dered for the defendant. The judgment was on writ of error affirmed by the Appellate Court, and the plaintiff then sued out this writ of error to reverse the judgments of the Appellate and circuit courts.

The plaintiff's cause of action is set forth in the special count, in substance and effect, that "the plaintiff complains of the village of Oquawka, a body politic and corporate organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois, the defendant, of a plea of trespass on the case on promises; for that whereas, heretofore, to-wit, at the county aforesaid, the defendant, on the first day of January, A. D. 1871, was organized as a town under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois, and had then and there, in pursuance of an act of the General Assembly of the said State of Illinois entitled 'An act to authorize the town of Oquawka to subscribe to the capital stock of certain corporations therein named,' approved June 1, 1852, and also an act of the said General Assembly of the said State of Illinois entitled 'An act to incorporate the town of Oquawka,' approved February 11, 1857, (reference to which acts is hereby expressly made,) issued certain bonds of the said town of Oquawka, as the defendant was then known and named, which said bonds, to wit, on the day aforesaid, were due and payable, and with interest then and there amounted to, to-wit, the sum of $60,000; that on, to-wit, the first day of July, 1871, for the purpose of compromising, settling and refunding said indebtedness and ridding said defendant of certain suits then and there pending against the said defendant under the name aforesaid, theretofore commenced against the said defendant named and known as aforesaid, and in pursuance of a certain act of the General Assembly of the said State of Illinois entitled 'An act relating to county and city debts, and to provide for the payment thereof by taxation in such counties and cities,' approved February 13, 1865, and in further pursuance and by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois as they then existed,

at the county aforesaid, under the name and style of "The City of Oquawka,' the town having theretofore changed to that of a city in form, made, executed and issued, in exchange for and upon the surrender of the said bonds theretofore issued, at the rate of fifty cents upon the dollar of the amount due on the said bonds theretofore issued, its certain five bonds in writing, each one signed by its then mayor and city clerk, and sealed with its corporate seal, and numbered, respectively, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, whereby, and in each and by each of the said bonds numbered as aforesaid, the said defendant, by the name and style of the said city of Oquawka, promised to pay the bearer thereof, twenty years after the date thereof, the sum of $1000, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, payable annually, on the first day of July in each year, at the agency of the treasurer of the State of Illinois in the city of New York, on presentation and surrender of the annexed coupons as they severally became due; and the said defendant then and there, on, to-wit, the first day of July, 1871, at, to wit, the county aforesaid, delivered all of the said bonds to the holders and owners of the said other matured bonds at the rate aforesaid, and thereby then and there became liable to pay the said five bonds to the bearer and holder thereof when due, according to their tenor and effect, and being so liable then and thereon, etc., promised to pay to the bearer the sums of money in said bonds, respectively, mentioned, together with said rate of interest therein specified, when due, according to the tenor and effect of said bonds."

There was printed on the face of each of these bonds this statement: "Issued under an act of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois entitled 'An act relative to county and city debts, and to provide for payment thereof by taxation in such counties and cities,' approved February 13, 1865." And said act was printed in full on the back of each of said bonds, together with the certifi

cate of the Auditor of Public Accounts that said bonds were duly registered in his office on November 29, 1871, in pursuance of said act of 1865.

When the defendant in error contracted the original indebtedness and issued the original bonds, to take up and cancel which the refunding bonds sued on were issued, it was incorporated and organized as a town, but shortly before the refunding bonds were issued it had undertaken to change its form of government to that of a city, and so assumed to act. Afterward it organized

as a village under the act for the incorporation of cities and villages. Said original bonds were in part issued in payment of a subscription to a plank road company, and the rest to reimburse certain persons for money and labor expended in construction of a railroad near said town of Oquawka.

FRANKLIN A. MCCONAUGHY, for plaintiff in error:

The power to issue the original bonds for the purpose and in the manner in which issued was given by express provisions of law. Jameson v. People, 16 Ill. 257; Private Laws of 1857, p. 472; Laws of 1852, p. 89; Laws of 1853, p. 252; Laws of 1839, p. 131.

The conditions imposed by law upon the issuance of the original bonds were duly observed, and, generally, the municipal authorities strictly complied with the law. Melvin v. Lisenby, 72 Ill. 63.

All statutes are held to be remedial which have for their object important and beneficent public ends. Marshall v. Vulter, 1 E. D. Smith, 294; Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597; New Orleans v. St. Romes, 9 La. Ann. 573.

