error.

about one sixth of its local freight busi- / report which it had made to the railroad ness, where the rate so authorized is nearly commission for the year ending June 30, 2 mills per ton larger than that company's 1904, and the report of the railroad commisaverage local freight rate.

sion to the governor of the state for the

year ending March 1, 1904, and upon these [Nos. 10, 11.]

two reports the cases were considered by the

supreme court. Argued March 2, 5, 1906. Decided December 3, 1906.

Messrs. Hilary A. Herbert, George P. I

N ERROR to the Suprema Court of the Raney, and Benjamin Micou for plaintiff in State of Florida to review two judg

Messrs. J. M. Barrs and W. H. Ellis for ments awarding peremptory writs of man

defendant in error. damus to enforce orders of the state railroad commission which respectively prescribe the local freight rates for a specified of the court:

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion road and fix a local freight rate for phos

There are no special findings of facts in phates. Affirmed. See same case below, No. 10, 48 Fla. 129, of the opinions filed by the supreme court

these cases, and only from an examination 152, 37 So. 314, 658; No. 11, 48 Fla. 150, 37

can we ascertain what its conclusions were So. 658.

or upon what its judgments were based.

It may well be doubted whether a railroad Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: These cases resemble the one immediate behalf, upon a report made and filed by it,

company can rely, as evidence in its own ly preceding, in this: that review is sought and while a report of the railroad commisin each of an award of a peremptory writsion to the governor may undoubtedly be of mandamus by the supreme court of Flor: used against it in an application made at ida to compel compliance with an order of its instance to secure compliance with one the state railroad commission. In the first, of its orders, yet there is little in its rethe court sustained an order of the com- port which throws light upon the questions mission, made June 25, 1903, and to go in these cases. . into effect July 1, 1903, prescribing rates on

Referring to the first case, in which is the Florida West Shore Railway, charged to be under the control and management of presented the reasonableness of an order

made by the commission respecting local the plaintiff in error (48 Fla. 129–152, 37 rates for business on, to, or from the FlorSo. 314, 657, 658), the order being in these ida West Shore Railway, we find it stated words: “It is hereby ordered and adjudged in the brief of the plaintiff in error that the by the railroad commission of the state of railroad commission on December 22, 1903, Florida that the following schedule of made an order, to go into effect July 1, freight tariffs shall be allowed and adopted 1904, reducing local freight rates generally; for freight shipments over the Seaboard Air that from this order no appeal was taken; Line Railway, to apply only to shipments that in November, 1903, an order was made from or destined to points on the Florida reducing by 10 per cent rates on certain West Shore Railway, and from points on the freights going over two or more roads, and Florida West Shore Railway to points on that from such order no appeal was taken. the Florida West Shore Railway, and the These are the orders referred to in the resame shall be put into operation and be ef- port of the commission to the governor. But fective on the 1st day of July, A. D. 1903,” | the order in controversy was made on June and followed by the schedule; and in the 25, 1903, to go into effect July 1, 1903, and is second, it enforced the order of the commis applicable solely to the Florida West Shore sion in respect to phosphates (which was road. Now, whether this order of June 25, noticed by us in the opinion in the preced-1903, was simply operative to make the ing case). 48 Fla. 150, 37 So. 658.

rates on the Florida West Shore road the The proceedings before the commission same as those then obtaining generally in are not disclosed, nor is there anything to the state, or whether it made them higher show upon what the orders were based. or lower than such rates, does not appear. There was notice and a hearing. And in the For some reason, not disclosed, the order pleadings in the first case appear the con- touched only the local freight rates to and tracts between the plaintiff in error and the from the Florida West Shore Railway and Florida West Shore Railway.

over the Seaboard Air Line Railway. Even In the supreme court the relator presented if the total receipts by the latter company no testimony, relying upon the statutory from local freight rates were insufficient to presumption which attends an order of the meet what could properly be cast as a burcommission. The defendant introduced the den upon that business, such insufficiency would not justify it in an inequality of Extradition-right to hearing before deporrates between different parts of the state,

tation. in one part too high and in the other too low. 2. Arranging and carrying out the ar. The state might properly insist that there rest and deportation of the accused so as to should be equality in the rates, the condi- leave him no opportunity to prove before tions being the same,—and, if nothing more he was not a fugitive from justice, or to ap.

the governor of the surrendering state that was accomplished by the order of the com- peal to some court of that state to prevent mission than to establish such equality, we his illegal deportation, does not violate the cannot hold that the judgment of the su- provisions of U. S. Const. art. 4, § 2, or U. preme court was erroneous.

