the procuring of the same, the Appellate Court has found that there was no fraud in the execution of the release. In this regard, the finding of facts by the Appellate Court was necessarily different from the finding of facts by the trial court, because the latter court could not have rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in error without finding that the release was not a bar to his right of recovery. It is apparent from the finding of the Appellate Court, that it excluded all evidence of fraudulent representations as not being germain to the issue, upon the ground that a court of law had no jurisdiction to try the question, whether or not the release had been obtained by fraudulent representations. The evidence is clear, that plaintiff in error fully understood that he was signing a release of all his claims or demands against the defendant in error, arising from the injuries received by him while at work for the defendant in error. He fully understood the character of the instrument which he signed, and received the consideration named therein, to-wit: the sum of $550.00, and still retains the same. There is no claim on the part of the plaintiff in error, or his counsel, that there was any fraud in the execution of the instrument by any misrepresentation as to the character of the instrument signed. The only fraud, charged by the plaintiff in error, is that fraudulent representations as to collateral matters were made to him, in order to induce him to sign an instrument, which he well understood at the time to be, in its nature and effect, a release. The finding of facts, made by the Appellate Court, would have been more complete, if the finding had proceeded to state that the release had not been obtained by any fraud in the execution thereof. But such finding is embraced and included in the general finding that the release was a valid writing. The finding, that it was a valid writing, was the finding of an ultimate fact, and the fact, that it was not procured by fraud in the execu tion, was merely an evidentiary fact. It is not necessary that the Appellate Court, in embodying in its judgment the finding of facts which the statute requires, should find the merely subordinate or evidentiary facts which, when established, contribute to the establishment of the ultimate fact. It is the ultimate fact, which must exist, in order to sustain the cause of action or defense. (Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Pulling, 159 Ill. 603; Hogan v. City of Chicago, 168 id. 551). Where the Appellate Court makes such a finding of facts, as is contemplated by section 87 of the Practice act, this court may inquire, whether the law has been correctly applied to the facts, to determine whether the refusal to remand the cause was proper. (Hogan v. City of Chicago, supra). If the Appellate Court has here embodied in its finding of facts what appears to be a conclusion of law, it is apparent that its holding on such question of law constitutes a holding of law on conceded facts. (Meyer v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 177 Ill. 591). The main question of law, therefore, which is presented for our consideration is, whether, in this action at law, it was proper to consider only fraud in the execution of the release, if there was any, and not fraud, consisting of false representations as to the nature and value of the consideration, upon which the release was based. It seems to be well settled that, when the signature to an instrument under seal is procured by false representations, the nature of the instrument being fully understood by the party signing it, the effect of such instrument can only be avoided by a separate proceeding in equity. Perhaps the leading case upon this subject in this country is the case of George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564, where the Supreme Court of the United States say: "It is well settled that the only fraud, permissible to be proved at law in these cases, is fraud touching the execution of the instrument, such as misreading, the surreptitious substi * * * tution of one paper for another, or obtaining by some other trick or device an instrument which the party did not intend to give. The remedy is by a direct proceeding to avoid the instrument." In an action at law, a written release, of the character of that here introduced in evidence, cannot be impeached for fraud, not inhering in the execution thereof, but which only goes to the extent of the consideration. In Vandervelden v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. 61 Fed. Rep. 54, it was said: "In the States where the two systems of jurisprudence prevail,-of equity and the common law,—a court of law refuses to open the question of fraud in the consideration, or in the transaction out of which the consideration arises, in a suit upon the sealed instrument, but turns the party over to a court of equity, where the instrument can be set aside upon such terms as, under all the circumstances, may be equitable and just between the parties. A court of law can hold no middle course; the question is limited to the validity or invalidity of the deed. Fraud in the execution of the instrument has always been admitted in a court of law; as, where it has been misread, or some other fraud or imposition has been practiced upon the party in procuring his signature and seal. The fraud in this aspect goes to the question whether or not the instrument ever had any legal existence. (Hartshorn v. Day, 19 How. 211). It is, therefore, necessary, where the party desires to escape the legal bar created by a written instrument by him duly executed, knowing, at the time of execution, its legal effect, and especially where the other party has performed the contract on his part, that the remedy should be by means of a direct proceeding to avoid the instru ment, or, in other words, by a proceeding in equity. Until the instrument is annulled by a decree to that effect in a further proceeding, its legal effect remains unimpaired. It stands between the parties as a valid legal contract of settlement; and, in an action at law upon the original * * * cause of action, the defendant may plead and rely upon it, and the court of law is bound to construe it and enforce it according to its legal effect. The legal effect of the release in this case is to bar the action of the plaintiff." (Shampeau v. Connecticut River Lumber Co. 42 Fed. Rep. 760; Kosztelnik v. Bethlehem Iron Co. 91 id. 606). The same doctrine has been recognized and adopted by this court. In Escherick v. Traver, 65 Ill. 379, which was an action of ejectment, wherein the defendant, in order to avoid the effect of a deed introduced by the plaintiff and defeat a recovery, proposed to prove that he was induced to make and deliver the deed by means of representations made by the plaintiff, that the Iowa lands, which formed the main consideration of the deed, were good rolling prairie lands, and well adapted to farming purposes, and worth $20.00 an acre, and situated within thirty miles of a certain city, and near a railroad, which was in process of construction, and that such representations were false and fraudulent and made with a design to cheat and defraud the defendant, etc.; to all of which evidence the plaintiff objected, which objection the court sustained, and decided that such evidence was incompetent and inadmissible, the defendant excepting to the ruling; and, upon an appeal to this court by the defendant in that case from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff therein, this court held that fraudulent representations, made to induce the execution of a deed can not be admitted to defeat a recovery in ejectment, where the representations relate merely to the nature or value of the land. In Escherick v. Traver, supra, we said (p. 381): "Two distinct systems of jurisprudence prevail in this State, one of equity and one of law. Fraud and circumvention used in the procurement of the deed, or the fact that it was executed upon the belief that it was another paper, or that it was misread and its contents falsely stated, may be proved in an action of ejectment; but the consideration is not an element of inquiry;" * * * and it was there held that the "jurisdiction of such questions rightly pertains" to a court of chancery. (Gage v. Lewis, 68 Ill. 604). In Windett v. Hurlbut, 115 Ill. 403, this court said (p. 405): "The rule is familiar, wherever the distinction between law and equity is preserved, that, in a trial at law, fraud in the execution of a deed may be given in evidence, as that, through misreading, or the substitution of one paper for another, or by other device and trickery, he was induced to seal it, believing, at the time, that he was sealing something else; and it may also be proved that what purports to be a deed, is in truth not a deed, but a forged instrument; but it cannot be proved that the transactions, which preceded and induced the execution of the deed, were fraudulent. Where a party knowingly and voluntarily signs a deed, although he do so in violation of his duty and of the laws, or be induced thereto by the fraudulent contrivances of others, yet if it be such, upon its face, as will convey title, it can only be impeached and set aside, and parol evidence be received for that purpose, in a court of equity." The cases decided by this court, which are referred to by counsel for plaintiff in error as holding a contrary doctrine, will, upon examination of the facts thereof, be found to be consistent with the rule above announced. For instance, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183, which was an action against a railroad company for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, and where a release executed by the plaintiff was introduced in evidence, it appeared that the plaintiff was induced to sign such release by representations that the release covered merely time or wages lost. So, in Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 Ill. 598, which was an action to recover damages for injuries sustained and where a release was introduced in evidence, it appeared that the physician, attending the injured person, practiced a fraud upon her, and made fraudulent representations by stating to her that the offi |