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by that vote that they will adhere to that provision of the bill. [Laughter.]

Mr. HOLMAN. Will it prevent another committee of conference?

The SPEAKER. It will not. It will prevent the House itself from asking another committee; but it will leave the Senate free to ask another committee.

Mr. PIKE. I move that the House recede. The SPEAKER. That motion has just been voted down.

Mr.LITTLEJOHN. Will not the gentleman change his motion to a motion to insist, so that the House may ask another committee?

Mr. STEVENS. To adhere is the proper motion.

Mr. HOLMAN. I move that the House insist upon its disagreement.

The SPEAKER. That motion is not in order now, as the previous question has been sustained.

Mr. MORRILL. I desire to ask what condition the bill will be in provided the House vote to adhere? Will not the bill be lost unless the Senate recede?

The SPEAKER. It will not. A message will be sent to the Senate that the House recede from its disagreement to all the Senate amendments except the fourth, and in reference to that, that they adhere. The Senate can then recede, or ask another committee of conference. The Senate have sent a message to the House stating that they further insisted on their disagreement, and asked a second committee of conference, which was granted by the House. They have not notified the House that they adhered, for they could not, under any rule known to the Chair, adhere and ask a conference of the House; nor has the House been informed of any adherence by the Senate. But after one House adheres, the other can recede or ask a conference, as by the Manual, page 125, where four such instances are cited from 3d Hatsell, and even one case where there was a conference after a second or final adherence. But more familiar instances are found in House Journal, first session Thirty-Fourth Congress, page 1600, where the House adhered to their amendment to the Army appropriation bill, August 28, 1856, but granted a conference asked by the Senate thereon; and in House Journal, first session Thirty-Fifth Congress, page 604, where the House adhered to their amendment to the Senate bill for the admission of Kansas into the Union, and yet, a few days after, on April 14, 1858, page 620, agreed to a conference thereon asked by the Senate.

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The result of the vote having been announced as above recorded,

Mr. STEVENS moved to reconsider the vote by which the House adhered to its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate, and also moved to lay the motion to reconsider on the table. The latter motion was agreed to.

Mr. HOLMAN. In renew the demand for the regular order of business.

The SPEAKER. The regular order of business is the consideration of bill of the House No. 214.

Mr. SCHENCK. I ask my colleague [Mr. PENDLETON] if he will allow me to offer, in behalf of the Military Committee, two or three resolutions calling for information.

Mr. PENDLETON. If they can be passed without objection, I shall not object; otherwise I

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The Journal was, by unanimous consent, ordered to be corrected.

Mr. BALDWIN, of Massachusetts. I find myself recorded as voting "no" yesterday, on the motion to lay on the table the resolution concerning the Dictionary of Congress. I voted "ay." I ask that the Journal be corrected.

The Journal was, by unanimous consent, ordered to be corrected.

OFFICERS IN SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

Mr. SCHENCK, by unanimous consent, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following resolution; which was read, considered, and agreed to:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to communicate to this House at as early a day as practicable a list of the officers of the subsistence department, showing severally their rank and where each of them is employed, and for how long they have been respectively employed. MAJOR GENERAL HALLECK.

Mr. SCHENCK also, by unanimous consent, and from the same committee, submitted the fol

Mr. PIKE. Upon the motion to adhere I de-lowing resolution; which was read, considered, mand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was put; and it was decided in the affirmative-yeas 91, nays 46, not voting 45; as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. James C. Allen, William J. Allen, Ancona, Anderson, Ashley, Baily, Blair, Bliss, Blow, Boyd, James S. Brown, William G. Brown, Chanler, Coffroth, Cox, Cravens, Dawson, Deming, Denison, Dixon, Driggs, Eckley, Eden, Edgerton, Eldridge, Eliot, Farnsworth, Ganson, Grider, Griswold, Benjamin G. Harris, Charles M. Harris, Herrick, Hotchkiss, John H. Hubbard, Jenckes, Philip Johnson, Kalbfleisch, Kelley, King, Knox, Law, Le Blond, Loan, Longyear, Mallory, Marvin, McAllister, McBride, Middleton, Moorhead, Daniel Morris, James R. Morris, Morrison, Leonard Myers, Noble, Charles O'Neill, John O'Neill, Orth, Pendleton, Radford, Samuel J. Randall, William H. Randall, Robinson, Rogers, James S. Rollins, • Ross, Schenck, Scott, Shannon, Sinith, Smithers, Starr, John B. Steele, William G. Steele, Stevens, Strouse, Stuart, Sweat, Thayer, Townsend, Van Valkenburgh, Wadsworth, Ward, Webster, Whaley, Wheeler, Chilton A. White, Joseph W. White, Williams, and Yeaman-91.

NAYS-Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Arnold, John D. Baldwin, Baxter, Beaman, Blaine, Boutwell, Broomall, Ambrose W. Clark, Freeman Clarke, Cobb, Cole, Garfield, Gooch, Grinnell, Hale, Harding, Harrington, Higby, Holman, Hooper, Asabel W. Hubbard, Ingersoll, Julian, KasOrlando Kellogg, Keruan, McClurg, MeIndoe, Samuel F. Miller, Morrill, Norton, Patterson, Perham, Pike, Price, Edward H. Rollins, Sloan, Spalding, Thomas, Upson, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, and Wilson-45.

son,

NOT VOTING-Messrs. Augustus C. Baldwin, Brandegee, Brooks, Clay, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Thomas T. Davis, Dawes, Donnelly, Dumont, English, Finck, Frank, Hall, Hulburd, Hutchins, William Johnson, Francis W. Kellogg, Knapp, Lazear, Littlejohn, Long, Marcy, McDowell, McKinney, William H. Miller, Amos Myers, Nelson, Odell, Perry, Pomeroy, Pruyn, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Scofield, Stiles, Tracy, Voorhees, Wilder, Windom, Winfield, Benjamin Wood, Fernando Wood, Woodbridge, and Worthington-45.

So the House determined to adhere to a disagreement to the fourth amendment of the Senate.

and agreed to:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to inform this House what is the duty or command to which Major General H. W. Halleck, United States Army, is assigned; whether he is drawing double rations; and if so, under what order such allowance is made, and by what authority of law.

