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are not, at the time, under the influence of direction of the defendant. The defendant liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd | denied responsibility for the acts of those or immoral character, where the statute is officers. It was sued by Greenberg in one applicable alike to all persons, corporations, of the courts of California, and there was or associations conducting places of public a verdict and judgment against the assoamusement or entertainment.
ciation for the sum of $1,000. The case Constitutional law-privileges and immuni
was taken to the supreme court of the state ties---corporation not a citizen.
and the judgment was affirmed. 148 Cal. 3. A corporation cannot claim the protection of the clause of the 14th Amendment 126, 82 Pac. 684. to the Federal Constitution which secures At the trial a question was raised as to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the applicability to this case of a statute of the United States against abridgment or California relating to the admission of perimpairment by the law of a state. *
sons holding tickets of admission to places Constitutional law—due process of law- of public entertainment and amusement. immunity.
That statute is as follows: “It shall be 4. The liberty guaranteed by the 14th unlawful for any corporation, person, or asAmendment of the Federal Constitution sociation, or the proprietor, lessee, or the against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial, agents of either, of any opera house, theater,
melodeon, museum, circus, caravan, race persons. Constitutional law—due process of law, course, fair, or other place of public amuse
regulating admission to places of public ment or entertainment, to refuse admittance amusement.
to any person over the age of twenty-one 5. Property rights of the lessee in pos- years who presents a ticket of admission session of a race course are not taken with acquired by purchase, and who demands adout due process of law by a state statute mission to such place, provided that any compelling it to recognize its own tickets person under the influence of liquor, or who of admission in the hands of persons who is guilty of boisterous conduct, or any perare not, at the time, under the influence of
son of lewd or immoral character, may be liquor, or boisterous in conduct, or of lewd excluded from any such place of amusement. or immoral character.
§ 2. Any person who is refused admission to [No. 189.]
any place of amusement, contrary to the
provisions of this act, is entitled to recover Submitted January 29, 1907. Decided Feb- from the proprietors, lessees, or their agents, ruary 25, 1907.
or from any person, association, corporation,
or the directors thereof, his actual damage IN N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the and $100 in addition thereto."
State of California to review a judgment 1. The record sufficiently shows that in which affirmed a judgment of the Superior | the supreme court of the state the defendant Court of the City and County of San Fran- questioned the validity of the statute in cisco, in favor of plaintiff, in an action to re- question under the 14th Amendment, in that cover damages for being excluded from a it "seeks to abridge the privileges and imrace course kept as a place of public amuse-munities of citizens of the United States, ment. Affirmed.
and to deprive them of liberty and property See same case below, 148 Cal. 126, 82 Pac. without due process of law, and to deny to 684.
them, being within its jurisdiction, the equal The facts are stated in the opinion. protection of the laws.” By the judgment
Mr. William S. Goodfellow for plaintiff below the validity of the statute was susin error.
tained, the court holding that it was a legitMr. William G. Burke for defendant in imate exertion of the police power of the error.
state. The contention that this court is
without jurisdiction to review that judg. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion ment is, therefore, overruled. of the court:
2. The supreme court of the state, in a The plaintiff in error is a corporation of previous decision between the same parties, California, and the lessee, in possession, of --Greenberg v. Western Turf Asso. 140 Cal.
. a race course kept as a place of public en- 357, 360, 73 Pac. 1050,-held the statute to tertainment and amusement, and to which be constitutional as a valid regulation imit was accustomed to issue tickets of admis- posed by the state in its exercise of police sion. The defendant in error, Greenberg, power. That decision, we assume, from the purchased one of such tickets, and was ad- opinion of the court, had reference only mitted to the race course.
