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47 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456. That, and had left it before answering the dewas the case of an arrest in New York, un- mands of justice. The important thing is der the warrant of the governor of that not their purpose in leaving, but the fact state, of an alleged fugitive from the justice that they had left, and hence were beyond of Tennessee, in which state he stood the reach of the process of the state where charged by indictment with crime commit- the crime was committed. Whether the ted in that state. This court said (p. 719, motive for leaving was to escape prosecution L. ed. p. 664, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 462) that as or something else, their return to answer the alleged fugitive "showed, without con- | the charges against them is equally within tradiction, and upon conceded facts, that he the spirit and purpose of the statute; and was not within the state of Tennessee at the simple fact that they are not within the the times stated in the indictments found in state to answer its criminal process, when the Tennessee court, nor at any time when required, renders them, in legal intendment, the acts were, if ever, committed, he was fugitives from justice, regardless of their not a fugitive from justice within the mean- purpose in leaving.” In Re Voorhees, 32 N. ing of the Federal statute upon that sub-J. L. 141, 150, the court said: "A person who ject, and upon these facts the warrant of commits a crime within a state, and withthe governor of the state of New York was draws himself from such jurisdiction withimproperly issued, and the judgment of the out waiting to abide the consequences of such court of appeals of the state of New York, act, must be regarded as a fugitive from discharging the relator from imprisonment the justice of the state whose laws he has by reason of such warrant, must be af- infringed. Any other construction would not firmed.” The present case is a wholly differ- only be inconsistent with good sense and ent one; for here the presumption arising with the obvious import of the word to be from the recitals in the warrant of arrest in interpreted in the context in which it favor of its validity was not everthrown by stands, but would likewise destroy, for most the proof; on the contrary, it appeared, by practical purposes, the efficacy of the entire a preponderance of evidence, that the accused constitutional provision.” In
Ex parte was in the state of New York when the al- Swearingen, 13 S. C. 74, 80, the court held leged crime was committed.
that the terms "fugitive from justice" "were Similar views to those expressed in Rob- intended to embrace not only a case where erts v. Reilly have been expressed by state a party, after committing a crime, actually courts. In Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223, flees, in the literal sense of that term, from 227, 228, the contention of the fugitive from the state where such crime was committed, justice was that, as she went into the de- but also a case where a citizen of one state, manding state and returned to her home in who, within the territorial limits of another the other state before the alleged crime was state, commits a crime, and then simply reknown, she could not be deemed to have fled turns to his own home. The object of the from justice. But the court said: “The ma- Constitution was to enable a state whose terial facts are, that the prisoner is charged laws had been violated, to secure the arrest with a crime in the manner prescribed, and of the person charged with such violation, has gone beyond the jurisdiction of the even though such person might be beyond state, so that there has been no reasonable the reach of the ordinary process of such opportunity to prosecute him after the facts state.” In Re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503, 512, 49 Am. were known. The fact in this case, that Rep. 63, the court, referring to the words in she returned to her permanent home, cannot the Constitution, "who shall flee from justice be material. ... It is sufficient that the and be found in another state,” said: “There crime of larceny has been properly charged, is a difference of opinion as to what must and that the prisoner is a fugitive, be the exact nature of this flight on the and a requisition has been properly made.” part of the criminal, but the better view, In State ex rel. Burner v. Richter, 37 Minn. perhaps, is that any person is a fugitive 436, 438, 35 N. W. 9, the contention was that within the purview of the Constitution, to constitute a fugitive from justice a per- 'who goes into a state, commits a crime, and son must have left the state where the crime then returns home.' " In Hibler v. State, was committed for the purpose of escaping 43 Tex. 197, 201, the court said: "The words the legal consequences of his crime. Refer- 'fugitive from justice' as used in this conring to Roberts v. Reilly, above cited, as au- nection, must not be understood in a literal thoritative and binding, and as in accordance sense, but in reference to the subject-matter, with its own views, the supreme court of considering the general object of the ConMinnesota well said: "The sole purpose of stitution and laws of the United States in this statute, and of the constitutional pro- relation thereto. A person who commits a vision which it was designed to carry into ef- crime in one state, for which he is indicted, fect, was to secure the return of persons and departs therefrom, and is found in anwho had committed crime within one state, other state, may well be regarded as a fugi.
