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dation of the community, in which the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of $5,000. Removal of causes-from Porto Rican court -objection by party causing removal.

2. The party who has wrongfully procured a removal from the local Porto Rican court to the Federal district court of a case within the original jurisdiction conferred upon the latter court by the act of March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 953, chap. 812), § 3, cannot be heard, after judgment against him, to assert that the Federal court had no jurisdiction, because of the irregularity of the removal, although, by the act of April 12. 1900 (31 Stat. at. L. 84, chap. 191), § 34, it is provided that the laws of the United States relating to the removal of causes shall govern as between the district court of the United States for Porto Rico and the courts of Porto Rico. Husband and wife,-community propertyrights of divorced wife.

a divorce carries with it a complete dissolu-
tion of all the matrimonial ties, and the
division of all property and effects between
the parties to the marriage.
Judgment - community property-liquida-
tion-money judgment.

7. The objection that the district court of the United States for the district of Porto Rico should not have given a money decrec in a suit by the wife to obtain the liquidation of the community is not a valid one, where the rights of the wife arise simply from an increased value of property or assets brought by the husband to the marriage, or as a result of the falling into the community of the revenues of the property of the husband.

Husband and wife-community propertyliquidation-allowance of alimony and expenses of divorce.

S. The amount of alimony pendente lite and the expenses incurred by the wife in a divorce suit in a Porto Rico court, which were sanctioned by that court, are properly allowed to the divorced wife in her suit to obtain a liquidation of the community and a decree for the payment of her share. Husband and wife-community propertyliquidation-allowance of counsel fees.

3. A rule of limited forfeiture in lieu of the rigorous rule of the Spanish law that the wife against whom a divorce for adultery was decreed forfeited all right to her share in in the community property was adopted for Porto Rico by the provisions of Civil Code 1889, art. 73, T 3, Civil Code 1992, tit. 5, chap. 5, § 174, to the effect that the 9. Counsel fees cannot be allowed by guilty spouse shall forfeit all gifts from the the district court of the United States for innocent party, who shall retain everything the district of Porto Rico to a wife in her which has been acquired from the other. suit to obtain a liquidation of the commuHusband and wife-community property-nity and a decree for the payment of her rights of divorced wife.

4. The rule of the Spanish law that the wife against whom a judgment of divorce for adultery has been decreed forfeits all

share.

[No. 72.]

Decided January 7, 1907.

right to her share in the community prop- Argued October 31 and November 1, 1906. erty does not obtain in Porto Rico because of the provision of Civil Code 1889, art. 1417, Civil Code 1902, § 1330, that the

United States for the District of Porto

cause of the nullity of the marriage, shall spouse who, by bad faith, has been the APPEAL from the District Court of the not have a share in the common property, since this provision relates, not to the dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, but to the recognition of tue nullity of a seeming marriage for causes which have operated to prevent it from ever having existed.

Husband and wife-community propertyliquidation-accounting for reckless ex

penditures.

5. The power of the husband as the head and master and administrator of the community property, under Porto Rico Civil Code 1889, arts. 1412, 1413, Civil Code 1902, §§ 1327, 1328, is such that, in the absence of express limitation, he cannot, after the dissolution of the community, be required to account for money which he may have recklessly and extravagantly expended during the existence of the community. Husband and wife-community propertyright of divorced wife to liquidation.

6. A divorced wife is entitled to obtain the liquidation of the community and the payment to her of her share, under Porto Rico Civil Code. 1902, § 173, providing that

27 S. C.-15.

Rico to review a decree in favor of the wife in a suit by her for the liquidation of the community and the payment to her of her share. Reversed and remanded with directions to disallow an award of counsel fees and a credit to the community property of the amount of reckless and extravagant expenditures by the husband.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Charles M. Boerman and Fritz von Briesen for appellants.

Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney, Francis H. Dexter, and John Spalding Flannery for appellee.

Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

In the district court of Ponce, in October, 1891, through a representative (next friend), Juana Dastas, alleged to be a resident of Porto Rico and a married woman, commenced this suit against her husband, Tomas Garrozi y Pietri, as also against Juana Maria Gonzalez and Domingo Piazzi y

On

Pietri, all three of whom were alleged to be
residents of Porto Rico. We shall here-
after speak of the plaintiff as the wife and
the principal defendant, Garrozi, as the husband's petition for removal contained
band.

prayed and were allowed a removal.
the filing of the record a motion to remand
was made, based upon the fact that the hus-

As far as essential to be considered, the facts alleged, the cause of action relied on, and the proceedings had, up to the pleading by the defendants, are summarized as follows: The marriage took place in May, 1886, and as no antenuptial contract was made, their property relations were governed by the community system under the Code of Porto Rico. They lived together until November, 1898, when they separated, and the wife, under the direction of the husband, resided in a house provided by him. There she lived until December, 1899, when, owing to the failure of the husband to support her, she removed to Ponce.

The husband in 1901 sued for a divorce on the ground of the wife's adultery and she, by a reconventional demand (cross bill), prayed for a divorce on the same ground, and because of cruel treatment. In this suit the court awarded the wife $75 a month alimony pendente lite. This not having been paid, the wife issued execution and realized from a sale of certain furniture one month's alimony. The remainder of the alimony up to the commencement of this suit, aggregating $225 and 598 pesos, Porto Rican currency, the amount of legal expenses incurred by the wife in defending the divorce suit, and which had been allowed by the court, were yet unpaid. These amounts were uncollected because of the apparent insolvency of the husband. This insolvency was, however, only apparent, because there was a large amount of real and personal property belonging separately to the husband, or to the community, which the husband had, with the object of defrauding the wife, apparently disposed of by simulated transfers to the defendants Maria Gonzalez and Domingo Piazzi. The character and extent of this property were detailed as well as the various alleged simulated contracts, which it was averred had been made concerning the same. The prayer was that the contracts in question be set aside as mere fraudulent simulations, so as to enable the wife to exert her rights therein or thereagainst. The court admitted the petition to be filed and authorized the suit by the wife in the name of her representative or next friend. Before the day for pleading, the husband, alleging himself to be a citizen and subject of France, and that by operation of law the wife was of the same nationality, obtained an order for removal to the court below. Subsequently the two other defendants

also

averment of residence. The court refused to remand and allowed an amendment alleging the residence of the husband to be in France.

Without attempting to state the many pleadings which followed, the ultimate issues and the action of the court may be thus summarized: The petition of the wife was amended and reformed, authority being given by the court for the prosecution of the suit on her behalf by her representative or next friend. The petition in its final form was less prolix, and the allegation was added that the divorce proceeding between the husband and wife, referred to in the original petition, had gone to the supreme court of Porto Rico, and had by that court been finally decided, decreeing a divorce in favor of the husband. The prayer for relief was amended to conform to this situation; that is, it was prayed not only that the simulated contracts be set aside, but, further, that the community be liquidated, and the wife he awarded her share. The defense, as finally made on the part of the husband, as well as the other defendants, was an averment of the good faith and reality of all the contracts alleged to have been simulated. Moreover, the husband denied that there was community property, because nothing had been acquired during marriage which fell into the community, and because all the property which he possessed, even assuming that the assailed contracts were simulated, was separate property, either owned at the date of the marriage or thereafter acquired as a reinvestment of separate funds. moreover, specially alleged that, as the divorce had been decreed against the wife on account of her adultery, she had forfeited all her interest in the community if any community property existed. Besides, the right of the wife to compel the liquidation of the community, even if she had not forfeited her right to a participation in the community assets, if any, was specially challenged.

