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47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456. That, and had left it before answering the dewas the case of an arrest in New York, un- mands of justice. The important thing is der the warrant of the governor of that not their purpose in leaving, but the fact state, of an alleged fugitive from the justice that they had left, and hence were beyond of Tennessee, in which state he stood the reach of the process of the state where charged by indictment with crime commit- the crime was committed. Whether the ted in that state. This court said (p. 719, motive for leaving was to escape prosecution L. ed. p. 664, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 462) that as or something else, their return to answer the alleged fugitive "showed, without con- the charges against them is equally within tradiction, and upon conceded facts, that he the spirit and purpose of the statute; and was not within the state of Tennessee at the simple fact that they are not within the the times stated in the indictments found in state to answer its criminal process, when the Tennessee court, nor at any time when required, renders them, in legal intendment, the acts were, if ever, committed, he was fugitives from justice, regardless of their not a fugitive from justice within the mean- purpose in leaving." In Re Voorhees, 32 N. ing of the Federal statute upon that sub- J. L. 141, 150, the court said: "A person who ject, and upon these facts the warrant of commits a crime within a state, and withthe governor of the state of New York was draws himself from such jurisdiction withimproperly issued, and the judgment of the out waiting to abide the consequences of such court of appeals of the state of New York, act, must be regarded as a fugitive from discharging the relator from imprisonment the justice of the state whose laws he has by reason of such warrant, must be af- infringed. Any other construction would not firmed." The present case is a wholly differ- only be inconsistent with good sense and ent one; for here the presumption arising with the obvious import of the word to be from the recitals in the warrant of arrest in interpreted in the context in which it favor of its validity was not everthrown by stands, but would likewise destroy, for most the proof; on the contrary, it appeared, by practical purposes, the efficacy of the entire a preponderance of evidence, that the accused constitutional provision." In Ex parte was in the state of New York when the al- Swearingen, 13 S. C. 74, 80, the court held leged crime was committed. that the terms "fugitive from justice" "were intended to embrace not only a case where a party, after committing a crime, actually flees, in the literal sense of that term, from the state where such crime was committed, but also a case where a citizen of one state, who, within the territorial limits of another state, commits a crime, and then simply returns to his own home. The object of the Constitution was to enable a state whose laws had been violated, to secure the arrest of the person charged with such violation, even though such person might be beyond the reach of the ordinary process of such state." In Re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503, 512, 49 Am. Rep. 63, the court, referring to the words in the Constitution, "who shall flee from justice and be found in another state," said: "There is a difference of opinion as to what must be the exact nature of this flight on the part of the criminal, but the better view, perhaps, is that any person is a fugitive within the purview of the Constitution, 'who goes into a state, commits a crime, and then returns home.' In Hibler v. State, 43 Tex. 197, 201, the court said: "The words 'fugitive from justice' as used in this connection, must not be understood in a literal sense, but in reference to the subject-matter, considering the general object of the Constitution and laws of the United States in relation thereto. A person who commits a crime in one state, for which he is indicted, and departs therefrom, and is found in another state, may well be regarded as a fugi
Similar views to those expressed in Roberts v. Reilly have been expressed by state courts. In Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223, 227, 228, the contention of the fugitive from justice was that, as she went into the demanding state and returned to her home in the other state before the alleged crime was known, she could not be deemed to have fled from justice. But the court said: "The material facts are, that the prisoner is charged with a crime in the manner prescribed, and has gone beyond the jurisdiction of the state, so that there has been no reasonable opportunity to prosecute him after the facts were known. The fact in this case, that she returned to her permanent home, cannot be material. . . It is sufficient that the crime of larceny has been properly charged, and that the prisoner is a fugitive, and a requisition has been properly made." In State ex rel. Burner v. Richter, 37 Minn. 436, 438, 35 N. W. 9, the contention was that to constitute a fugitive from justice a person must have left the state where the crime was committed for the purpose of escaping the legal consequences of his crime. Referring to Roberts v. Reilly, above cited, as authoritative and binding, and as in accordance with its own views, the supreme court of Minnesota well said: "The sole purpose of this statute, and of the constitutional provision which it was designed to carry into effect, was to secure the return of persons who had committed crime within one state,
tive from justice in the sense in which it is | ered to and accepted by the insured while in here used."
Referring to the opinion in Pettibone v. Nichols (just decided) 203 U. S. 192, 51 L. ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, for a further discussion of the general subject, and perceiving no error in the action of the Circuit Court, its final order is affirmed.
NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE IN-
PAUL RIGGS and Eugene De Hart, Exec-
good health. At any time when this policy has been two years continuously in force it will be incontestable, except for fraud and nonpayment of premiums as provided herein, if the age of the insured has been correctly stated in the application."