After being ad- to the Constitution of California. But this mitted he was ejected from the premises court can only pass upon the validity of against his will by police officers, acting, the statute with reference to the Constituit was alleged in the complaint, by the I tion of the United States.
tion of the United States. We perceive no *Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 10, Cent. Dig. Constitutional Law, 627.
reason for holding it to be invalid under ent or governmental power, nor a violation that instrument. The contention that it of any right secured by the Constitution is unconstitutional as denying to the de- of the United States. The race course in fendant the equal protection of the laws is question, being held out as a place of pubwithout merit, for the statute is applicable lic entertainment and amusement, is, by the alike to all persons, corporations, or asso-act of the defendant, so far affected with a ciations conducting places of public amuse- public interest that the state may, in the ment or entertainment. Of still less merit interest of good order and fair dealing, reis the suggestion that the statute abridges quire defendant to perform its engagement the rights and privileges of citizens; for a to the public, and recognize its own tickets corporation cannot be deemed a citizen with of admission in the hands of persons enin the meaning of the clause of the Con-titled to claim the benefits of the statute. stitution of the United States which pro- That such a regulation violates any right tects the privileges and immunities of citi- of property secured by the Constitution of zens of the United States against being the United States cannot, for a moment, be abridged or impaired by the law of a state. admitted. The case requires nothing further
The same observation may be made as to to be said. the contention that the statute deprives the The judgment is affirmed. defendant of its liberty without due process of law; for the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment against deprivation without due process of law is the liberty of
UNITED STATES, Appt., natural, not artificial, persons. North western Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243,
JOHN M. HITE. 51 L. ed. 168, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 126. Does the statute deprive the defendant of any Navy-extra pay of naval officers after disproperty right without due process of law? charge. We answer this question in the negative. The two months' extra pay provided Decisions of this court, familiar to all, and for by the act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. at which need not be cited, recognize the pos- enlisted men comprising the temporary force
L. 1214, chap. 427), in favor of "officers and session, by each state, of powers never sur of the Navy during the war with Spain who rendered to the general government; which served creditably beyond the limits of the powers the state, except as restrained by its United States, and who have been or may own Constitution or the Constitution of the hereafter be discharged,” should be United States, may exert not only for the puted, when awarded to a naval officer appublic health, the public morals, and the pointed under the act of May 4, 1898 (30
Stat. at L. 369, chap. 234, U. Š. Comp. Stat. public safety, but for the general or com: 1901, p. 1056), to serve only during the conmon good, for the well-being, comfort, and tinuance of the exigency under which his good order of the people. The enactments services were required in the existing war, of a state, when exerting its power for such on the basis of the pay he was receiving purposes, must be respected by this court, when he was detached from duty, after the if they do not violate rights granted or se - home preliminary to his discharge.
treaty of peace was signed, and was ordered cured by the supreme law of the land. In view of these settled principles, the defend
[No. 276.] ant is not justified in invoking the Constitution of the United States. The statute is on- Submitted December 18, 1906. Decided Febly a regulation of places of public entertain
ruary 25, 1907. ment and amusement upon terms of equal and exact justice to everyone holding a ticket of admission, and who is not, at the time, | A PPEAL from the Court of Claims to re
view a judgment awarding extra pay under the influence of liquor, or boisterous into a naval officer after his discharge, on the conduct, or of lewd and immoral character. basis of sea service. Affirmed. In short, as applied to the plaintiff in error, The facts are stated in the opinion. it is only a regulation compelling it to Assistant Attorney General Van Orsdel perform its own contract as evidenced by and Mr. John Q. Thompson for appellant. tickets of admission issued and sold to Mr. Edward S. McCalmont for appellee. parties wishing to attend its race course. Such a regulation, in itself just, is like- Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the wise promotive of peace and good order opinion of the court: among those who attend places of public This was a petition for the recovery of entertainment or amusement. It is neither $116.66. The case having been heard by an arbitrary exertion of the state's inher-| the court of claims, that court, upon the
evidence, filed the following findings of fact, 1228, chap. 427), among other things, proand conclusion of law:
“The officers and enlisted men comprising Findings of Fact.
