any other means, except a written agreement between Obligahim and the person with whom he deals. NOTE. "Obligations not altered by notice."-Nevins vs. Bay State Steamboat Co., 4 Bosw., p. 225; Cole vs. Goodwin, 19 Wend., p. 251; approved, Dorr vs. N. J. Steam Nav. Co., 11 N. Y., p. 485. "Nor otherwise, except by written agreement." This provision is new, in so far as it requires the agreement to be written; but it seems eminently desirable that such should be the law. This subject is ably discussed in Red. on Carr., Sec. 138, et seq., where, in Sec. 140, it is said: "Notice brought home to the owner of the goods as evidence merits a very different consideration in this species of bailment from any other, where there is no obligation upon the bailee to assume the duty." With the carrier of the text it is not optional, if the goods to be carried, or act to be done, is in the course of his customary business. That one of their liabilities, that of an insurer, may be limited by notice consented to by owner, has been decided in most of the State Courts, except New York.-Id., Sec. 144; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. vs. Merc. Bank, 6 How. U. S., p. 344. Being regarded in the light of an express contract is the ground of these decisions. In Sec. 147, id., it is said the right of the carrier to restrict his liabilities by special acceptance is firmly established in Pennsylvania. See Atwood vs. The Reliance Co., 9 Watts, p. 87; Brigham vs. Rogers, 6 Watts & Serg., p. 495; Laing vs. Colder, 8 Penn. St., p. 479. All these cases referred to in Dorras. N. J. Steam Nav. Co., 1 Kernan, p. 485, supra. It is, however, pretty well settled (Sec. 148 id.) that the restriction by notice brought home to owner only limits their responsibility as insurers, as by special contract at the time of the acceptance of the goods. From these authorities and cases it will be apparent that this power of restricting the ordinary obligations of common carriers, implied by law, from conducting the business, is far from being uniform or settled, and affords the strongest possible argument in favor of the adoption of the rule laid down in the text, and in making it of universal application, for under it such variance must be in writing and between the carrier and his employer. tions of carrier altered only by agreement. 2175. A common carrier cannot be exonerated, Certain by any agreement made in anticipation thereof, from void. agreements liability for the gross negligence, fraud, or willful wrong of himself or his servants. NOTE.-Penn. R. R. vs. McCloskey, 23 Penn. St., p. 532; Camden & Amboy R. R. vs. Baldauff, 16 id., p. 67; Smith vs. N. Y. Central R. R., 29 Barb., p. 132; affirmed, 24 N. Y., p. 222. The latest cases in New York seem to hold that the carrier may be exempted from such liability for the acts of his servants.-Bissell vs. N. Y. Central R. R., 25 N. Y., p. 442; reversing S. C., 29 Barb., p. 502; Perkins vs. N. Y. Central R. R., 24 N. Y., p. 196; Wells vs. Same, id., p. 181. But these decisions were made by a bare majority of the Court of Appeals, and the dissenting opinions are regarded as entitled to the most weight. It is notorious that the negligence of railroad managers cannot be stopped by criminal prosecutions, and if they are enabled, by a reduction of a few cents in the fare, to escape a civil action, they will be practicably irresponsible for the acts of their servants. 2176. A passenger, consignor, or consignee, by accepting a ticket, bill of lading, or written contract for carriage, with a knowledge of its terms, assents to the rate of hire, the time, place, and manner of delivery therein stated. But his assent to any other modification of the carrier's rights or obligations contained in such instrument can only be manifested by his signature to the same. NOTE.-Nevins vs. Bay State Steamboat Co., 4 Bosw., p. 225. This appears to be the only sound rule, notwithstanding its apparent repudiation by a bare majority of the New York Court of Appeals. See Bissell vs. N. Y. Central R. R., 25 N. Y., p. 442. This should be the rule, to correspond with the provisions of Sec. 2174, ante. See, also, note to that section. ARTICLE II. COMMON CARRIERS OF PERSONS. SECTION 2180. Obligation to carry luggage. 