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p. 3214), Congress made permanent annual | mate any disagreement with the conclusions appropriations of a certain sum of money of that court. But, as the plaintiff in error "to each state and territory for the more must fail in the attempt to compel the paycomplete endowment and maintenance of ment to it of the money in the hands of the colleges for the benefit of agriculture and defendant for the reasons already given, the mechanic arts, now established, or which there is no need to go further in this court, may be hereafter established, in accordance and the judgment of the Supreme Court of with an act of Congress approved July sec- Wyoming is therefore affirmed. ond, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, to be applied only to instruction in agriculture, the mechanic arts, the English lan
Finley, Plffs. in Err.,
ILLINOIS & MISSOURI BRIDGE COMPANY.
Error to state court-questions reviewable -local law.
guage, and the various branches of mathe- R. G. STONE, R. M. Finley, and Nannie E. matical, physical, natural, and economic science, with special reference to their applications in the industries of life, and to the facilities for such instruction." It is so obvious that these appropriations are made to the state, and not to any institutions within the state, and that the states, acting through their legislatures, are to expend the appropriations in accordance with the trust imposed upon them, that it is unnecessary to quote the numerous expressions in this act which support that view. By the act of March 2, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 440, chap. 314, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3218), Congress directed that a certain sum should be annu
1. Rulings of the highest court of the state on questions involving the powers of corporations under the laws of that state are conclusive on the Federal Supreme Court when reviewing the judgment of the state court. *
Error to state court-questions reviewable -local law.
2. Whether a given corporation comes within the scope of the statutes of a state is entitled to assert such right, presents conferring the right of eminent domain, and only a question of state law, which cannot be reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court on writ of error to a state court. † Eminent domain-bridge over navigable stream-effect of time limit set by Con
act of January 26, 1901 (31 Stat. at L. 741, chap. 181), over a navigable stream, is denied no Federal right because the erection of the bridge was not begun within the time limit set by Congress, where the bridge has been constructed without complaint by the Federal authorities, Congress having, by the act of January 18, 1904 (33 Stat. at L. 6, chap. 5), extended the time for its completion.
ally appropriated to each state" for the support of agricultural experiment stations at the institutions established under the act of 1862. The law provides that the appropriation shall be paid to the treasurer of the institution where the agricultural experiment station is established, and no money has come or will come into the hands of the state treasurer. It is, therefore, un- 3. The owner of property taken by emnecessary to consider further the provisions inent domain for the approaches and terof this act. There is in the hands of the minal facilities necessary to the use of a state treasurer the permanent fund estab-bridge erected, under the authority of the lished under the act of 1862, and one of the annual appropriations paid to him under the act of 1890. The interest on the fund and the annual appropriation the state treasurer is about to pay to the University of Wyoming in obedience to the laws of the state. The agricultural college claims that it is entitled under those statutes to receive this money. If this claim fails it is the end of the case. But, as has been shown, both the fund and its interest and the annual appropriations are the property of the state, and not of any institution within it. The agricultural college shows no title or right to this money under these statutes. The whole case of the plaintiff in error fails at the threshold, and it is unnecessary to determine whether the state has complied with its trust in bestowing the government bounty upon the University of Wyoming, or has violated the obligation of a contract by repealing, as it has, the act establishing the agricultural college. These questions were discussed with learning and ability in the court below, and we do not intend to inti
Eminent domain-bridge over navigable stream-approaches and terminal facili
4. The appropriation by eminent domain of land for the approaches and terminal facilities necessary to the use of a bridge erected, under the authority of the act of January 26, 1901, over a navigable stream, is not forbidden by that act because the plans submitted to the Secretary of though fully subserving the purpose of War, and specifically approved by him, alshowing the extent to which navigation would be affected, do not include such terminal and connecting facilities, and cannot, under the act, be altered without his consent.
*Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, § 962. tEd. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 13, Courts, § 1049.
Argued March 22, 25, 1907. Decided May | miles above or below the terminus of said railway.
N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri to review a judgment affirming, on a second appeal, a judgment of the Circuit Court of Scott County, in that state, for the appropriation of land for approaches and terminal facilities necessary to the use of a bridge erected under congressional authority over a navigable
The bridge was to be constructed for the passage of railway trains, and, at the option of the corporation, might be so constructed as to provide for the use thereof by wagons, vehicles, and the transit of foot passengers and animals at such reasonable tolls as might be approved by the Secretary of War. It was also provided that the bridge constructed under the act and subject to its limitations should be a lawful structure and
See same case below, 194 Mo. 175, 92 S. recognized and known as a post route of the United States.