The court appointed an examiner, who took and reported the testimony. Under a stipulation and order the cause ferred for report to a special master upon the facts and law. Before the master reported the wife prayed a receiver and an injunction, upon averments that the two defendants, to whom it was charged the property of the husband had been seemingly transferred or encumbered by simulated contracts, were dealing with the same so as

The court, in its findings, has stated the rulings which were excepted to with respect to the admission or rejection of evidence, accompanied with such portions of the evidence as it deemed adequate to enable a review of such rulings.

to dissipate the estate and frustrate the re- | sary, to pay the decree in favor of the wife. lief prayed. A receiver was appointed, and On the day after the entry of the final dethe defendants were enjoined as prayed. cree, on motion of the wife, the court passed The report of the special master, as to both a further decree in her favor, directing the the facts and law, substantially sustained payment to her, first, of the sum of $598, the claims of the wife. Exceptions taken awarded to her by the district court of to the report were overruled and the report Ponce as her expenses in the divorce litiwas confirmed. The court below adopted gation, and the sum of $133.50, interest the facts found by the master and reiterat- thereon to the date of the decree; second, ed them in the findings in the nature of a the sum of $885, due for alimony awarded special verdict, made for the purposes of the by the district court of Ponce to the date of present appeal. By those findings all the the decree of divorce; and, third, the sum charges of fraudulent simulation relied upon of $1.500, on account of solicitors' fees in by the wife were found to be true, and, as the pending litigation,--a total of $3,116.50. a legal conclusion, all the property and as- The receiver was directed to pay these sets to which the simulated contracts re- several sums out of any money in his lated were held to belong to the husband. hands, and, in default of sufficient funds, Concerning the community and its liquida- execution to enforce against the husband tion, it was found, as a matter of fact, that was authorized. the wife, at the time of the marriage, had no property, and subsequently acquired none, whilst the hushand, at the time of the marriage, was the owner of various assets and described property, which was found to have been of the value, at the time of the marriage, of $71,500. The net property of the husband at the date of the dissolution of the marriage, including all reinvestments or avails of his separate property existing at the time of the marriage, and, allowing for community debts, was found by the court to be $77,000, thus leaving $5,500 as the acquêt or gain of the community, which was subject to be divided equally between the husband and wife. In addition, the court found that during the marriage the husband had spent, out of the revenues of his property, which revenues fell into the community, the sum of $47,000, during various trips made by him to Europe, and that these expenditures by the husband, from revenue which belonged to the community, were unreasonable to the extent of $22,000. From the facts thus found, as a matter of law, it was concluded that the "That the jurisdiction of the district court $22,000 should be treated as an existing of the United States for Porto Rico in civil acquêt of the community, subject to be equal-cases shall, in addition to that conferred by ly divided between the parties. The sum, the act of April twelfth, nineteen hundred therefore, of the community property for [31 Stat. at L. 77, chap. 191], extend to and distribution, was fixed at $27,500, the wife's embrace controversies where the parties, or share, therefore, being $13,750. The court either of them, are citizens of the United in its final decree annulled the simulated States, or citizens or subjects of a foreign contracts, and decreed the property to which state or states, wherein the matter in dissuch contracts related to belong to the hus-pute exceeds, exclusive of interest or costs, band, and, fixing the sum of the community the sum or value of one thousand dollars." as above stated, a money decree was entered in favor of the wife for her share thereof, $13,750. The decree reserved the right of the court to make such further orders as might be necessary, the receiver was directed to make full report, and a special master was appointed with power to sell the property in the custody of the receiver, if neces

Before coming to the merits we must dispose of three preliminary questions. First. The suggestion of a want of jurisdiction in this court is without merit. Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192 U. S. 149, 48 L. ed. 385, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247. Second. The contention that the court below was without jurisdiction, and that the cause, therefore, should not be passed upon on the merits, but should be remanded to the court below, with directions to remand to the local court from which it was removed, is also without merit. That the case was within the original jurisdiction of the United States district court of Porto Rico clearly results from the broad grant of jurisdiction conferred by the 3d section of the act of March 2, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 953, chap. 812), reading as follows:

The assertion of the want of jurisdiction in the court below rests, however, not upon a denial of power in that court to have entertained the controversy if the suit had been originally brought there, but upon the contention that, as a defendant other than the husband was a resident and citizen of Porto Rico, the cause was improperly re

moved from the local court. And the proposition goes to the extent of insisting that such want of jurisdiction may be asserted by the person who procured the removal, who resisted the effort to remand, and when the want of jurisdiction is only suggested after trial and final decree. The premise upon which these contentions are based is a portion of the text of the 34th section of what is known as the Foraker act (act of April 12, 1900, 31 Stat. at L. 84, chap. 191) which provides that

"The laws of the United States relating to appeals, writs of error and certiorari, removal of causes, and other matters and proceedings as between the courts of the United States and the courts of the several states, shall govern in such matters and proceedings as between the district court of the United States [for Porto Rico] and the courts of Porto Rico."

Without so deciding, we concede, for the sake of the argument, that where the power to remove from a state court to a court of the United States is restricted by statute to a certain class of cases, a removal operated contrary to the statute does not devest the state court of jurisdiction, and, therefore, does not confer jurisdiction on the court to which the cause has been wrongfully removed, even although the cause may have been one of which such court might have taken jurisdiction originally. So, also, we concede for argument sake that in such a case the party wrongfully procuring the removal may escape the effect of a judgment rendered against him in the forum to which he voluntarily resorted, by suggesting after judgment the want of power to remove. But these concessions are not decisive of the case at bar, because of the extent of the jurisdiction conferred upon the United States court in Porto Rico by the act of 1901; that is to say, in consequence of the enlarged character of the jurisdiction conferred by that act, and the obvious departure which it manifests from the principles controlling the jurisdiction of a United States court as contradistinguished from a state court, we do not think the rule which demarks the line between the courts of the United States and state courts within the removal act should be held applicable to Porto Rico to the extent which might have obtained had the act of 1901 not been enacted. We conclude, therefore, that where a case is removed from the iocal Porto Rican court to the United States court, over which case the latter court would have had jurisdiction as to all the parties impleaded if the case had been there originally brought, even though the removal was irregular, the party who caused the removal cannot be

heard, after judgment against him, to assert that the United States court was wanting in jurisdiction solely on the ground that the case was erroneously removed.

3. The objections to rulings made by the court in admitting and rejecting evidence are numerous. We shall not undertake to review them in detail or state at length our conclusions concerning them, contenting ourselves with saying that, after examining them all, we think they are without foundation, either because fundamentally unsound or because the objections concerned not the admissibility but the mere weight of the evidence offered or rejected, or because the record is not in such a condition as to enable us to overcome the strong impression we form that no prejudicial error resulted from the rulings complained of.

The conclusive effect of the facts found below narrows the issues. Thus the finding that the contracts were fraudulent simulations sustains the legal conclusion that the property to which the contracts related belonged to the husband, and therefore that subject is put out of view. Again, as the facts found concerning the sum of the property owned by the husband at the date of the marriage and the amount owned by him at the date of the dissolution of the community by the divorce sustain the conclusion that the difference between the two was an acquêt or gain of the community, to be divided equally, that question need not be further considered. In order, therefore, to dispose of the entire controversy, it will be necessary to decide only four questions: First, whether the wife, as a consequence of the judgment of divorce rendered against her, had forfeited her interest in the community, if there was any such interest. Second, whether error of law was committed in crediting the community with $22,000, the amount expended by the husband for traveling and medical expenses during the years 1889 and 1890, and during the years 1895 to 1898, both inclusive, upon the ground that such expenditures were unreasonable and extravagant, and therefore created an obligation on his part to return. the amount to the community as an acquêt or gain thereof. Third, if there was due the wife any amount on account of her interest in the community, and such interest had not been forfeited, was she entitled, as a divorced wife, to provoke a liquidation of the community, and to a degree in her favor for the amount, if any, of her interest in such community? Fourth, did the court below err as a matter of law, in addition to giving the wife a decree for her interest in the community, in allowing her the sum of the alimoney pendente lite de

creed in her favor by the local court up to the date of the divorce, the sum of her expenses in the divorce suit which had been approved by the local court, and an additional sum of $1,500 for the services of the counsel of the wife in the cause.

