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essary result of the legislation of Congress, | lotted land, is without merit, since the right the United States retained such control over of possession asserted of necessity is deallotments as was essential to cause the al-pendent upon the existence of an equitable lotted land to inure during the period in title in the claimant under the legislation which the land was to be held in trust "for of Congress to the ownership of the allotted the sole use and benefit of the allottees.” lands. Indeed, that such was the case plainAs observed in the Smith Case, 194 U. S. ly appears from the excerpt which we have 408, 48 L. ed. 1043, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676, made from the concluding portion of the prior to the passage of the act of 1894, "the opinion of the supreme court of Oregon. sole authority for settling disputes concern- Because, from the considerations previ. ing allotments resided in the Secretary of ously stated, we are constrained to the conthe Interior.” This being settled, it follows clusion that the court below was without that, prior to the act of Congress of 1894, jurisdiction to entertain the controversy, we controversies necessarily involving a deter- must not be considered as intimating an mination of the title, and, incidentally, of opinion that we deem that the principles apthe right to the possession, of Indian allot. plied by the court in disposing of the merits ments while the same were held in trust by of the case were erroneous. the United States, were not primarily cog. The judgment of the Supreme Court of nizable by any court, either state or Federal. Oregon is reversed and the cause remanded It results, therefore, that the act of Con- to that court for further proceedings not gress of 1894, which delegated to the courts inconsistent with this opinion. of the United States the power to determine such questions, cannot be construed as The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice Brewer, having conferred upon the state courts the and Mr. Justice Peckham dissent. authority to pass upon Federal questions over which, prior to the act of 1894, no court had any authority. The purpose of the act of 1894 to continue the exclusive Federal TEXAS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,
Piff. in Err., control over the subject is manifested by the provision of that act which commands that a judgment or decree rendered in any
ABILENE COTTON OIL COMPANY. such controversy shall be certified by the
Error to state court-Federal question. court to the Secretary of the Interior. By this provision, as pointed out in the Smith consistently with the act to regulate com
1. The question whether a state court, Case, supra, the United States consented to merce, can grant relief to a shipper because submit its interest in the trust estate and of the exaction by a common carrier of an the future control of its conduct concerning alleged unreasonable freight rate for an inthe same to the result of the decree of the terstate shipment, when such rate has been courts of the United States,-a power which filed with the Interstate Commerce Commissuch courts could alone exercise by virtue of sion and promulgated as provided by the act the consent given by the act. The subse to regulate commerce, and has not been quent legislation of Congress, instead of ex- sion, will sustain a writ of error from the
found to be unreasonable by the Commishibiting a departure from this policy, con: Federal Supreme Court to a state court, firms it. By the amendments to the act where such question was presented by the of 1894, approved February 6, 1901, chap. pleadings, was passed upon by the trial 217 (31 Stat. at L. 760) it is expressly re-court, was expressly and necessarily decided quired that in suits authorized to be brought by the highest state court, and is essentially in the circuit courts of the United States involved in the case. respecting allotments of Indian lands, "the Error to state court-question reviewable. parties thereto shall be the claimant as
2. The question whether a schedule of plaintiff and the United States as party de interstate freight rates filed with the Interfendant.” Nothing could more clearly dem- state Commerce Commission was posted as onstrate than does this requirement, the not open in the Supreme Court of the
required by the act to regulate commerce is conception of Congress that the United United States on writ of error to a state States continued, as trustee, to have an court, where the latter court in effect deactive interest in the proper disposition of clared that such schedule was conceded to allotted Indian lands, and the necessity of have been filed and published in conformity its being made a party to controversies con- with the statute, and it does not appear cerning the same, for the purpose of secur
that if the court, having the evidence before ing a harmonious and uniform operation of it, had not treated the case as presented, it
might not have considered the facts in relathe legislation of Congress on the subject.
tion to the publication of the schedule, and The suggestion made in argument that affirmatively found facts compelling the con: the controversy here presented involved the clusion that the statute had been complied mere possession, and not the title, to the al..I with, even if such inference was not sufficiently sustained by the findings of the trial, carrier had exacted, over the protest of the court which the appellate court adopted. oil company, on the delivery of the cotton Carriers-remedy for exacting unreasonable seed, the payment of an unjust and unrea
interstate rate-necessity of action by In- sonable rate, which exceeded, in the aggreterstate Commerce Commission.
