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not open in a case in which no maritime lien | to issue bonds for $48,000, to be secured by is asserted. *
Courts-state or Federal jurisdiction-enforcing lien on vessel.
3. The enforcement of a lien given by a state statute upon a vessel for materials furnished after she was launched is within the jurisdiction of a state court, where such materials were really furnished for the completion of the vessel, and were fairly a part of her original construction.†
Commerce-state regulation-enforcing lien on vessel.
4. The exclusive control over interstate commerce vested in Congress by the Federal Constitution or laws is not infringed by the enforcement against a vessel engaged in interstate commerce of a lien given by a state statute for materials furnished for her construction.
Courts-state or Federal jurisdiction-enforcing lien on vessel.
5. A contract to build a ship, not being a maritime contract, which can only be enforced in a court of admiralty, a lien given by a state statute for materials furnished in her construction may be enforced against the vessel in a state court.†
[Nos. 218, 219.]
mortgage upon its property. On April 5,
$7,500, at date of signing contract;
4,000, July 15, 1902.
An additional $4,000 was paid on October 3, 1902, and two negotiable notes of $4,000 given, maturing respectively November 1, 1903, and November 1, 1904.
The steamer was launched March 21, 1903. After she was in the water the work on the contract continued. On July 18, 1903, she was inspected, measured, enrolled, and licensed to be employed in domestic and foreign trade. This license was issued in the name of the Columbia Iron Works as owner.
On July 19, 1903, the Iroquois Transportation Company received a bill of sale of the steamer and delivered to the Columbia Iron Works ninety-six negotiable bonds of $500 each, secured by mortgage on the
Argued February 28, 1907. Decided April 8, steamer, and paid the balance of the pur
N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan to review two judgments affirming decrees of the Circuit Court of Wayne County, in that state, enforcing liens against a vessel for materials and supplies furnished for her construction.
See same case below, 142 Mich. 84, 105 N. W. 527.
Statement by Mr. Justice Day:
These cases may be considered together. They are writs of error to the judgments of the supreme court of Michigan affirming the decrees of the circuit court of Wayne county, Michigan, enforcing liens for the De Laney Forge & Iron Company, defendant in error, in 218, and George W. Edwards and others, defendants in error in 219, and interveners in the original case.
The Winnebago, a steel steamer of 1,091 tons burden, was built by the Columbia Iron Works, at St. Clair, Michigan. The contract price was $95,000; date of contract, March 8, 1902; between the Columbia Iron Works and John J. Boland and Thomas J. Prindeville. It was understood that these persons should organize a corporation to be known as the Iroquois Transportation Company. The contract price was to be paid, $31,000 in cash, from time to time; for the balance the transportation company was to execute its notes to the amount of $16,000,
chase money, which was to be paid in cash, then amounting between $400 and $500.
The agreement recited that possession was given to the Iroquois Transportation Company for the purpose of completing and finishing up those things still remaining undone on the steamer and required to be done by the iron works by the terms of the contract for the construction of the steamer, "it being the sole intent and purpose of this agreement to enable the Iroquois Transportation Company to obtain immediate possession of the steamer, and without intending either to limit the extent of the obliga tion of said Columbia Iron Works under the original specifications."
The steamer left St. Clair for Lorain, Ohio, July 19, 1903. At that time she was not completed, and workmen remained on her and went with her to St. Clair, where additional work was done upon her. She was afterwards engaged in carrying cargoes between points on Lake Erie and Lake Superior.
On July 30, 1903, the Columbia Iron Works made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. On August 25, 1903, the De Laney Forge & Iron Company served notice on the Iroquois Transportation Company that it made a claim of lien against the steamer for forging and material furnished; and on October 6, 1903, complaint was filed in the circuit court of Wayne county, Michigan, and shortly thereafter Edwards and
*Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 10, Cent. Dig. Constitutional Law, § 39. tEd. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 34, Cent. Dig. Maritime Liens, § 111.
others intervened in the case, claiming a lien. The Iroquois Company gave a bond under the statute for the release of the vessel. Decrees were rendered in favor of the claimants and interveners in the circuit court of Wayne county, and upon appeal they were affirmed in the supreme court of Michigan, 142 Mich. 84, 105 N. W. 527.
of state law, upon which the judgment of the state court is final and conclusive. The same may be said as to the objection because the transportation company was a bona fide purchaser without notice of complainant's lien, and because complainant did not within a year file its claim for a lien with the proper court in the county in which it resided. These are state questions, like
Messrs. Charles E. Kremer and William T. wise concluded by the decision of the state Gray for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Herbert K. Oakes, John C. Shaw, Charles B. Warren, William B. Cady, Joseph C. Hamblen, Jr., and Hugh Shepherd for defendant in error.