the temporary force of the Navy during 1. The claimant, John M. Hite, was ap- the war with Spain, who served creditably pointed assistant engineer in the United beyond the limits of the United States, and States Navy, with the relative rank of en- who have been or may hereafter be dissign, for temporary service during the late charged, shall be paid two months' extra war with Spain, on May 14, 1898; he re-pay; and all such officers and enlisted men ported for duty on board the U. S. S. of the Navy who have so served within the “Massachusetts," in obedience to orders of limits of the United States, and who have the Navy Department, on June 1, 1898, and been or may hereafter be discharged, shall served creditably as such officer on said be paid one month's extra pay." ship until December 17, 1898, at which date Appellee's counsel say that the issue is he was detached and ordered to his home, correctly stated by counsel for the United and on December 22, 1898, was honorably States as follows: discharged from the naval service.
“The claimant contends that the two The order referred to is in the words months' extra pay provided for in the forefollowing:
going statute should be at the rate of pay “Navy Department, he received while doing sea service, to wit, "Washington, D. C., Dec. 12, 1898. $1,700 per year. “Sir:
“The contention of the government is that "You are hereby detached from duty on under the ruling of this court in United board the U. S. S. “Massachusetts," and States v. North, 112 U. S. 510, 28 L. ed. will proceed to your home.
808, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285, the claimant has "Immediately upon your arrival report been paid all that was due him, inasmuch your local address in full to the Bureau of as he was paid two months' extra pay proNavigation, Navy Department, Washington, vided for in the statute at the rate of D. C. See article 224, U. S. Navy Regula- pay he was receiving at the time of his distions, 1896.
charge,-to wit, at the rate of $1,000 per "Report also the date of your detachment, annum." and inform the Department of the status Appellee was appointed an officer in the of your accounts, and whether you are in- Navy, May 14, 1898, by authority of the debted to the government by reason of ad- act of Congress of May 4 of that year (30 vances drawn by you.
Stat. at L. 369, chap. 234, U. S. Comp. Stat. “Respectfully,
1901, p. 1056), which provided : "John D. Long, Secretary. "Whenever, within the next twelve “Assistant Engineer John M. Hite, U. S. months, an exigency may exist which, in
the judgment of the President, renders their “U. S. S. Massachusetts."
services necessary, he is hereby authorized 2. The U. S. S. “Massachusetts” was in to appoint from civil life and commission commission and cruised beyond the limits such officers of the line and staff, not above of the United States (in Cuban waters) dur- the rank or relative rank of commander, ing the time of the claimant's service on and warrant officers including warrant maboard.
chinists, and such officers of the Marine 3. In settlement of claimant's claim for Corps not above the rank of captain, to be extra pay authorized by the act of March 3, appointed from the noncommissioned officers 1899 [30 Stat. at L. 1214, chap. 427], he of the corps and from civil life, as may was allowed by the accounting officers of the be requisite: Provided, That such officers Treasury Department two months' pay at shall serve only during the continuance of the rate of pay of an assistant engineer in the exigency under which their services are the Navy on waiting orders only, to wit, required in the existing war.” $166.66.
The war with Spain began April 21, 1898, If entitled to two months' pay upon the and the treaty of Paris was signed December basis of sea service the difference is $116.66. 10, 1898. [30 Stat. at L. 1754.) Appellee Conclusion of Law.
served until December 17, 1898, at which Upon the foregoing findings of fact the time he was detached from the vessel on court decides, as a conclusion of law, that which he was serving and ordered home, the claimant is entitled to judgment in the where, on December 22, he was honorably sum of one hundred and sixteen dollars and discharged from the naval service. It seems sixty-six cents ($116.66).
to have been thought reasonable that the
government should pay the expenses of the The case is reported 41 Ct. Cl. 256. journey home and for the time in getting The act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat. at L. I there.