3. A shipper cannot maintain an action gate, by the sum sued for, a just and reaagainst a common carrier to obtain relief sonable charge. There were, moreover, averfrom an alleged unreasonable freight rate ments that the rate exacted was discrimexacted from him for an interstate ship inatory, constituted an undue preference, ment, without reference to any previous ac- and amounted to charging more for a shorter tion by the Interstate Commerce. Commis- than for a longer haul. Besides a general sion, where such rate has been filed with traverse, the railway company defended on that Commission and promulgated as pro- the ground that the shipments were intervided by the act to regulate commerce, and state, and were, therefore, covered by the is the rate which it is the duty of the car act of Congress to regulate commerce.
It rier, under that act, to enforce against shippers until changed in accordance with the was averred that, as the rate complained of provisions of that statute, since the inde was the one fixed in the rate sheets which pendent right of an individual originally to the company had established, filed, pubmaintain actions to obtain pecuniary redress lished, and posted, as required by that act, for violations of the act, conferred by $ 9,1 the state court was without jurisdiction to must be confined to such wrongs as can, entertain the cause, and, even if such court consistently with the context of the act, be had jurisdiction, it could not, without disredressed without previous action by the Commission, and the provision of $ 22,7 that regarding the act to regulate commerce, nothing therein “shall in any way abridge grant relief upon the basis that the estabor alter the remedies now existing at com | lished rate was unreasonable, when it had mon law or by statute, but the provisions not been found to be so by the Interstate of this act are in addition to such remedies," Commerce Commission. cannot be construed as continuing in ship- The trial court made findings of fact. pers a common-law right the continued ex- Those relating to the subject of the estabistence of which would be absolutely incon- lishing, filing, and publishing by the railsistent with the provisions of the statute.
way company of rate sheets containing the [No. 78.]
rate which was complained of were as fol
lows: Argued November 2, 1906. Decided Febru- “7th. That the Western Classification Comary 25, 1907.
mittee, agent and representative of numerous
railways and of defendant, filed with the ERROR to the Court of Civil Appeals Interstate Commerce Commission what is IN
for the Second Supreme Judicial District known as the Western Classification, giving for the State of Texas to review a judgment classifications of different articles or items which reversed a judgment of the District of merchandise, and in same cotton sued is Court of Taylor County, in that state, in classed as 'A;' that this was the joint act favor of defendant in a suit to obtain re- of a number of roads, and the defendant lief from an alleged unreasonable interstate adopted said joint classification; that on freight rate exacted by a common carrier May 30, 1901, the Southwestern freight from a shipper, and rendered judgment in Committee, agent of a number of roads and favor of the plaintiff for the recovery of the agent of defendant, filed with the said Comexcessive charges. Reversed and remanded mission a supplement for numerous roads for further proceedings. See same case below (Tex. Civ. App.) 85 in connection with defendant, whereby the
rate on cotton seed from all points in S. W. 1052.
Louisiana east of Alexandria was fixed at The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. David D. Duncan, John F. Dillon, 67 cents per 100 pounds to all points in Winslow S. Pierce, and Thomas J. Freeman Texas from all points in Louisiana east of for plaintiff in error.
Alexandria and west of Alexandria.
"8th. That said classification and said Mr. Hannis Taylor for defendant in error. rate schedule was adopted by defendant and
Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of was filed by said S. W. Freight Committee the court:
with said Interstate Commerce Commission The oil company, the defendant in error, in behalf of defendant. sued to recover $1,951.83. It was alleged “9th. That copies of said schedule and that, on shipments of car loads of cotton said tariffs and classifications were kept in seed, made in September and October, 1901, the cffice of said defendant at said points over the line of the defendant's road from of shipment and at said Abilene, that is, various points in Louisiana east of Alex in the freight office and depots, for the andria, in that state, to Abilene, Texas, the 'inspection of the public, as admitted by plaintiff, which admission is found in the court as to the unreasonableness of the rate, statement of facts.
