Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

assault, or a murder,—and subject the same | whether the offense for which an officer or person to a punishment, under the state soldier is being tried is, in every substanlaws, for a misdemeanor or felony. That tial respect, the same offense for which he either or both may (if they see fit) punish had been previously tried. We will not such an offender, cannot be doubted. Yet it therefore attempt to formulate any rule by cannot be truly averred that the offender which every conceivable case must be has been twice punished for the same of solved. But, passing by all other questions fense; but only that by one act he has com- discussed by counsel, or which might arise mitted two offenses, for each of which he on the record, and restricting our decision is justly punishable. He could not plead to the above question of double jeopardy, the punishment by one in bar to a convic- we adjudge that, consistently with the tion by the other; consequently, this court above act of 1902, and for the reasons stathas decided, in the case of Fox v. Ohio, 5 ed, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the How. 432, 12 L. ed. 222, that a state may Army, having been acquitted of the crime punish the offense of uttering or passing of homicide, alleged to have been committed false coin, as a cheat or fraud practised on by him in the Philippines, by a military its citizens; and, in the case of the United court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding States v. Marigold, supra, that Congress, in under the authority of the United States, the proper exercise of its authority, may could not be subsequently tried for the punish the same act as an offense against same offense in a civil court exercising authe United States." thority in that territory. This is sufficient to dispose of the present case.

It is clear that the cases above cited are not in point here. The government of the United States and the governments of the several states, in the exercise of their respective powers, move on different lines. The government of the United States has no power, except as expressly or by necessary implication has been granted to it, while the several states may exert such powers as are not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States nor with a republican form of government, and which have not been surrendered by them to the general government. An offense against the United States can only be punished under its authority and in the tribunals created by its laws; whereas, an offense against a state can be punished only by its authority and in its tribunals. The same act, as held in Moore's Case, may constitute two offenses, one against the United States and the other against a state. But these things cannot be predicated of the relations between the United States and the Philippines. The government of a state does not derive its powers from the United States, while the government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly to the United States, and its judicial tribunals exert all their powers by authority of the United States. The jurisdiction and authority of the United States over that territory and its inhabitants, for all legitimate purposes of government, is paramount. So that the cases holding that the same acts committed in a state of the Union may constitute an offense against the United States and also a distinct offense against the state do not apply here, where the two tribunals that tried the accused exert all their powers under and by authority of the same government, that of the United States.

It may be difficult at times to determine

[blocks in formation]

V.

MAX DREY, Charles D. Bernheimer, and
Meyer A. Bernheimer, Executors of the
Last Will and Testament of Isaac Bern-
heimer, Deceased, Plffs. in Err.,
THEODORE R. CONVERSE, Receiver of
the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing
Company, Deft. in Err. (No. 279.)
Corporations-stockholder's liability.

1. A domestic corporation formed for the purchase of the capital stock, evidences of indebtedness, and assets of another domestic corporation, and for the further purments and machinery, is one organized for pose of manufacturing and selling implea purpose other than that of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical business, and is therefore not within the exception as to the liability of stockholders made by Minn. Const. art. 10, § 3, in favor of corporations of that kind. Constitutional law-impairing contract obligations-change of remedy.

2. The contractual obligations arising out of Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, chap. 76, adopted to enforce the liability of stock

holders prescribed by Minn. Const. art. 10, The actions were brought (January 28, § 3, are not impaired by Minn. Gen. Laws 29, 1904) by Theodore R. Converse as re1899, chap. 272, enacted to make the rem-ceiver of the Minnesota Thresher Manufacedy more effectual, because, while under turing Company, a corporation of the state of Minnesota, to enforce an alleged stockholders' liability under the Constitution and laws of the state of Minnesota. The court below held the executors of Simon Bern

the old law stockholders who could not be reached by personal service were immune from liability, under the new law they need not necessarily be served with process in the action in which the assessment is made, or because the expenses incident to the en-heimer and Isaac Bernheimer, both having forcement of the liability in other states died before the suits were brought, liable and against other parties are taken into as such stockholders. consideration in estimating the amount of the assessment.

Constitutional law-due process of lawenforcing stockholder's liability-service of process.

a

3. Due process of law is not denied stockholder in a domestic corporation by Minn. Gen. Laws 1899, chap. 272, enacted to make more effectual the constitutional liability of stockholders for the debts of the corporation, because stockholders need not necessarily be served with process in

the action in which the assessment is made. Receivers-suits in foreign jurisdiction.