The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Shepard Barclay, Madison Smith, and Thomas T. Fauntleroy for plaintiffs in error.
Messrs. Martin L. Clardy and Alexander G. Cochran for defendant in error.
Section 5 provides:
"That the approaches to the bridge built under this act shall be so designed and constructed as not to interfere with the free discharge of the river in seasons of flood; and any encroachment on the high-water cross sections by piers, solid embankments,
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of or otherwise, which might result in unduly the court:
accelerating the high-water current at the
On March 3, 1899, Congress passed an act site of the bridge, shall not be allowed." providing, among other things:
“That it shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, etc., . . . . any navigable river of the United States until the consent of Congress to the building of such structures shall have been obtained, and until the plans for the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War."
The act further provided:
"That when plans for any bridge or other structure have been approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War, it shall not be lawful to deviate from such plans either before or after completion of the structure, unless the modification of said plans has previously been submitted to and received the approval of the Chief of Engineers and of the Secretary of War." 30 Stat. at L. 1151, § 9, chap. 425, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3540.
On January 26, 1901, Congress passed an act (31 Stat. at L. 741, chap. 181) authorizing the Southern Illinois & Missouri Bridge Company (defendant in error), a corporation of the state of Illinois, to erect, construct, maintain, and operate a bridge and approaches thereto over the Mississippi river from a point on the Mississippi river in Alexander county, in the state of Illinois, opposite the terminus of the St. Louis South(western Railway, at or near Gray's Point, in Scott county, in the state of Missouri, or from some other convenient point on said river in said Alexander county, Illinois, to some opposite point on said river in the state of Missouri, within the distance of 3
Section 7 provides for the submission to the Secretary of War of the drawings of the bridge, piers, approaches, and accessory works and a map of the location, giving, for the space of at least 2 miles above and 1 mile below the proposed site, the topography of the banks of the river and the shore lines at high and low water. The maps and drawings are to be referred to the board of officers of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, for examination and report.
Provision is made for hearing objections to the construction of the bridge, and it is provided that the proposed bridge shall be a lawful structure only when built in accordance with the plans recommended by the Board of Engineers and approved by the Chief of Engineers and by the Secretary of War, and while so managed and kept in repair as to offer at all times reasonable and proper means for the passage of rafts, steamboats, and other water craft under the said bridge, and while said requirements are observed.
Section 10 provides for alterations and changes as may be required by the Secretary of War, in accordance with existing visions of the act, so as to preserve free and law, in the bridge constructed under the proconvenient navigation. Such changes were to be made, under the direction of the Secretary of War, at the expense of the persons, companies, or corporations owning, controlling, and operating the bridge.
Section 11 provides that the bridge shall be constructed under the general supervision of the Secretary of War, and no changes or alterations in the plan shall be made during the construction of said bridge or after its completion, unless recommended by the
Chief of Engineers and approved by the a bridge company to build a bridge across Secretary of War. the Mississippi river;
The act makes provision for the preservation of the navigable channel during the construction of the bridge.
Section 12 provides that whenever Congress shall decide that the public interests require it, the right to order the removal of the bridge at the expense of the owners is expressly reserved, without liability for damages on the part of the United States. Section 13 provides that if the bridge is not commenced within one year and completed within three years from the date of the approval of the act, the same shall be null and void, and the rights thereby conferred ceased and determine.
The Southern Illinois & Missouri Bridge Company, in pursuance of this act, submitted its drawings and plans and the same were duly approved as required by law.
The bridge company, on the 24th day of April, 1902, filed its petition in the circuit court of Scott county, Missouri, for the appropriation of a strip of land containing 20.3 acres, said to be approximately 4,000 feet long and 200 feet wide, alleging that it is necessary to have a right of way for the railway tracks, bridge, and terminal yards of the company, and, for the purpose of carrying out its charter privileges, it is necessary to hold and own the described tract.
On trial in the circuit court that court held that the bridge company had no right to make the appropriation under the laws of Missouri.
From this adjudication an appeal was taken to the supreme court of Missouri and that court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded the case with directions to the lower court to appoint three disinterested commissioners to assess the damages which the defendants would sustain by the appropriation of the strip of land. 174 Mo. 1, 63 L.R.A. 301, 73 S. W. 453.
