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HENRY A. M. SMITH, as Receiver of the, a petition for an injunction to restrain the late Corporation Named and Styled "The treasurer from obeying the requirements of President, Directors, & Company of the an act (presently to be stated) of the State Bank," Plff. in Err., legislature of the state. The supreme court R. H. JENNINGS, as Treasurer of the State of the state dismissed the petition, and the case is here on writ of error.

V.

of South Carolina.

Error to state court-Federal question-conformity of state law to state Constitution.

1. The conformity with the state Constitution of the proceedings of the state legislature in the enactment of a law is not a Federal question, which will sustain a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to a state court, but is a question upon which the determination of the state court is final. *

Error to state court-Federal question-impairing contract obligation.

2. No Federal question respecting the impairment of contract obligations which will sustain a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to a state court is presented by the contention that the obligation of the contract made by bonds of the state is impaired by a joint resolution of the state legislature directing the state treasurer to write off of the books in his office certain of such bonds, and to carry no longer such bonds on the books as a debt of the state, since such law merely directed a change of entries in the books of the treasurer, and could in no respect impair or af fect the rights of the holders.†

[No. 104.]

The state of South Carolina issued, in 1859, bonds due in twenty years in aid of the Blue Ridge Railroad Company. The bank came to be the owner of one hundred of these bonds, each of the par value of $1,000. In 1865 the assets of the bank, including the hundred bonds, were seized and carried away by soldiers of the Federal Army. Sixty-three of the bonds have been recovered by the bank from time to time and have been paid or funded by the state Thirty-seven of the bonds are still outstanding, and nothing is known of them. In 1896 the general assembly of the state passed an act directing that no coupon bond of the state payable to bearer should be funded or paid by the state treasurer after the expiration of twenty years from the date of maturity. In 1903 the general assembly passed the following act: "A Joint Resolution to Authorize and Require the State Treasurer to Write off the Books in His Office Certain Bonds Entered on Said Books as Old Bonds, Not Fundable (Act of 1896), Blue Ridge Railroad Bonds, $37,000.

"Be it resolved by the general assembly,

of the state of South Carolina:

"Section 1. That whereas, by the act of

Argued April 24, 25, 1907. Decided May, the legislature of 1896, the treasurer of this

13, 1907.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina to review a judgment denying an injunction to restrain the state treasurer from complying with the joint resolution of the state legislature, directing him to write certain state bonds off the books in his office, and to carry no longer such bonds on the books as a debt of the state. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See same case below, 67 S. C. 324, 45 S.

E. 821.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. T. W. Bacot, A. M. Lee, and Julian Mitchell, Jr., for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Charles A. Douglas and E. B. Sherrill for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Moody delivered the opinion

of the court:

The plaintiff in error is the receiver of a state bank of South Carolina which has been many years in liquidation. The defendant in error is the treasurer of the state of South Carolina. The receiver brought in the supreme court of the state

state is forbidden to pay, consolidate, or fund any coupon bond of the state after the expiration of twenty years from the date of maturity of such bonds, and certain bonds entered on the books of the state treasurer as 'Old bonds, not fundable, act of 1896, Blue Ridge Railroad Bonds, $37,000,' are still carried on the books of the state treasurer. Therefore, be it resolved: That the state treasurer be, and he is hereby, authorized and required to write said bonds off of the books in his office, and no longer carry said bonds on the books as a debt of the state."

tion, alleging that the act last stated, if Thereupon the receiver brought this petivalid, impaired the obligation of the contract made by the bonds, and that the act was not passed in conformity with the Constitution of the state, and was therefore void. The prayer of the petition was that the respondent be restrained by injunction "from writing the said $37,000 of the state bonds off the books in his office, and no longer carrying said bonds on the books as a debt of the state." The supreme court of the state decided against both these contentions, and they are brought here as Fed

*Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, § 1052. tEd. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, § 1055.