OFFICERS IN QUARTERMASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

Mr. SCHENCK also, by unanimous consent, and from the same committee, submitted the following resolution; which was read, considered, and agreed to:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be instructed to communicate to this House a list of all officers assigned under the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth sections of the act to provide for the better organization of the quartermaster's department, approved July 4, 1864, stating the duty to which each of said officers has been assigned, the rank that assignment entities him to, and whether selected from the volunteer service or from the regular Army, and from what former duty taken.

CABINET OFFICERS IN CONGRESS.

The House then proceeded to the consideration of the motion to reconsider the vote by which joint resolution of the House, (No. 214,) to provide that the heads of Executive Departments may occupy seats on the floor of the House of Representatives was recommitted to the select committee upon that subject, and upon which Mr. PENDLETON was entitled to the floor.

Mr. PENDLETON. I desire to yield the hour which is accorded to me by the rules in opening this debate to my colleague upon the committee from New York, [Mr. GANSON.]

Mr. GANSON. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PENDLETON] at the last session, on the 6th day of April, introduced into the House a joint resolution providing that the heads of the

Executive Departments might occupy seats on the floor of this House, which resolution was referred to a select committee of seven for consideration and report. That committee reported at the present session in favor of that resolution, recommending its passage with two amendments, and also recommending an amendment to the rules providing the proper machinery for carrying out the proposed project.

The resolution, when it was introduced, did not embrace within its terms the Secretary of State or the Attorney General. The committee, upon consideration, saw no reason why the privilege proposed to be extended to the other heads of the Departments should not also be extended to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, and why also they should not be subjected to the same duty that it is proposed to impose upon the heads of the other Departments by the second section, to wit, to attend the sessions of the House to answer such questions as may be put to them relative to the business in their respective Departments.

The resolution, as reported, contains two sections. The first provides

That the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, and the Postmaster General, shall be entitled to occupy seats ou the floor of the House of Representatives, with the right to participate in debate upon matters relating to the business of their respective Departments, under such rules as may be prescribed by the House.

The second section provides

That the said Secretaries, the Attorney General, and the Postmaster General, shall attend the sessions of the House of Representatives, immediately on the opening of the sittings on Mondays and Thursdays of each week, to give information in reply to questions which may be propounded to them under the rules of the House.

It will be seen that the resolution by its first section extends a privilege to the heads of the Executive Departments which they do not now enjoy; that is, to occupy, seats on this floor and to participate, to a limited extent, in the debates of the House, that limitation being confined to matters which relate to the business of their respective Departments. The other section imposes on them the duty to attend the sittings of the House on Mondays and Thursdays in each week, to answer such questions as may be propounded to them, in accordance with the rule, relating to the business of their respective Departments.

The first question that naturally presents itself in considering this resolution, is whether there is anything in the Constitution conflicting with it; and the next is whether, if we have the power to pass the resolution, it is expedient to do so. The House will perceive that it is not contemplated to confer any other privileges on, or vest any other rights in, those officers than the right to occupy seats on the floor, and to participate to a limited extent in the debates. It confers no other right of membership on these executive officers. The Congress has exercised, ever since the organization of the Government, the same power which it is proposed to exercise in this instance. Congress confers on persons who come here claiming to represent Territories, a right to seats. It also extends the privilege of the floor to those who come to contest the seats of sitting members. It gives to Delegates the right of participating in debates, and to contestants the right of speaking to the question in which they are interested.

On the 2d day of September, 1789, Congress, in the law creating the Treasury Department, provided expressly that it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to make report and give information to either branch of the Legislature in person or in writing, as he may be required, respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office. The committee saw no constitutional objection to this proposed measure. It saw that the measure harmonized with the action of previous Congresses since the formation of the Government. While the Secretary of the Treasury stands bound to appear here at the call of the House and give information, when interrogated, as to the business relating to his Department, the committee saw no reason why the same duty should not be imposed on the other heads of Departments. The committee thought also that it was just to those officers, while they were required to attend here at specified times and for specified purposes, that there should be

extended to them the privilege of seats on the floor, and the right of participating in debate relating to matters proposed by them.

In order, Mr. Speaker, that the House may the better understand what is proposed by the second section, I will ask the Clerk to read the amendments to the rules which the committee recommend.

The Clerk read, as follows:

Amendments to the Rules, reported by the Select Committee. That the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall keep a notice-book, in which he shall enter, on the request of any member, any resolution requiring information from any of the Executive Departments, or any question intended to be propounded to any of the Secretaries, or the Postmaster General, or Attorney General, relating to public affairs or to the business pending before the House, together with the name of the member and the day when the same will be called up.

The member giving notice of such resolution or question shall, at the same time, give notice that the same shall be called up on Monday or Thursday of the succeeding week: Provided, That no such resolution or question shall be called up, except by unanimous consent, within less than three days after notice shall have been given.

The Clerk shall, on the same day on which notice is entered, transmit to the chief officer of the proper Department a copy of the resolution or question, together with the name of the member proposing the same, and of the day when it will come before the House for action.

On Monday and Thursday of each week, before any other business shall be taken up, except by unanimous consent, the resolutions and questions shall be taken up in the order in which they have been entered upon the notice-book for that day.

The member offering a resolution may state succinctly the object and scope of his resolution and the reasons for desiring the information, and the Secretary of the proper Department may reply, giving the information or the reasons why the same should be withheld, and then, without further debate, the House shall vote on the resolution, unless it shall be withdrawn or postponed.

In putting any question to the Secretaries, or the Attorney General, or Postmaster General, no argument or opinion is to be offered, nor any fact stated, except so far as may be necessary to explain such question. And in answering such question, the Secretary, the Attorney General, or Postmaster General, shall not debate the matter to which the same refers, nor state facts or opinions other than those necessary to explain the answer.

