State ex rel. Mahler and Stechelin vs Judge. It applies here. Having reached this conclusion in regard to the jurisdiction of this court in cases of habeas corpus, it devolves upon us to decide whether the defendants are entitled to bail. The laws of Louisiana contain a provision which seems to be a summary of the common law upon the subject. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offence, where the proof is evident, and the presumption great. The offence charged in the warrant is not within the exception. It seems that no preliminary examination has been held. We infer from the oral argument that there was no disposition on the part of the judge to refuse the examination, and no inclination on the part of the relators to waive the examination. But be this as it may: "The magistrate may make reasonable continuance of the hearing, and, in the intervals, bail or commit the prisoner. In the cases that are bailable the accused has a right to be admitted to bail." 1 Bishop Crim. Pro. It is not our purpose to discountenance any future action, if necessary, owing to the condition of the person charged to have been assaulted. Upon that subject we quote the language of our immediate predecessors in a similar case: "It is to be understood that nothing in this opinion must be construed as forestalling the subsequent action of any competent authority to find or prefer a charge of greater gravity against this relator. Our action is based exclusively on the nature of the sole charge now pending against him, and under which he is entitled to bail." State ex rel. Condon vs. Sheriff, 36 An. 856. It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the writ of habeas corpus applied for be made peremptory, and that the respondent judge release the prisoners on bonds, with sufficient securities, in such sum as he may fix, conditioned for their appearance before competent authority to answer to the charge preferred against them. Mr. JUSTICE MILLER Concurs in the decree. State ex rel. Whitesides et als. vs. Judge. No. 12,054. STATE OF LOUISIANA EX REL. JAMES WHITESIDES ET ALS. VS. JUDGE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT. The question arising in regard to the allleged violation of a prior bond in another criminal case can more properly be determined in a separate suit, after the District Judge will have passed upon the issue. A PPLICATION for Writs of Habeas Corpus, Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition. Thomas F. Maher for Relators. A. E. Billings for Respondents. Argued and submitted January 21, 1896. The opinion of the court was delivered by BREAUX, J. The facts in this case are similar in every respect to those in case just decided, numbered 12,055, ante, p. 92; except that in the case now before us for our examination and decision the judge of the District Court in his return stated that he refused to release James Whitesides, one of the number against whom affidavits were made, for the additional reason that the relator, Whitesides, stands indicted before his court for arson, a capital offence; that his case could not be tried at the last term of his court and was continued to its next jury term; that he admitted the relator to bail for his appearance for trial at the next term. A condition of the bond was that he should keep the peace of the State in the meantime; that being satisfied that relator has committed a breach of the peace and broken the condition of the bond, he refused him bail until he could be further advised, and that after due consideration he may consider it his duty to revoke the order admitting him to bail upon the charge of arson and remand him to the custody of the sheriff on that charge. Our conclusion in this case is the same as in the case just decided as relates to the charge of assault and battery. The additional reasons are excepted and are not considered by Sentell et als. vs. Police Jury. us. It is a separate and independent issue with which we do not deal in this case. We desire to respect the expressed intention of the judge to give further consideration to the additional question he states. It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed, in so far as relates to the charge of assault and battery, the writ of habeas corpus applied for be made peremptory, and that the respondent judge release the prisoners on bonds with sufficient securities in such sum as he may fix, conditioned for their appearance before competent authority to answer to the charge preferred against them. MR. JUSTICE MILLER concurs in this decree. No. 11,965. GEORGE W. SENTELL ET. ALS. VS. POLICE JURY OF THE PARISH OF The petition of taxpayers charging substantially that the proposed tax in aid of a railroad was defeated at the election held to authorize the tax; that votes cast against the tax were not counted; that the promulgated result was not in accordance with the facts, but is based upon the illegal rejection by the returning officer of such votes against the tax, and praying that the promulgation of such result be adjudged void, and the returns of the returning officer be set aside with the prayer for general relief, will be deemed a petition of taxpayers, authorized by law, contesting such elections. Constitution, Art. 242; Act No. 106 of 1892. The taxpayers, plaintiffs in such suit, contesting the election, may join the demands that the election be set aside and that the ordinance of the police jury be annulled-levying the tax-for if the tax is defeated, there is no warrant for the tax. Ibid. Our jurisprudence affirms the jurisdiction of the courts in a class of cases without reference to the money demand of the litigant, and this case falls within that class. 