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through the transom over a door into a room occupied by him and the young woman who was his nurse. There was practically no dispute of these facts, and there was nothing whatever to cast any reflection upon any witness or other person. It is the duty of a court to preserve its own dignity and the respect due to the courts and the administration of the law, by not allowing counsel, under the pretense of arguing the case, to indulge in coarse and vulgar abuse of parties or witnesses. Such conduct on the part of counsel tends to bring the administration of law and the courts into disrepute, and to destroy the respect of litigants, jurors and the public for the courts and the law. A party litigant, however, can only complain where he has objected and obtained a ruling and excepted to it, or excepted to a refusal of the court to
(Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railroad Co. v. Fletcher, 128 Ill. 619; Holloway v. Johnson, 129 id. 367; Marder, Luse & Co. v. Leary, 137 id. 319; West Chicago Street Railroad Co. v. Sullivan, 165 id. 302; North Chicago Street Railroad Co. v. Leonard, 167 id. 618; Chicago and Erie Railroad Co. v. Cleminger, 178 id. 536.) As to this address generally, no such action was taken. 'Only one objection was made, and that was to one of the attacks on the mayor for the employment of a detective in St. Louis. The court said it was a matter of argument and might be answered. The objection was only to a minor matter, of but little importance as compared with other portions of the address to which no objection was made. Counsel were satisfied to permit the other and far more objectionable remarks to pass without protest, and in view of all the evidence we do not feel justified in reversing the judgment on account of the ruling. The jury were fully justified in adopting, as they did, the evidence for plaintiff as to the extent of the injuries sustained. It was undis. puted that plaintiff's expenditures on account of the injuries had amounted at the time of the trial to $1465.45, and the damages were assessed at $3000. Plaintiff had
not recovered from the effects of the injury, and the verdict would indicate that either the address was its own antidote or any injurious effects were removed and obvi. ated by the addresses of the two attorneys for the defendant, which the record shows followed in reply. We are satisfied that the defendant was not injured, and that the judgment should be affirmed. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. Bondurant
SEYMOUR MARQUISS et al.
Opinion filed October 24, 1901.
1. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when a franchise is involved in quo warranto. A franchise is involved in quo warranto proceedings against village officers where the controversy is as to the legality of the organization of the village and its right to exercise the municipal powers and privileges conferred by the City and Village act.
2. ELECTIONS-village organization election law not repealed by Ballot act of 1891. The provisions of article 11 of the City and Village act, relating to elections held for the purpose of organizing villages, were not repealed by the Ballot act of 1891.
3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-farm lands may be included in village organization. Section 5 of article 11 of the City and Village act, providing for the organization of villages, does not require that the lands embraced within the village limits shall be platted into lots and blocks; nor is the including of farm lands precluded by the act for disconnecting territory from cities and villages.
4. SAME — language “contiguous territory, not exceeding two square miles,” construed. The language of section 5 of article 11 of the City and Village act, that "any area of contiguous territory, not exceeding two square miles,” etc., may be organized into a village, means that the area of such village shall not exceed two square miles in extent and that the territory shall be contiguous.
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Piatt county; the Hon. W. G. COCHRAN, Judge, presiding.
C. F. MANSFIELD, State's Attorney, (J. L. RAY, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.
REED & EDIE, for defendants in error.
Mr. JUSTICE HAND delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an information in the nature of a quo warranto, filed by the State's attorney of Piatt county in the circuit court of said county, on the relation of Thomas E. Bondurant, to contest the legality of the organization of the village of DeLand, in said county. The information is brought against the officers of the village, and charges that, without any warrant or right whatsoever, Seymour Marquiss was holding and executing and has usurped the office of president of the board of trustees, John W. Dressback, William Keighon, Henry Gessford, Samuel Reddick, W. H. Gantz and John Vail the office of trustee, S. A. Goodman the office of clerk, and J. H. Ran. kin the office of police magistrate of said village, and prays that they may be required to show by what war. rant they hold and execute their respective offices. The defendants, by plea, set up in detail the proceedings for the organization of the village, resulting in an order declaring it duly organized and calling an election for the choice of village officers, and that at such election the defendants were duly elected to their respective offices, and that by that warrant they hold the same and discharge the duties thereof. To this plea the relator filed four replications, in the first of which it was alleged that the election called by the county judge to vote upon the question of organizing said territory into a village was not called by the county judge to be held under the Australian ballot system, as prayed for in said petition; in the second of which it was alleged that the petition to organize said village was a petition to organize farm lands into a village; in the third of which it was alleged that the said petition and proceedings to incorporate said village take into said corporation the south-west
quarter of section 4, the south-east quarter and the east half of the south-west quarter of section 5, belonging to the relator; that the same are farming lands, and were never used for anything but farming purposes and have never been platted or subdivided for village or suburban purposes into lots, blocks, streets or alleys, and that the same lie along the borders and outer edge of said incorporated village and about a half mile from the platted part of said village, and that the relator objected to and voted against incorporating said lands in said village; and in the fourth of which it was alleged that the lands described in said petition and incorporated in said village are not two square miles of contiguous territory. The information having been dismissed as to S. A. Good man, William Keighon, W. H. Gantz and John Vail, whose terms of office had expired, and William M. McBride, William 0. Dillavou, William E. Adams and C. W. Colvin, their successors in office, having been substituted as defendants in their stead, the defendants demurred specially to said replications, which demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, to reverse which judgment the relator has prosecuted a writ of error from this court. A motion by defendants in error to dismiss the writ for want of jurisdiction was reserved and taken with the case.
It was incumbent upon the defendants in error to justify, and in so doing it was necessary for them to state particularly the organization of the village. This could not be done without setting up in detail the proceedings for the organization thereof. (Clark v. People, 15 Ill. 213; Carrico v. People, 123 id. 198; Kamp v. People, 141 id. 9.) There was, therefore, a controversy as to the legality of the organization of the village and to its right to exercise the municipal powers and privileges conferred by the legislature upon villages under the act for the incorporation of cities and villages, which involves a franchise. (People v. O' Hair, 128 Ill. 20; People v. City of Spring Valley,
129 id. 169; People v. Bruennemer, 168 id. 482.) The case, therefore, was properly brought directly to this court. The motion to dismiss is accordingly denied.
The City and Village act provides that upon the filing of a petition for the incorporation of a village from unorganized territory, in the office of the county clerk, it shall be the duty of the county judge to call an election within the territory sought to be organized into an incorporated village, for the purpose of voting upon village organization, and that he shall fix the time and place, give notice and appoint judges thereof, and that each qualified voter residing within such proposed village shall have the right to cast a ballot at such election with the words thereon, “For village organization under the general law," or "Against village organization under the general law," and that the returns of such election shall be made to the county judge, who shall call to his assistance any two justices of the peace and canvass such returns and cause a statement of the result of such election to be entered upon the records of the county court, and that if a majority of the votes cast at such election is for village organization under the general law, such proposed village, with the boundaries and name mentioned in the petition, shall from thenceforth be deemed an organized village under said act, and that the county judge shall thereupon call and fix the time and place of an election to elect village officers, and cause notice thereof to be posted and published, and perform all other acts in reference to such election, in like manner, as nearly as may be, as he is required to perform in reference to the election of officers in newly organized cities. This act is special in its nature and applies only to a particular class of elections,-the organization of villages under the general law,-and was not repealed by the Ballot law passed in 1891. People v.Cowden, 160 I11. 557; People v. Brown, 189 id. 619; Village of Ridgway v. Gallatin County, 181 id. 521.