Mr. GANSON. At present, Mr. Speaker, there is no authorized mode of communication between these executive officers and the House

in regard to matters of legislation. The object of the resolution is to enable Congress to avail itself of the best possible means of information in regard to measures of legislation on which it may be called to act. The heads of Departments have necessarily a more thorough and intimate knowledge of what is requisite in legislation, so far as their Departments are concerned, than members of the House. They also have the experience of heads of bureaus, men who have been engaged for a long time in their public duties, and who are familiar with the details of their respective Departments. It is necessary that the knowledge thus acquired shall, in some manner, be communicated to this House for its proper action in reference to various measures of a public character.

The President of the United States is expressly authorized by the Constitution to require the heads of these Departments to give their opinion in writing in regard to any matter relating to their respective Departments. But this House cannot compel the giving of this information. The necessity for it is so great that it has grown into a uniform custom for the Executive to transmit with his annual message, and at other times, communications from these officers to the House, recommending legislation. The necessity for this communication is so great that the heads of these Departments seek private interviews with the members of the House; they attend the sittings of the various committees; they have oral and written communication of an unauthorized nature, necessarily. Now, we propose that, instead of this, they shall have the right to come upon the floor of the House, and in the face of the Representatives of the people and before the nation, not only give the information which they possess in regard to proposed legislation, but that they may urge the passage or the defeat of these measures, as the public interest and the welfare of the country may require.

It may be objected to this that we are giving to the heads of these Departments additional and dangerous powers. I have no doubt, Mr. Speaker, that if this bill be adopted it will give to the heads of these Departments an influence which they do not now possess; but it will be a due influence, instead of one that is undue. It will remove from them the necessity of having secret, unauthor

ized, irresponsible communications with the members of this House or its committees, and to substitute for that their duty to appear upon the floor of the House, in the presence of the Representatives of the people and before the nation, to disclose the objects and purposes of the measures that they may desire to have passed. When this privilege shall have been conferred upon them and this power given to them, it will be unbecoming the heads of the Executive Departments to have these secret, silent, irresponsible interviews-this secret, private solicitation of the measures necessary for their Departments. When the doors of this House are thrown open to them, when they can come directly into the presence of the Representatives of the people and advocate their measures, they will have no occasion to use this invisible, intangible, irresponsible influence which every one now feels but cannot touch.

It may be objected that the project does not harmonize with the theory of our Government. But, sir, why are we here? To represent the people, and to provide such legislation as the welfare of the country and the interests of the people require. In order that this may be well and faithfully done, it is our duty to procure all the knowledge in our power to enable us to act intelligently upon these subjects. That knowledge is necessarily, in many instances, lodged exclusively in the Departments over which these executive officers preside. We have now no mode of reaching it with certainty and bringing it before us with promptitude. On the 21st day of December last a resolution was introduced into this House to ask what communications had passed relative to the exchange of prisoners. One month having expired, on the 21st of January we have a report upon that subject. If this bill should become a law, three days' notice will be served upon the head of any Department, and he will be required to come here and answer the questions propounded. It will facilitate our business; it will aid us in our legislation.

Furthermore, (and this I regard as its most important feature,) this measure will impose upon these officers a direct responsibility to the people, in the presence of their Representatives, for the faithful discharge of their executive duties. In addition to that, it will enable these officers, if

they are improperly charged by any portion of the public, to come upon the floor of this House and make known the truth, so that if they are right they may be justified, and if they are wrong they may be condemned.

I would ask the attention of members of the House to some illustrations appended to the report in regard to the difficulty in obtaining information, and of its unreliable character. Äfter reading those, and after recalling to their recollection numerous instances of the same kind that have occurred, they will, I think, be satisfied of the merit of this measure in this respect.

Mr. Speaker, it was the practice, in the earlier and better days of the Republic, for the heads of these Departments to come upon the floor of the House to furnish information of facts and to submit to inquiries; and I ask the Clerk to read from page 6 of the report some circumstances of this character.

The Clerk read, as follows:

"Wednesday, July 22, 1789.-The Secretary of Foreign Affairs [Mr. Jefferson] attended, agreeably to order, and made the necessary explanations.-Annals of Congress, First Congress, vol. 1, p. 51.

"Saturday, August 22, 1789.-The Senate again entered on executive business. The President of the United States came into the Senate Chamber, attended by General Knox, [Secretary of War,] and laid before the Senate the following statement of facts, with the questions thereto annexed, for their advice and consent.-Annals of Congress, First Congress, vol. 1, p. 66.

"And again, on the Monday following, the President and General Knox were before the Senate.

"Friday, August 7, 1789.-The following message was received from the President of the United States, by General Knox, [the Secretary of War,] who delivered therewith sundry statements and papers relating to the same." -Proceedings of House of Representatives, Annals of Congress, vol. 1, p. 684.

Monday, August 10, 1789.-The following message was received from the President, by General Knox, [Secretary of War,] who delivered in the same, together with statement of the troops in the service of the United States.'Proceedings of House of Representatives, Annals of Con gress, vol. 1, p. 689.

"Instances of this kind might be almost indefinitely multiplied, but these serve sufficiently to exhibit the practice established at an early day by those who framed the Constitution."

Mr. GANSON. These instances occurred in the regular proceedings of the House, it never being in executive session. I make these remarks because, as I understand, the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] has denied that it was the practice for these persons to appear upon the floor.

Mr. MORRILL. I merely contended that such instances never occurred in the House, but only in the Senate, with regard to executive communications.

Mr. GANSON. Two of these instances are from the proceedings of the House of Representatives, not of the Senate.

But, Mr. Speaker, I do not see why it is proper for the heads of these Executive Departments to go upon the floor of the Senate and participate in its proceedings to this limited extent, and not proper for them to have an opportunity to do so upon the floor of the House. The only objection that I can see to it is that it will enable them to exercise this influence to which I have referred. If any influence is to be exercised over the members of the House it should be open, authorized, done in the presence of the Representatives and before the people of the country. And the point I make is that we are subject to that influence now, and that it is exercised in a secret, unauthorized, private, irresponsible manner. We desire, sir, by this measure to substitute a responsible exercise of this influence for one that is irresponsible.

I regard the proposed measure as a decided step toward the people. I regard it as important in securing popular rights. I know that the project has been proposed frequently of electing these public officers in order that they may be directly responsible to the people for the faithful discharge of their public duties. This is a measure of like character, only not so direct as the one which would confer upon the people the right to elect these officers. They have no control over them other than to compel them to come in the presence of members and give reasons for their conduct.