1. It may be conceded that, by the law of Spain, prior to the adoption of the Spanish Civil Code, the wife against whom a judgment of divorce for adultery was decreed forfeited all right to her share in the community existing between herself and husband. But that rigorous rule was not incorporated into the Spanish Civil Code, which was in force in the island of Porto Rico when the territory was acquired. Spanish Code of 1889, War Department translation, title 4, § 5, articles 67 et seq. Such forfeiture, moreover, did not obtain in the Porto Rican Civil Code, adopted after the acquisition of the island by the United States, and which was in force in that is

land when the decree of divorce which was here involved was rendered. Porto Rico, Civil Code 1902, title 5, chap. 5, §§ 173, 174. To the contrary, the Code of 1889 provided that, in case of a divorce for adultery, the guilty spouse should forfeit or lose, not his or her interest in the community, but "all that may have been given or promised him or her by the innocent one, or by any other person, in consideration for the latter." Code of 1889, art. 73, ¶ 3. And a similar provision was incorporated in the Code of 1902, as follows:

"The party against whom the judgment is rendered (of divorce) shall forfeit to the party obtaining the divorce all gifts which the other party may have conferred upon such party during the marriage, or when the same was contracted, and the innocent party shall retain everything which has been acquired from the other." Sec. 174.

Both these provisions were plainly intended to depart from the rule of forfeiture prevailing in the more ancient Spanish law and to incorporate the rule of limited forfeiture, as existing in the Louisiana (article 156) and Napoleon (article 299) Codes; a similar provision to which has been enacted in the codes of some other countries, which have modeled their codes on the Code Napoleon. 1 De Saint-Joseph, Concordance, pp. 24 et seq. This conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that, at the time of the adoption of the Spanish and Porto Rican Codes, the provision of the Napoleon Code on that subject had been conclusively determined not to operate a forfeiture of the community property. See authorities collected in note to article 299 in the Fuzier-Herman edition of the Code Napoleon, Paris, 1896.

The argument advanced in the brief of

one of the counsel, that, despite the change in the Code to which we have referred, the old rule of forfeiture should be held to obtain, 'because of the provision of article 1417 of the Code of 1889 and § 1330 of the Code of 1902, saying: "The spouse who, by bad faith, has been the cause of the nullity (of the marriage), shall not have a share in the common property," rests upon a mere misconception. The provision relied on in both the Codes relates not to the dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce or for any other cause, but to the recognition of the nullity of a seeming marriage for causes which have operated to prevent the marriage from having ever existed. In other words, the distinction between the article relied upon and the other articles to which we have previously referred is that which obtains between a decree of a court dissolving a marriage which has existed and a decree establishing that there never had been a marriage to dissolve. The pertinency of this distinction again becomes manifest when it is observed that a similar distinction and consequence exists in the Code Napoleon.

2. Owing to an apparent ambiguity in the finding of fact concerning the liability of the husband to the community for $22,000 it becomes necessary, before reviewing the legal conclusion of the court below on that subject, to fix the exact meaning of the facts found upon which that legal conclusion was based. As a preliminary to so doing we reproduce in the margin† the finding of fact on the subject, as well as the legal conclusion drawn by the court there from.

Whilst there are expressions in the finding referred to which, isolatedly considered, might lead to the inference that it was the intention of the court to find that the husband had not expended the money, but had concealed it or yet had it in his possession, we think the context of the finding and the result of the other findings establish that the court intended to and did find that the

+That said defendant Garrozi made several trips to Europe during the continuance of his marital partnership, and spent large sums of money by reason thereof, which were, as near as can be determined from his testimony, the following amounts:

In 1889
In 1890
In 1895
In 1896-98

Total

$10,000.00

7,000.00

5,000.00

25,000.00

$47,000.00

Said defendant claims in his testimony that these trips to Europe and the expendirendered necessary by reason of his serious ture of these large sums of money was and continued illness. But said testimony is not substantiated by that of any other

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