The act of March 3, 1899, provided for were 'engaged in the military service of the extra pay for active service. Hite was de- United States in the war with Mexico' may tached because it became the Department's be said to have served out the term of their duty to discharge him under the proviso of engagement,' or to have been 'honorably the act of 1898, and the detachment was discharged,' within the meaning of those manifestly preliminary to his discharge. terms as used in the act of 1848, when the The order detaching him did not prescribe war was over, or when they were ordered that on arrival home he was to hold him or mustered out of that service. Being in self "on waiting orders" or for further as the Army and Navy, their 'engagement was signment to duty. On the other hand, it to serve wherever they were ordered for required him to inform the Department of duty. Their engagement to serve in the the status of his accounts, obviously in or- war with Mexico ended when they were der that they might be settled on his leav- taken away from that service by proper ing the service.
authority The two months' extra pay is given, as "The pay they were to receive was eviChief Justice Peele, delivering the opinion dently that which they were receiving at of the court of claims, says, “because of the end of their engagement, or when they creditable service beyond the limits of the were honorably discharged. The language United States during the war with Spain, is, 'shall be entitled to receive three months' and, therefore, upon discharge such officers extra pay,' evidently meaning the same pay become entitled to the same pay they were they would have received if they had rereceiving while so serving beyond the limits mained in the same service three months of the United States." "To hold, because longer. It follows that, as North was servthe claimant was ordered to his home, where ing at sea when he was ordered away, he he was discharged five days later, instead was entitled to three months' sea pay." of being discharged on the day he was de- In the present case, appellee was taken tached, that therefore he is entitled only to away from the service when he was dethe lesser pay, would be a construction too tached from his vessel, as he was appointed narrow to harmonize with the purpose of to serve "only during the continuance of Congress as disclosed by the act." Notwith-the exigency under which their services standing the considered dissenting opinion were required in the existing war," and was in the court below, we agree with the con- entitled, in the circumstances of the case, clusion that, his engagement having ended, to extra pay on the basis of that which he and he having been discharged, the two was receiving when detached, as we have months' extra pay should have been given said above. him upon the basis of the pay he was re- Emory's Case was also considered by the ceiving when detached.
court in the same opinion and the same The contention of the government is that conclusion reached, and reference was there this case is governed by the ruling in United made to that case as reported in 19 Ct. States v. North, 112 U. S. 510, 28 L. ed. Cl. 254. 808, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285. In that case it The judgment of the Court of Claims was was held that officers of the Navy and of right, and it is affirmed. the regular Army, who were employed in the prosecution of the war with Mexico, Mr. Justice Moody took no part in the were entitled to the three months' extra disposition of this case. pay provided for by the act of Congress of July 19, 1848, chap. 104, § 5, 9 Stat. at L. 248, and the act of February 19, 1879, chap. 90, 20 Stat. at L. 316.
STATE OF KANSAS, Complainant, The act of 1848 provided: “That the officers, etc., engaged, etc., in the war with UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.,
Defts. Mexico, and who served out the term of their engagement, or have been or may be Supreme Court of the United States-orighonorably discharged, .. shall be en
inal jurisdiction-suit by state. titled to receive three months' extra pay.” 1. The original jurisdiction of the Su
North was an officer in the Navy of the preme Court of the United States does not United States from May 29, 1829, to Jan extend to a bill filed by the attorney general uary 14, 1861, when he resigned. He served of Kansas on behalf of the state as trustee in the war with Mexico, as lieutenant, on for the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway board the frigate Potomac, from February Company of certain lands in the Indian ter10, 1846, until July, 1847, when his vessel ritory, alleged to have been granted by Consailed for the United States. And Chief gress to the state for the benefit of the rail
way company, where the name of the state Justice Waite said:
is being used simply for the prosecution of “Those of the regular Army or Navy whol the claim of the railway company.
United States-immunity from suit. Kansas, near Chetopa, Kansas; the second
2. The United States may not, without was the Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Fort Gibits consent, be sued by a state.*
son Railway Company, since conveyed to
the Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fé Railroad [No. 11, Original.]