I regard it as important, not only as being just to the officer himself, but as furnishing additional means for detecting faithlessness in the discharge of executive duty. Does any gentleman suppose, if this right had existed in 1860-61, when privy conspiracy was being concocted in this House and in the Departments; that if this right had then existed in the Representatives of the people to call the heads of Departments upon this floor to explain why they were disposing of the public property, why they were removing vessels at such distance so that they could not be used in time, and why they were selling the arms and munitions of war of the Government; does anybody doubt that there would have been an earlier disclosure and defeat of that conspiracy? I think not. The House was then required to go through the forms of creating committees for the purpose of instituting investigations, and the Sergeant-at-Arms had to be sent with subpenas for the persons who were to be examined. All these difficulties had to be encountered to reach these concoctors against the Government of the country.

It was my purpose, Mr. Speaker, to do nothing more at this time than to explain to the House the provisions of this measure, and to give some of the leading considerations which induced the committee to report it favorably to the House. I leave to my associates on the committee, and the other gentlemen who may engage in the debate, the duty of discussing in detail the merits of the

measure.

I hope, sir, that it will pass, believing, as I have said already, that it is a direct step toward the people and the security of popular rights. If it is adopted it will furnish more direct means of communication between this House and the Executive Departments. It will be open, authorized, responsible. It will give the House power to detect faithlessness in its officers. It will relieve us from private solicitations, and from acting upon private and unreliable information. It will enable us to discharge our duties more satisfactorily. I hope, therefore, the resolution will be adopted.

Mr. PIKE. If it is in order to move an amendment at this stage of the resolution, I have one to suggest. The resolution provides that all the heads of Departments may occupy places upon the floor of this House. I notice a very grave omis

sion, that the head of the Department of Agriculture is not included.

Mr. GANSON. There will be no objection to include that, if the gentleman desires it.

Mr. MORRILL. Mr. Speaker, not having the time necessary to prepare a minority report, I shall yet use the materials gathered for that purpose in the form of a speech. The framers of our system of government incorporated so much that is wise and good from the British constitution, steering clear, however, of its aristocratic features; the rights and liberties of the people of both countries are so similar, save that here they are multiplied and expanded by the American sentiment of universality; and the statutes and legal literature of the American and English courts have so much in common, that it is not wonderful to find some untransportable prescriptions or usages, tolerable enough for Englishmen, but hitherto rejected by us, still exciting the lingering regret of some gentlemen whose democratic affinities remain unimpeachable.

The project introduced by my friend from Ohio, [Mr. PENDLETON,] that members of the President's Cabinet shall hold seats in the House of Representatives, it is, perhaps, not unfair to presume, results from a study and admiration of the British example, as it could hardly be asked of us to copy from the rebel States or from Spain, Costa Rica, or even Hayti. He proposes to modify the custom by giving the Secretaries seats with power of speech, and to compel them to be present two days of each week to answer to resolutions and interrogatories of which previous notice shall have been given, but without the right of voting.

Not having been able to agree to this proposition as now presented, I shall, as one of the minority of the select committee, present some of the reasons for my dissent, and try to show that the plan is opposed to the genius of our institutions, that it would be cumbrous, expensive, unwarranted by the Constitution, and accompanied by evils which would far more than counterbalance the advantages sought to be obtained. As the question is now seriously presented, I hope that gentlemen of more ability and more knowledge of the subjects involved than I possess, will discuss the negative and, as I think, the American side of the question.

plied-these titled parties are nearly balanced if they happen to be in conflict. When they act together they are, irrespective of the people, omnipotent, and the people have no check upon them except through a free press, that great agitator in behalf of human rights and common avenger of wrongs. The United States Government was ordained, has been sustained, and will be maintained by the people. It has confidence in and relies upon the people. The policy of every Administration is biennially reviewed and approved or disapproved by the ballots of not less than four or five million jurors. A verdict thus given, next to the fiat of Heaven, commands and receives our acquiescence.

The President is almost as much the representative of the people as the House of Representatives. He is elected for four years, or twice as long as a member of the House and two thirds of the term of a Senator. He has constitutional rights not to be invaded by Congress. His Cabinet are his confidential and constitutional advisers, and responsible to him, and only to him, within the law and the Constitution. If he does not choose wisely or they act wrongly, four years is sure to terminate his and their career. The people decide the whole matter, unless such cases of delinquency arise as merit impeachment, and the people will and should hold the President to a just responsibility. They will not consent to a bureaucracy-a government by the heads of Departments, not elective, but holding their offices by executive appointment. The President should not be permitted to shirk off his responsibilities upon subordinates. He can call around him the ablest men of the country, as it is his duty to do, and if he does not do so, or if, having done so, he takes no counsel at their hands, he alone is accountable.

It is otherwise in Great Britain. The throne is never vacant, and by a considerable fiction it is assumed that the Crown can do no wrong. There the ministers alone are held to responsibility. If they advise measures which Parliament in face of their tact and eloquence determines against them, it is equivalent to a vote of want of confidence, and they lose their official places, or must venture upon the result of a dissolution of Parliament and a new election. But the mass of the British people are only lookers on, while a few electors decide the issue presented.

The number of Englishmen and Welshmen

It is obvious that what may harmonize with the Britsh constitution might prove very incongruous and even mischievous to that of the Uni-voting in 1852 was only 341,830 out of an adult ted States. It may be useful to point out some of the broad distinctions, the incompatibilities, between the two.

