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are not, at the time, under the influence of | direction of the defendant. The defendant liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd denied responsibility for the acts of those or immoral character, where the statute is officers. It was sued by Greenberg in one applicable alike to all persons, corporations, of the courts of California, and there was or associations conducting places of public a verdict and judgment against the assoThe case ciation for the sum of $1,000. was taken to the supreme court of the state and the judgment was affirmed. 148 Cal. 126, 82 Pac. 684.
amusement or entertainment.
Constitutional law-privileges and immuni
ties-corporation not a citizen.
3. A corporation cannot claim the protection of the clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution which secures the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against abridgment or impairment by the law of a state. * Constitutional law-due process of law immunity.
4. The liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial,
Constitutional law-due process of law regulating admission to places of public
At the trial a question was raised as to the applicability to this case of a statute of California relating to the admission of persons holding tickets of admission to places of public entertainment and amusement. That statute is as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any corporation, person, or association, or the proprietor, lessee, or the agents of either, of any opera house, theater, melodeon, museum, circus, caravan, course, fair, or other place of public amusement or entertainment, to refuse admittance to any person over the age of twenty-one years who presents a ticket of admission acquired by purchase, and who demands admission to such place, provided that any person under the influence of liquor, or who is guilty of boisterous conduct, or any person of lewd or immoral character, may be
excluded from any such place of amusement. § 2. Any person who is refused admission to any place of amusement, contrary to the provisions of this act, is entitled to recover
Submitted January 29, 1907. Decided Feb- from the proprietors, lessees, or their agents,
ruary 25, 1907.
N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of California to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, in favor of plaintiff, in an action to recover damages for being excluded from a race course kept as a place of public amusement. Affirmed.
or from any person, association, corporation, or the directors thereof, his actual damage and $100 in addition thereto."
1. The record sufficiently shows that in the supreme court of the state the defendant questioned the validity of the statute in question under the 14th Amendment, in that it "seeks to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and to deprive them of liberty and property
See same case below, 148 Cal. 126, 82 Pac. without due process of law, and to deny to
them, being within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws." By the judgment below the validity of the statute was sustained, the court holding that it was a legitMr. William G. Burke for defendant in imate exertion of the police power of the
The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. William S. Goodfellow for plaintiff in error.
state. The contention that this court is without jurisdiction to review that judg
Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion ment is, therefore, overruled. of the court:
The plaintiff in error is a corporation of California, and the lessee, in possession, of a race course kept as a place of public entertainment and amusement, and to which it was accustomed to issue tickets of admission. The defendant in error, Greenberg, purchased one of such tickets, and was admitted to the race course. After being admitted he was ejected from the premises against his will by police officers, acting, it was alleged in the complaint, by the
*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 10, Cent. 27 S.C.-25
2. The supreme court of the state, in a previous decision between the same parties,
Greenberg v. Western Turf Asso. 140 Cal. 357, 360, 73 Pac. 1050,-held the statute to be constitutional as a valid regulation imposed by the state in its exercise of police power. That decision, we assume, from the opinion of the court, had reference only to the Constitution of California. But this court can only pass upon the validity of the statute with reference to the Constitution of the United States. tion of the United States. We perceive no Dig. Constitutional Law, § 627.