4. A chancery receiver of a domestic corporation upon whom, as a quasi assignee and representative of the creditors, is conferred by Minn. Gen. Laws 1899, chap. 272, the authority to maintain an action to enforce the liability of stockholders, may sue in a foreign jurisdiction. Limitation of actions-enforcing stockholder's liability in foreign jurisdiction.

5. The limitation of the right to bring an action against a stockholder for a debt of the corporation to two years after he has ceased to be a stockholder, which is made by N. Y. Laws 1892, chap. 688, § 55, is not applicable to a suit to enforce the liability of a stockholder in a foreign corporation.

Limitation of actions-enforcing stockholder's liability in foreign jurisdiction.

6. A cause of action to enforce the liability of a stockholder under the Minnesota Constitution and laws does not accrue so as to start the running of the six years' limitation prescribed by N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 382, until the receiver of the corporation sue upon the assessment after the stockholder has failed to pay as required by an order of court.

[Nos. 278, 279.]

The record discloses that the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company was incorporated under the laws of the state of Minnesota on the 5th of December, 1884, the objects for which the corporation was formed being the purchase of the capital stock, evidences of indebtedness, and assets. of the Northwestern Manufacturing & Car Company, also a corporation under the laws of the state of Minnesota, and for the further purpose of manufacturing and selling steam engines, farm implements, machinery, etc., and the manufacture and sale of arti cles, implements, and machinery of which wood and iron form the principal parts.

The Northwestern Manufacturing & Car Company was in the hands of a receiver, carrying on its business under the orders of a court, and, on October 27, 1887, the property and plant of that company, includand assets were sold under decree and puring all its bills receivable, farmers' notes, chased by the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company. The last-named company continued in business until December, 1900. On December 14 of that year the property and business of the thresher company were placed in the hands of a receiver by the order of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota, in a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon its property, and this receiver carried on the business until the mortgaged property was sold under a decree of foreclosure on May 25, 1901.

On May 6, 1901, the Merchants' National Bank of St. Paul obtained a judgment in the district court of Ramsey county, Minnesota, against the thresher company, and executions thereon having been returned un

Argued April 25, 26, 1907. Decided May 27, satisfied, the judgment creditor brought suit

TWO

1907.

against the thresher company for the appointment of a receiver and the enforcement WO WRITS of error to the Circuit Court of the individual liability of its stockholdof the United States for the Southerners in the district court of Washington District of New York to review judgments county, Minnesota. In that suit Theodore enforcing the liability of stockholders in a R. Converse, defendant in error in these foreign corporation. Affirmed. cases, was appointed receiver. On the petition of the receiver, for the purpose of providing funds for the payment of the expenses of the receivership in the enforce. ment of the stock liability and payment of indebtedness, an order was made, Decem

Statement by Mr. Justice Day: These are writs of error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

A former statute had been for some years in force in Minnesota and was the statute law of the state when the stock which concerns the controversy here was acquired by the Bernheimers. This statute was before this court in the cases of Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 47 L. ed. 380, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244, and Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335, 47 L. ed. 839, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558. It was the act of 1894, General Statutes of Minnesota of that year, chap. 76, p. 1595, and is set forth in full in the margin (188 U. S. p. 60, 47 L. ed. p. 385, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 245).

ber 22, 1902, reciting, among other things, | been acquired before the passage of the that copies of an order of April 16, 1902 statute of 1899. General Laws of Minne(not in the record), had been published, sota, chap. 272, being "An Act to Provide mailed, and served as therein required, and for the Better Enforcement of the Liability that due notice of the hearing had been of Stockholders of Corporations." given to the defendant company and to each stockholder of record, as directed by the order, and, on a hearing duly had, an order of assessment of 36 per cent of the par value of each share of the capital stock of the thresher company, to wit, $18 per share, was assessed against each and every share of the capital stock, and against each and every person, corporation, or party liable as such stockholder, and each such person, corporation, or party was directed to pay to the said receiver, at his office in the city of Stillwater, Minnesota, within thirty days after the date of the order, the said sum of $18 a share; and, further, upon failure to pay said sums, the receiver was authorized to prosecute actions or proceedings against the persons liable in any court having jurisdiction in the state of Minnesota or elsewhere. On appeal to the suitor or creditors for the benefit of all credpreme court of the state of Minnesota this order was affirmed. 90 Minn. 144, 95 N. W. 767. Subsequently, as stated, these actions were brought and judgment rendered against the executors of the Bernheimers.

Mr. Laurence Arnold Tanzer for plaintiffs in error.