The English idea is the conservation of monarchy, nobility, and an established church. The American idea is to maintain the principles of 1776, or that all men were created equal, with certain inalienable rights, including that of worshiping God according to the dictates of conscience. The American Congress, though having many similar functions, is very unlike the British Parliament. The House of Commons is elected for seven years. Here the House of Representatives is elected for two years only. We have a salary, equal to a moderate support, and no man is excluded on account of his poverty. A member of the House of Commons draws little or no pay, is subjected to heavy expenses, and cannot be sworn into office unless possessed of an annual rental of a specified amount. None but wealthy men can there afford to be even candidates, and poor men are wholly precluded. The House of Peers is mainly hereditary or composed of members for life, and all new appointments emanate exclusively from the Crown. Each peer in the House of Lords is there in his own behalf and represents nobody else. Here the Senate is elected by State Legislatures for six years only, and represents the several States. Great Britain is governed by the aristocracy and the monarchy. The House of Peers and the wealthy aristocracy really nominate or control a majority of the House of Commons. Compromises have nearly always been made between the monarchy and aristocracy. Only when they have been at variance has the power of the Commons increased. With the appointing power in the hands of the Crown, threatening an augmentation of members and a dilution of the peerage whenever a sufficient exigency arises-a measure always dreaded by the existing peers, whose value diminishes in proportion as they are multi

male population of 4,500,000. If all had voted who were entitled to vote not more than one man in five could have done so. In a population of 20,000,000 less than one in twenty are voters. The whole number of registered voters was 918,683. Of these the average number required to make a member of Parliament was 691, and a majority of that number is 346, the actual number necessary to elect. Representation in proportion to numbers or population is entirely set at naught. The counties, with 507,754 registered electors, return 159 members, but the less populous boroughs, with only 410,929 registered electors, return 339 members, or more than twice the number of members and at the same time with 100,000 less voters.

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The. excitement of an English election, even with so few participants, is far from inconsiderable. The multitude, whe look on while the voting proceeds vivâ voce, cheer or hiss the voter as they may be pleased or displeased with the vote. The expense is not small, and the corruption is formidable. But whatever the result, whether the ins or outs are Whigs or Tories, the inevitable rule of the aristocracy prevails. The Whigs in power are almost as reluctant to press reforms as their adversaries, and the Tories out of power are as eloquent in popular cries as those who have got their places by more liberal votes when in an irresponsible minority. The only difference between the oligarchical parties would seem to be that one party yields nothing, for example, in the way of extending the right of suffrage, lest in the end it should be forced to yield all; the other party would concede something now lest in the end it should be forced to give up all. Neither are believers in universal suffrage. Both are alike averse to it, and they only disagree as to the wisest method of warding it off. With such issues an oligarchy, dwelling compactly together within a small territory, may be able to maintain itself for an indefinite period, or until the masses discover that, whosoever wins, they are lost. North, Pitt, Peel, and Palmerston, each prolong their premiership for years, and yet British statutes present few ear-marks by which the Tory or Whig would be discovered.

If the Government of the United States had to bear the strain of a new national election, in addition to elections already provided for, whenever an Administration measure should be defeated, it would keep us in endless confusion and instability. The periodical return of these excitements is enough without the cometary visitations incident to a change of ministry to perplex the nation still more. The acquiescence of the American people in the decisions of the majority has been prominently evinced in our whole history, with but a single exception, and that exception we are so rapidly washing out with blood and erasing with the sharp points of the bayonet that it will be remembered only to be shunned and execrated. Let us concede that it might not be possible for Great Britain to adopt our form of Governmentuniversal suffrage, voting by ballot, and frequent elections and succeed. By her own confession she has less than a million people capable of self-government, for less than that number are permitted to vote. It would be quite as unwise for us to adopt many things which are the daily food of Great Britain, especially the commingling of the executive with the legislative department.

The examples to be found in some other Governments, where the sovereign power is lodged in the Executive, furnish an argument not for but against the adoption of the scheme proposed. It is not inconsistent with their theory, and their example is one we strove and yet strive to avoid. In France it makes no difference whether Richelieu and Louis XIV, or the Revolution and Napoleon, nor whether Louis Philippe or Louis Napoleon are triumphant, the grand march of centralization proceeds ever the same, and the executive power, by whomsoever wielded, maintains its primitive vigor with no signs of feebleness or decrepitude. Because Louis Napoleon permits his ministers to enter one or both of the legislative bodies which he has ordained and licensed, and insists that they shall be heard, it by no means follows that the United States should be swift to copy the latest French pattern. Nor can Spain or even modern Greece yet be invoked as our instructors. If all Europe led the way, and Brazil and all the twinkling stars of Central America followed in the train, our own time-honored example, in a case of this character, would be for us a higher, nobler, and safer precedent for abiding reverence and future

The ministry govern only by parliamentary majorities, and to this end seats to them become indispensable. They strive to absorb the men of distinction, the Broughams, Peels, and Gladstones, and the task of leading the crowd of undistinguished voting members," as they are called, is thus made easy. Such a form of government may be well enough adapted to a small island, but would most likely fail in a large continental country. If England had conceded to the American colonies the right to representation she would soon have become democratized, and the character of her Government would have been wholly changed. To talk of her as a representa-practice. tive Government like that of the United States is an absurdity. Words are said by a distinguished writer to have power when we see a man behind them. Representatives certainly should have power in proportion to the number of men behind them. With such a test my friend from Michigan, [Mr. UPSON,] with his 25,000 voters should count about equal to thirty-five members of Par liament, and our Speaker, [Mr. COLFAX,] with his 28,000 Indianians, should be equal to forty. And this is the difference between the American and the British standard of representation.

I know that it is not proposed to extend this measure beyond a seat in this House to members of the Cabinet, with the liberty of speech. No greater innovation is at present contemplated. But it may be doubted much whether the half of the British example is better than the whole.

The Secretaries, if the measure passes, may be interrogated and fail to give satisfactory answers. They may lose the confidence of the House, and, retaining the confidence of the President, there they are still to remain till the end of the term. Their failure may be only an inaptitude of speech

or want of cleverness in explanation, so, that a good cause may be sacrificed by forcing the client to become his own advocate. Legal gentlemen here, with strong partisan predilections, may desire to put a Cabinet to which they are opposed to the torture of a cross-examination, not for the single purpose of eliciting substantial information, but to gratify the passion of prosecutors, and to figure in frequent petty impeachments.

On the other hand, a Secretary may wield a large measure of persuasive power, and thus gloss and carry measures devoid of those solid nerits upon which alone they ought to stand. Such a Secretary would be dangerous as a leader, or rather as a misleader.