S. Rev. Stat. & 5278, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, With reference to the second of these p. 3597, relating to extradition proceedings. cases, the order made by the railroad com- Habeas corpus-in Federal courts-review mission is said by the plaintiff in error to

of extradition proceedings. be an "irregular, unjust, and unreliable 3. A person held in actual custody by a method of rate fixing;” and this upon the state for trial in one of its courts under an theory that the order makes the rate per not be released on habeas corpus by a Fed

indictment for a crime against its laws will mile the same for any distance, whether eral circuit court because the methods by one mile or a hundred miles. It appears which his personal presence in the state that 16.43 per cent of all the local freight was secured may have violated the provibusiness of the company in Florida comes sions of U. S. Const. art. 4, § 2, or U. S. from the carrying of phosphates, and refer- Rev. Stat. § 5278, relating to extradition ence is made to several cases in which the proceedings.† courts have noticed the fact that the cost of moving local freight is greater than that

[No. 249.] of moving through freight, and the reasons for the difference. But evidently counsel Argued October 10, 11, 1906. Decided De.

cember 3, 1906. misinterpret the order of the railroad commission. It does not fix the rate at l cent

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the per ton per mile. It simply provides that A

United States for the District of Idaho it shall not exceed 1 cent per ton per mile, to review a judgment refusing to discharge, prescribes a maximum which may be reduced by the railway company, and, if dis

on habeas corpus, a person held in custody tance demands a reduction, the company

to await a trial for murder, because of the may and doubtless will make it. In addition methods by which his personal presence in it must be borne in mind that it is to be the state was secured. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. presumed that the railroad commission acted with full knowledge of the situation; s. Darrow, and John H. Murphy for appel

Messrs. Edmund F. Richardson, Clarence that phosphates were in Florida possibly

lant. carried a long distance, the place of mining being far from the place of actual use or

Messrs. James H. Hawley and W. E.

Borah for appellee. preparation for use. Further, when we turn to the report of the railroad company

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion (which, of course, is evidence against it),

: we find that the company's average freight of the court: receipt per ton per mile in the state of This is an appeal from a judgment of the Florida was 815/100 mills; so that the rate circuit court of the United States for the authorized for phosphates was nearly 2 mills district of Idaho, refusing, upon habeas corper ton larger than such average.

Under pus, to discharge the appellant, who alleged these circumstances it is impossible to say that he was held in custody by the sheriff that there was error in the conclusions of of Canyon county, in that state, in violathe Supreme Court of the state, and its tion of the Constitution and laws of the

United States. judgments are affirmed.

It appears that on the 12th day of February, 1906, a criminal complaint verified by

the oath of the prosecuting attorney of that GEORGE A. PETTIBONE, Appt., county and charging Pettibone with having

murdered Frank Steunenberg at Caldwell, JASPER C. NICHOLS, Sheriff. Idaho, on the 30th day of December, 1905,

was filed in the office of the probate judge. Extradition-fugitives from justice.

Thereupon, a warrant of arrest based upon 1. Independent proof, apart from the that complaint having been issued, applicarequisition papers, that the accused was a

tion was made to the governor of Idaho for fugitive from justice, need not be demanded by the governor of the surrendering state a requisition upon the governor of Colorado before issuing his warrant of arrest in ex

(in which state the accused was alleged then tradition proceedings.*

V.

delivery to the agent of Idaho, to be con- , was charged with the commission of a crime veyed to the latter state and there dealt in the former state and was a fugitive from with in accordance with law. The papers its justice; that, after the prisoner cama on which the governor of Idaho based his within the jurisdiction of the demanding requisition distinctly charged that Pettibone state, he could not raise in its courts the was in that state at the time Steunenberg question whether he was or had been, as a was murdered and was a fugitive from its matter of fact, a fugitive from the justica justice.