reason for holding it to be invalid under that instrument. The contention that it is unconstitutional as denying to the defendant the equal protection of the laws is without merit, for the statute is applicable alike to all persons, corporations, or associations conducting places of public amusement or entertainment. Of still less merit is the suggestion that the statute abridges the rights and privileges of citizens; for a corporation cannot be deemed a citizen within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution of the United States which protects the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against being abridged or impaired by the law of a state. The same observation may be made as to the contention that the statute deprives the defendant of its liberty without due process of law; for the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons. Northwestern Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 51 L. ed. 168, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126. Does the statute deprive the defendant of any property right without due process of law? We answer this question in the negative. Decisions of this court, familiar to all, and which need not be cited, recognize the possession, by each state, of powers never surrendered to the general government; which powers the state, except as restrained by its own Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may exert not only for the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, but for the general or common good, for the well-being, comfort, and good order of the people. The enactments of a state, when exerting its power for such purposes, must be respected by this court, if they do not violate rights granted or secured by the supreme law of the land. view of these settled principles, the defendant is not justified in invoking the Constitution of the United States. The statute is only a regulation of places of public entertainment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admission, and who is not, at the time, under the influence of liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. In short, as applied to the plaintiff in error, it is only a regulation compelling it to perform its own contract as evidenced by tickets of admission issued and sold to parties wishing to attend its race course. Such a regulation, in itself just, is likewise promotive of peace and good order among those who attend places of public entertainment or amusement. It is neither an arbitrary exertion of the state's inher
ent or governmental power, nor a violation of any right secured by the Constitution of the United States. The race course in question, being held out as a place of public entertainment and amusement, is, by the act of the defendant, so far affected with a public interest that the state may, in the interest of good order and fair dealing, require defendant to perform its engagement to the public, and recognize its own tickets of admission in the hands of persons entitled to claim the benefits of the statute. That such a regulation violates any right of property secured by the Constitution of the United States cannot, for a moment, be admitted. The case requires nothing further to be said.
The judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES, Appt.,
JOHN M. HITE.
Navy-extra pay of naval officers after discharge.
The two months' extra pay provided for by the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. at enlisted men comprising the temporary force L. 1214, chap. 427), in favor of "officers and of the Navy during the war with Spain who served creditably beyond the limits of the United States, and who have been or may hereafter be discharged," should be computed, when awarded to a naval officer appointed under the act of May 4, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 369, chap. 234, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1056), to serve only during the continuance of the exigency under which his services were required in the existing war, on the basis of the pay he was receiving when he was detached from duty, after the treaty of peace was signed, and was ordered home preliminary to his discharge.
evidence, filed the following findings of fact 1228, chap. 427), among other things, proand conclusion of law: vides:
Findings of Fact.
"The officers and enlisted men comprising the temporary force of the Navy during the war with Spain, who served creditably beyond the limits of the United States, and who have been or may hereafter be discharged, shall be paid two months' extra pay; and all such officers and enlisted men of the Navy who have so served within the limits of the United States, and who have been or may hereafter be discharged, shall be paid one month's extra pay."
1. The claimant, John M. Hite, was appointed assistant engineer in the United States Navy, with the relative rank of ensign, for temporary service during the late war with Spain, on May 14, 1898; he reported for duty on board the U. S. S. "Massachusetts," in obedience to orders of the Navy Department, on June 1, 1898, and served creditably as such officer on said ship until December 17, 1898, at which date he was detached and ordered to his home, and on December 22, 1898, was honorably discharged from the naval service. The order referred to is in the words months' extra pay provided for in the forefollowing:
"U. S. S. Massachusetts."
2. The U. S. S. "Massachusetts" was in commission and cruised beyond the limits of the United States (in Cuban waters) during the time of the claimant's service on board.
3. In settlement of claimant's claim for extra pay authorized by the act of March 3, 1899 [30 Stat. at L. 1214, chap. 427], he was allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department two months' pay at the rate of pay of an assistant engineer in the Navy on waiting orders only, to wit, $166.66.
If entitled to two months' pay upon the basis of sea service the difference is $116.66. Conclusion of Law.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court decides, as a conclusion of law, that the claimant is entitled to judgment in the sum of one hundred and sixteen dollars and sixty-six cents ($116.66).
Appellee's counsel say that the issue is correctly stated by counsel for the United States as follows:
"The claimant contends that the two
going statute should be at the rate of pay he received while doing sea service, to wit, $1,700 per year.
"The contention of the government is that under the ruling of this court in United States v. North, 112 U. S. 510, 28 L. ed. 808, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285, the claimant has been paid all that was due him, inasmuch as he was paid two months' extra pay provided for in the statute at the rate of pay he was receiving at the time of his discharge, to wit, at the rate of $1,000 per annum."