2181. Luggage, what. 2182. Liability for luggage. 2183. Luggage, how carried and delivered. SECTION 2184. Obligation to provide vehicles. 2185. Seats for passengers. 2180. 2186. Regulations for conduct of business. 2188. Ejection of passengers. 2189. Passenger who has not paid fare. to carry A common carrier of persons, unless his Obligation vehicle is fitted for the reception of passengers exclu- luggage. sively, must receive and carry a reasonable amount of luggage for each passenger, without any charge except for an excess of weight over one hundred pounds to a passenger. NOTE. This obligation is usually provided for by statute.-See Red. on Car., etc., Sec. 486. Cannot enforce a rule requiring passenger to be booked and his passage paid before receiving his baggage, for it is inconsistent with the usual statute, and it would be a restriction on the rule of this text unauthorized.—Id., Secs. 71 to 76. Carriers of passengers are liable as common carriers for their baggage, and their checks take the place of bills of lading; but are responsible without giving check, if received as baggage, and whether passenger has paid his fare or not, or is riding on a free pass. See Sec. 481, ante, " Railroad Corporation Business." Company is not liable unless baggage is given in charge of their servants.-Red. on Car., etc., Sec. 74. Their liability results from duty, and not from contract in regard to baggage or passengers.—Id., Sec. 75. If one company gives a check for a depot or place beyond their route, they are agents of the owner, under obligations to forward by safe conveyance, and liable therefor.-Id., p. 72. So, when two roads connect and issue reciprocal checks, either may be sued and recovered from on the check of the other.-Id. Luggage is the English term. Our writers have usually used the term baggage.-See id., Sec. 71. what. 2181. Luggage may consist of any articles in- Luggage, tended for the use of a passenger while traveling, or for his personal equipment. 5-vol. ii. NOTE. The implied undertaking of the carrier to carry in safety the baggage of a passenger is not Liability for luggage. Luggage, how carried and delivered. Obligation to provide vehicles. unlimited, and cannot be extended beyond ordinary 2182. The liability of a carrier for luggage received by him with a passenger is the same as that of a common carrier of property. NOTE.-Story on Bailm., Secs. 498, 499, 595; Ang. on Car., Sec. 571; Cary vs. Cleveland & Toledo R. R., 29 Barb., p. 35; Cole vs. Goodwin, 19 Wend., p. 251; Powell vs. Myers, 26 Wend., p. 591. 2183. A common carrier must deliver every passenger's luggage, whether within the prescribed weight or not, immediately upon the arrival of the passenger at his destination; and, unless the vehicle would be overcrowded or overloaded thereby, must carry it on the same vehicle by which he carries the passenger to whom it belongs. NOTE.-Carrier liable for actual delivery of baggage or luggage to the owner.-See this question fully treated in Sec. 73, Red. on Car., etc., and note, wherein the text is fully sustained; Richards vs. The L. B. & S. Coast Railw., 7 C. B., p. 839; Butcher vs. L. & S. W. Railw., 16 C. B., p. 13; s. c. 29 Eng. L. & Eq., p. 347. If passenger chooses to take exclusive control of it, company not liable.-Tower vs. Utica & Sch. Railw., 7 Hill N. Y., p. 47; Camden & Amboy Railw. vs. Belknap, 21 Wend., p. 354. Particularly in point is Glasco vs. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 36 Barb., p. 557. 2184. A common carrier of persons must provide a sufficient number of vehicles to accommodate all the passengers who can be reasonably expected to require carriage at any one time. NOTE.-See Sec. 481, ante, and note thereto; also, Secs. 482, 483, 484, as to how business of railroads is conducted; passengers. 2185. A common carrier of persons must provide Seats for every passenger with a seat. He must not overload his vehicle by receiving and carrying more passengers than its rated capacity allows. NOTE.-See Secs. 481, 482, 483, 484, ante, and notes. |