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defaulted and the bill was answered by appellants, who insisted that the bond had been forfeited and that the amount tendered was not sufficient to pay the amount due. The court heard the evidence of the parties and found for the appellee, and decreed that the appellants should convey to him, by quit-claim deed, all interest in the premises upon payment of the amount found due by the court, which was tendered in open court and refused and left with the clerk of the court. The costs were adjudged against the appellants, and they appealed.

The bill alleged that the deed by the complainant, Tomlinson, and his co-tenant, Whan, to Edwin H. Carroll, was intended by the parties to be a security for the amount then due on the mortgage and certain sums paid for taxes and redemption from tax sale and expenses, and that the conveyance and bond amounted to a mortgage. It is insisted that the transaction did not have the character of a mortgage, but that it was a conveyance with an agreement to re-convey, which might be forfeited for non-compliance with the terms of the bond. There was no agreement on the part of the complainant and Whan to do anything or to pay any money, and the bond did not secure any debt. A mortgage is security for a debt or obligation and an incident thereto, and it is therefore held that a debt or obligation of some kind is an essential element in a mortgage. (Rue v. Dole, 107 Ill. 275; Burgett v. Osborne, 172 id. 227.) The bond merely provided that if the complainant and Whan should pay a certain sum, with interest and taxes, the obligors would convey the premises. There was no liability which the makers of the bond could enforce and no debt or obligation. The conveyance and bond did not amount to a mortgage, but the bill set out the transaction and the instruments executed by the parties, and was so framed as to authorize a decree for a specific performance.

In the next place, it is contended that the complainant was not entitled to a specific performance because

the bond had been forfeited. When the money was due by the terms of the bond, complainant paid Edwin H. Carroll $500, and it is conceded that the time was then extended to September 1, 1899. There were further agreements for extension, but it is contended that Carroll never agreed to extend the principal sum beyond March 1, 1900. Time was made of the essence of the contract, but Carroll waived the provision so far as the first extension was concerned, and it is clear that afterward, while he was anxious to collect the interest, he was unwilling to receive the whole amount. He wrote several letters during 1900, and as late as the last of November he objected to receiving the principal, which would probably be idle in his hands until the next spring. In these letters he was insisting upon payment of the seven per cent interest, and, at the same time, was unwilling to take the principal when he could not realize the same rate of interest or perhaps the money would be idle. The evidence failed to show that there was any forfeiture.

It is next contended that the court did not ascertain correctly the amount due. The bond had been lost or mislaid and its contents were proved by the testimony of witnesses. They differed slightly as to the amount, and we see no reason to differ with the court in its conclusion. The principal thing complained of is, that the court charged the defendant Edwin H. Carroll with $360 as rent collected when he only collected $200. By agreement he had possession of the land from March 1, 1898, to March 1, 1899, and was to rent the land and apply the rent on the bond. He rented it to one Swanson for $360, payable March 1, 1899. The land was overflowed and a good part of the crops was lost, and he, deeming it equitable to the tenant, threw off $50 of the rent. Of the remaining $310, $200 was paid to him. The evidence showed that the tenant was good and that the rent could have been collected. It was, perhaps, a hardship for the tenant to pay the rent under the circumstances, but the

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obligation to pay was not affected thereby, and Carroll had no right to release a part of the rent without the consent of those beneficially interested. He did not show that he could not, by reasonable effort, have collected the rent, and he was chargeable with it if he could by reasonable diligence have collected it. Jackson v. Lynch, 129 Ill. 72.

It is further objected that the costs should not have been adjudged against the defendants because there was no allegation in the bill that the complainant was willing and ready to pay all that was due on the bond. The bill alleged that he offered to pay all that was afterward found due by the court, and the amount tendered was sufficient to pay the debt, with the exception of what the defendant Edwin H. Carroll had paid to the county clerk to redeem from a sale of the land to complainant for taxes. Complainant had bought the land at a tax sale, but he was bound to pay the taxes, and his payment by purchase was not different from any other payment. The purchase was worth nothing against Carroll and he was not called upon to redeem from it. Inasmuch as he had done so, the court required Tomlinson to refund the amount in addition to the amount due on the bond. Costs in chancery cases are ordinarily in the discretion of the court, and we do not think the discretion was abused in this case.