Messrs. William G. Wilson and C. A. Severance for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of

the court:

Before entering upon a discussion of the objections urged against the validity of the assessment upon stockholders which is the subject of controversy here, we may say we find no reason to disagree with the judgment of the supreme court of Minnesota in holding the Minnesota Thresher Manufacturing Company to be a corporation organized for other than the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical business, and therefore not within the exception as to stockholders' liability in favor of corporations of that kind. State ex rel. Clapp v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 40 Minn. 215, 3 L.R.A. 510, 41 N. W. 1020; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 90 Minn. 144, 95 N. W. 767.

The questions made in these cases involve the right to recover upon a stockholder's liability in a Federal court in a state other than the one in which the original proceedings in liquidation were had, and under whose laws the corporation was formed, and wherein it carried on business, against stockholders in such corporate companies as the Thresher Company, where the stock had

Under that act it was held, in a series of decisions in the state of Minnesota, which were reviewed in Hale v. Allinson, that an action could only be maintained under the laws of Minnesota when brought Ly a cred

itors of the corporation, and the recovery was had for the purpose of making good any deficiency in the corporate assets for the payment of corporate debts; that the receiver could not maintain such an action outside of the jurisdiction of the court appointing him, and that the only remedy was, as stated, in a creditor's action, bringing in all the stockholders, for the realization of a fund to be proportionately distributed among the creditors in one suit.

The principal contentions in these cases are that the act of 1899, above referred to, works such a change in the contract theretofore existing by virtue of the acquisition of stock in a Minnesota corporation as to impair the obligation thereof, and, in ways to be hereafter noticed, undertakes to hold a stockholder by judgment rendered without due process of law.

The act of 1899 was before this court in the case of the First Nat. Bank v. Converse, 200 U. S. 425, 50 L. ed. 537, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 306, and its principal parts are set forth in the margin of the report of that case on page 428, L. ed. page 538, Sup. Ct. Rep. page 307. The act, for our purposes, may be summarized as follows:

[ocr errors][merged small]
[merged small][ocr errors]

Section 2 provides that upon the petition of the assignee or receiver, or any creditor of the corporation who has filed his claim, the district court shall appoint a time for hearing not less than thirty days nor more than sixty days from the time of filing said petition, and direct notice of the hearing to be given by publication or otherwise, in the discretion of the court; but if the petition be filed by a creditor, other than the assignee or receiver, the court shall direct notice of the hearing to be personally served on the assignee or receiver.

levied shall be conclusive upon and against all parties liable upon or on account of any shares of said stock of such corporation, whether appearing or having notice thereof or not, as to all matters relating to the amount of and the necessity for said assessment, which provision shall also apply to any subsequent assessment levied by order of the court.

Section 6 makes it the duty of the assignee or receiver, upon failure to pay as required by the order, to institute and maintain an action against any party liable upon or on account of any such shares of stock, and that actions may be maintained against each stockholder in Minnesota or in any other state or country where such stockholder or any property subject to attachment, garnishment, or other process may be found, and provides that if the assignee or receiver shall believe any such stockholder to be insolvent, or that the expense of prosecuting such action will work to the disadvantage of the estate, he shall not be required to prosecute the same, unless specifically directed so to do by the court.

Section 7 provides for further assessments in case the first proves inadequate. Section 8 extends the provisions of the act to such subsequent assessments.

Section 9 provides where two or more assessments are levied or directed, the assignee or receiver may join the causes of action against any stockholder on two or

more such assessments.

Section 10 provides that if the assignee or receiver fails to institute or prosecute the action, the creditors may petition the court to compel him to proceed under cer

Section 3 provides that the court shall consider the proofs offered by the assignee or receiver, or by any creditor or stockholder who may appear in person or by attorney as to the probable indebtedness of the corporation and the expenses of the assignment or receivership and the probable amount of assets available for the payment of such indebtedness and expenses; also as to what parties are or may be liable as stockholders, and the nature and extent of such liability. And if it shall appear to the satisfaction of such court that the ordinary assets, or such amount as may be real-tain conditions. ized therefrom in a reasonable time, will not be sufficient to pay the expenses of such assignment or receivership and the indebtedness, and it is necessary to resort to the liability of stockholders, the court shall, by order, direct and levy a ratable assessment upon all parties liable as stockholders, or upon or on account of any stock or shares of such corporation for such amount as the court, in its discretion, may deem proper, taking into account the probable solvency or insolvency of stockholders, and the probable expenses of collecting the assessment, and shall direct the payment of the amount so assessed to the assignee or receiver within such time as the court may specify in said order.

Section 11 provides for the return of the surplus, if any remain, in the hands of the assignee or receiver after paying the expenses of the assignment or receivership and the claims of the creditors, and that stockholders who have paid assessments shall, in addition to the remedy provided in the statute, be entitled to enforce contributions from stockholders who have not paid assessments.