*U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3159. * U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3170.
it was said: “10th. That, other than said schedule and “So that we are relieved from a considclassification, nothing has been filed with eration of the difficulties discussed in some the Interstate Commerce Commission by or of the cases in ascertaining the fact, and in behalf of defendant in the way of class- therefore now have squarely before us the ifications, schedules, or rates on cotton seed questions whether, in a state court, a shipfrom points on its road in Louisiana to per in cases of interstate carriage can, by points on its road in Texas.”
the principles of the common law, be acFrom the facts found the court stated the corded relief from unjust and unreasonable following as its conclusions :
freight rates exacted from him, or shall re“Ist. The facts so found show that this lief in such cases be denied merely because was an interstate shipment.
such unreasonable rate has been filed and “2d. The facts so found show that the de- promulgated by the carrier under the interfendant complied with the interstate com- state commerce act?" merce law, and said rates and classifications Proceeding in an elaborate opinion to diswere thereby properly established and in pose of the question thus stated to be the force, except that the rate charged on cot- only one for consideration, the conclusion ton seed in car load lots was unreasonable was reached that jurisdiction to grant reand excessive.
lief existed, and that to do so was not re“3d. I find that the rate charged by the pugnant to the act to regulate commerce. defendant was that established under the Applying these conclusions to the findings interstate commerce law."
of fact, the relief prayed was allowed. The As nothing in these conclusions relates to court said: the averments of discrimination, undue pref- “We therefore adopt the trial court's finderence, or a greater charge for a shorter than ings of fact, and, applying thereto the prinfor a longer haul, those subjects, it may be ciples of law we have deduced, reverse the assumed, were considered to have been elimi- judgment, and here render judgment in apnated in the course of the trial.
pellant's favor for the said sum of $1,951.83, There was judgment for the railway com excessive freights charged, together with inpany. When the controversy came to be terest. disposed of by the court of civil appeals, to The assigned errors are addressed excluwhich the cause was taken, that court sively to the operation of the act to regulate deemed there was only one question pre-commerce upon the jurisdiction of the court sented for decision; that is, whether, con below to entertain the controversy, and its sistently with the act to regulate commerce, power in any event to afford relief to the there was power in the court to grant re-oil company, based upon the alleged unlief upon the finding that the rate charged reasonableness of the rate under the cirfor an interstate shipment was unreason
cumstances disclosed. Before we take up able, although such rate was the one fixed the consideration of that subject, however, by the duly published and filed rate sheet, two questions must be disposed of: First, it and when the rate had not been found to is insisted that this court is without jurisbe unreasonable by the Interstate Commerce diction, because no Federal question is preCommission. In opening its opinion the sented. We think it suffices to say that it court said (85 S. W. 1052):
obviously results from the statements pre“Adopting the construction of the plead- viously made that a question of that charings evidently given them in the briefs, and acter was presented by the pleadings, was treating it as presented, the case, briefly passed upon by the trial court, was stated, is an action by appellant for dam- pressly and necessarily decided by the court ages for a violation of an alleged common
below, and is also essentially involved in
the cause as it is before us. Second, it is law right, in that appellee demanded and coercively collected from appellant freight commerce upon the right of the oil company
urged that the effect of the act to regulate charges in excess of a reasonable compen- to recover need not be passed upon, since, sation, for the transportation of a number even if error on that subject was committed of car loads of cotton seed from the town below, a review of the decision in that reof Cottonport and other designated towns in gard is unnecessary, because, if the correct the state of Louisiana to the city of Abilene legal inference be drawn from the facts in the state of Texas."
