at which said property had been assessed, and that the reason the said written complaint was not filed with the board of review on or before the first Monday in August, was because it was impossible, on or before the first day of August, to learn the value at which said property had been assessed; that when he went to the office of said board of review to make said complaint he was unable to see any member of the board of review in person, but was referred to a clerk standing at a desk in the front part of the office; that when he handed the complaint to said clerk, said clerk informed said Fry that the said objection would be called up before the board of review in its due course and would be considered by the board of review, and that he, Fry, as agent of said objector, would receive due notice by mail when such objection would be taken up for hearing by said board of review; that he did not, nor did the said B. Loewenthal, nor any person acting on his behalf, receive any notice of any hearing of said objection before said board of review, but that said Fry on several subsequent occasions called at the office of said board of review and inquired of the clerks placed in charge of said office by said board of review as to when said objection would come up for hearing, and was each time informed that said objection had not yet been reached in its order but it would be taken up in due course, and that prior to said hearing said Fry and the said objector would receive notice in writing of the time of said hearing; that the said Fry and the said B. Loewenthal depended upon the statements made by said clerk in the office of the board of review and expected such notice of a hearing upon said objections, but that no such notice was ever received by said Fry or by said Loewenthal, and while said Fry and said Loewenthal were still waiting in expectation of receiving notice of such hearing, the tax books were closed and delivered by the board of review to the county clerk; that no hearing was ever given by said board of review upon the ob

jections filed against the assessment on said property, so far as is known to the said Loewenthal or said Fry, or any person for said Loewenthal or said Fry."

The statute secures to every person whose property is assessed for taxes the right to a hearing before the board of review on a complaint in writing that the property has been assessed too high. The board are required to review the assessment upon such complaint and correct the same as shall appear to be just. This provision is of vital importance to the tax-payer, and it is against every principle of right and justice that he should be deprived of all opportunity to contest the fairness of the assessment. The constitution authorized the General Assembly to provide such revenue as shall be needful by levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property, and the provisions of the statute are designed to accomplish that purpose. The requirement of the statute for a hearing of the complaint is mandatory, and no person ought to be required to pay a tax without a compliance with the law which entitles him to such hearing.

Section 1 of article 9 of the constitution of 1870, except so much thereof as relates to the imposition of taxes upon certain specified occupations, is as follows: "The General Assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its property-such valuation to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise."

In obedience to this constitutional requirement that the value of property assessable for taxation shall be ascertained by some person or persons elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall elect for that purpose, and not by other persons or other

manner, the General Assembly, by an act entitled "An act for the assessment of property," etc., approved February 25, 1898, (Hurd's Stat. 1899, p. 1444,) provided that the value of real property situate in Cook county, as is the property in question, should be ascertained by a board of assessors, consisting of five persons, to be elected in the manner as prescribed in section 3 of the act. The act further provided the board of assessors shall have authority to designate and appoint deputy assessors to perform such duties connected with the assessment of property as may be assigned to them. Section 32 of the act authorizes the selection of three persons, by election, to constitute a board of review, and section 35 empowers the persons composing such board of review, among other duties, on complaint that any property has been assessed too high by the board of assessors, to ascertain the true assessable value of such property and approve or correct the assessment of such property as made by the board of

assessors.

Under the said provision of the constitution hereinbefore referred to, and of the said act of February 25, 1898, made in pursuance thereof, the valuation of property for the purposes of taxation in said city of Chicago and county of Cook is committed to the persons composing said board of assessors, in the first instance, and the persons composing the board of review, when sitting in review of the action of said board of assessors. The power does not reside in the courts to revise the assess ments made by these bodies, on the ground, alone, they fell into an error of judgment in estimating the value of the property. This principle was declared in People ex rel. v. Lots in Ashley, 122 Ill. 297, and many decisions of this court declaring or illustrating it are there collected. In later cases, notably Keokuk Bridge Co. v. People, 145 Ill. 596, Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, 157 id. 543, Clement v. People, 177 id. 144, and Keokuk Bridge Co. v. People, 161 id. 514, the doctrine has been re-affirmed. In Clement v. Peo

ple, supra, we said: "We have repeatedly held that the courts have no power to revise an assessment merely because of a difference of opinion as to the reasonableness of the valuation placed upon the property. On an application for judgment against lands for delinquent taxes it may be objected that the tax is not authorized by law, or is assessed upon property not subject to taxation, or that the property has been fraudulently assessed at too high a rate."

The contention, here, on the part of the appellant is, the county court of Cook county became vested with authority and jurisdiction to ascertain the true valuation of his property for the purposes of taxation, for the reason that the board of review had failed or refused to review the assessment of his property made by the board of assessors, as required of them by the provisions of the second paragraph of section 35 of the said act of February 25, 1898, though he had complained, in writing, to said board of review that the estimate of the value of his said property made by the board of assessors was too high.

Conceding that the board of review refused to perform a plain duty imposed upon it by law, to ascertain the fair cash value of his lots and review and correct the estimate of such value made by the board of assessors, could the appellant lawfully take no further steps to procure an estimate to be made by the tribunal empowered to perform such duty, refuse to pay the taxes levied on the estimated values as made by the board of assessors and standing approved by the non-action of the board of review, and demand that the county court, when asked to enter judgment against his lots as delinquent for such taxes, should take upon itself the duty of estimating the true fair cash value of his property? We think not. His duty was to employ the ample remedy provided by the law to compel the board of review to discharge the duties imposed upon them by law, and ascertain the true fair cash value of his property and revise the action of the

board of assessors accordingly. The board of review, and not the courts, are invested with the power to estimate the value of assessable property, and he should have sought the aid of the courts, not to estimate the value of his property, but to command the board of review to perform that duty.

In the case of Beidler v. Kochersperger, 171 Ill. 563, which was an appeal from the decree of the circuit court dismissing, for want of equity, a bill in chancery which sought to enjoin the collection of a tax, because, as alleged, the property had been over-assessed, and that appellant filed his complaint with the board of supervisors sitting as a board of review, and while said complaint was pending before a committee of that board to whom it had been referred the board adopted a general resolution confirming the assessment returned by the assessors, without notice to appellant or an opportunity to be heard before the board and without considering his complaint, and thus disposed of and completed its work as a board of review, we said (p. 566): "The statute imposed upon the board of supervisors, as an absolute duty, to entertain, consider and determine the application of appellant for relief with respect of the alleged over-valuation of his property. Courts of law possessed ample power to enforce the performance of this duty by the board. Appellant could have applied to such courts for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to perform the duty so charged upon it by the statute,-that is, to hear, consider and decide as to the alleged grievance. * * It is the policy of our law the whole matter of the valuation of property for taxation shall be committed to the control of the assessor, the board of review and the board of supervisors of the respective counties. (People ex rel. v. Lots in Ashley, 122 Ill. 297.) It was therefore incumbent upon the appellant to have availed himself of the ample and adequate remedy of the writ of mandamus to secure action on the part of the board of supervisors, in order

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