Section 12 provides for additional judgments in case of the inadequacy of former assessments.

Section 13 excludes certain stockholders in pending actions from the operation of the act.

This statute came before the supreme court of Minnesota in Straw & E. Mfg. Co. v. L. D. Kilbourne Boot & Shoe Co. 80 Minn. 125, 83 N. W. 36. In that case it was given full consideration and its constitutionality sustained, and it was held that while the assessments upon the outstanding shares of Section 5 provides that the assessment stock in an amount necessary to meet the

Section 4 provides for an order to the assignee or receiver to proceed to collect the amount so assessed, unless it be paid within the time specified in the order, and, in default of payment, the receiver is to bring suit.

The fundamental contention upon which the argument of the plaintiffs in error against the constitutionality of this subsequent act rests is that the statute created a contract into which the stockholder entered upon subscribing to or obtaining his stock, which the legislature had no power to change without running counter to the constitutional requirement invalidating laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Constitution, art. 1, § 10.

deficiency in the assets of the corporation In pursuance of that power the legislawas conclusive upon the stockholders as ture passed the act of 1894, which remained members of the corporation, yet the statute, in force until the passage of the act of properly construed, did not have the effect 1899. to deprive a person, when sued for the amount assessed on shares of stock under the visions of the act, from showing that he was not a stockholder, or that he was not the holder of so large an amount of stock as was alleged, or that he had a claim against the corporation which, in law or equity, he might be enabled to set off as against a claim for assessments, or from making any other defense personal to himself; and that the order of assessment was conclusive upon stockholders only in so far as it decided the amount of assets or liabilities of the insolvent corporation and the necessity of making an assessment upon the stock to the extent and in the amount ordered.

The constitutionality of the act was again affirmed in the same court in the later case of London & N. W. American Mortg. Co. v. St. Paul Park Improv. Co. 84 Minn. 144, 86 N. W. 872.

The stockholders' liability in Minnesota, as in some other states, has its origin in a constitutional provision, and arises under § 3, article 10, of the Constitution of that state. The language is:

"Liabilities of stockholders. "Each stockholder in any corporation (excepting those organized for the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical business) shall be liable to the amount of stock held or owned by him."

The courts of Minnesota have held that a stockholders' liability is, therefore, fixed and measured by the Constitution. Willis v. Mabon (Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co.) 48 Minn. 140, 16 L.R.A. 281, 31 Am. St. Rep. 626, 50 N. W. 1110; McKusick v. Seymour, S. & Co. 48 Minn. 158, 50 N. W. 1114. It is apparent from a consideration of this constitutional provision that its purpose was to make a stockholder liable to the creditors of the corporation in an amount not exceeding the par value of the stock held by him, and thus secure, for the benefit of such creditors, in addition to the assets and property which the corporation might possess, the liability of those who hold its stock in a sum necessary to make good any deficiency between the amount of the assets and the debts within the limitation stated. It is evident from the general language used in this constitutional provision that while a remedy might have been worked out in the courts of equity in the state, it was proper, if not necessary, that a statute should be passed to make more effectual the liability thus secured by the Constitution.

It may be regarded as settled that, upon acquiring stock, the stockholder incurred an obligation arising from the constitutional provision, contractual in its nature, and, as such, capable of being enforced in the courts not only of that state, but of another state and of the United States (Whitman v. National Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 44 L. ed. 587, 20 sup. Ct. Rep. 477), although the obligation is not entirely contractual, and springs primarily from the law creating the obligation (Christopher v. Norwell, 201 U. S. 216, 50 L. ed. 732, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502).

Is there anything in the obligation of this contract which is impaired by subsequent legislation as to the remedy, enacting new means of making the liability more effectual? The obligation of this contract binds the stockholder to pay to the creditors of the corporation an amount sufficient to pay the debts of the corporation which its assets will not pay, up to an amount equal to the stock held by each shareholder. That is his contract, and the duty which the statute imposes, and that is his obligation. Any statute which took away the benefit of such contract or obligation would be void as to the creditor, and any attempt to increase the obligation beyond that incurred by the stockholder would fall within the prohibition of the Constitution. But there was nothing in the laws of Minnesota undertaking to make effectual the constitutional provision to which we have referred, preventing the legislature from giving additional remedies to make the obligation of the stockholder effectual, so long as his original undertaking was not enlarged. There is a broad distinction between laws impairing the obligation of contracts and those which simply undertake to give a more efficient remedy to enforce a contract already made.

This principle was stated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L. ed. 529, as follows:

"The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »