venting the mischiefs of it, made it unlawful, even so much as to mourn for their duke at his death: Intimating thereby, that their felicity and safety depends not upon the uncertain thread of any one man's life, but upon the vertue of their good laws, and or ders, well executed, and that they can never want virtuous persons to succeed. And how do such principles in men, led by little more than morality, reprove those, who have a great measure of gospel-light, for their senseless excess, in their adoring the remembrance of Cromwell? For as the objects of idolatry are mistaken creatures, or things, proceeding sometimes from self-love, as well as other causes, so the undeserved approbation, and applause, that Cromwell's memory seems to have with his adherents, amounting to little less, than the idolising of him, appears to me to be the product of an excessive veneration of greatness, and a selfish par. tiality towards him; for that, the more honour is given to him, the more praise they think will consequently redound to them, who were his favourites; and they fortify themselves herein, with the credit, they say, he hath abroad, though there is little in that, because the opinion, that strangers have of him, may well be put upon the account of their ignorance, in the affairs of England, which travellers do find to be so great, even amongst ministers of state, as is to be admired. And now, as this error in idolising Oliver hath two moral evils in it (besides the sin in itself :) The one a reflexion upon the present times, as if the former were better than these; and the other, the unjust defrauding the long-parliament of that, which is due to them, to give it idolatrously to him, to whom it doth not belong; I esteem it a duty incumbent upon me to discover the mistake. I am not insensible, that I shall, by this, draw the envy of those upon me, who, being jealous of their honour, will be angry for touching them in their Diana ;* but, knowing myself clear from the vices of envying virtue in any, how contrary soever he may be to me in judgment, as well as from being unwilling to allow every one their due commendations, I will cast myself upon Providence, for the success of this paper; and in reference to Cromwell's government, and the present times, make some observations relating to both, and, in order thereunto, shew,

First, That the original cause of the low condition that we are now (in relation to trade) reduced unto, had its beginning in Oliver's time, and the foundations of it, laid either by his ignorant mistaking the interest of this kingdom, or wilfully doing it, for the advancement of his own particular interest.

Secondly, That his time, for the short continuance, had as much of oppression, and injustice, as any former times.

Thirdly and Lastly, That he never, in his latter days, valued either honour or honesty, when they stood in the way of his ambition, and that there is nothing to be admired in him (though so much idolised) but that the partiality of the world should make

Or, favourite.

him so great a favourite of ignorance, and forgetfulness, as he seems to be.

When this late Tyrant, or Protector (as some calls him) turned out the long-parliament, the kingdom was arrived at the highest pitch of trade, wealth, and honour, that it, in any age, ever yet knew. The trade appeared, by the great sums offered then for the customs and excise, nine-hundred thousand pounds a year being refused. The riches of the nation shewed itself, in the high value that land and all our native commodities bore, which are the cer tain marks of opulency. Our honour was made known to all the world, by a conquering navy, which had brought the proud Hollanders upon their knees, to beg peace of us, upon our own conditions, keeping all other nations in awe. And besides these advantages, the publick stock was five-hundred thousand pounds in ready money, the value of seven-hundred thousand pounds in stores, and the whole army in advance, some four, and none under two months; so that, though there might be a debt of near five-thousand pounds upon the kingdom, he met with above twice the value in lieu of it.

The nation being in this flourishing and formidable posture, Cromwell began his usurpation, upon the greatest advantages ima ginable, having it in his power to have made peace, and profitable leagues, in what manner he had pleased with all our neighbours, every one courting us then, and being ambitious of the friendship of England; but, as if the Lord had infatuated, and deprived him of common sense and reason, he neglected all our golden opportunities, misimproved the victory, God had given us over the United Netherlands, making peace (without ever striking a stroke) so soon as ever things came into his hands, upon equal terms with them: And immediately after, contrary to our interest, made an unjust war with Spain, and an impolitick league with France, bringing the first thereby under, and making the latter too great. for Christendom; and by that means broke the balance betwixt the two crowns of Spain, and France, which his predecessors, the long-parliament, had always wisely preserved.

In this dishonest war with Spain, he pretended, and endeavoured to impose a belief upon the world, that he had nothing in his eye, but the advancement of the protestant cause, and the honour of this nation; but his pretences were either fraudulent, or he was ignorant in foreign affairs (as I am apt to think, that he was not guilty of too much knowledge in them.) For he that had known any thing of the temper of the popish prelacy, and the Frenchcourt-policies, could not but see, that the way to increase, or preserve the reformed interest in France, was by rendering the protestants of necessary use to their king, for that, longer than they were so, they could not be free from persecution; and that the way to render them so, was by keeping the balance betwixt Spain and France even, as that, which would consequently make them useful to their king: But by overthrowing the balance in his war with Spain, and joining with France, he freed the French king

from his fears of Spain, enabled him to subdue all factions at home, and thereby to bring himself into a condition of not standing in need of any of them; and from thence hath proceeded the persecution that hath since been, and still is, in that nation, against the reformed there; so that Oliver, instead of advancing the reformed interest, hath, by an error in his politicks, been the author of destroying it.

The honour and advantage he propounded to this nation, in his pulling down of Spain, had as ill a foundation. For if true, as was said, that we were to have had Ostend and Newport, as well as Dunkirk (when we could get them) they bore no proportion, in any kind, to all the rest of the king of Spain's European dominions, which must necessarily have fallen to the French king's share, because of their joining and nearness to him, and remoteness from us, and the increasing the greatness of so near a neigh. bour must have increased our future dangers.

But this man, who, through ignorance, is so strangely cried up in the world, was not guilty of this error in state only, but com. mitted as great a solecism, in his designing the outing of the king of Denmark, and setting up of the king of Sweden. For had the Swedes but got Copenhagen (as in all probability, had Oliver lived, they would have done) they had wanted nothing of consequence, but the cities of Lubeck and Dantzick (which, by their then potency, they would easily have gained) of being masters of the whole Baltick Sea, on both sides, from the Sound or Mouth down to the bottom of it; by which, together with all Denmark, Norway, and the Danes part of Holstein, which would consequently have been theirs (they then having, as they still* have, the land of Bremen) there would have been nothing, but the small counties of Ouldenburgh and East-Friezland, which would easily have fallen into their mouths, betwixt them and the United Netherlands, whereby Sweden would on the one side, to the north and north-cast, have been as great, as France on the other, to the south and south-west; and they two, able to have divided the western empire betwixt them.

And whereas it had in all ages been the policy of the Northern States and Potentates, to keep the dominion of the Baltick Sea divided among several petty princes and states, that no one might be sole master of it; because, otherwise, most of the necessary commodities for shipping, coming from thence and Norway, any one lord of the whole might lay up the shipping of Europe, by the walls, in shutting only of his ports, and denying the commodities of his country to other states. Cromwell, contrary to this wise maxim, endeavoured to put the whole Baltick Sea into the Swedes hands, and undoubtedly had (though, I suppose, ignorantly) done it, if his death had not given them that succeeded him, the long-parliament, an opportunity of prudently preventing it: For, if he had understood the importance of the Baltick Sea to this nation, he could not have been so impolitick, as to have

In the year 1658.

projected so dangerous a design against his new Utopia,* as giving the opening and shutting of it to any one prince. I am not ignorant, that this error is excused, by pretending that we were to have had Elsinore and Cronenburg Castle (the first, the town, upon the narrow entrance of the Baltick, called the Sound, where all ships ride, and pay toll to the king of Denmark; and the latter, the fortress, that defends both town and ships) by which we should have been masters of the Sound, and consequently of the Baltick ; but they that know those countries, and how great a prince the Swede would have been, had he obtained all the rest; besides, these two bawbles must confess, we should have been at his devotion, in our holding of any thing in his countries: And further, if the dangerous consequence of setting up so great a prince had not been in the case. it had been against the interest of England, to have had an obligation upon us, to maintain places so remote, against the enmity of many states and princes; and that for these

reasons:

First, because the ordinary tolls of the Sound would not have defrayed half the charge, and, to have taken more than the ordinary tolls, we could not have done, without drawing a general quarrel upon us, from most of the princes and states of the northern parts of Europe.