The application for insurance was made by reference a part of the policy, the latter providing that the statements and answers therein every person accepting or acquiring an interest in the policy "adopts as his own, and warrants to be full, complete, and true, and agrees to be material." The application provides: "No obligation shall arise under this application until the usual policy of insurance shall be issued and delivered to me,
Deceased. Constitutional law-due process of law-I being at that time in good health, and the equal protection of the laws-state regu- first premium paid by me," also, "I warrant lation of insurance. the statements and answers as written or A foreign life insurance company do- printed herein, or in part two of this appliing business in Missouri is neither deprived cation, to be full, complete, and true, whethof its liberty of property without due proc-er written by my own hand or not, and agree ess of law nor denied the equal protection of the laws by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 7890, which cuts off any defense by a life insurance company, domestic or foreign, based upon the false and fraudulent statements in the application, unless the matter misrepresented, in the judgment of the jury, actually contributed to the death of the insured.
that every such statement and answer is material to the risk;" also, "That I am not material to the risk;" also, "That I am not afflicted with any disease or disorder; nor have I had any illness, local disease, or personal injury not herein set forth."
Among the questions propounded to the insured and his answers-embodied in the application-were the following: "Q. Has any company or association ever postponed or declined to grant insurance on your life?
Argued October 18, 1906. Decided Decem- A. No. Q. If so, for what reason and by
ber 3, 1906.
N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri to review a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action on two policies of
life insurance. Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Stephen S. Brown, W. A. Kerr, and John E. Dolman for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Robert A. Hewitt, Jr., W. H. Haynes, Kendall B. Randolph, and W. M. Fitch for defendants in error.
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:
This was an action upon two policies of insurance issued by the Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, a Minnesota corporation doing business in Missouri, upon the life of Eber B. Roloson; one, dated November 21st, 1901, the other, May 14th, 1902; each for the sum of $5,000, payable to the estate of the insured within ninety days after the acceptance by the company of satisfactory evidence of his death while the policy was in full force.
Each policy contained these provisions: "This policy shall not be in force until the first premium is paid, and the policy deliv
what company or association. A. No. Q.
It was admitted at the trial that the insured died February 28th, 1903, having paid all premiums due upon his policies, and that proofs of his death were made, such proofs stating that he died of progressive anæmia.
The company denied all liability on its policies, upon the ground that each of the answers to the above questions was untrue, and known to be so by the applicant
when he made them. And at the trial it was | tention to deceive and mislead the company, offered to be proved (and the offer was rethe insured made in his application an unjected, the company duly excepting) that true warranty or misrepresentation concernsuch answers were not true, and when made ing anything material to the risk, or if, at were known to be untrue. the time of the application, he was in bad health, and knew such to be his condition, but fraudulently and falsely, with the intent to deceive, stated that he was then, and had been for twelve months, in good health, free from all ailments, diseases, weaknesses and infirmities, whereby the company was deceived into issuing the policy, when it would not otherwise have done so, he could not recover in this action.
There was a verdict for the plaintiffs, the executors of the insured, for the amount due on the two policies, namely, $11,050, for which judgment was rendered against the company.
The case was brought here under the act of March 3d, 1891, chap. 517, which authorizes an appeal or writ of error directly to this court from a circuit or district court of the United States, in any case in which the Constitution or law of a state is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States. 26 Stat. at L. 826, 828, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 488, 549.
When the policies in question were issued it was provided by the statutes of Missouri, § 7890, that: "No misrepresentation made in obtaining or securing a policy of insurance on the life or lives of any person or persons, citizens of this state, shall be deemed material, or render the policy void, unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contribited to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become due and payable, and whether it so contributed in any case shall be a question for the jury;" and by § 7891, that "in suits brought upon life policies, heretofore or hereafter issued, no defense based upon misrepresentation in obtaining or securing the same shall be valid unless the defendant shall, at or before the trial, deposit in court for the benefit of the plaintiffs, the premiums received on such policies."
These provisions were first enacted in 1874, appearing in the Revision of 1879 as §§ 5976 and 5977, in the Revision of 1889 as §§ 5849 and 7891, and in the present revision as §§ 7890 and 7891.
The trial court refused each request of the company and an exception to its action was duly taken; and it charged the jury (the company excepting) that the Missouri statute was applicable to this case, and not unconstitutional, and that the defendant company could not avoid liability on its policy by reason of any representations by the insured in his application, unless the jury found that the matters to which such representations had reference actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy, by its terms, was to become due and payable.