It may be argued that the scheme would keep men of inferior capacity out of office. If this could be assured, it would certainly be a strong argument in favor of the measure. It is my belief, however, that incapacity would be more apt to fold itself and its victims in the suffocating embrace of unscrupulous patronage or to hide itself in nimble words and flippant rhetoric. Unfortunately, executive ability and knowledge of mankind, such as guaranty the selection of the best instrumentalities for the accomplishment of great purposes, are not always found in connection with eloquence or with readiness in debate. Some ancient orators, not to mention any modern, were disgraced when they took the field, and we may well doubt whether they would have succeeded any better as national financiers. Albert Gallatin was no debater, but he was one of our most successful Secretaries of the Treasury. Jefferson was a great man, but on this floor he would have been overmatched by Mike Walsh. Executive ability, the mastery of great principles as well as of minor details, coupled with knowledge of affairs and of men, is as rare as the possession of genius or the power of magnetism in debate, and we have to regret that it is a quality among our countrymen now more desirable than abundant.

The evils experienced in Great Britain in the practice of this measure, the worst part of which, when all parts are bad, we are now asked to copy, have been so great that the number of the Cabinet allowed seats in Parliament has been more than once reduced and limited. The goal of British ambition is the Cabinet. If men of mark are assembled there, yet the bulk of such men appear to shun the House of Commons; the place is too tame, and its glory is disappearing. Bright and Cobden almost alone represent the great commoners, the Chathams, Foxes, and Burkes.

When we build up the Executive Departments of our Government let us not do it at the expense of the Representatives of the people.

If we look at the details of this bill, and the practices, voluntary and compulsory, that will be generated by it, these will be found no less obnoxious than its fundamental principles.

pregnant-that no more than this shall be doneand the logical conclusion and ruling would be that so much might be done and would be in order.

Any one tolerably conversant with such rules knows the latitude of debate which would spring up or could be achieved with such nominal restrictions, and that a fair parliamentarian would be able to give utterance to all he might desire without let or hinderance. Should it turn out otherwise, the rules would be changed or the decisions of the Speaker overruled. Except when answering to resolutions or questions, the Secretaries, upon business relating to their Departments, are to have the same latitude of debate enjoyed by members of the House, and would of course be liable to be interrupted by questions even without the three days' notice. Any bill containing a charge upon the Treasury could be debated by the Secretary of the Treasury; any proposed law whatever would be open to the Attorney General; and thus no matter of legislation could come up where the Executive Departments might not actively interfere. Even now, our "resolution days," so called, though often convenient, coming upon every alternate Mondayto say nothing of suspension day-are subject to great abuse, and are used by all parties more or less for the classic purposes of Buncombe. Old members on both sides of the House feel that these days are, as to legislative objects, mainly wasted, and they hail an early adjournment as a relief. It is here that smart gentlemen bring in cunningly-worded resolutions to obtain the weather gauge of their opponents-such resolutions as one party may swallow and such as another party must not refuse, but which, like Macbeth's amen, will stick in the throat. It is the perpetual entertainment of the fox and storkdishes palatable to the hosts but unapproachable by the guests.

If we were to adopt this scheme we might thereby throw away eight days every month instead of two or four, and in this toilsome but useless labor the partisans of the Secretaries would be driven to a ceaseless activity, equal to and as conspicuous as that of their opponents. Instead of attending to legislative duties, the House would be the arena for skillful political fencing-masters, and the chief interest would soon center upon these eager encounters, where the victors would be congratulated and the vanquished derided.

Nor is it until after this takes place that the House reaches any vote. Any member may offer as many resolutions, wise or crude, as it may suit his pleasure, or may propound as many questions, restrained only by his sense of propriety. The Clerk's notice-book, where all these are to be entered, would soon be, in learned phrase, “a big thing." Any malignant outsider, who could obtain the kind services of a member willing to ask crooked questions, might here find the highway of his ambition. Now, in resolutions calling upon the Executive for information, anything frivolous is apt to be excluded, for we must have the sanction of a majority, at least, of the House, and usually the vote of the entire House is obtained when the object is truly legitimate, and then the response becomes a permanent record for all Section second requires that they shall abso- coming time. The document remains to be examlutely attend the sessions of the House immedi-ined by every member, and does not pass away ately on the opening of the sitting on Mondays and Thursdays of each week to give information in reply to questions which may be propounded to them under the rules of the House.

Section first of the bill, as reported, gives the right to all the Secretaries and members of the Cabinet to occupy seats in this House, and to participate in the debates under such rules as may be prescribed by the House, and these rules may of course be modified at any time according to the pleasure of any accidental majority.

Thus it is proposed to change the rules of the House at the start of this new programme, so that the first business on Mondays and Thursdays shall be to consider the resolutions and questions of which any member shall have given notice, to the exclusion of all other business. It is also provided that the mover of the resolution or question may state succinctly the object and scope of his resolution and the reasons for desiring the information, and such arguments, opinions, and facts as may be necessary to explain his questions. The Secretaries are to reply-but suppose they refuse, what then?-giving the information or the reasons why the same should be withheld, stating facts and opinions so far as may be necessary to explain the matter; and then, without further debate, the House is to vote on the resolution, unless it shall be withdrawn. The amendments to the rules are put in the form of a negative

with the hour. It seems to me that this method is by far the most satisfactory.

Again, the House is to vote, but upon what is the House to vote? If the information sought has been communicated, what will be left to vote upon? And yet the resolution can only be withdrawn by the mover. If the information has been withheld for reasons satisfactory to the Secretary, what shape is the vote to assume? Is it to be "content" or "non-content?" Is it to be complimentary or censorious? The amendment to the rules leaves all this quite in the dark. If it was proposed to have the decision one of confidence or want of confidence, and the retention or dismissal of the Cabinet pending upon that decision, the proposition would not appear, as it now does, so objectless. To have a vote of "content" and yet to have the Cabinet go out, or to have a vote of "non-content" and yet have the Cabinet retained, would leave the position of the House quite as ridiculous as that of the Cabinet.

It will scarcely be denied that the new practice, if once inaugurated, would consume much valua

ble time and greatly prolong the sessions of Congress.

