pose all this performed in the face of an enemy; the garrison embarked; as many of the inhabitants as chose, to the amount of many thousands, taken on board the ships; and all without the loss of a single man, which could hardly have been hoped in a peaceable embarkation of the same extent, on the river Thames; let them then add the destruction of the enemy's ships to such a degree, as to form the greatest blow given to the French navy at any period, and then would any man say, that the officers who conducted these operations were not entitled to every honourable mark of commendation and applause.

Mr. For said, that although a future discussion was promised, some sentiments had been delivered on which he must remark while they were fresh in the memory of the House. He agreed perfectly with the hon. gentleman who opened the discussion, as to the propriety of the observations he had made. According to the best practice of the best times it was strictly in order to consider the ability of ministers to direct to the most beneficial effect that force which they were voting the money of their con

at their command. On this he would rest the whole of their merit or demerit. When the force at Toulon, and the force ordered thither were known, he should be ready to discuss the conduct of ministers respecting the defence of that place, if the House thought fit. All he should then say was, that although they considered the retreat of Toulon as of importance, they did not hold it to be so important as to give up, on account of it, the expedition to the West Indies. They had ordered such a force for the defence of Toulon as they conceived to be sufficient, and he did not even then think that it would have been justifiable to forego the expedition under sir Charles Grey. They afterwards diminished the force intended for that expedition, for reasons, which it was not then proper to explain. Such as it still remained, they thought it adequate to the service for which it was sent. With respect to the force under the command of the earl of Moira, it was idle to discuss the merits of an expedition which had been only projected and was now laid aside. All he should say was, that ministers had not the means of attempting such an exstituents to pay. He was glad to find pedition at an earlier period; and that they were justified in planning it at the time they did.-To return to the subject of Toulon, in the defence of it, while it could be defended, and in the evacuation when it could be defended no longer, the officers who commanded, had great and extraordinary merit. The obtaining possession of it depended on the excellent condition of the fleet sent into the Mediterranean, and the admirable conduct of the officers who commanded it. But for these, the fleet of the enemy could not have been blocked up in the port of Toulon and that degree of famine produced, which was the primary cause of the surrender. After the tower and forts were occupied by the small force then at the disposal of lord Hood, such exertions for maintaining the place were made, as he was astonished to hear a member of the British army represent as disgraceful to the British arms. When it became necessary to evacuate the place, let gentlemen call to mind the circumstance against which that operation had been effected; let them suppose great town to be abandoned, a large garrison to be embarked, and the inhabitants, in conster-part, instead of conducting, as might have nation and dismay, to be taken away, while the enemy had gained such advantages in various quarters, as enabled them to threaten the town itself; let them sup

gentlemen on the other side of the House so pleased as they professed to be with the successes of the campaign. If it were possible to talk with levity of a situation of Europe, which he considered as highly disastrous, he should congratulate the House on the issue of a campaign with which all parties engaged in it were pleased. We extolled the success of our armies; so did the French that of their's. We applauded the evacuation of Toulon as a most fortunate event; the French celebrated the same event by public festivals-so that ministers and they might meet and join in a common jubilee. Unfortunately for him, he could not participate in these rejoicings, while he saw Europe brought into a situation afflicting to every man who retained the least spark of justice or humanity. Since the prorogation of parliament, when the advantages we had obtained were set forth in terms as vaunting as they could well bear, we had seen little success and much defeat. When he saw that all the latter part of the campaign had been uniformly unsuccessful; when the successes of the early

been expected, to new successes, had only led to disaster and disgrace, he augured but ill of the future; as in such circumstances every rational man must

augur. He could neither agree with the | heard that the part of the treaty to which hon, gentleman, nor with the chancellor he alluded had been broken by our subseof the exchequer who corrected him, on quent proclamations. We got possession the subject of responsibility; which in- of the ships and stores in trust for our ally stead of laying wholly with generals, or Louis 17th., and after that, to boast of jointly on the generals and ministers, lay destroying them as the ships of an enemy, wholly with ministers in the first instance. was a perversion of terms. He admitted, There was, or ought to be, a military that when they could not be defended, we man in the cabinet, and he supposed the had a right to destroy them, or, what was commander in chief held that situation still better, to bring them away, in order nów, on whose information and advice to prevent their falling into the hands of ministers were to decide both as to the those who were the enemies of Louis 17th. propriety of undertaking expeditions and But this was to be lamented as a misforthe force requisite for them. They might tune, more especially if any considerable have much information respecting which part of them did fall into the hands of his the officer appointed to command in any enemies, not vaunted as an instance of expedition might be ignorant; conse- extraordinary success. Let ministers hold quently they, and not he, were to judge to Louis 17th or his representative, if he of the force necessary, and the acceptance had any; let them hold to French royalon his part of a command with an inade- its the language they held to the House, quate force was no justification for them. of preferring an expedition to the West If he knew that an officer had miscon- Indies to the defence of Toulon: let them ducted the force entrusted to him (and he say, "We have got possession of a port hoped no man would be so uncandid as to and a fleet in trust for you; but we must suppose what he said to have any particu- take your West India islands for ourselves; lar application), he would charge ministers we cannot attempt the one without endanwith the blame in the first instance, be- gering the other; and we prefer taking cause it was their duty to employ none what we mean to keep at all events, to but proper persons. When they were put defending what we must restore to you upon their defence, they might show rea- when reinstated on the throne of your sons for the choice they had made, and in ancestors," and see with what cordiality proportion to the validity of those reasons and gratitude it would be received. If would they be exculpated. He did not seating Louis 17th on the throne of France pretend to know whether the commander was the object to which ministers looked in chief of the combined army, and the as the means of peace, they ought to have illustrious prince who commanded the sent the whole force at their disposal to troops sent against Dunkirk, approved or Toulon, if necessary, in preference to disapproved of the expedition; but this every other expedition, on motives of he knew, that if, on the general inquiry common policy, much more on the into the business, it should appear that it strongest of all motives, that of good was undertaken contrary to the judgment faith.-He had often heard, as he had of such professional men, the circum- again been told that day, that all the instance would form a strong aggravation of habitants of Toulon who chose it were the charge against ministers.-The chan- taken away by the British fleet. Was it cellor of the exchequer had said, that the not true, however, and notorious, that defence of Toulon was not to supersede hundreds, nay thousands of the unfortuthe expedition to the West Indies. In nate remainder, had glutted the vengeance one point of view, the defence of Toulon of those whom they had made their implawas paramount to the capture of all the cable enemies by the confidence they reWest India islands, for it was to preserve posed in us? If it should be said, that the faith of the nation solemnly pledged these victims preferred staying to being to the inhabitants, who had put them- brought away, that would contribute selves under our protection. We entered but little to his satisfaction; for what Toulon by treaty, not by conquest, as must our treatment of those men have the ally of Louis 17th, in conjunction with been, what opinion must they have formed the king of Spain, to whom the place was of us, seeing that they preferred the fury of as much surrendered as to us, and on the avowed enemies to our protection? It express condition of restoring to the inha- had been insinuated, that the surrender bitants who admitted us, what they called of Toulon had been effected by blockade their constitution of 1789, although he and famine, and the decided superio

The resolution was agreed to.

stance, for he believed no position would | abhorred. Yet we never went into the be more readily admitted, than that an extreme of saying, "We will make no armed nation, so long as it acted upon the peace with the government that has atdefensive, was invincible, and happy he tempted this; we can have no security was that it was invincible, for it was the while a ruling power exists, whose prinonly security that one nation had against ciples are so hostile to ours." Sorry he the designs of combined and ambitious was to find such sentiments entertained neighbours, for the preservation of its li- now; for if France was become an armed berty and independence: he did not mean nation, we might accelerate the calamities that kind of liberty which they had in we dreaded, but we should not conquer France, but that rational and desirable li- France. He should, perhaps, be told, berty which was enjoyed under a well-re- that, if France had become an armed nagulated government. If Great Britain tion, it might be necessary for us to beshould be attacked by a combined force come one also. But we ought not to beof the powers of Europe, which was not come an armed nation in order to carry on a thing impossible, the troops they were an offensive war. If, unfortunately, we about to vote that night would be as no- should ever be driven to fight on the thing to oppose against it. Would sixty same terms as the French had been, we thousand of her sons be all that would too should become an armed nation, and take up arms in defence of Britain? No; like them be invincible. we should arm as one man, we should have but one sentiment, to conquer or to die; and, on this principle, he rejoiced that an armed nation was invincible. The same reason that made an armed nation invincible in defence, rendered it in attack quite the contrary. The desire of conquest could animate but a few, and they would be opposed by the same principle of resistance in their attempts to conquer other countries which enabled them to defend their own. The French, therefore, would not succeed in their attempts at conquest if they had not abandoned them, and we might make peace with them, in full as much security that it would be permanent as we had done at any former period. If in former times we had said, that we would make no peace with France, without a change of that government, which we knew to be hostile to our own, we should have been at war for more than a hundred years. What were the dangers we had now to dread from France more than those we had actually experienced and repelled? An hon. friend of his had said, that when a danger rose to a certain magnitude, all beyond that became of no account, because we already saw what we dreaded more than loss of life. Now, what was the danger from which we were delivered in the days of the pretender? A powerful foreign despot attempted to seat on the throne a prince whose right we had abjured; to overturn our constitution and establish an arbitrary government; to subvert the protestant and introduce the Roman catholic religion; in one word, to ravish from us all we held most dear, and force upon us all we most [VOL. XXX.]

Debate on Mr. Adam's Motion respect ing the Criminal Law of Scotland.] Feb. 4. Mr. Adam said, he rose to perform the duty which he had undertaken towards the close of the last session relative to the criminal law of Scotland, and the practice of the court of justiciary. Whatever opinion might be formed of the proposition he meant to submit to the House, he hoped for indulgence and a candid construction of his motives. And if there were no other reason for it, he trusted, he might claim it, because it was nineteen years since he had the honour of sitting in parliament; and although, during that period, he had often troubled the House on the different subjects under discussion, that was the first time of his bringing for ward any proposition of his own. He had given the subject the most deliberate consideration; and perhaps the best mode of explaining it to the House, would be to detail the history of it as it stood, and had passed in his own mind. He had had occasion to bestow much reflexion on the articles of union, and the history of the period at which they were concluded. He had been led to the subject of his intended motion by the discussion that had taken place on the Treasonable Correspondence bill, and by a recent decision in the House of Lords. He had been professionally employed in that House on a question that came before it, whe, ther or not an appeal lay from the judg ments of the court of justiciary, and Cir cuit courts of Scotland, on matter of law only, not matter of fact. An appeal was

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