Appellee was appointed an officer in the Navy, May 14, 1898, by authority of the act of Congress of May 4 of that year (30 Stat. at L. 369, chap. 234, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1056), which provided:
"Whenever, within the next twelve months, an exigency may exist which, in the judgment of the President, renders their services necessary, he is hereby authorized to appoint from civil life and commission such officers of the line and staff, not above the rank or relative rank of commander, and warrant officers including warrant machinists, and such officers of the Marine Corps not above the rank of captain, to be appointed from the noncommissioned officers of the corps and from civil life, as may be requisite: Provided, That such officers shall serve only during the continuance of the exigency under which their services are required in the existing war."
The war with Spain began April 21, 1898, and the treaty of Paris was signed December 10, 1898. [30 Stat. at L. 1754.] Appellee served until December 17, 1898, at which time he was detached from the vessel on which he was serving and ordered home, where, on December 22, he was honorably discharged from the naval service. It seems to have been thought reasonable that the government should pay the expenses of the journey home and for the time in getting
The case is reported 41 Ct. Cl. 256.
The act of March 3, 1899, provided for | were 'engaged in the military service of the extra pay for active service. Hite was de- United States in the war with Mexico' may tached because it became the Department's be said to 'have served out the term of their duty to discharge him under the proviso of engagement,' or to have been 'honorably the act of 1898, and the detachment was discharged,' within the meaning of those manifestly preliminary to his discharge. terms as used in the act of 1848, when the The order detaching him did not prescribe war was over, or when they were ordered that on arrival home he was to hold him- or mustered out of that service. Being in self "on waiting orders" or for further as- the Army and Navy, their 'engagement' was signment to duty. On the other hand, it to serve wherever they were ordered for required him to inform the Department of duty. Their engagement to serve in the the status of his accounts, obviously in or- war with Mexico ended when they were der that they might be settled on his leav- taken away from that service by proper ing the service. authority.
The two months' extra pay is given, as Chief Justice Peele, delivering the opinion of the court of claims, says, "because of creditable service beyond the limits of the United States during the war with Spain, and, therefore, upon discharge such officers become entitled to the same pay they were receiving while so serving beyond the limits of the United States." "To hold, because the claimant was ordered to his home, where he was discharged five days later, instead of being discharged on the day he was detached, that therefore he is entitled only to the lesser pay, would be a construction too narrow to harmonize with the purpose of Congress as disclosed by the act." Notwithstanding the considered dissenting opinion in the court below, we agree with the conclusion that, his engagement having ended, and he having been discharged, the two months' extra pay should have been given him upon the basis of the pay he was receiving when detached.
The contention of the government is that this case is governed by the ruling in United States v. North, 112 U. S. 510, 28 L. ed. 808, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285. In that case it was held that officers of the Navy and of the regular Army, who were employed in the prosecution of the war with Mexico, were entitled to the three months' extra pay provided for by the act of Congress of July 19, 1848, chap. 104, § 5, 9 Stat. at L. 248, and the act of February 19, 1879, chap. 90, 20 Stat. at L. 316.
The act of 1848 provided: "That the officers, etc., engaged, etc., in the war with Mexico, and who served out the term of their engagement, or have been or may be honorably discharged, . . shall be entitled to receive three months' extra pay." North was an officer in the Navy of the United States from May 29, 1829, to January 14, 1861, when he resigned. He served in the war with Mexico, as lieutenant, on board the frigate Potomac, from February 10, 1846, until July, 1847, when his vessel sailed for the United States. And Chief Justice Waite said:
"The pay they were to receive was evidently that which they were receiving at the end of their engagement, or when they were honorably discharged. The language is, 'shall be entitled to receive three months' extra pay,' evidently meaning the same pay they would have received if they had remained in the same service three months longer. It follows that, as North was serving at sea when he was ordered away, he was entitled to three months' sea pay."
In the present case, appellee was taken away from the service when he was detached from his vessel, as he was appointed to serve "only during the continuance of the exigency under which their services were required in the existing war," and was entitled, in the circumstances of the case, to extra pay on the basis of that which he was receiving when detached, as we have said above.
Emory's Case was also considered by the court in the same opinion and the same conclusion reached, and reference was there made to that case as reported in 19 Ct. Cl. 254.
The judgment of the Court of Claims was right, and it is affirmed.
Supreme Court of the United States-original jurisdiction-suit by state.
1. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States does not extend to a bill filed by the attorney general of Kansas on behalf of the state as trustee for the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Company of certain lands in the Indian territory, alleged to have been granted by Congress to the state for the benefit of the railway company, where the name of the state is being used simply for the prosecution of "Those of the regular Army or Navy who the claim of the railway company.
Kansas, near Chetopa, Kansas; the second was the Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Fort Gibson Railway Company, since conveyed to the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fé Railroad Company, extending from Leavenworth, through Lawrence, to the northern line of
Submitted November 12, 1906. Decided Feb- the Indian territory, near Coffeyville, Mont
ruary 25, 1907.
gomery county, Kansas, in the direction of Galveston bay, in Texas; and the third was
ORIGINAL BILL filed by the attorney the Kansas & Neosho Valley Railway Com
general of Kansas on behalf of the state as trustee for the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Company of certain lands in the Indian territory, alleged to have been granted to the state for the benefit of the railway company. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The facts are stated in the opinion. Solicitor General Hoyt, Attorney General Moody, and Assistant Attorney General Russell in support of motion to dismiss.
Messrs. Joseph H. Choate, Chiles C. Coleman, James Hagerman, Adrian H. Joline, A. B. Browne, Joseph M. Bryson, and John Madden in opposition.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:
On April 30, 1906, the state of Kansas applied for leave to file a bill of complaint against the United States and others, to which the United States objected on the ground of want of jurisdiction. May 21 leave was granted, without prejudice, and the bill was accordingly filed. As such an application by a state is usually granted as of course, we thought it wiser to allow the bill to be filed, but reserving to the United States the right to object to the jurisdiction thereafter, and hence the words, "without prejudice," were inserted in the order. October 9 leave was granted to the United States to file a demurrer, and, in lieu of this, a motion to dismiss was substituted, which was submitted November 12 on printed briefs on both sides.
The bill was filed by the attorney general of Kansas, on behalf of the state, as trustee for the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Company, of certain lands in the Indian territory, alleged to have been granted to the state for the benefit of the railway com
It is stated by counsel for complainant, as appearing from the bill, that in 1866 "there were three Kansas railroad companies running through the state to the Indian territory line. The first was the Union Pacific Railway Company, Southern Branch, since the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Company, extending from Fort Riley, now Junction City, Kansas, in a southeasterly direction, down the valley of the Neosho river to the southern line of the state of
*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 47, Cent.
pany, since the Kansas City, Fort Scott, & Memphis, and now a part of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, extending from a point of connection with the Union Pacific Railroad at or near the mouth of the Kansas river, thence southeasterly, through the eastern tier of counties, to the northern line of the Indian territory, at or near Baxter Springs, in Cherokee county, Kansas."
On July 25, 1866, an act of Congress was passed entitled "An Act Granting Lands to the State of Kansas to Aid in the Construction of the Kansas & Neosho Valley Rail
road and Its Extension to Red River." 14 Stat. at L. 236, chap. 241. On the next day, July 26, an act was passed, using the same language, except as to the routes, entitled "An Act Granting Lands to the State of Kansas to Aid in the Construction of a Southern Branch of the Union Pacific Railway and Telegraph, from Fort Riley, Kansas, to Fort Smith, Arkansas" (14 Stat. at L. 289, chap. 270), which provided as fol
"That for the purpose of aiding the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, the same being a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kansas, to construct and operate a railroad from Fort Riley, Kansas, or near said military reservation, thence down the valley of the Neosho river to the southern line of the state of Kansas, with a view to an extension of the same through a portion of the Indian territory to Fort Smith, Arkansas, there is hereby granted to the state of Kansas, for the use and benefit of said railroad company, every alternate section of land or parts thereof designated by odd numbers to the extent of five alternate sections per mile on each side of said road, and not exceeding in all ten sections per mile; "Sec. 3. And the lands hereby granted shall inure to the benefit of said company, as follows: When the governor of the state of Kansas shall certify that any section of ten consecutive miles of said road is completed in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner as a first-class railroad, then the said Secretary of the Interior shall issue to the said company patents for so many sections of the land herein granted within the limits above named, and coterDig. United States, § 113.