The information now communicated to Congress, in fullness and variety, as to the annual condition of public affairs, is unsurpassed by that of any nation in the world. The President's message, the reports of the Secretaries, and the statements of the heads of all the different bureaus, in their elaborateness and completeness, rarely leave anything to be desired. If any wise at fault, it is that they are too voluminous and too minute to be seasonably read. It might gratify some members to have this abbreviated and given in concentrated doses, but I submit whether, in addition to the original sources of information, we shall institute abridged oral communications for the gratification of the indolently blind and halt? Let us not be dazzled by the idea of reform when only a change is offered, and that change the surrender of the substance for a vain shadow.

The proposition now made was of course not overlooked by the framers of our Constitution, and was, as most of our people have always thought, properly rejected, nothing having been provided unless it be its prohibition and avoidance. The power is nowhere directly granted, and if inferentially assumed it will be seen to be a maladroit assumption.

It is claimed by the majority of the committee that the power is found in the clause of the Constitution which declares that the President "shall from time to time give the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall deem necessary and expedient." How can it be seriously contended that Congress, under this clause, can compel the attendance of the President, either in person or by proxy, upon the sessions of either or both Houses of Congress? He alone is made the judge of what information or measures are necessary and expedient" for him to communicate, and yet it is now proposed to make a law by which any member of this House may dictate as to the time and then bring the House to a direct vote upon the necessity and expediency. A clause which merely defines the duty of the President cannot be strained into a definition of the power and duties of Congress, nor will it justify the admission or coercion of seven gentlemen, however elevated in position, into this House with all the liberty of speech which may be ac

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corded under the rules.

Washington and the elder Adams read their annual speeches to Congress, but Jefferson did not, and the practice has never been resumed. This practice, however, bears no relation to that of Cabinet ministers holding seats with the privilege of participating in debate, nor more especially of being catechised in this House. This involves principles of the utmost gravity. The reading of a speech in person, or the sending of it as a written communication, is a question of mere etiquette, of no possible consequence except as a bauble among monarchists, and properly belongs solely to the President. It is a matter of taste and without dignity in a constitutional argument. It will not be pretended that the President could hold a seat and participate in debates in our House. How, then, can you authorize him, far less compel him, to do by proxy, by seven agents, that which he cannot do as principal?

Nothing, perhaps, better exhibits the straits to which the advocates of this measure are driven for constitutional authority than the fact that they fly from one part of the Constitution to another, and finally alight on that which provides that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings!" That is to say, in parliamentary proceedings each House determines the rules for itself and its own members, not for anybody else. Surely this clause does not confer power upon one House to determine the rules for the proceedings of the President, and if not upon one House certainly not upon both Houses. With equal propriety, under such a latitudinarian construction, and possibly with greater usefulness, might the Chief Justice of the United States be compelled to attend our sessions for the purpose of giving information and answering questions touching all legal matters.

If it had been intended to confer upon Congress the power to compel by law the attendance of the President's Cabinet in this House, then the power of enforcing such a law would also have been

were adopted, and his organization of the Treasury Department, a monument to his forecast and wisdom, remains with nearly all its original features hardly touched by modern innovations. But at the session already alluded to he made a

given. But it was not. If the Secretary should refuse to appear, what are you to do about it? Can you punish him? The House can only punish members for disorderly conduct. Would these Secretaries in fact be members? If so, would their silence be disorderly? The maximum of punish-report as to the Post Office Department, with a ment which the House can inflict is expulsion upon a vote of two thirds of the members present. How much punishment would expulsion be to a recusant Secretary who had already chosen to absent himself?

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The Constitution unmistakably declares that no person holding office under the United States shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office." Language more absolutely denunciatory of this measure cannot, it appears to me, be found, and yet it may be said that it does not apply in this case. If its force applies to full membership, it cannot be parried by any contrivance of half membership or members in all respects save the right of voting. A member or semi-member cannot be hidden even in the robes of a minister. Any Delegate from a Territory to this House, holding office under the United States, would, for analogous reasons, be at once excluded.

I do not think it is going too far to say that the project indorsed by a majority of the committee is not warranted by anything in the Constitution, and this view is fully sustained by its earliest and best expositors. The question came up in the session of Congress in 1790-so far as the question could come up upon the admission of the Secretary of the Treasury for once only into the House of Representatives-upon the question of allowing Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, to make his celebrated report upon his plan for supporting the public credit, and, though the temptation could hardly be greater from the pressing nature of the subject and the emiment character of the man, it being the discussion of measures vital to our young Republic by the most accomplished Secretary of the Treasury this or any other country has furnished, yet, upon an occasion of such gravity, the House, composed of a large number of the distinguished men who had made the American Revolution a success, and who had based a Constitution upon its principles, rejected the proposition after a brief debate, and that nearly or quite unanimously.

It may not be improper for me to reproduce briefly the history of this proceeding. On the 9th day of January, 1790,

"A letter from Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, was read, informning the House that agreeably to their resolution of the 21st of September, he had prepared a plan for the support of the public credit, and that he was ready to report the same to this House when they should be pleased to receive it.".

It was then proposed to assign Thursday, then next, for the purpose, and Mr. Gerry moved to add to the motion that it should be in writing.

Mr. Boudinot, the friend of Mr. Hamilton, hoped the Secretary might be permitted to report in person in order to answer such inquiries as the members might be disposed to make, for it was a justifiable surmise that gentlemen would not be able clearly to comprehend so intricate a subject

without oral illustration.

Mr. Ames conceived it to be the duty of the House to obtain the best information on any subject, and was willing to extend every indulgence to the Secretary, but he wished these communications to be in writing; in this shape they would obtain a degree of permanency favorable to the responsibility of the office, while at the same time they would be less able to be misunderstood.

Mr. Clymer thought such communications ought to be in writing.

Mr. Benson thought we should receive the report in any manner in which it was prepared, but had no doubt this officer, actuated by motives of deference and respect, will conform to any rule the House may think proper to enjoin.