Such proceedings were had, and $10,000 was assessed as damages in favor of the plaintiffs in error, defendants below, and a second appeal was prosecuted to the supreme court of Missouri, where judgment below was affirmed. 194 Mo. 175, 92 S. W. 4/5.
That the laws of Missouri do not confer the right of eminent domain on a corporation of another state;
That a corporation of Illinois can only exercise in Missouri such powers as are conferred upon it by the state of its creation.
These questions involve the powers of corporations under the laws of Missouri, which are concluded by the adjudication of the state supreme court.
There is no contention that the statutes conferring the right of eminent domain, passed by the legislature of the state of Missouri, and which its courts have decided authorize this appropriation by the defendant in error, do not make ample provision for assessment of damages to the landowner by due process of law. Whether a given corporation comes within the law of the state, and is entitled to assert its power, presents only a question of state law.
Nor is error shown in the contention that the erection of the bridge was not begun within the year, as provided by the act of Congress. The evidence shows that the bridge has been constructed without complaint by the Federal authorities, and, indeed, Congress has extended the time for the completion of the bridge by an act passed January 18, 1904. 33 Stat. at L. 6, chap. 5. It cannot prejudice any Federal right secured to the plaintiffs in error that the right of eminent domain is authorized by the state notwithstanding the bridge was not begun within the time which Congress might have insisted upon as a condition of enjoyment of the privileges conferred.
If the record presents any Federal question at all, it rests in the contention that the appropriation in controversy is in contravention of the act of Congress, because it is an unauthorized extension of the approaches to the bridge upon the Missouri side, not included in the drawings and plans as submitted to the Secretary of War, and which met with his approval, as already recited.
The copy of the approved drawings in the record shows that the approach to the bridge upon the west side was shown in a series of arches extending from the river bank to a distance of 720 feet. And it is the con
To that judgment this writ of error is tention of the plaintiffs in error that, in prosecuted.
Many of the assignments of error involve only questions of state law, the rulings concerning which, in the supreme court of the state, are conclusive, and involve no substantial Federal question.
Among these may be named:
The contention that the statutes of Missouri do not authorize the incorporation of
view of the act of Congress, the approach must be limited to the extent and construction shown in the plans and drawings thus approved by the Secretary of War. Indeed, it is contended that this plan, after its approval, became a limitation upon the power of the state to extend the bridge by authorizing further approaches and connections.
But we think this contention wholly untenable. The act of Congress and the powers given the Secretary of War thereunder are the result of the exertion of the constitutional power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce between the states. Federal control of bridges constructed over nav. igable waters is maintained because of the right to prevent obstructions to navigation and preserve such public highways as rivers for free and unobstructed use in the interest of commerce. Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. United States, 105 U. S. 470-475, 26 L. ed. 1143-1145, and cases therein cited.
An examination of the act of Congress under which the bridge company was authorized to construct this bridge manifests the purpose to prevent its becoming an obstruction or interference with free navigation of the river, and when the matter of approaches is specifically spoken of it is provided that they shall be so designed and constructed as not to interfere with the free discharge of the river in seasons of flood.
It is evident that the purpose of requiring the submission of plans, and their approval by the Secretary of War, was to preserve, as far as may be, the unobstructed passage of the river in the uses of navigation. To the extent that it was necessary to protect such interests, the law provides that the structure shall be unalterable, and
This record shows that the point 720 feet to the west, where the approach required by the War Department ends, is at a height of some 60 feet from the ground. The structure was thence extended some distance to the crest of a bluff, thence over the lands of the plaintiffs in error to a point where the terminal yards of the bridge company are situated.
We cannot find it within the purpose of Congress, if it had the power so to do, by the terms of this act to limit the state in its right to authorize these necessary terminals and connecting facilities, because the plans and specifications, which fully subserved the purpose of showing the extent to which navigation would be affected, had been specifically approved by the Secretary of War, and are not to be altered without his consent.
In our view no Federal right was taken from the plaintiffs in error by the action complained of under the state laws as interpreted by the supreme court of the state of Missouri, and if it may be said that the contention fairly presents a Federal question, we are unable to find merit in it. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is affirmed.
eral, John C. Hart,
TENNESSEE COPPER COMPANY and Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, & Iron Company (Limited).