a patent infringement suit to enjoin the complainant in the prior suit from interfering with the former's business by suing his customers for an alleged infringement of the patent on account of the use or sale of the same article passed upon in the prior suit.

eral questions. But the conformity with the state Constitution of the proceedings in the enactment of the law is a question for the determination of the state court, and its judgment is final. Burt v. Smith, 203 U. S. 129, 135, 51 L. ed. 121, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37; Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 51 L. ed. 400, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. Nor did the law complained of impair the obligation of the state to pay the bonds Submitted January 28, 1907. Decided May therein mentioned, or the remedy to recover upon them. The obligation and the

remedy remained precisely the same after

the enactment of the law as before.

Nei

ther one was in the slightest degree dimin-
ished or affected. The law merely directed
a change of entries in the books of the
state treasurer, and could by no possibility,
in any respect whatever, deny, obstruct,
impair, or affect the rights of the plaintiff
This was the view expressed by
the court below, and the statute, thus in-
terpreted, raises no Federal question.
Writ of error dismissed.

in error.

WILLIAM F. KESSLER
V.

GEORGE S. ELDRED.

Judgments-effect or conclusiveness.

1. A final decree of a Federal circuit court in favor of defendant in a patent infringement suit entitles him to continue the business of manufacturing and selling throughout the United States the alleged infringing article, free from all interference by the complainant by virtue of the patent alleged to have been infringed. Judgments-effect or conclusiveness.

2. Defendant's rights under a final decree in his favor rendered by a Federal circuit court in a patent infringement suit are violated by the action of the complainant therein in thereafter filing a bill against one of the former's customers for an alleged infringement of the patent on account of the use or sale of the same article passed upon in the prior suit. Estoppel-by conduct.

[No. 196.]

13, 1907.

ON A CERTIFICATE from the United

States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit presenting questions respecting the right of the successful defendant in a patent infringement suit to proceed in equity against the complainant to restrain him from interfering with the former's business by suing his customers for an alleged infringement of the patent on account of the use or sale of the same article passed upon in the prior suit. swered in favor of the right to maintain such suit.

Statement by Mr. Justice Moody:

An

This case comes to this court from the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit upon a certificate of that court of questions of law concerning which it desires instructions. Accompanying the certificate is a statement of facts. The statement of the facts and the certificate of the questions of law are as follows:

Kessler, a citizen of Indiana, prior to 1898, had built up an extensive business in the manufacture and sale of electric cigar lighters, and had customers throughout the United States. Eldred, a citizen of Illinois, and an inhabitant of the northern district, was the owner of patent No. 492,913, issued to Chambers on March 7, 1893, for an electric lamp lighter. Eldred was a competitor of Kessler's and manufactured a similar form of lighter (entirely dissimilar from that described in the Chambers patent), so that it was not a matter of much importance to customers which lighter they 3. The assumption by the manufacturer bought. In 1898 Eldred began a suit against of the defense of a patent infringement Kessler in the district of Indiana for the insuit brought in a Federal circuit court fringement of the Chambers patent. The against one of his customers does not de- bill alleged that Kessler's manufacture and prive him of his right to proceed against the sale of the Kessler lighter infringed all the complainant in such suit in the state and claims. The answer denied that Kessler's district of the latter's residence for wrong- lighter infringed any of the Chambers fully interfering with the business of such claims. On final hearing the circuit court manufacturer by instituting the suit after found for Kessler on the issue of nonina final adjudication in a prior suit that the tringement and dismissed the bill. That dearticle in question did not infringe the pat- cree was affirmed in 1900 by the circuit court pat-tringement of appeals for the seventh circuit. Eldred v. Kessler, 45 C. C. A. 454, 106 Fed. 509.

ent.

Equity-adequate remedy at law.