Secondly, because the experience of all former times sheweth us, that foreign acquisitions have ever been chargeable and prejudicial to the people of England, as Sir Robert Cotton makes it clearly appear, That not only all those pieces of France, which belonged to us by rightful succession, but also those we held by conquest, were always great burthens to our nation, and cause of much poverty and misery to the people. And it is not our case alone, to be the worse for conquests (though more ours, than other countries, because of the charge and uncertainty of the winds and weather, in the transportation of succours and relief by sea; which contiguous territories, which are upon the Main, are not subject to) but the case also of (I think I may say) all other kingdoms. In France their burthens and oppressions have grown in all ages, with the greatness of their kings: Nay, even after their last peace with Spain, by which they had given them peace with all the world, besides many places in the Spanish Netherlands, and Catalonia, to boot: Upon which the poor people promised themselves, though vainly, an unquestionable abatement of taxes; instead of that, they found their pressures increased daily, and their king, though overgrownly great and rich, himself, yet the people so poor, that thousands are said to die in a plentiful year, for want of bread to their water, nothing being free there, but fresh water and air: For, except in some few privileged places, wherever they have the conveniency by their situation of sea-water (lest they should make use of the benefit of that, which God and nature hath given them, for saving the charge of salt) every family is forced to take so much salt of the king, at his own rate (which is above ten

Meaning his own new sort of government.

times the price it is sold for to strangers, for transportation) as is judged they may spend in a year; the Lord deliver all other countries from their example. In Sweden, that king, court, and their military officers are the better for their conquests in Germany, Denmark, Russia, and some places anciently belonging to Poland; but the commons the worse: Spain is undone, by the great num. ber of people sent thence to the West-Indies, which hath depopu. lated the country, France reaping more benefit by keeping their people at home to manufactures, than Spain doth by sending theirs abroad for silver and gold; and now, though by these instances it may appear to be the interest of the people of other nations, as well as ours, to live in peace, without coveting additions; yet it is more our true interest, because, by reason of our situation, we have no need of foreign frontier towns, our ships, well ordered, being better than other princes bordering garisons, than any other kingdoms, to neglect especially European acquisitions, and colonies, and apply ourselves,

First, to the improving of our own land, of which we have more than we have people to manage.

Secondly, to the increasing our home and foreign trades, for which we have natural advantages above any other nation.

Thirdly and Lastly, by our strength, which trade will increase. To make use of it, together with the helps that God and nature hath given us in our situation, and otherwise, in keeping the ba lance amongst our neighbours. For, if the province of Holland, which is but four-hundred-thousand acres of profitable ground, is, by the benefit of trade, able to do so much as we experienced the last war, what might we do, if trade were improved, who have much more advantages for it, than they have. I ascribe what was done by the Netherlands, in the late war, to the province of Holland; because that, though the provinces are seven in number, Holland's due proportion of all charges is 58, in a hundred, to all the others 413, of which 413, Holland gets little more than 20 honestly paid them, insomuch that it alone may be reckoned to bear four fifths in a hundred, to one fifth that all the other six bear; and how prodigious a thing is it, that Holland, no bigger than as before-mentioned, should be able to coap with England, Scotland, and Ireland; and, that, though their charges in the late war was abundantly greater than ours, yet, by their good manage. ment, to be so little the worse for it, as, at the conclusion of the war, to have their credit so high, that they could have commanded what money they had pleased at three in the hundred, and all this by the meer additional benefit of trade and good order; and how by Cromwell's indiscreet neglecting of trade, and choosing war, when he was in peace, did he miss the true interest of England, as, by his ill-founded designs, he did the interest of the reformed religion. For, if he had succeeded in his unjust invasion of the Spanish territories in the West-Indies (as God seldom prospereth dishonest undertakings) it being intended for a state acquisition, the benefit would not have been diffusive, but chiefly to himself and