Mr. Gerry, enumerating the various topics likely to be discussed, said:

“Can the human mind retain with any degree of decision [precision] objects so extensive and multifarious upon a mere oral communication? This consideration alone ought to be sufficient to induce gentlemen to agree to his proposition of making the report in writing."

The resolution for receiving the report in writing was carried in the affirmative, and, so far as appears, without a division.

Many valuable suggestions made by Hamilton

bill in conformity to it, and when the Clerk proceeded to read it a member objected to its being read on the ground of the impropriety of executive officers being permitted to bring bills before the House, and this objection was sustained. This exhibits the early and inherent jealousy of the House of executive influence in the most earnest manner. The action was instant and decisive. No such officer would now be permitted to bring any bill directly before the House, but it could not have been intended to forbid the draft of a bill from being sent to committees for their assistance in framing proper legislation, for that would be a little too nice. If a Secretary may unfold and urge a measure of legislation in his official reports, it is difficult to see why he may not submit the mere forms to a standing committee, (to be modified, adopted, or rejected,) which will in his judgment best carry out the substance of that legislation which he has already recommended.

Once more this question was incidentally discussed upon a report of a committee of the House upon the defeat of General St. Clair, whom they attempted to shield from blame, while they in| culpated more or less the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretaries, believing themselves to be greatly wronged, naturally desired to vindicate themselves. On the 13th of November, 1792, a resolution was offered by one of their friends notifying the Secretaries that the subject would be taken up on a day named to inquire into the causes of the failure," to the end that they may attend the House and furnish such information as may be conclusive to the due investigation of the matter stated in said report:"

Even this was refused by the House, which first voted to strike out all the latter part of the resolution, and then rejected it as thus amended.

But the earnest discussion which occurred is important, as it records the opinion of Madison upon the main question now before us, and this will be as authoritative as the opinions of any modern statesman, or even as that of learned scholiasts. In the Annals of Congress for 1792, page 680, it is reported as follows:

"Mr. MADISON objected to the motion on constitutional grounds, and as being contrary to the practice of the House. He had not, he said, thoroughly revolved the matter in his own mind, and therefore was not prepared to state fully the effects which would result from the adoption of the resolution; but he would hazard thus much, that it would form an innovation in the mode of conducting the business of this House, and introduce a precedent which would lead to perplexing and embarrassing consequences; as it involved a conclusion, in respect to the principles of the Government, which at an earlier day would have been revolted from. He was decidedly in favor of written information."

I ask gentlemen to mark the emphasis of his conclusion. "It involved" said he, "a conclusion, in respect to the principles of the Government, which at an earlier day, "only five years after the date of the Constitution, "would have been revolled from. He was decidedly in favor of written information.

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The two cases cited are believed to be the only ones where Congress has acted on the question of giving the Cabinet any share of the privileges of members of the House. For more than seventy years there has been no attempt to bring about any change of this character. The House has neither sought to nominate or control the Cabinet of the President, nor has it exhibited any disposition to diminish its own importance by sharing its privileges with the President's nominees and be by them controlled. No ambitious minister has suggested the idea, and where Hamilton twice knocked at the door and was twice refused no

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more weight than that of the framers of the Constitution, including Madison, its acknowledged father; nor will it be pretended that it should have the effect of changing the settled and uniform practice of the House.

It is true that some examples can be cited in the earlier days of the first term of Washington when he went to the Senate in person to make oral communications and was accompanied by his Secretaries, or one of them went in lieu of the President. This practice commends itself when we understand that he and they went on executive business solely, and it is wholly irrelevant to cite such examples as precedents for the scheme now presented. The advice and consent of the Senate under the Constitution must be obtained for appointments to office and for the ratification of treaties. The Senate is an executive body, as well as a legislative, and in its capacity as such Washington, with rare modesty not only sought its consent, (all that is ever now done,) but in person often sought its advice in advance of his own action. Generally, whenever he desired immediate action, he went in person to the Senate, and when otherwise, he made his communications in writing. If he took his Secretary of War or Secretary of State with him, it was, let it be remembered, beyond being most respectful and useful, long prior to the introduction of private secretaries. The Senate had been expected by many to be a permanent body, ready at all times to give its advice. Having almost lost its advisory character, it has industriously increased its importance as a debating and legislative branch of the Government. I know of no examples where the President or the head of any executive Department ever participated in person in the proceedings of the House or in the Senate except upon purely executive business, but when it was partially attempted it was opposed, by such men as Madison, on constitutional grounds, and defeated.

Our fathers looked with jealousy upon the interference of executive officers with the legislative deliberations of Congress in either House. Their presence here, merely as visitors, pending any measure in which they or their Departments are concerned, even in more recent days, as far as my observation reaches, has always been looked upon with so much healthy aversion that it has more often injured than aided the progress of the

measure.

The Executive Mansion, and other executive buildings, as is well known, were placed at one end of the city, while the Capitol was placed at the other, avowedly to avoid executive influence and to escape any encroachment upon legislative deliberations. Under the Manual it would be a breach of our privileges to state the views of the Executive upon any pending measure, save where it has been officially and openly communicated in writing; and now it is proposed to reverse all this, and have all the members of the Cabinet here all the time, if they choose, and semi-weekly, at any rate, to whisper in our ears some indication of the will of the Executive. We are to have this influence forever on the alert, not through one, but seven of the representatives of the Executive in this House-influential by position, character, patronage, and power-and these possibly hereafter to be increased, according to British precedent, so as to include the under or Assistant Secretaries! It should be remembered that British ministers hold their places in the House of Commons by virtue of an election, and not by appointment. They must have a constituency, and be elected to the House of Commons, and that after their acceptance of office, or they cannot occupy their seats. So jealous are they, even there, that members who receive appointments thereby vacate their seats, and must allow their constituents to pass upon the question whether they are willing the member should take an appointment from the Crown and still be their representative. But here the bald proposition is made to give certain official gentlemen seats in this House with no constituency whatever! A despotism or an absolute monarchy might look upon it with favor; but can a republic? As a measure involving grave principles-the preservation of the fundamental privileges and independence of a republican Legislature-I am persuaded we ought to give it no countenance or support.

It may be said that the object is to ask questions for the purpose of obtaining information

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