found by the trial court, which were adopted After referring to the findings as to the by the appellate court, it will result that the unreasonableness of the charge exacted, and railway company had not established a legal after pointing out that the railway company schedule of rates in compliance with the had not, by a cross assignment, challenged act to regulate commerce, and therefore the the correctness of the findings of the trial jurisdiction of the court and its right to
afford relief was not at all affected by the had been fully complied with, even if such provisions of the act. We do not presently inference was not sufficiently sustained by stop to consider whether the consequences as the findings of the trial court which the to jurisdiction and right to recover which appellate court adopted. Because we thus are asserted would result if the premise find the question not open for consideration was well founded, because we think the we must not be considered as conceding the premise is either shown by the findings to correctness of the conclusion attempted to be unfounded or it is not open for con- be drawn from the supposed failure to post. tention on the record. The premise rests We are thus brought to the underlying
* upon two propositions of fact: a. That the proposition in the case,-viz., the effect of findings of the trial court show that the the act to regulate commerce upon the claim rate sheet filed was joint and therefore did asserted by the oil company. As presented not necessarily relate to a shipment entirely below and pressed at bar, the question takes over the road of the railway company. This a seemingly two-fold aspect,—the jurisdiccontention, we think, is shown by the find- tion of the court below as affected by the ings to be without merit, since those findings act to regulate commerce and the right to clearly point out that the rate sheet was the relief sought consistently with that filed by an agent of the defendant railroad, act, even if jurisdiction existed. was by it adopted, and constituted the only that these questions are only seemingly difrate sheet embracing the traffic in question. ferent, because they present but different b. Although it is conceded that the evidence phases of the fundamental question, which showed that the schedule of rates was es- is the scope and effect of the act to regulate tablished and filed with the Interstate Com-commerce upon the right of a shipper to merce Commission, and was kept at the maintain an action at law against a common stations of the railway company for public carrier to recover damages because of the inspection, and that the oil company had exaction of an alleged unreasonable rate, alknowledge of the fact, it is insisted that the though the rate collected and complained of facts found do not justify the conclusion was the rate stated in the schedule filed that there was a compliance with the re- with the Interstate Commerce Commission quirements of the act to regulate commerce and published according to the requirements as to the posting of the established schedule. of the act to regulate commerce, and which We think this contention is not open on it was the duty of the carrier under the this record. As we have seen, the trial law to enforce as against shippers. We court expressly concluded that the railway come, therefore, first, to the consideration company had complied with the act to regu- of that subject. late commerce in the matter of filing, etc., Without going into detail, it may not be its schedule of rates, and the appellate court doubted that, at common law, where a caropened its opinion by the statement that the rier refused to receive goods offered for course of the trial and the briefs of counsel carriage except upon the payment of an unconfined the issue for determination to the reasonable sum, the shipper had a right question of the effect of the act to regulate of action in damages. It is also beyond commerce upon the rights of the parties, controversy that, when a carrier accepted manifestly upon the assumption that the goods, without payment of the cost of carcorrectness of the conclusion of the trial riage or an agreement as to the price to be court as to compliance with the act was paid, and made an unreasonable exaction as conceded by both parties. In other words, a condition of the delivery of the goods, an as the court below, in deciding the case, action could be maintained to recover the expressly declared that the course of the ar- excess over a reasonable charge.
a And it gument and briefs of counsel before it had may further be conceded that it is now setconfined the case to the issue of whether tled that even where, on the receipt of goods there was a right to recover upon the hy- by a carrier, an exorbitant charge is stated, pothesis that a schedule of rates had been and the same is coercively exacted, either in filed and published, we do not think that it advance or at the completion of the service, is now open to contend that that which an action may be maintained to recover the the court below in effect declared was con- overcharge. 2 Kent, Com. 599, and note a; ceded in the briefs of counsel to be a law. 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. pt. 1, 8th ed. (Hare & ful schedule of rates was not such. Non W. notes) p. 457. constat, that if the court of civil appeals, As the right to recover, which the court having the evidence before it, had not treated below sustained, was clearly within the printhe case as presented, it might not have ciples just stated, and as it is conceded that considered the facts in relation to the pub- the act to regulate commerce did not, in so lication of the schedule and affirmatively many words, abrogate such right, it folfound facts inevitably compelling the con- lows that the contention that the right was clusion that the act to regulate commerce taken away by the act to regulate commerce