4. Lack of any adequate remedy at law justifies a court of equity in taking jurisdiction of a suit by the successful defendant in

Subsequently, Eldred brought suit on the same patent in the northern district of

New York against Kirkland, who was selling
a similar lighter, but not of Kessler's make.
The circuit court found for Kirkland on
the issue of noninfringement and dismissed
the bill. The circuit court of appeals for
the second circuit reversed that decree and
held the Kirkland lighter to be an infringe-fering with Kessler's business?
ment. Eldred v. Kirkland, 64 C. C. A. 588,
130 Fed. 342.

Third. Did Kessler's assumption of the defense of Eldred's suit against Breitwieser deprive Kessler of the right, if that right would otherwise exist, of proceeding against Eldred in the state and district of his citizenship and residence for wrongfully inter

In June, 1904, Eldred filed a bill for infringement of the same patent in the Western district of New York against Breitwieser, user of Kessler lighters, which were identical with those held in Eldred v. Kessler, to be no infringement of the Chambers patent. Many of Kessler's customers were intimidated by the Breitwieser suit, so that they ceased to send in further orders for lighters, and refused to pay their accounts for lighters already sold and delivered to them. Kessler assumed the defense of the Breitwieser suit, and will be compelled, in the proper discharge of his duty to his customers, to assume the burden and expense of all suits which may be brought by Eldred against other customers. In this state of affairs Kessler, a citizen of Indiana, in July, 1904, filed a bill against Eldred in the circuit court for the northern district of Illinois, the state and district of Eldred's citizenship and residence, to enjoin Eldred from prosecuting any suit in any court of the United States against anyone for alleged infringement of the Chambers patent by purchase, use, or sale of any electric cigar lighter manufactured by Kessler and identical with the lighter in evidence before the circuit court for the district of Indiana and the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit in the trial and adjudication of the suit of Eldred against Kessler. From an adverse decree by the circuit court Kessler perfected an appeal to this court.

Upon the foregoing facts the questions of law concerning which this court desires the instruction and advice of the Supreme Court are these:

First. Did the decree in Kessler's favor, rendered by the circuit court for the district of Indiana in the suit of Eldred against Kessler, have the effect of entitling Kessler to continue the business of manufacturing and selling throughout the United States the same lighter he had theretofore been manufacturing and selling, without molestation by Eldred, through the Chambers patent?

Second. Did the decree mentioned in the first question have the effect of making a suit by Eldred against any customer of Kessler's for alleged infringement of the Chambers patent by use or sale of Kessler's lighters a wrongful interference by Eldred with Kessler's business?

Fourth. If Eldred's acts were wrongful, had Kessler an adequate remedy at law?

Messrs. Robert S. Taylor and Elwin M. Hulse for Kessler.

Messrs. Charles C. Linthicum and Louis K. Gillson for Eldred.

Mr. Justice Moody delivered the opinion of the court:

The industry of counsel has not discovered any decision on the exact questions presented by the certificate, and they agree that those questions are not settled by controlling authority: The decision of the case turns upon the effect of the judgment in the suit which Eldred brought against Kessler. Both manufactured and sold electric cigar lighters. Eldred, being the owner of a patent issued to one Chambers for an electric lamp lighter, brought a suit against Kessler, in which it was alleged by the plaintiff and denied by the defendant that the cigar lighters manufactured by Kessler infringed each and all of the claims of the Chambers patent. On the issue thus joined there was final judgment for Kessler. This judgment, whether it proceeds upon good reasons or upon bad reasons, whether it was right or wrong, settled finally and everywhere, and so far as Eldred, by virtue of his ownership of the Chambers patent, was concerned, that Kessler had the right to manufacture, use, and sell the electric cigar lighter before the court. The court, having before it the respective rights and duties on the matter in question of the parties to the litigation, conclusively decreed the right of Kessler to manufacture and sell his manufactures free from all interference from Eldred by virtue of the Chambers patent, and the corresponding duty of Eldred to recognize and yield to that right everywhere and always. After this conclusive determination of the respective rights and duties of the parties, Eldred filed a bill for an infringement of the same patent against Breitwieser, on account of his use of the same kind of Kessler cigar lighter which had been passed on in the previous case, and Kessler has assumed the defense of that suit. Whether the judgment between Kessler and Eldred is a bar to the suit of Eldred v. Breitwieser, either because Breitwieser was a privy to the original judgment, or because the articles themselves were, by that judgment, freed from the control of

It follows from the foregoing reasoning that the first and second questions certified should be answered in the affirmative, and the third and fourth in the negative, and it is so ordered.

STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. WY-
OMING AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE and
MATT BORLAND et al., Plffs. in Err.,

V.

WILLIAM C. IRVINE, as Treasurer of the
State of Wyoming.

that patent, we deem it unnecessary to in- | right which, by a judgment, has already quire. We need not stop to consider wheth- been declared to exist. If the suits are sucer the judgment in the case of Eldred v. cessful the result will be practically to deKessler had any other effect than to fix stroy Kessler's judgment right. Moreover unalterably the rights and duties of the though the impairment or destruction of immediate parties to it, for the reason that Kessler's right would certainly follow from only the rights and duties of those parties the course of conduct which Eldred has beare necessarily in question here. It may be gun, it would be difficult to prove, in an acthat the judgment in Eldred v. Kessler will tion at law, the extent of the damage innot afford Breitwieser, a customer of Kess- flicted. An action at law would be entirely ler, a defense to Eldred's suit against him. inadequate to protect fully Kessler's unUpon that question we express no opinion. questioned right, and, under these circumNeither it nor the case in which it is raised stances, though there may be no exact preceare before us. But the question here is dent, we think that the jurisdiction in equiwhether, by bringing a suit against one of ty exists. Nor do we see any good reason Kessler's customers, Eldred has violated the why Kessler's interposition for the defense right of Kessler. The effect which may rea- in the suit of Eldred v. Breitwieser debars sonably be anticipated of harassing the him from his remedy in equity. purchasers of Kessler's manufactures by claims for damages on account of the use of them would be to diminish Kessler's opportunities for sale. No one wishes to buy anything if with it he must buy a law suit. That the effect to be anticipated was the actual effect of the Breitwieser suit is shown by the statement of facts. Kessler's customers ceased to send orders for lighters, and even refused to pay for those which had already been delivered. Any action which has such results is manifestly in violation of the obligation of Eldred, and the corresponding right of Kessler, established by the judgment. Leaving entirely out of view any rights which Kessler's customers have or may have, it is Kessler's right that those customers should, in respect of the articles before the court in the previous judgment, be let alone by Eldred, and it is Eldred's duty to let them alone. The judgment in the previous case fails of the full effect which the law attaches to it if this is not so. If rights between litigants are once established by the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction those rights must be recognized in every way, and wherever the judgment is entitled to respect, by those who are bound by it. Having, then, by virtue of the judgment, the right to sell his wares freely, without hindrance from Eldred, must Kessler stand by and see that right violated, and then bring an action at law for the resulting damage, or may he prevent the Argued April 19, 22, 1907. Decided May 13, infliction of the unlawful injury by proceedings in personam in equity? If Eldred succeeds in his suit against one of Kessler's customers, he will naturally bring suits against others. He may bring suits against others, whether he succeeds in one suit or not. There may be, and there is likely to be, a mutiplicity of suits. It is certain that such suits, if unsuccessful, would, at the same time, tend to diminish Kessler's sales, and to impose upon him the expense of defending many suits in order to maintain the

Colleges-public aid-congressional grants and appropriations.

No particular institutions are entitled to the grants and appropriations made respectively by the act of July 2, 1862 (12 Stat. at L. 503, chap. 130), granting lands or land scrip to the several states for the endowment, support, and maintenance of at shall be to teach agriculture and the meleast one college, where the leading object chanic arts, and by the act of August 30, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 417, chap. 841, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3214), appropriating annually certain sums to each state and territory for the more complete endowment and maintenance of such colleges, but the states take the property, charged with the duty to devote it to the purposes named.

[No. 272.]

1907.