Although the assignments of error are numerous, we do not deem it necessary to notice any questions except those growing out of the application of the Missouri statute to this case.
As to the purpose and scope of that statute, we need only refer to the decisions of the highest court of Missouri, whose province it is to declare its meaning and effect, while it is the province of this court to adjudge whether the statute, as interpreted, is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. We do not stop to inquire whether, having due regard to its words, the statute might not have been differently construed by the state court, but accept its At the trial in the circuit court the insur- judgment as indicating what it is to be takance company made several requests for in- en to mean. In Schuermann v. Union Cent. structions. They embodied these proposi-L. Ins. Co. 165 Mo. 641, 653, 65 S. W. 723, tions: That the statute of Missouri, § 7890, reference was made to the history of was not applicable to this case, and could not business of life insurance in Missouri, the be applied to it consistently with the 14th court saying: "While equality of rights and Amendment of the Constitution of the Unit- privileges should be the general aim of all ed States; that the plaintiff could not re- laws, and special restrictions and burdens cover on either policy if it appeared that it imposed its strict exception, yet laws have was not delivered to and accepted by him ever been enacted by the state, and suswhile he was in good health; that if the in-tained, since the adoption of our present sured, at the time of making his application Constitution, as before its adoption, which for a policy of insurance, knowingly, falsely, and fraudulently, with the purpose to mislead and deceive the company, misrepresented in the application any matter concerning his health, life, or physical condition, which would reasonably affect the action of the company, then the Missouri statute was not applicable to the case; that if, with the in
were made to operate against certain classes of the community only, when that class has occupied some peculiar position, or when it has been clothed with some peculiar opportunities not enjoyed by the remainder of the community. As said befc.e, life insurance companies in this state, prior to the adoption of § 7890, could, and by a practice,
almost universal, did, insert in their policies We take it, then, that the statute, if a stipulation to the effect that any untrue enforced, cuts off any defense by a life instatement or answer made by the applicant surance company, based upon false and for insurance (regardless of its materiality fraudulent statements in the application, or regardless of the intent of the applicant unless the matter misrepresented actually in making same) should avoid the policy, contributed to the death of the insured. Is and too frequently when demands were made the statute, therefore, to be held repugnant upon them for the obligations of the policies to the 14th Amendment? Does it, in such the companies availed themselves of these case, deprive the insurance company of its. harsh provisions without a return by them "liberty" or property without due process of of the money which they had obtained from law, or deny to it the equal protection of the the insured in his lifetime, and when the laws? Although the statute in some degree untrue statements made had little, if any, restricts the company's power of contracteffect upon the risk undertaken by the insur-ing, and is so worded that the berreficiaries er. This doctrine of warranties, in the ex- of its policy may sometimes reap the fruits tent to which it had grown and was applied, of fraud practised upon it by the insured, was something peculiar to insurance com- we cannot, for that reason, hold that the panies, and was therefore thought the sub-state may not, so far as the Constitution ject of special legislation, in a law which of the United States is concerned, regulate properly undertook to affect insurance companies alone in that particular. By a long and hurtful practice of a given policy peculiarly their own, insurance companies had stamped themselves as a class, to which alone legislation might properly address itself, in that regard."
the business of life insurance to the extent indicated. It is true that this court has said that the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against deprivation otherwise than by due process of law embraces the right to pursue a lawful calling and enter into all contracts proper, necessary, and essential to the carrying out of the purposes. of such calling. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. It is true, also, that a corporation of one state, doing business in another state, under such circumstances as
the instance of suitors, may invoke the protection of that clause of the 14th Amendment which declares that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 260, 261, 43 L. ed. 432, 440, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. But it is equally the doctrine of this court that the power, whether called police, governmental, or legislative, exists in each state, by appropriate legislation, not forbidden by its own Constitution or by the Constitution of the United States, to determine for its people all questions or matters relating to its purely domestic or internal affairs, and, "to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its jurisdiction, and, therefore, to provide for the public convenience and the public good." Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 297, 43 L. ed. 702, 706, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465, and authorities there cited.
