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

SECTION 1832. Person suffering detriment, may recover damages. 1833. Detriment, what.

1834. Injuries resulting or probable after suit brought.

Person sufment, may

fering detri

recover

S1832. Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a compensation there for in damages. money, which is called damages.

S1833. Detriment is a loss or harm suffered in Detriment, person or property.

This word is used in order to avoid the repetition of
the words "loss or harm" in the numerous places in
which they must otherwise occur. Injury signifies the
wrongful act, and not its results, while on the other
hand there may be loss without injury. The phrase
“damnum absque injuria," is familiar to lawyers. The
word "harm" alone would be inadequate to express
all the meaning of "loss."

S1834. Damages may be awarded, in a judicial proceeding, for detriment resulting after the commencement thereof, or certain to result in the future.

Drew v. Sixth Avenue R. R., 26 N. Y., 49.

what.

Injuries probable brought.

resulting or

after suit

ARTICLE II.

Person

entitled to

recover

damages,

interest thereon.

INTEREST AS DAMAGES.

SECTION 1835. Person entitled to recover damages, may recover interest

thereon.

1836. In actions other than contract.

1837. Limit of rate by contract.

1838. Acceptance of principal waives claim to interest.

S 1835. Every person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain

may recover by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day,' except during such time as the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor, from paying the debt."

In actions

other than

2

This seems to be the rule in actions for wrongful injuries (Andrews v. Durant, 18 N. Y., 496; Jackson v. Wood, 24 Wend., 443), as it clearly is in actions upon contract (Dana v. Fiedler, 12 N. Y., 40; Van Rensselaer v. Jewett, 2 N. Y., 136; Livingston v. Miller, 11 N. Y., 80; Purdy v. Phillips, 11 N. Y., 406; 1 Duer, 369; see Brinckerhoff v. Phelps, 24 Barb., 100; Sherman v. Wells, 28 id., 403). The obligation to pay interest rests upon the default of the debtor, and not upon his use of the money (Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow., 587; People v. County of N. Y., id., 331).

* If a debtor is prevented from paying by injunction he is not liable for interest (Stevens v. Barringer, 13 Wend., 639; Fitzgerald v. Caldwell, 2 Dallas, 215; Le Braithwait v. Halsey, 4 Halst., 3).

$1836. In an action for the breach of an obliga

on contract. tion not arising from contract,' and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury."

Limit of rate by contract.

1 Sedgw. Dam., 385, 386.

Wilson v. Conine, 2 Johns., 280; Bissel v. Hopkins, 4
Cow., 53; Hyde v. Stone, 7 Wend., 354; Baker v.
Weller, 8 Wend., 504; Dillerback v. Jerome, 7 Cow
294; Beals v. Guernsey, 8 Johns., 446.

S 1837. Any legal rate of interest stipulated by a contract remains chargeable after a breach thereof, as

before, until the contract is superseded by a verdict
or other new obligation.

This rule is established in California, by statute (Kohler
v. Smith, 2 Cal., 597). The common law rule is other-
wise. Compare Lawrence v. Leake & Watts Orphan
House, 2 Den., 577.

of principal

S1838. Accepting payment of the whole principal, Acceptance as such, waives all claim to interest.

Jacot v. Emmett, 11 Paige, 142; Gillespie v. Mayor, &c.,
of New York, 3 Edw., 512; Tillotson v. Preston, 3
Johns., 229; Johnston v. Brannan, 5 id., 268; Wil-
liams v. Houghtaling, 3 Cow., 86; Consequa v. Fanning,
3 Johns. Ch., 587. But receiving a general payment,
though precisely enough (People v. County of New
York, 5 Cow., 331), or more than enough (Stevens v.
Barringer, 13 Wend., 639) to pay the principal, does
not defeat the right to recover the interest. And if
payment of interest is stipulated in the contract, it may
be recovered, although the principal has been paid
(Fake v. Eddy, 15 Wend., 76).

waives claim to interest.

ARTICLE III.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

SECTION 1839. Exemplary damages, in what cases allowed.

damages, in

what cases

allowed.

$1839. In any action for the breach of an obligation Exemplary not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages' for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant."

1 In this the commissioners have taken the rule as now
settled in this state by the court of appeals (Hunt v.
Bennett, 19 N. Y., 173; and see Johnson v. Jenkins,
24 N. Y., 252; Fry v. Bennett, 1 Abb. Pr., 289; 4
Duer, 247; Brown v. Chadsey, 39 Barb., 253, 259;
Sharon v. Mosher, 17 Barb., 518). The propriety of
allowing damages by way of punishment has been,
however, very earnestly and ably questioned. See
the discussion of this subject in Sedgwick on Dam.,
3d edition, ch. 18, and especially p. 477, note 2; and
Appendix.

Tillotson v. Cheatham, 3 Johns., 56, 64.

CHAPTER II.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

ARTICLE I. Damages for breach of contract.
II. Damages for wrongs.

III. Penal damages.

IV. General provisions.

Measure of

damages for breach of contract.

ARTICLE I.

DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.

SECTION 1840. Measure of damages for breach of contract.
1841. Damages must be certain.

1842. Breach of promise to pay liquidated sum.

1843. Dishonor of bills of exchange.

1844. Breach of covenant of seizure, &c.

1845. Breach of covenant against incumbrances.

1846. Breach of agreement to convey real property.

1847. Breach of agreement to buy real property.

1848. Breach of agreement to sell personal property, not paid for
1849. Breach of agreement to sell personal property, paid for.
1850. Breach of agreement to pay for personal property sold.
1851. Breach of agreement to buy personal property.
1852. Breach of warranty of title to personal property.
1853. Breach of warranty of quality of personal property.
1854. Breach of warranty of quality for special purpose.
1855. Breach of carrier's obligation to receive goods, &c.
1856. Breach of carrier's obligation to deliver.

1857. Carrier's delay.

1858. Breach of warranty of authority.

1859. Breach of promise of marriage.

1840. For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, which the party in fault had notice, at the time of entering into the contract,' or at any time before the breach, and while it was in his power to perform the contract upon his part, would be likely to result from such breach, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.1

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