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cers of the company had expended the amount of money, named in the receipt signed by her, for her benefit, and merely wanted something to show the company what the money had been expended for. So, also, in Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 120, the injured party was made to believe that he was merely signing a receipt, instead of a release of his claims or demands against the company at whose hands he had suffered the injuries, for damages on account of which his suit had been brought. ,(20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 763, note 2). Thus, in the three cases last mentioned where the court permitted proof to be introduced as to the practice of fraud in the procurement of the releases, it ap. peared that the fraud consisted in false representations as to the character of the instrument itself which was signed, and that the parties signing were made to believe that they were executing mere receipts, instead of releases. Again, in National Syrup Co.v. Carlson, 47 Ill. App. 178, which was an action to recover damages for personal injuries and where a release was introduced in evidence, it is said that the party signing "was led to believe that it was a paper to enable the paymaster to show where the money went. He was told that he should sign his name for the money, and did so.
The release was not fairly obtained, and did not operate to release the dam· ages sued for." The judgment in the case last referred to was affirmed by this court in National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 155 Ill. 210, where this court said (p. 216): "The question as to whether the release was executed with knowledge on the part of the appellee, or under circumstances that would bind him, was one of fact settled by the adjudications of the Appellate and trial courts.”
For the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that the law was correctly applied to the facts, as found by the Appellate Court.
Second-It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff in error, that evidence as to fraudulent representations of
collateral facts, and going to the nature and value of the consideration of this release, was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff in error upon the trial below, and was not then objected to by the defendant in error upon the ground now set up, namely, that such fraudulent representations could not be properly proven in a court of law but belonged to the jurisdiction of chancery. After an examination of the record we are content with the following statement upon this subject, made by the Appellate Court in their opinion delivered upon their decision of this case: "It was material error to admit in evidence the matters tending to show how it was that appellee was induced to execute the release.
A diligent and careful consideration of the record satisfies us that the objections interposed by the appellant, and the course adopted in trying the case, saved the question for review.”
The trial court erred in admitting the testimony as to the alleged fraudulent representations which did not inhere in the execution of the release. The error in admitting this evidence was an error of law, and, under ordinary circumstances, it would be the duty of the Appellate Court to reverse the cause for such error and remand it for a new trial. We have said: "Had the Appellate Court reversed the judgment on the ground that the trial court had erred in giving or refusing instructions, or erred in its ruling in the admission or exclusion of evidence, or in passing oú any other legal question which might be obviated on another trial, then it would be the duty of the court to remand for another trial." (Senger v. Town of Harvard, 147 Ill. 304; Hogan v. City of Chicago, supra). Here, however, if the cause were remanded to the trial court, the trial court, under the ruling here made, would exclude the testimony in question if again offered upon another trial of the cause; and if such testimony were excluded, the judgment of the trial court would necessarily be in favor of the defendant in error, because there was no fraud in the execution of the
instrument, inasmuch as plaintiff in error admits thať he signed the instrument, and understood its nature and character when he signed it. This being so, a remandment of the cause by the Appellate Court was unnecessary, inasmuch as the result of a reversal and remandment would necessarily be a judgment for defendant in error, and the present judgment of the Appellate Court, reversing without remandment; leads to and involves the same result.
Where an application of the law to the facts found by the Appellate Court leads to a particular judgment as a necessary consequence, and where the result cannot be different if the cause is remanded to the trial court, the Appellate Court is authorized itself to enter the judgment, which would thus necessarily result from the remandment of the cause. (Manistee Lumber Co. v. Union Nat. Bank, 143 Ill. 490).
Third—It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff in error that, inasmuch as the release introduced in evidence in this case was obtained after the suit was commenced and issue was joined, it should have been pleaded puis darrein continuance.
It is undoubtedly the general rule at common law, that a matter of defense, which arises after suit brought, and also after plea filed, and after issue joined, must be pleaded puis darrein continuance. (Mount v. Scholes, 120 Ill. 394). But an action on the case is an exception to this rule. “In such an action the defendant is permitted under the general issue to give in evidence a release, a former recovery, a satisfaction, or any other matter ex post facto, which shows that the cause of action has been discharged, or that, in equity and conscience, the plaintiff ought not to recover.” (2 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 231; City of Chicago v. Babcock, 143 Ill. 358; Kapischki v. Koch, 180 id. 44; Chicago, Wilmington and Vermilion Coal Co. v. Peterson, 45 Ill. App. 507). The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
ABSTRACT OF RECORD.
all given instructions must appear in the abstract of rec-
ord in order to authorize consideration of alleged error
when obligor in bond for deed is chargeable, on accounting,
with the rent reserved in a lease of the premises... ... 398
the negligence of fellow-servant is a defense where the suit
is against the common master but not where it is against
cause of an injury, either or both may be held liable for
of president of corporation he cannot defend by setting
the election of the respondent to the office of president
of corporation at a meeting held without the State...... 160
fendant in person and not by counsel, and which is not
the power of the court to compel it to re-convene and