Injunction—against pollution of air-suit
that its approaches shall be approved by the STATE OF GEORGIA, by its Attorney GenSecretary and remain unchanged without his sanction, but it certainly never was designed to destroy the usefulness of the bridge by limiting the power of the state to authorize the corporation constructing and owning it, by proper connections and other facilities, to make the bridge available for the purposes for which it was intended. The bridge and approaches as approved by the Secretary of War have not been altered. The connecting approaches and tracks are additional means of making the bridge available for the purposes intended.
As was pertinently observed by the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the court in Union P. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 163 U. S. 588, 41 L. ed. 273, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1173: "A railroad bridge can be of no use to the public unless united with necessary appurtenances, such as approaches, tracks, depots, and other facilities for the public accommodation."
1. Foreign corporations will be enjoined at the suit of the state of Georgia from so discharging sulphurous fumes from their works in Tennessee as to pollute the air over large tracts of territory in Georgia, and to cause and threaten wholesale damage to forests and vegetable life therein, if not
Laches-as bar to injunctive relief.
guilty of such laches as bars her right to in2. The state of Georgia has not been junctive relief against the pollution of air
over large tracts of her territory, and the destruction of forests and vegetable lifetherein by sulphurous gases discharged by foreign corporations from their works in Tennessee, where such conditions have not obtained until recent years, and the dismissal, without prejudice, of a similar bill filed in 1904, was due to the mistaken belief that changes in the process of manufacture then in progress would remove the evil.
If the state was deprived of its power to authorize extensions and connections which should make this bridge available for the common use of railroads for which it was intended, it would have been a vain thing to provide for a bridge abruptly terminating at a height and point where, without further approaches and connecting facilities, its Argued February 25, 26, 1907. Decided May usefulness would have been destroyed.
[No. 5, Original.]
ORIGINAL BILL in equity filed by the sort, on the part of a state, for relief from
state of Georgia to enjoin certain foreign corporations from discharging noxious gases from their works in Tennessee over large tracts of territory in Georgia. Injunction decreed.
The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Ligon Johnson and John C. Hart for complainant.
Messrs. James G. Parks, Howard Cornick, John H. Frantz, James B. Wright, and Martin H. Vogel for defendants.
injuries analogous to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520, 521, 50 L. ed. 572, 578, 579, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268. But it is plain that some such demands must be recognized, if the grounds alleged are proved. When the states by their union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the of the court:
This is a bill in equity filed in this court by the state of Georgia, in pursuance of a resolution of the legislature and by direction of the governor of the state, to enjoin the defendant copper companies from discharging noxious gas from their works in Tennessee over the plaintiff's territory. It alleges that, in consequence of such discharge, a wholesale destruction of forests, orchards, and crops is going on, and other injuries are done and threatened in five counties of the state. It alleges also a vain application to the state of Tennessee for relief. A preliminary injunction was denied; but, as there was ground to fear that great and irreparable damage might be done, an early day was fixed for the final hearing, and the parties were given leave, if so minded, to try the case on affidavits. This has been done without objection, and, although the method would be unsatisfactory if our decision turned on any nice question of fact, in the view that we take we think it unlike ly that either party has suffered harm.
The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting here. The state owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This is a suit by a state for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might have to pay individuals before it could utter that word, but with it remains the final power. The alleged damage to the state as a private owner is merely a makeweight, and we may lay on one side the dispute as to whether the destruction of forests has led to the gullying of its roads.
The caution with which demands of this
alternative to force is a suit in this court. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241, 45 L. ed. 497, 512, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 331.
Some peculiarities necessarily mark a suit of this kind. If the state has a case at all, it is somewhat more certainly entitled to specific relief than a private party might be. It is not lightly to be required to give up quasi-sovereign rights for pay; and, apart from the difficulty of valuing such rights in money, if that be its choice it may insist that an infraction of them shall be stopped. The states, by entering the Union, did not sink to the position of private owners, subject to one system of private law. This court has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm that will be done by an injunction against that of which the plaintiff complains, that it would have in deciding between two subjects of a single political power. Without excluding the considerations that equity always takes into account, we cannot give the weight that was given them in argument to a comparison between the damage threatened to the plaintiff and the calamity of a possible stop to the defendants' business, the question of health, the character of the forests as a first or second growth, the commercial possibility or impossibility of reducing the fumes to sulphuric acid, the special adaptation of the business to the place.
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from the same source. If any such demand is to be enforced this must be notwithstanding the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were between private parties, and the doubt whether, for the injuries which they might be suffering to their property, they should not be left to an action at law.