It is further contended that to seize the vessel and subject her to sale and the proceeds thereof to distribution in the state court would be in direct conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty in the
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of courts of the United States in favor of the court:
The Michigan statute under which the liens are claimed in this case is as follows: "Third Compiled Laws of Michigan, p. 3254:
"(10789) Sec. 2. Every water craft of above 5 tons burden, used or intended to be used, in navigating the waters of this state, shall be subject to a lien thereon:
liens of a maritime character, and therefore the Michigan act is unconstitutional. No maritime lien is asserted in this case, and it is merely a matter of speculation as to whether any such claim existed, or might be thereafter asserted. No holder of any such maritime lien is here contesting the constitutionality of the state law.
In a case from a state court, this court does not listen to objections of those who do not come within the class whose constitutional rights are alleged to be invaded; or hold a law unconstitutional because, as against the class making no complaint, the law might be so held. This was distinctly ruled in a case decided at this term. New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 51 L. ed. 415, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188. See also Albany County v. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305-311, 26 L. ed. 1044-1049; Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 276, 283, 284, 45 L. ed. 527, 530, 531, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114-118, 44 L. ed. 392-396, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284; Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108-114, 48 L. ed. 365368, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 219.
"First, for all debts contracted by the owner or part owner, master, clerk, agent, or steward of such craft, on account of supplies and provisions furnished for the use of said water craft, on account of work done or services rendered, on board of such craft by seamen or any employee other than the master thereof; on account of work done or service rendered by any person in or about the loading or unloading of said water craft; on account of work done or materials furnished by mechanics, tradesmen, or others, in or about the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or equipping such craft: Provided, That when labor shall be performed or materials furnished, as aforesaid, by a subcontractor or workman other than an original contractor, and the same is not paid There is no one in position in this case for, said person or persons may give the to make this objection, and, for aught that owner or his agent, or the master or clerk this record discloses, no such maritime lien of said craft, timely notice of his or their existed. If this statute is broad enough said claim, and from thenceforth said per- to include strictly maritime liens, it can son or persons shall have a lien upon said only be held unconstitutional, in a case comcraft pro rata for his or their said claims, ing from a state court, where the complaint to the amount that may be due by said own- on that ground is made by the holder of er to said original contractor for work or such a demand. We agree with Judge Sevlabor then done on said water craft." erns, speaking for the circuit court of apSeveral objections are urged by the plain-peals for the sixth circuit, in a case directly tiff in error which, if sustained, will result in the reversal of the judgments of the supreme court of Michigan. Some of them are of a non-Federal character. It is insisted that the statute does not apply in this case, because the steamer Winnebago was not to be used in navigating the waters of Michigan, within the terms of the statute. But this only presents a question
involving this question, where other claimants upon the Winnebago had removed a case to the United States circuit court for the eastern district of Michigan, whence it was taken to the circuit court of appeals:
"And the fact that she [the Winnebago] might become subject to maritime liens would not destroy liens already lawfully acquired. It is true she might become subject
It is urged that the attempt to enforce the lien on the vessel was while she was engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore proceedings against her were unlawful and void, in view of the exclusive control of this subject by Congress under the Constitution and laws of the United States. But it must be remembered that concerning contracts not maritime in their nature, the state has authority to make laws and enforce liens, and it is no valid objection that the enforcement of such laws may prevent or obstruct the prosecution of a voyage of an interstate character. The laws of the states enforcing attachment and execution in cases cognizable in state courts have been sustained and upheld. Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co. 119 U. S. 388-398, 30 L. ed. 447-450, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254. The state may pass laws enforcing the rights of its citizens which affect interstate commerce, but fall short of regulating such commerce in the sense in which the Constitution gives exclusive jurisdiction to Congress. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99-103, 23 L. ed. 819, 820; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 23, 32 L. ed. 346, 351, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132.