27 S. C.—23.
rests upon the proposition that such result, ods of dealing, and generally to enforce the was accomplished by implication. In test- provisions of the act. To that end it was ing the correctness of this proposition we made the duty of the district attorneys of concede that we must be guided by the the United States, under the direction of the principle that repeals by implication are not Attorney General, to prosecute proceedings favored, and, indeed, that a statute will not commenced by the Commission to enforce be construed as taking away a common-law compliance with the act. The act specially right existing at the date of its enactment, provided that whenever any common carunless that result is imperatively required; rier subject to its provisions “shall do, that is to say, unless it be found that the cause to be done, or permit to be done, any pre-existing right is so repugnant to the act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited statute that the survival of such right would or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to in effect deprive the subsequent statute of do any act, matter, or thing in this act reits efficacy; in other words, render its pro- quired to be done, such common carrier shall visions nugatory.
be liable to the person or persons injured Both parties concede that the question thereby for the full amount of damages for decision has not been directly passed sustained in consequence of any such violaupon by this court, and that its determination of the provisions of this act. tion is only persuasively influenced by ad- [24 Stat. at L. 382, chap. 104, § 8, U. S. judications of other courts. They both, Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3159.] Power was conhence, mainly rely upon the text of the act ferred upon the Commission to hear comto regulate commerce as it existed at the plaints concerning violations of the act, to time the shipments in question were made. investigate the same, and, if the complaints The case, therefore, must rest upon an in- were well founded, to direct not only the terpretation of the text of the act and is making of reparation to the injured permeasurably one of first impression.
sons, but to order the carrier to desist from Let us, without going into detail, give such violation in the future. In the event an outline of the general scope of that act, of the failure of a carrier to obey the order with the object of fixing the rights which it of the Commission, that body, or the party was intended to conserve or create, the in whose favor an award of reparation was wrongs which it proposed to redress, and the made, was empowered to compel compliance remedies which the act established to ac- by invoking the authority of the courts of complish the purposes which the lawmakers the United States in the manner pointed had in view.
out in the statute, prima facie effect in The act made it the duty of carriers sub- such courts being given to the findings of ject to its provisions to charge only just and fact made by the Commission. By the 9th reasonable rates. To that end the duty was section of the act it was provided as fol. imposed of establishing and publishing lows: schedules of such rates. It forbade all un- “That any person or persons claiming to just preferences and discriminations, made be damaged by any common carrier subit unlawful to depart from the rates in the ject to the provisions of this act may either established schedules until the same were make complaint to the Commission, as herechanged as authorized by the act, and such inafter provided for, or may bring suit in departure was made an offense punishable his or their own behalf for the recovery of by fine or imprisonment, or both, and the the damages for which such common carprohibitions of the act and the punishments rier may be liable under the provisions of which it imposed were directed not only this act, in any district or circuit court of against carriers but against shippers, or any the United States of competent jurisdiction; person who, directly or indirectly, by any but such person or persons shall not have machination or device, in any manner what the right to pursue both of said remedies, soever, accomplished the result of produ- and must, in each case, elect which one of cing the wrongful discriminations or prefer- the two methods of procedure herein proences which the act forbade. It was made vided for he or they will adopt. the duty of carriers subject to the act to And by $ 22, which we shall hereafter file with the Interstate Commerce Commis- fully consider, existing appropriate commonsion created by that act copies of estab- law and statutory remedies were saved. lished schedules, and power was conferred When the act to regulate commerce was upon that body to provide as to the form of enacted there was contrariety of opinion the schedules, and penalties were imposed whether, when a rate charged by a carrier for not establishing and filing the required was, in and of itself reasonable, the person schedules. The Commission was endowed from whom such a charge was exacted had with plenary administrative power to super- at common law an action against the carvise the conduct of carriers, to investigaterier because of damage asserted to have their affairs, their accounts, and their meth-! been suffered by a discrimination against