of that state; that the courts of Idaho had A requisition by the governor of Idaho no jurisdiction to inquire into the acts or was accordingly issued and was duly hon-motives of the executive of the state deliver. ored by the governor of Colorado, who is ing the prisoner; that "one who commits sued a warrant commanding the arrest of a crime against the laws of a state, whether Pettibone and his delivery to the author- committed by him while in person on its ized agent of Idaho, to be conveyed to the soil, or absent in a foreign jurisdiction, and latter state. Pettibone was arrested under acting through some other agency or medithat warrant and carried to Idaho by its um, has no vested right of asylum in a sisagent, and was there delivered by order of ter state," and the fact “that a wrong is the probate judge into the custody of the committed against him in the manner or warden of the state penitentiary, the jail method pursued in subjecting his person to of the county being deemed at that time an the jurisdiction of the complaining state, and unfit place.

that such wrong is redressible either in the On the 23d day of February, 1906, Petti- civil or criminal courts, can constitute no bone sued out a writ of habeas corpus from legal or just reason why he himself should the supreme court of Idaho. The warden not answer the charge against him when made a return, stating the circumstances brought before the proper tribunal.” Ex under which the accused came into his cus- parte Moyer, 85 Pac. 897; Ex parte Pettitody, and also that the charge against Petti. bone, 85 Pac. 902. bone was then under investigation by the From the judgment of the supreme court grand jury. To this return the accused of Idaho a writ of error was prosecuted to made an answer embodying the same mat- this court. That case is No. 265 on the ters as were alleged in the application for docket of the present term, but the record the writ of habeas corpus, and charging, in has not been printed. But the parties agree substance, that his presence in Idaho had that the same questions are presented on been procured by connivance, conspiracy, this appeal as arise in that case, and as this and fraud on the part of the executive offi- case is one of urgency in the affairs of a cers of Idaho, and that his detention was state, we have acceded to the request that in violation of the provisions of the Consti- they may be argued and determined on this tution of the United States and of the act appeal. of Congress relating to fugitives from jus- On the 15th of March, 1906, after the final tice.

judgment in the supreme court of Idaho, Subsequently, March 7th, 1906, the grand Pettibone made application to the circuit jury returned an indictment against Petti-court of the United States, sitting in Idaho, bone, William D. Haywood, Charles H. Moy- for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that er, and John L. Simpkins, charging them he was restrained of his liberty by the sherwith the murder of Steunenberg on the 30th iff of Canyon county, in violation of the of December, 1905, at Caldwell, Idaho. Hav- Constitution and laws of the United States. ing been arrested and being in custody under As was done in the supreme court of Idaho, that indictment, the officer holding Petti- the accused set out numerous facts and cir. bone made an amended return stating the cumstances which, he contended, showed fact of the above indictment, and that he that his personal presence in Idaho was sewas then held under a bench warrant based cured by fraud and connivance on the part thereon.

of the executive officers and agents of both At the hearing before the supreme court Idaho and Colorado, in violation of the conof the state the officers having Pettibone in stitutional and statutory provisions relatcustody moved to strike from the answer of ing to fugitives from justice. Consequently, the accused all allegations relating to the it was argued, the court in Idaho did not manner and method of obtaining his pres- acquire jurisdiction over his person. The ence within the state. That motion was officer having Pettibone in custody mado sustained March 12th, 1906, and the prisoner return to the writ that he then held the was remanded to await his trial under the accused under the bench warrant issued above indictment. The supreme court of against him. It was stipulated that the Idaho held thə action of the governor of application for the writ of habeas corpus Colorado to be at least quasi judicial and, might be taken as his answer to the return. in effect, a determination that Pettibone / Subsequently, on motion, that answer was stricken out by the circuit court as imma- | must often be controlled by the special cirterial, the writ of habeas corpus was cumstances of the case; and unless in some quashed, and Pettibone was remanded to the emergency demanding prompt action, the custody of the state.