Company, extending from Leavenworth,
through Lawrence, to the northern line of Submitted November 12, 1906. Decided Feb- the Indian territory, near Coffeyville, Montruary 25, 1907.
gomery county, Kansas, in the direction of Galveston bay, in Texas; and the third was
the . general of Kansas on behalf of the state pany, since the Kansas City, Fort Scott, & as trustee for the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Memphis, and now a part of the St. Louis Railway Company of certain lands in the & San Francisco Railroad Company, extendIndian territory, alleged to have been granting from a point of connection with the ed to the state for the benefit of the rail. Union Pacific Railroad at or near the mouth way company. Dismissed for want of ju- of the Kansas river, thence southeasterly, risdiction.
through the eastern tier of counties, to the The facts are stated in the opinion.
northern line of the Indian territory, at or Solicitor General Hoyt, Attorney General near Baxter Springs, in Cherokee county, Moody, and Assistant Attorney General Rus- Kansas.” sell in support of motion to dismiss.
On July 25, 1866, an act of Congress was Messrs. Joseph H. Choate, Chiles C. Cole-passed entitled “An Act Granting Lands to man, James Hagerman, Adrian H. Joline, A. the State of Kansas to Aid in the ConstrucB. Browne, Joseph M. Bryson, and John tion of the Kansas & Neosho Valley RailMadden in opposition.
road and Its Extension to Red River." 14
Stat. at L. 236, chap. 241. On the next Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the day, July 26, an act was passed, using the opinion of the court:
same language, except as to the routes, enOn April 30, 1906, the state of Kansas titled “An Act Granting Lands to the State applied for leave to file a bill of complaint of Kansas to Aid in the Construction of a against the United States and others, to Southern Branch of the Union Pacific Railwhich the United States objected on the way and Telegraph, from Fort Riley, Kanground of want of jurisdiction. May 21 sas, to Fort Smith, Arkansas” (14 Stat. at leave was granted, without prejudice, and L. 289, chap. 270), which provided as fol,
lows: the bill was accordingly filed. As such an application by a state is usually granted
"That for the purpose of aiding the Union as of course, we thought it wiser to allow Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, the bill to be filed, but reserving to the the same being a corporation organized unUnited States the right to object to the der the laws of the state of Kansas, to jurisdiction thereafter, and hence the words, construct and operate a railroad from Fort "without prejudice,” were inserted in the Riley, Kansas, or near said military reser
, order. October 9 leave was granted to the vation, thence down the valley of the Neosho United States to file a demurrer, and, in river to the southern line of the state of lieu of this, a motion to dismiss was sub-| Kansas, with a view to an extension of the stituted, which was submitted November same through a portion of the Indian ter12 on printed briefs on both sides.
ritory to Fort Smith, Arkansas, there is The bill was filed by the attorney general hereby granted to the state of Kansas, for of Kansas, on behalf of the state, as trustee the use and benefit of said railroad comfor the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway pany, every alternate section of land or Company, of certain lands in the Indian parts thereof designated by odd numbers to territory, alleged to have been granted to the extent of five alternate sections per the state for the benefit of the railway com- mile on each side of said road, and not pany.
exceeding in all ten sections per mile; It is stated by counsel for complainant,
And the lands hereby as appearing from the bill, that in 1866 granted shall inure to the benefit of said “there were three Kansas railroad companies company, as follows: When the governor of running through the state to the Indian the state of Kansas shall certify that any territory line. The first was the Union section of ten consecutive miles of said road Pacific Railway Company, Southern Branch, is completed in a good, substantial, and since the Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Rail-workmanlike manner as a first-class railway Company, extending from Fort Riley, road, then the said Secretary of the Interior now Junction City, Kansas, in a southeast. shall issue to the said company patents for erly direction, down the valley of the Neosho so many sections of the land herein granted river to the southern line of the state of 'within the limits above named, and coter.
*Ed. Note. -For cases in point, see vol. 47, Cent. Dig. United States, $ 113.