to maritime liens which would be superior | Cas. No. 7,060; The Victorian, 24 Or. 121, 41 to the existing lien, and that such liens Am. St. Rep. 838, 32 Pac. 1040; The Winnewould have to be enforced in the admiralty. bago, 73 C. C. A. 295, 141 Fed. 945. But that possibility does not defeat the enforcement by a state court of the nonmaritime lien to which she is subject. How else is the owner of the latter to obtain his remedy? It may be the vessel will never become subject to maritime liens at all; and, if so, the holder of the existing lien may never have even the privilege of proving his claim in some cause instituted for another purpose. But no such supposed embarrassment has yet occurred. And they are as yet imaginary. But suppose such other liens should attach. That should not prevent the enforcement of the earlier lien in the proper court. If the holder of the earlier lien delays his action, he subjects himself to the danger of superior liens becoming fastened, and the enforcement of his own lien in the state court must leave the vessel subject to the superior liens of which the state court cannot take cognizance. If occasion requires, and the admiralty court enforces the superior liens, it is in no wise obstructed by the action of the state court, and a title under a decree of the former court would defeat the title gained under the decree of the state court. The case of Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 38 L. ed. 981, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019, is a good illustration of this subject. There is no difficulty other than such as may happen in case one court should take and have possession of the vessel at a time when the other should require it; but that is an incident common along all the lines of concurrent proceedings in the state and Federal courts, and gives no ground for the denial of jurisdiction to either." The Winnebago, 73 C. C. A. 295, 141 Fed. 945.
It is next insisted that the materials and supplies were not furnished on the credit of the vessel, but were contracted for, furnished, and delivered on the credit of the Columbia Iron Works.
The findings upon this proposition are again questions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state court. The findings will not be disturbed here.
It is next objected that the court erred because certain items were allowed for material furnished the vessel after she was launched, and therefore the subject of exclusive jurisdiction for which a lien could only be enforced in the admiralty. But we agree with the state court that these items were really furnished for the completion of the vessel, and were fairly a part of her original construction. In such a case the remedy was within the jurisdiction of the state court. The Iosco, 1 Brown, Adm. 495, Fed.
Upon the subject, Mr. Justice Brown, speaking for the court in Knapp, S. & Co. Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638-642, 44 L. ed. 921-923, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 824-827, said:
"That wherever any lien is given by a state statute for a cause of action cognizable in admiralty, either in rem or in personam, proceedings in rem to enforce such lien are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty courts.
"But the converse of this proposition is equally true, that if a lien upon a vessel be created for a claim over which a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction in any form, such lien may be enforced in the courts of the state. Thus, as the admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to a contract for building a vessel, or to work done or materials furnished in its construction (People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, 15 L. ed. 961; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129, 16 L. ed. 294), we held in Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 22 L. ed. 487, that in respect to such contracts it was competent for the states to enact such laws as their legislatures might deem just and expedient, and to provide for their enforcement in rem."
The contract in this case being for theconstruction of a vessel, and its enforcement within the power and jurisdiction of the
state courts, we do not think that execu- | latter a minor, suing by her mother and tion of such a decree can be avoided because next friend, and both being citizens of the vessel engaged in interstate commerce. Texas, against the Chicago, Rock Island, & Finally, an elaborate and able argument Pacific Railroad Company, an Illinois coris made in support of the contention that poration. a contract to build a ship is a maritime contract, and therefore can be enforced only in admiralty; but, as late as this term, in Graham & M. Transp. Co. v. Craig Ship-leged negligent killing of said John Peterbuilding Co., this contention was overruled upon the authority of the previous decisions of this court. 203 U. S. 577, 51 L. ed. 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 777.
The plaintiffs in error, wife and daughter of one John Peterson, an employee of the Pacific company, sought recovery for the al
son while engaged as an engineer in its employ at Chickasha, in the Indian territory, on October 19, 1903. It is charged in the petition that the Pacific company was then
The judgments of the Supreme Court of engaged in carrying on its business in the Michigan are affirmed.
state of Texas in the name and through the Chicago, Rock Island, & Gulf Railroad, a corporation of the state of Texas, which latter corporation, it was alleged, was an auxiliary corporation and agent of the defendant, and was then and there dominated and controlled by it, its lines of railroad being operated by the Pacific company as a part of the Rock Island system.
It was charged that S. B. Hovey, vice president and general manager of the Gulf company, residing in Tarrant county, Texas, was also the general manager and local agent of the Pacific company in that state. It was also alleged that F. E. Merrell was the local agent in Tarrant county, Texas, of the Pacific company, and that M. E. Sebree was the local agent for it in said county and
Service of citation was made on the de
fendants by serving the parties above named as its agents in Tarrant county, Texas, in pursuance of the statute of the state. The defendant moved to quash the service on the ground that none of the parties were such agents, and filed in support of its motion the affidavits of each,-Hovey, Merrell, and Sebree,-denying such agency. Thereafter plaintiffs made application for additional process in pursuance of a later statute of the state of Texas, to be hereinafter noticed, and charged that A. L. Thomas, who resides
Argued and submitted March 6 and 7, 1907. in Tarrant county, Texas, was a train con
Decided April 8, 1907.