A remedial act should be so construed as most effectually to meet the beneficent end in view. As a general rule it should be most liberally construed. It should receive an equitable, or rather a benignant, interpretation. The letter of the act should sometimes be enlarged, sometimes restrained, and construed contrary, if necessary,

to the letter. It should be extended, by construction, to other cases within the same mischief and occasion of the act, though not expressly within the words. 24 Abbott's N. C. 292; Potter's Dwarris, 231-236; Pearson v. Lovejoy, 53 Barb. 407; Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597; Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y. 446; Condon v. Hayward, 37 id. 653; Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, secs. 108-112, and notes.

Long continued acquiescence and public recognition preclude all question of any irregularity in municipal organization. Jameson v. People, 16 Ill. 257; Hamilton v. Carthage, 24 id. 22; People v. Farnham, 35 id. 566; Dunning v. Railroad Co. 2 Cart. 437; Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 6.

The purchaser of bonds has the right to assume, from the certificate of registration, the existence of all facts necessary to that act. Cairo v. Zane, 149 U. S. 123.

If, through carelessness, mistake or otherwise, bonds recite the wrong act, mis-recite the right act or recite an act which had been repealed at the time, such bonds are nevertheless binding on the corporation if it in fact had the legal authority to issue the bonds for the purpose for which issued. Knox County v. Bank, 147 U. S. 91; Anderson County Comrs. v. Beal, 113 id. 227; Railroad Co. v. Smith, 23 Kan. 745; Johnson County v. January, 94 U. S. 202.

But, independently of either the act of 1865, of 1869, or any of the subsequent acts in this municipality, the inherent and implied power existed, by judicial determination, in the State of Illinois to refund its bonded indebtedness. So it has been held repeatedly by the court of last resort in this State, both before and after the adoption of the constitution of 1870. Johnson v. Stark County, 24 Ill. 75; Quincy v. Warfield, 25 id. 281; Galena v. Corwith, 48 id. 425; Smith v. Peoria County, 59 id. 425; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 id. 450; Burr v. Carbondale, 76 id. 474; Highway Comrs. v. Newell, 80 id. 595; Hardin v. McFarlan, 82 id. 140; Hyde Park v. Ingalls, 87 id. 13; Law v. People, 87 id. 410; Kane v. Charleston, 161 id. 179; Folsom v. School Directors, 91 id. 402.

RAUS COOPER, and KIRKPATRICK & ALEXANDER, for defendant in error:

A municipal corporation can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Huesing v. Rock Island, 128 Ill. 465; Law v. People, 87 id. 385; Trustees v. McConnell, 12 id. 138; Hall v. Jackson County, 95 id. 352; Wells v. Whittaker, 4 Ill. App. 381; Strodtman v. County of Menard, 56 id. 125; Mt. Carmel v. Shaw, 52 id. 433; Chicago v. McCoy, 136 Ill. 344; Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 148 id. 141; Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 140 id. 216; Smith v. McDowell, 148 id. 51; Wheeler v. County of Wayne, 132 id. 599; Hewitt v. Normal School, 94 id. 528; Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 476; Gaddis v. Richland County, 92 Ill. 119.

A municipal corporation being created for governmental and not for commercial purposes, the power to borrow money or incur debts is not incident to its corporate existence. Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 476; Bourdeaux v. Coquard, 47 Ill. App. 254; Hutchinson v. Self, 153 Ill. 550; Law v. People, 87 id. 410; 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. 488.

If there is a doubt as to the power it is resolved against the corporation. Hutchinson v. Self, 153 Ill. 550; Seeger v. Mueller, 133 id. 86; Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673; Brenham v. Bank, 144 id. 173; Kelley v. Milan, 127 id. 625; Risley v. Howe, 12 C. C. A. 220; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 Ill. 250; Hill v. Memphis, 134 U. S. 194; Ottawa v. Carey, 108 id. 110; Highway Comrs. v. Newell, 80 I11. 587; Champaign v. Harmon, 98 id. 491; Cooley on Taxation, 209; Dillon on Mun. Corp. secs. 151, 507, 507 a.

Where a particular mode is provided by statute to effect a particular purpose no other can lawfully be pursued. County of Hardin v. McFarlan, 82 Ill. 138; Goodrich v. Lincoln, 93 id. 359; Locke v. Davison, 111 id. 23; Gaddis v. Richland County, 92 id. 124; Mayor v. Ray, 19 Wall. 475.