tive from justice in the sense in which it is ered to and accepted by the insured while in here used.”
good health. At any time when this policy Referring to the opinion in Pettibone v. has been two years continuously in force it Nichols (just decided) 203 U. S. 192, 51 L. will be incontestable, except for fraud and ed. 148, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, for a further nonpayment of premiums as provided herein, discussion of the general subject, and perceiv- if the age of the insured has been correctly ing no error in the action of the Circuit stated in the application.” Court, its final order is affirmed.
The application for insurance was made by reference a part of the policy, the latter providing that the statements and answers
therein every person accepting or acquiring NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL LIFE IN- an interest in the policy "adopts as his own, SURANCE COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,
and warrants to be full, complete, and true, v.
and agrees to be material.” The application PAUL RIGGS and Eugene De Hart, Exec- provides: “No obligation shall arise under
utors of the Estate of Eber B. Roloson, this application until the usual policy of inDeceased.
surance shall be issued and delivered to me, Constitutional law-due process of law-I being at that time in good health, and the
equal protection of the laws-state regu- first premium paid by me," also, "I warrant lation of insurance.
the statements and answers as written or A foreign life insurance company do- printed herein, or in part two of this appliing business in Missouri is neither deprived cation, to be full, complete, and true, whethof its liberty of property without due procer written by my own hand or not, and agree ess of law nor denied the equal protection that every such statement and answer is of the laws by Mo. Rev. Stat. & 7890, which material to the risk;” also, “That I am not cuts off any defense by a life insurance company, domestic or foreign, based upon the afflicted with any disease or disorder; nor false and fraudulent statements in the ap- have I had any illness, local disease, or plication, unless the matter misrepresented, personal injury not herein set forth.” in the judgment of the jury, actually con- Among the questions propounded to the intributed to the death of the insured.
sured and his answers-embodied in the ap
plication-were the following: “Q. Has any [No. 34.]
company or association ever postponed or
declined to grant insurance on your life? Argued October 18, 1906. Decided Decem- A. No. Q. If so, for what reason and by ber 3, 1906.
what company or association. A. No. Q.
Has any physician ever given an unfavorN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the able opinion upon your life with reference
United States for the Western District to life insurance or otherwise ? A. No. Q. of Missouri to review a judgment in favor Have you ever had any illness, local disease, of plaintiffs in an action on two policies of injury, mental or nervous disease or infirmlife insurance. Affirmed.
ity, or ever had any disease, weakness, or The facts are stated in the opinion.
ailment of the head, throat, lungs, heart, Messrs. Stephen S. Brown, W. A. Kerr, stomach, intestines, liver, kidneys, bladder and John E. Dolman for plaintiff in error.
or any disease or infirmity whatever? A. Messrs. Robert A. Hewitt, Jr., W. H. No. 0. Give name and address of each phyHaynes, Kendall B. Randolph, and W. M. sician who has prescribed for or attended Fitch for defendants in error.
you within the past ten years, and for what
disease and ailments? Name, Dr. C. 0. PatMr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion ton, McFall, Missouri. (b.) For what disof the court:
or ailment? A. Bilious attack. Q. This was an action upon two policies of Has your husband or wife or any other iminsurance issued by the Northwestern Na-mediate member of your family any tubertional Life Insurance Company, a Minnesota culous disease? A. Only sister had, as statcorporation doing business in Missouri, up-ed.” on the life of Eber B. Roloson; one, dated It was admitted at the trial that the inNovember 21st, 1901, the other, May 14th, sured died February 28th, 1903, having paid 1902; each for the sum of $5,000, payable to all premiums due upon his policies, and the estate of the insured within ninety that proofs of his death were made, such days after the acceptance by the company of proofs stating that he died of progressive satisfactory evidence of his death while the anæmia. policy was in full force.