Finally, it is urged as error that the cause was not referred to a master in chancery to state an account. There was no such general account as required a reference. There was nothing to be done but to compute interest and a few payments on the bond and the amount paid to redeem from the tax sale. We perceive no error in the decree, but think the equities were with the complainant and that the decree was right.

The decree is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

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1. SANITARY DISTRICTS-when ordinance sufficiently specifies purposes for which proceeds from bonds are to be used. Under section 9 of the Sanitary Drainage act, providing that districts "may borrow money for corporate purposes and may issue bonds therefor," an ordinance adopted by the Sanitary District of Chicago which provides for an issue of bonds the proceeds of which shall be used for "corporate purposes" is sufficiently definite in that respect.

2. SAME-Sanitary District of Chicago may deepen and widen Chicago river. The Sanitary District of Chicago has power, with the consent of the Federal government and upon payment of such damages as it may cause, to widen and deepen the Chicago river so that the same shall have sufficient capacity to supply the drainage canal with enough water to enable the district to comply with the statute regulating the flow of water without violating the restrictions contained in the permit issued by the Secretary of War to turn the water into the canal.

3. SAME-sanitary district may build new bridges across the Chicago river. If the necessary changes to be made in the Chicago river by the sanitary district will render any existing bridge or bridges unfit for use, the district has power to re-place such bridges with new ones of proper construction.

4. SAME-eleventh issue of bonds is within the debt limit. The eleventh issue of bonds by the Sanitary District of Chicago in the amount of $2,750,000 is within the amount which the district is authorized by law to raise, both as regards the percentage of indebtedness and the $15,000,000 limit imposed by sections 9, 10 and 12 of the Sanitary Drainage act of 1889.

5. SAME-equalized assessment for preceding year is proper basis for estimating legal limit of indebtedness. Whether or not the amount of the bond issue of the sanitary district of the date of October 22, 1900, is within the legal limit imposed by statute upon the right of the sanitary district to incur indebtedness, is to be ascertained by computation, based upon the equalized assessed valuation of the property within the district for the year 1899.

6. PARTIES-purchaser of bonds is necessary party to bill to cancel the sale and avoid the bonds. The purchaser of bonds issued by a corporation is a necessary party to a bill to have the bonds declared invalid and the sale thereof fraudulent and collusive.

MAGRUDER, J., dissenting.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARLES G. NEELY, Judge, presiding.

WOOD & OAKLEY, for appellant:

The right of a tax-payer to control and to keep within legitimate channels the municipal funds to which he is bound to contribute is unquestioned. Consequently, he has the right to invoke the aid of a court of chancery to restrain the mis-use of public funds or the issuance, wrongfully, of municipal bonds. Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626.

Sanitary districts being corporations of a quasi municipal character and erected to perform one single function, can exercise no powers except those expressly granted. In this respect they differ from municipal corporations, properly so called, particularly in tax matters. Dillon on Mun. Corp. secs. 89, 91.

The first duty of the sanitary district is to perform the corporate functions for which it was created, and hence it cannot pledge or mortgage its income to such an extent as to impair its ability to perform this first duty. White v. Mayor of Decatur, 23 So. Rep. 999.

The bonds are made void by the failure of the district to make provision for a tax with which to pay interest for the year 1900, in violation of the constitution of Illinois, (art. 9, sec. 12,) and of section 10 of the Drainage act. Kyes v. St. Croix County, 83 N. W. Rep. 637.

The fact that since the bill was filed the bonds, the issuance of which the bill sought to restrain, have been put out either in good or in bad faith, does not impair the right of complainant (if his contention be well founded) to the writ of injunction, for the reason that defendant acted at its peril, as did all purchasers. Holden v. Alton, 179 Ill. 318; Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 id. 313; Moundsville v. Ohio River Co. 20 L. R. A. 161; Hunt v. Sain, 181 Ill. 372; Harrison v. Supervisors, 51 Wis. 647; Snyder v. Railway Co. 41 L. R. A. 345; Central Trust Co. v. Moran, 29 id. 212; High

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