N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas to review a judgment dismissing, for want of jurisdiction, an action against for want of jurisdiction, an action against a foreign corporation. Affirmed.
Statement by Mr. Justice Day:
ductor engaged in handling trains over the tracks of the Gulf railroad in the state of Texas and over those of the Pacific railroad
beyond the limits of the state, and that he was engaged in running and handling passenger trains on the tracks of both said companies on both sides of the state line, and is an agent and representative of the defendant company, residing in Tarrant county, Texas. It was further charged that V. N. Turpin, who resides in Fort Worth, Tarrant county, Texas, was a ticket agent engaged in the selling of tickets and the making of contracts for transportation and for and in behalf of the Pacific company from the city of Fort Worth, Texas, over
This case comes here upon a certificate from the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Texas, raising the question of the jurisdiction of that court over an action brought by plaintiffs in error, Augusta A. Peterson and Ida Peterson, the *Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 12, Cent. Dig. Corporations, §§ 2610-2615. 27 S.C.-33
"As the Rock Island company is the owner of the entire capital stock, except directors' shares, of the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railroad Company, the income of both the companies is included in the fol
the lines of the Gulf company, in the state | prise what is known as the 'Rock Island sysof Texas, and over the line of the defendant tem.' company beyond the line of said state, and was an agent and representative of the defendant company in said state and county. These persons, Thomas and Turpin, were accordingly served under the application for new process as the agents and represen-lowing statement." tatives of the defendant company in the This report purports to be made by order said county and state. of the board of directors, was dated October 17, 1904, and was signed by Robert Mather, president. Appended to this report, as a part of it, under the head of "Statements and Exhibits, Rock Island System Lines," was the following statement, to wit:
The defendant company filed a supple. mental motion to quash this service upon the grounds that these persons were not the agents or representatives of the defendant company, filing their affidavits in support of said motion. In the return of the writ served on Hovey it was also set forth that he was general manager of the Pacific company, residing in Tarrant county, Texas. The motion and supplemental motion to quash the service was heard by the court, the motion sustained, and the cause dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the court holding that the defendant had not been properly served with process.
From the stipulated facts, documentary evidence, and testimony embodied in the bill of exceptions, the following facts, pertinent to the determination of the issues, may be gathered:
The Pacific company and the Gulf company are both of the "Rock Island system" of railroads. The second annual report of the "Rock Island company" (June 30, 1904) shows that it is the owner of the entire capital stock, except directors' shares, of the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation of Iowa; that company owns 695,574.75 shares of the capital stock of the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation of the states of Illinois and Iowa, and 286,349 shares of the common capital stock of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, a corporation of the state of Missouri, and the report adds:
"Each of the two latter companies operates independently its lines of railway and each is interested through the ownership, directly or indirectly, of at least the majority of the capital stock in certain subsidiary companies, each of which operates its property independently. The lines of the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company, including lines formerly of the Choctaw, Oklahoma, & Gulf Railroad Company, the Burlington, Cedar Rapids, & Northern Railway Company, and the Rock Island, & Peoria Railway Company, together with the lines of its subsidiary companies, namely, the Chicago, Rock Island, & Gulf Railway Company, and the Chicago, Rock Island, & El Paso Railway Company, com
Total, Chicago, Rock Island, & Gulf
Plaintiff also introduced in evidence a railroad folder, dated July 10, 1904, on which was printed in large letters, "Rock Island System Time-table," in which appears the names of the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company, Chicago, Rock Island, & El Paso Railway Company, and the Chicago, Rock Island, & Gulf Railway Company, with a list of the names and residences of the passenger and freight agents, and a schedule of the passenger trains on said lines. On the inside of the cover of the folder is a map showing the lines of the said railroad company, so connected as to belong to one system. Below the map is printed:
"The Rock Island System of America.
"The Rock Island system covers a territory which is 1,000 miles long by 1,000 miles wide, supports a population of more than 21,000,000 people, and is capable of supporting at least four times that many. The area of this territory is as great as the combined area of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Netherlands, Turkey, Switzerland, and Greece, and its productive capacity is greater.
"Here are produced more than half the wheat, more than half the corn, and nearly half the cotton, silver, and gold produced in the United States."
The origin of the Gulf company is thus