The company denied all liability on its Each policy contained these provisions: policies, upon the ground that each of the “This policy shall not be in force until the answers to the above questions was un. first premium is paid, and the policy deliv-'true, and known to be so by the applicant
when he made them. And at the trial it was tention to deceive and mislead the company, offered to be proved (and the offer was re- the insured made in his application an unjected, the company duly excepting) that true warranty or misrepresentation concernsuch answers were not true, and when made ing anything material to the risk, or if, at were known to be untrue.
the time of the application, he was in bad There was a verdict for the plaintiffs, the health, and knew such to be his condition, executors of the insured, for the amount due but fraudulently and falsely, with the intent on the two policies, namely, $11,050, for to deceive, stated that he was then, and had which judgment was rendered against the been for twelve months, in good health, free company.
from all ailments, diseases, weaknesses and The case was brought here under the act infirmities, whereby the company was deof March 3d, 1891, chap. 517, which author. ceived into issuing the policy, when it would izes an appeal or writ of error directly to not otherwise have done so, he could not rethis court from a circuit or district court cover in this action. of the United States, in any case in which The trial court refused each request of the the Constitution or law of a state is claimed company and an exception to its action was to be in contravention of the Constitution duly taken; and it charged the jury (the of the United States. 26 Stat. at L. 826, company excepting) that the Missouri stat828, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 488, 549. ute was applicable to this case, and not un
When the policies in question were issued constitutional, and that the defendant comit was provided by the statutes of Missouri, pany could not avoid liability on its policy § 7890, that: "No misrepresentation made by reason of any representations by the inin obtaining or securing a policy of insur-sured in his application, unless the jury ance on the life or lives of any person or found that the matters to which such reprepersons, citizens of this state, shall be sentations had reference actually contributdeemed material, or render the policy void, ed to the contingency or event on which the unless the matter misrepresented shall have policy, by its terms, was to become due and actually contribited to the contingency or payable. event on which the policy is to become due Although the assignments of error are and payable, and whether it so contributed numerous, we do not deem it necessary to in any case shall be a question for the jury;” notice any questions except those growing and by $ 7891, that "in suits brought upon out of the application of the Missouri statlife policies, heretofore or hereafter issued, ute to this case. no defense based upon misrepresentation in As to the purpose and scope of that stat. obtaining or securing the same shall be valid ute, we need only refer to the decisions of unless the defendant shall, at or before the the highest court of Missouri, whose prov. trial, deposit in court for the benefit of the ince it is to declare its meaning and effect, plaintiffs, the premiums received on such while it is the province of this court to policies."
adjudge whether the statute, as interpreted, These provisions were first enacted in is in conflict with the Constitution of the 1874, appearing in the Revision of 1879 as United States. We do not stop to inquire SS 5976 and 5977, in the Revision of 1889 whether, having due regard to its words, the as $8 5849 and 7891, and in the present re- statute might not have been differently convision as $$ 7890 and 7891.
strued by the state court, but accept its At the trial in the circuit court the insur- judgment as indicating what it is to be takance company made several requests for in- en to mean. In Schuermann v. Union Cent. structions. They embodied these proposi- L. Ins. Co. 165 Mo. 641, 653, 65 S. W. 723, tions: That the statute of Missouri, $ 7890, reference made to the history of was not applicable to this case, and could not business of life insurance in Missouri, the be applied to it consistently with the 14th court saying: "While equality of rights and Amendment of the Constitution of the Unit- privileges should be the general aim of all ed States; that the plaintiff could not re- laws, and special restrictions and burdens cover on either policy if it appeared that it imposed its strict exception, yet laws have was not delivered to and accepted by him ever been enacted by the state, and suswhile he was in good health; that if the in- tained, since the adoption of our present sured, at the time of making his application Constitution, as before its adoption, which for a policy of insurance, knowingly, falsely, were made to operate against certain classes and fraudulently, with the purpose to mis- of the community only, when that class has lead and deceive the company, misrepresent. occupied some peculiar position, or when it ed in the application any matter concerning has been clothed with some peculiar opporhis health, life, or physical condition, which tunities not enjoyed by the remainder of would reasonably affect the action of the the community. As said befc.e, life insurcompany, then the Missouri statute was not ance companies in this state, prior to the applicable to the case; that if, with the in-'adoption of g 7890, could, and by a practice,