In the subsequent case of Kern v. Supreme Lodge, A. L. of H. 167 Mo. 471, 487, 67 S. W. 252, the court, referring to the statute, said that it "was enacted to correct the evil that had grown up, of permitting insurance companies to make every statement or answer a warranty, and if any one, how-to be directly subject to its process at ever trivial or however foreign to the risk or loss, turned out to be untrue, to avoid the policy without refunding the benefits the company had received. The statute draws no distinction between innocent and fraudulent misrepresentations, and the courts have no right to draw any such distinction. The test applied by the statute is whether the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become due and payable,' and the power to determine that question is vested by the statute in the jury, and not in the court." The case of Christian v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268, being called to the attention of the state court, it further said: "In that case no distinction was drawn, or intended to be permitted, between innocent and wilfully fraudulent misrepresentations. The purpose was to give full force and effect to the statute, and to hold that no misrepresentation, whether innocent or fraudulent, when based upon a warranty of truth by the terms of the policy or not, shall be a defense, 'unless the matter misrepresented shall have actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become due and payable.'" See also Jenkins v. Covenant Mut. L. Ins. Co. 171 Mo. 375, 383, 71 S. W. 688.
We are informed by the decisions of the supreme court of Missouri that life insurance companies doing business in that state often secured contracts under which they could defeat all recovery upon a policy, and retain all premiums paid by the insured, if it appeared in proof that the application for insurance contained an inaccurate or untrue statement, however innocently made,
may not make its provisions applicable to corporations of other states doing business in its territory with its sanction or under its license. That Missouri could forbid life insurance companies of other states from doing any business whatever within its limits, except upon the terms prescribed by the statute in question, cannot be doubted, in view of the decisions of this court. If it could go that far, why may it not declare, as it has in effect done, by this statute, that its provisions shall apply to foreign life insurance companies doing business in Missouri under its license? It would, indeed, be extraordinary if the state could compel its own life insurance companies to respect this statute, but could not enforce its provisions against a foreign corporation doing business within its limits, with its consent, express or implied-especially against one which, as is the case here, came into the state for purposes of business after such statutory provisions were enacted. As the present statute is applicable alike to all life insurance companies doing business in Missouri, after its enactment, there is no reason for saying that it denies the equal protection of the laws. Equally without foundation is the contention that the statute, if enforced, will be inconsistent with the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. The liberty referred to in that Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons. Nor, in any true, constitutional sense, does the Missouri statute deprive life insurance companies doing business in that state of a right of property. This is too plain for discussion.
as to matters having no real or substantial | Missouri, it is not perceived that the state connection whatever with the death of the insured, and which were in no sense material to the risk. This was deemed an evil practice, to be remedied by legislation. Of course, the state, if it had seen proper, might have excepted from the operation of the statute cases in which the insured, by his representations when obtaining a policy, perpetrated a fraud upon the company, or made untrue statements in his application as to matters material to the risk. But that remedy was deemed inadequate to prevent wrong and injustice. The state decided to go to the root of the evil, and therefore, in substance, it established, as a rule of conduct for all life insurance companies, domestic and foreign, doing business in the state, that representations, of whatever nature, made to the company by the insured, should not defeat recovery upon a policy unless such representations, in the judgment of a jury, actually contributed to the contingency or event on which it was to become due and payable. Surely the state could make such a regulation in relation to its own corporations; for a corporation cannot exert any power, nor make any contract, forbidden by the law of its being. Such a restriction as that founded in the Missouri statute, if embodied in the original charter of a life insurance corporation, would, of course, be binding upon it in the state granting such charter, and could not be disregarded. If, however, no such restriction was imposed by its charter, it could yet be imposed by subsequent legislation, unless the state had precluded itself from so doing by some contract (if a binding one could be made) which, as to its obligation, was protected by the Federal Constitution. The business of life insurance is of such a peculiar character, affects so many people, and is so intimately connected with the common good, that the state creating the insurance corporations and giving them authority to engage in that business may, without transcending the limits of legislative power, regulate their affairs, so far, at least, as to prevent them from committing wrong or injustice in the exercise of their corporate functions. The 1. A title in fee may pass under a treaty state may well say to its own corporate with the Indians without the aid of an act creatures engaged in the business of life of Congress, and without any patent from insurance that they shall not refuse to pay the United States. what they agreed to pay simply because of Courts-following decisions of state courts. some representation made by the insured 2. Decisions of the courts of a state rewhich did not actually contribute to the specting the title acquired by individual Incontingency or event on which the agree-dians under the treaty of September 24, ment to pay depended. If a life insurance corporation does not approve such a restriction upon the conduct of its affairs it is its privilege to cease doing business. Now, if the statute in question is not invalid as to life insurance corporations of 27 S. C.-9.
What has been said disposes of the only questions we need to determine, and the judgment is affirmed.
ANN FRANCIS, Plff. in Err.,
PETER J. FRANCIS, William Francis, and
Indians-treaty as grant.
1819, with the Chippewa Nation, to the lands therein reserved for their use, will not United States, where they have become a be disturbed by the Supreme Court of the rule of property, and do not clearly involve a misinterpretation of the words of the treaty.