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

State of Wyoming to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the state treasurer to pay to the treasurer of Wyoming Agricultural College certain funds in his hands, the proceeds of land grants and the amount of appropriations made by Congress for the promotion of education in agriculture and mechanic arts. Affirmed.

See same case below, 14 Wyo. 318, 84 Pac. | science, and of the arts. 90.

Statement by Mr. Justice Moody:

The col

lege, or the department of the arts, shall embrace courses of instruction in the practical and fine arts, especially in the application of science to the arts of mining and metallurgy, mechanics, engineering, architecture, agriculture, and commerce, together with instruction in military tactics."

The plaintiff in error the state of Wyoming, on the relation of the Wyoming Agricultural College and its officers, filed a petition in the supreme court of that state for a writ of mandamus against the defendant in error, the state treasurer. The object of the proceeding was to compel the state treasurer to pay to the treasurer of the college certain funds in his hands, being the proceeds of land grants and the amount of appropriations made by Congress for the promotion of education in agricultural and mechanical arts. An alternative writ isAn alternative writ is sued, and the respondent appeared and demurred to the petition. The cause was then heard by the supreme court of Wyoming, and by that court the demurrer, which was regarded by court and counsel as sufficient-eral question first to be considered. ly raising the merits of the controversy, was. sustained and judgment rendered for the respondent. The case comes here upon writ of error, with allegations of violations of Federal rights, which, so far as material to the decision, are stated in the opinion.

Land grants and appropriations, which presently will be described in detail, have been made by Congress for the support of education in the state, and the state, acting through its legislature, has accepted the appropriations under the conditions prescribed in the acts of Congress, and has appropriated these national bounties to the support of the university. The agricultural college claimed that, under the acts of Congress bestowing these gifts, it is entitled to them, and the denial of the supreme court of the state of this claim raises the Fed

Messrs. Porter B. Coolidge, Fenimore Chatterton, Samuel T. Corn, and A. E. L. Leckie for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. Timothy F. Burke, W. E. Mullen, Nellis Corthell, Charles W. Burdick, and John W. Lacey for defendant in error.

By the act of July 2, 1862 (12 Stat. at L. 503, chap. 130), amended by act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. at L. 484, chap. 102, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3212), Congress "granted to the several states, for the purposes hereinafter mentioned," certain quantities of the public lands, or, under certain conditions, in lieu thereof land scrip. The entire proceeds of the sale of the land or of the land scrip were directed to be safely invested by the states as a perpetual fund, whose interest should be "inviolably appropriated by each state which may take and claim the benefit of this act, to the endowment, sup

Mr. Justice Moody delivered the opinion port, and maintenance of at least one colof the court:

The Wyoming Agricultural College was established by an act of the legislature of that state. Wyo. Sess. Laws 1890, 1891, chap. 92. It was declared to be "a state public educational institution," with the object of giving to men and women, without regard to color, "a liberal education and a thorough knowledge of such arts and sciences as will aid in the prosecution of agricultural pursuits, with their varied applications."

The University of Wyoming was established by the territory with the declared object of providing education for both sexes in "the different branches of literature, the arts and sciences, with their varied applications." The Constitution of the state of Wyoming confirmed the establishment of the university and declared it to be the university of the state of Wyoming. The first session of the state legislature enacted a law declaring more fully the objects of the university, which provided, among other things, that it should be open to both sexes, regardless of race or color, and should "embrace colleges or departments of letters, of

lege, where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the states may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life." The act further provided that "if any portion of the fund invested . . . be .. lost, it shall be replaced by the state to which it belongs;" and that "no state, while in a condition of rebellion or insurrection against the government of the United States, shall be entitled to the benefit of this act. No state shall be entitled to the benefits of this act unless it shall express its acceptance thereof by its legislature."

The grant made in this statute is clearly to the state, and not to any institution established by the state. Montana ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 51 L. ed. 499, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281.

By the act of August 30, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 417, chap. 841, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901,

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