party held in custody by a state, and seekAs the application for the writ of habeas ing to be enlarged, will be left to stand his corpus was, by stipulation of the parties, trial in the state court, which, it will be astaken as the answer of the accused to the sumed, will enforce-as it has the power to return of the officer holding him in custody, do equally with a court of the United States and as that answer was stricken out by the (Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637, 28 L. court below as immaterial, we must, on | 2d. 542, 546, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 544)—any right this appeal, regard as true all the facts suffi- secured by the supreme law of the land. ciently alleged in the application, which, in “When the state court,” this court has said, a legal sense, bear upon the question wheth- “shall have finally acted upon the case, the er the detention of the accused by the state circuit court has still a discretion whether, authorities was in violation of the Consti- under all the circumstances then existing, tution or laws of the United States.

the accused, if convicted, shall be put to his That application is too lengthy to be in writ of error from the highest court of the corporated at large in this opinion. It is state, or whether it will proceed, by writ of sufficient to say that its allegations present habeas corpus, summarily to determine the case of a conspiracy between the govern- whether the petitioner is restrained of his ors of Idaho and Colorado, and the re- liberty in violation of the Constitution of spective officers and agents of those states, the United States.” Ex parte Royall, 117 to have the accused taken from Colorado to U. S. 241, 251-253, 29 L. ed. 868, 871, 872, Idaho under such circumstances and in such 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734. To the same effect are way as would deprive him, while in Colo- numerous cases in this court, among which rado, of the privilege of invoking the juris- | may be named Ex parte Fonda, 117 U. S. diction of the courts there for his protection 516, 29 L. ed. 994, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 848; New against wrongful deportation from the state, York v. Eno, 155 U. S. 89, 93, 39 L. ed. 80, --it being alleged that the governor of Idaho, 82, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Cook v. Hart, 146 the prosecuting attorney of Canyon county, U. S. 183, 192, 36 L. ed. 934, 939, 13 Sup. and the private counsel who advised them, Ct. Rep. 40; Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 well knew all the time that "he was not in U. S. 499, 501, 45 L. ed. 639, 640, 21 Sup. Ct. the state of Idaho on the 30th day of De- Rep. 455; Reid v. Jones, 187 U. S. 153, 47 çember, 1905, nor at any time near that L. ed. 116, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 89; Riggins v.

, date.” The application also alleged that the United States, 199 U. S. 547, 549, 50 L. ed.

. accused “is not and was not a fugitive from 303, 304, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 147. This rule, justice; that he was not present in the state firmly established for the guidance of the of Idaho when the alleged crime was alleged courts of the United States, is applicable to have been committed, nor for months here, although it appears that the supreme prior thereto, nor thereafter, until brought court of Idaho has already decided some into the state as aforesaid."

of the questions now raised. But the quesIn the forefront of this case is the fact tion of Pettibone's. guilt of the crime of that the appellant is held in actual custody having murdered Steunenberg has not, howfor trial under an indictment in one of the ever, been finally determined, and cannot be courts of Idaho for the crime of murder, except by a trial under the laws and in the charged to have been committed in that courts of Idaho. If he should be acquitted state, against its laws, and it is the purpose by the jury, then no question will remain of the state to try the question of his guilt as to a violation of the Constitution and or innocence of that charge.

laws of the United States by the methods Undoubtedly, the circuit court had juris- adopted to secure his personal presence diction to discharge the appellant from the within the state of Idaho. custody of the state authorities if their ex- The appellant, however, contends that the ercise of jurisdiction over his person would principle settled in Ex parte Royall and be in violation of any rights secured to him other like cases can have application only by the Constitution or laws of the United where the state has legally acquired jurisStates. But that court had a discretion as diction over the person of the accused, and to the time and mode in which, by the ex. cannot apply when, as is alleged to be the ercise of such power, it would, by its proc-case here, his presence in Idaho was obtained ess, obstruct or delay a criminal prosecu- by fraud and by a violation of rights guartion in the state court. The duty of a anteed by the Constitution and laws of the Federal court to interfere, on habeas cor- United States. Under such circumstances, pus, for the protection of one alleged to be it is contended, no jurisdiction could legally restrained of his liberty in violation of the attach for the purpose of trying the accused Constitution or laws of the United States, under the indictment for murder.