19 La. 567; 45 An. 637, 681; 46 An. 278; Constitution, Art. 11. In the suit of the taxpayers contesting the election to authorize a tax under Art. 242 of the Constitution, the amount in dispute is the tax on the prop. erty of the parish; an amount undoubtedly sufficient to give jurisdiction to the District Court, as well as this court on appeal, and the suit substantially involving the legality of the tax, this court on that ground besides, has jurisdiction of the appeal. 39 An. 107; 45 An. 682; 43 An. 95; 45 An. 681; Constitution, Arts. tl and 81; 36 An. 328, 812; 39 An. 946; 37 An. 507. Taxpayers, non-residents and residents in the parish, may join in such suit. Constitution, Art. 242; Act No. 35 of 1886, Sec. 5; 39 An. 107; Cooley on Taxation, 765; 101 U. S. 601. Sentell et als. vs. Police Jury. In a petition to contest an election to authorize a tax the prayer that the returns be set aside, the promulgated result be decreed a nullity, that the returning officer be directed to make a correct compilation of votes, and that the ordinance levying the tax based on such return be decreed a nullity, all tend to the same relief and are not cumulative of distinct demands. Such suit is required to be directed against the police jury, and the allegation that the returning officer rejected or changed returns of commissioners, in violation of law, furnishes no ground for the exception on non-joinder, because the returning officer is not made a defendant. Act No. 106 of 1892. A PPEAL from the Tenth Judicial District for the Parish of Avoyelles. Coco, J. A. B. Irion for Plaintiffs, Appellants. William H. Peterman, A. J. Lafargue and Clegg & Quintero for Defendant, Appellee. Argued and submitted December 19, 1895. The opinion of the court was delivered by MILLER, J. The plaintiffs, alleged to be taxpayers of the parish of Avoyelles, brought this suit against the Police Jury of the parish, to set aside the election returns of the votes cast on the question of levying a five mills tax in aid of a projected railroad, the petition praying also for the annulment of the ordinance of the jury imposing the tax. The allegations are in substance that the tax was defeated by a majority of the votes; that the returns were changed, and that the promulgation of the result was not in accordance with the votes cast. The defendants excepted that the District Court had no jurisdiction, because there was no pecuniary amount involved; on the ground also there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiffs and defendants; on the further ground of an improper cumulation of demands, and an additional ground of no cause of action. The lower court sustained the exceptions, and plaintiffs appeal. There is a motion to dismiss this appeal on the ground that there is no amount in controversy. If the Constitution in defining the jurisdiction of this court is to be Interpreted as excluding all controversies, in which the appellant does not assert a pecuniary demand Sentell et als. vs. Police Jury. of the amount stated in the Constitution, the result would be to deny judicial cognizance of a large class of suits involving rights of the highest importance, though not in the form of money demands. Under the Constitution of 1812, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was declared to extend to all civil cases in which the amount in dispute exceeded three hundred dollars. In respect to this question our present Constitution is not different, except as to the appealable amount, from that of 1812. The construction of the judicial power has, at all times, been adverse to confining the jurisdiction of this court to mere money demands of litigants of the amount fixed by the Constitution. Rowley vs. Rowley, 19 La. 558; State vs. City, 41 An. 159; State ex rel. Denis vs. Mayor, 43 An. 95; State ex rel. Custodian Notarial Records vs. Theard, 45 An. 681; Sheriff vs. President Police Jury, 46 An. 278. The argument in support of this motion supposes the jurisdiction depends on the amount of the tax each of the taxpayers has to pay. Their suit puts at issue the tax of five mills on the entire taxable property of the parish. In view of our jurisprudence, we would find it difficult to adopt the narrow test of jurisdiction urged in support of the motion. But there is another view. If the votes cast defeated the tax, the ordinance imposing it is illegal. The tax depends on the vote. The petition avers the requisite vote in number and amount of property was not obtained, but on the contrary the tax was defeated. With the prayer that the returns be set aside, there is also the demand that the ordinance imposing the tax be annulled. In this view the suit involves the legality of the tax, dependent as it is on the vote, and that question gives this court jurisdiction. Constitution, Art. 81; McGuire vs. Vogh, 36 An. 812; Adler, Goldman & Co. vs. Board of Assessors, 37 An. 507. The motion to dismiss is therefore overruled. One of the exceptions denies the jurisdiction of the District Court because, as it is charged, no pecuniary amount is involved. It is a suit of taxpayers of the parish seeking relief against a tax alleged to have been illegally imposed. There is no averment of the tax of each of the taxpayers, and the absence of this averment is the basis of the exception. The right of the taxpayer to contest elections under Art. 242 of the Constitution to authorize increased taxation is derived from the Act No. 106 of 1892. "Any party in interest" may contest. The object of such contest is to avert taxa |