almost universal, did, insert in their policies We take it, then, that the statute, if a stipulation to the effect that any untrue enforced, cuts off any defense by a life in. statement or answer made by the applicant surance company, based upon false and for insurance (regardless of its materiality fraudulent statements in the application, or regardless of the intent of the applicant unless the matter misrepresented actually in making same) should avoid the policy, contributed to the death of the insured. Is and too frequently when demands were made the statute, therefore, to be held repugnant upon them for the obligations of the policies to the 14th Amendment? Does it, in such the companies availed themselves of these case, deprive the insurance company of its harsh provisions without a return by them "liberty” or property without due process of of the money which they had obtained from law, or deny to it the equal protection of the the insured in his lifetime, and when the laws ? Although the statute in some degree untrue statements made had little, if any, restricts the company's power of contracteffect upon the risk undertaken by the insur- ing, and is so worded that the beneficiaries er. This doctrine of warranties, in the ex- of its policy may sometimes reap the fruits tent to which it had grown and was applied, of fraud practised upon it by the insured, was something peculiar to insurance com- we cannot, for that reason, hold that the panies, and was therefore thought the sub- state may not, so far as the Constitution ject of special legislation, in a law which of the United States is concerned, regulate properly undertook to affect insurance com- the business of life insurance to the extent panies alone in that particular. By a long indicated. It is true that this court has and hurtful practice of a given policy pecul- said that the liberty guaranteed by the 14th iarly their own, insurance companies had Amendment against deprivation otherwise stamped themselves as a class, to which than by due process of law embraces the alone legislation might properly address it right to pursue a lawful calling and enter self, in that regard."
into all contracts proper, necessary, and In the subsequent case of Kern v. Supreme essential to the carrying out of the purposes. Lodge, A. L. of H. 167 Mo. 471, 487, 67 S. of such calling Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 W. 252, the court, referring to the statute, U. S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 17 Sup. said that it "was enacted to correct the Ct. Rep. 427. It is true, also, that a corporaevil that had grown up, of permitting in- tion of one state, doing business in ansurance companies to make every statement other state, under such circumstances as or answer a warranty, and if any one, how to be directly subject to its process at ever trivial or however foreign to the risk the instance of suitors, may invoke the proor loss, turned out to be untrue, to avoid tection of that clause of the 14th Amendthe policy without refunding the benefits ment which declares that no state shall the. company had received. The statute "deny to any person within its jurisdiction draws no distinction between innocent and the equal protection of the laws.” Blake v. fraudulent misrepresentations, and the McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 260, 261, 43 L. ed. courts have no right to draw any such dis- 432, 440, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. But it is tinction. The test applied by the statute is equally the doctrine of this court that the whether the matter misrepresented shall power, whether called police, governmental, have actually contributed to the contingency or legislative, exists in each state, by apor event on which the policy is to become propriate legislation, not forbidden by its due and payable, and the power to deter- own Constitution or by the Constitution of mine that question is vested by the statute the United States, to determine for its. in the jury, and not in the court.” The case people all questions or matters relating to of Christian v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. its purely domestic or internal affairs, and, 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268, being called to the "to regulate the relative rights and duties of attention of the state court, it further all persons and corporations within its jusaid: “In that case no distinction was risdiction, and, therefore, to provide for drawn, or intended to be permitted, between the public convenience and the public good.” innocent and wilfully fraudulent misrepre- Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. sentations. The purpose was to give full | 285, 297, 43 L. ed. 702, 706, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. force and effect to the statute, and to hold 465, and authorities there cited. that no misrepresentation, whether innocent We are informed by the decisions of the or fraudulent, when based upon a warranty supreme court of Missouri that life insurof truth by the terms of the policy or not, ance companies doing business in that state shall be a defense, ‘unless the matter mis- often secured contracts under which they represented shall have actually contributed could defeat all recovery upon a policy, and to the contingency or event on which, the retain all premiums paid by the insured, if policy is to become due and payable.'” See it appeared in proof that the application for also Jenkins v. Covenant Mut. L. Ins. Co. insurance contained an inaccurate or un171 Mo. 375, 383, 71 S. W. 688.
true statement, however innocently made,
as to matters 'having no real or substantial | Missouri, it is not perceived that the state connection whatever with the death of the may not make its provisions applicable to insured, and which were in no sense mate corporations of other states doing business rial to the risk. This was deemed an evil in its territory with its sanction or under its practice, to be remedied by legislation. Of license. That Missouri could forbid life incourse, the state, if it had seen proper, might surance companies of other states from dohave excepted from the operation of the ing any business whatever within its limits, statute cases in which the insured, by his except upon the terms prescribed by the statrepresentations when obtaining a policy, per- ute in question, cannot be doubted, in view petrated a fraud upon the company, or made of the decisions of this court. If it could untrue statements in his application as to go that far, why may it not declare, as it matters material to the risk. But that rem- has in effect done, by this statute, that its edy was deemed inadequate to prevent provisions shall apply to foreign life insurwrong and injustice. The state decided to ance companies doing business in Missouri go to the root of the evil, and therefore, in under its license? It would, indeed, be exsubstance, it established, as a rule of con- traordinary if the state could compel its duct for all life insurance companies, do- own life insurance companies to respect this mestic and foreign, doing business in the statute, but could not enforce its provisions state, that representations, of whatever na- against a foreign corporation doing busiture, made to the company by the insured, ness within its limits, with its consent, exshould not defeat recovery upon a policy press or implied-especially against one unless such representations, in the judgment which, as is the case here, came into the of a jury, actually contributed to the con- state for purposes of business after such tingency or event on which it was to be- statutory provisions were enacted. As the come due and payable. Surely the state present statute is applicable alike to all life could make such a regulation in relation to insurance companies doing business in Misits own corporations; for a corporation can- souri, after its enactment, there is no reanot exert any power, nor make any contract, son for saying that it denies the equal proforbidden by the law of its being. Such a tection of the laws. Equally without founrestriction as that founded in the Missouri dation is the contention that the statute, statute, if embodied in the original charter if enforced, will be inconsistent with the of a life insurance corporation, would, of liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. course, be binding upon it in the state grant. The liberty referred to in that Amendment ing such charter, and could not be disregard- is the liberty of natural, not artificial, pered. If, however, no such restriction was im- sons. Nor, in any true, constitutional sense, posed by its charter, it could yet be imposed does the Missouri statute deprive life inby subsequent legislation, unless the state surance companies doing business in that had precluded itself from so doing by some state of a right of property. This is too contract (if a binding one could be made) plain for discussion. which, as to its obligation, was protected by What has been said disposes of the only the Federal Constitution. The business of questions we need to determine, and the life insurance is of such a peculiar character, judgment is affirmed. affects so many people, and is so intimately connected with the common good, that the state creating the insurance corporations and giving them authority to engage in
ANN FRANCIS, Plff. in Err., that business may, without transcending the limits of legislative power, regulate their | PETER J. FRANCIS, William Francis, and
Frank Francis. affairs, so far, at least, as to prevent them from committing wrong or injustice in the
Indians-treaty as grant. exercise of their corporate functions. The
1. A title in fee may pass under a treaty state may well say to its own corporate with the Indians without the aid of an act creatures engaged in the business of life of Congress, and without any patent from insurance that they shall not refuse to pay the United States. what they agreed to pay simply because of Courts-following decisions of state courts. some representation made by the insured 2. Decisions of the courts of a state rewhich did not actually contribute to the specting the title acquired by individual Incontingency or event on which the agree-dians under the treaty of September 24, ment to pay depended. If a life insurance 1819, with the Chippewa Nation, to the
lands therein reserved for their use, will not corporation does not approve such a restriction upon the conduct of its affairs it be disturbed by the Supreme Court of the striction upon the conduct of its affairs it United States, where they have become a is its privilege to cease doing business. rule of property, and do not clearly involve Now, if the statute in question is not in a misinterpretation of the words of the valid as to life insurance corporations of treaty.
27 S. C.-9.