In support of this view we have been re- | made a condition of surrendering the patiferred to that clause of the Constitution of tioner that evidence be furnished that he was the United States providing that if "a per- a fugitive from justice within the meaning son charged in any state with treason, fel- of the Constitution of the United States. ony, or other crime, who shall free from Upon the governor of Colorado rested the rejustice and be found in another state, shall, sponsibility of determining, in some proper on demand of the executive authority of the mode, what the fact was. But he was not state from which he fled, be delivered up, obliged to demand proof of such fact by to be removed to the state having juris- evidence apart from the requisition papers. diction of the crime.” Art. 4, § 2; also, to As those papers showed that the accused was § 5278 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. regularly charged by indictment with the Stat. 1901, p. 3597), in which it is provided crime of murder committed in Idaho, and that “whenever the executive authority of was a fugitive from its justice, the governor any state or territory demands any person of Colorado was entitled to accept such paas a fugitive from justice, of the executive pers, coming, as they did from the governor authority of any state or territory to which of another state, as prima facie sufficient for such person has fled, and produces a copy a warrant of arrest. His failure to require of an indictment found or an affidavit made independent proof of the fact that petitioner before a magistrate of any state or terri- was a fugitive from justice cannot be retory, charging the person demanded with garded as an infringement of any right having committed treason, felony, or other of the petitioner under the Constitution or crime, certified as authentic by the governor laws of the United States. Ex parte Reggel, or chief magistrate of the state or terri- 114 U. S. 642, 652, 653, 29 L. ed. 250, 253, tory from whence the person so charged has 254, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1148. In Munsey v fled, it shall be the duty of the executive Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 372, 49 L. ed. 515, authority of the state or territory to which | 516, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282, this court said that such person has fled to cause him to be ar- the issuing of a warrant of arrest by the rested and secured, and to cause notice of governor of the surrendering state, "with or the arrest to be given to the executive au- without a recital therein that the person da. thority making such demand, or to the agent manded is a fugitive from justice, must be of such authority appointed to receive the regarded as sufficient to justify the refugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be de-i moval, until the presumption in favor of livered to such agent when he shall appear. the legality and regularity of the warrant If no such agent appears within six months is overthrown by contrary proof in a legal from the time of the arrest, the prisoner proceeding to review the action of the govmay be discharged. All costs or expenses in- ernor. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95, curred in the apprehending, securing, and 29 L. ed. 544, 549, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Hyatt transmitting such fugitive to the state or v. New York, 188 U. S. 691, 47 L. ed. territory making such demand shall be paid 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456." See also Re by such state or territory.”

Keller, 36 Fed. 681, 686. Looking, first, at what was alleged to But the petitioner contends that his arhave occurred in the state of Colorado touch- rest and deportation from Colorado was, by ing the arrest of the petitioner and his de- fraud and connivance, so arranged and carportation from that state, we do not per- ried out as to deprive him of an opportunity ceive that anything done there, however to prove, before the governor of that state, hastily or inconsiderately done, can be ad that he was not a fugitive from justice, as judged to be in violation of the Constitution well as opportunity to appeal to some court or laws of the United States. We pass by, in Colorado to prevent his illegal deportaboth as immaterial and inappropriate, any tion from its territory. If we should assume, consideration of the motives that induced upon the present record, that the facts are the action of the governor of Colorado. This as alleged, it is not perceived that they make court will not inquire as to the motives a case of the violation of the Constitution which guided the chief magistrate of a state or laws of the United States. It is true, as when executing the functions of his office. contended by the petitioner, that if he was Manifestly, whatever authority may have not a fugitive from justice, within the meanbeen conferred upon the governor of Colo-ing of the Constitution, no warrant for his rado by the Constitution or laws of his state, arrest could have been properly or legally he was not required, indeed, was not author- issued by the governor of Colorado. It is ized, by the Constitution or laws of the equally true that, even after the issuing of United States, to have the petitioner arrest- such a warrant, before his deportation from ed, unless, within the meaning of such Con-Colorado, it was competent for a court, stitution and laws, he was a fugitive from Federal or state, sitting in that state, the justice of Idaho. Therefore he would to inquire whether he was, in fact, a fugitive not have violated his duty if it had been from justice, and, if found not to be, to