Murray; the gentle persuasiveness of Wilberforce; the splendor of Sheridan; the wisdom of Camden; the vigor of Lord Grenville; the epigram of Grattan; the brilliance of Canning; the substantial logic of Peel; the invective, pathos, and humor of O'Connell; the brilliant antithesis of Shiel; the masterly force of Lyndhurst, and the rushing vehemence of Brougham, all adorn the parliamentary oratory of England, and would have adorned it still more had not the seductions of power often led them to degrade their genius and forget their inspiration as the guardians of England's greatness and glory. It is, alas! too true, that their finest efforts were made either in the defense or prosecution of great crimes and wrongs. Need I show to this House how nobly our own Senate and this House have been graced by our own orators? Their like will never more be seen here, until the Executive with his millions shall here creep into our free Halls, and by his corrupting influences call for the deep thunders and fierce lightnings of a nation's wrath expressed in the noble fervor of the future tribunes of the people.

highest for its wisdom and its security to freedom of all the constitutions of the civilized world. It does not become us, therefore, to set it aside as unworthy of our study, of our careful observation. Gentlemen should not forget that, in the days of George III, England, as well as America, emancipated herself from the tyranny of kingly prerogative; and it may be well questioned whether the two streams that sprung from that great struggle have not been flowing in parallel channels of equal depth and greatness, one on this continent and the other in the British islands.

It may well be doubted whether there is not as much popular freedom and more parliamentary security in the Kingdom of Great Britain than in this Republic. A gentleman who has lately crossed the sea, a man of great ability, and a philosophic observer, has said that to-day the British ministry is nothing more nor less than "a committee of the House of Commons." And I believe he described it correctly. I believe that no nation has a ministry so susceptible to the breath of popular opinion, so readily influenced and so completely controlled by popular power, as is the ministry of Great Britain by the House of Commons. Let one vote be given against the plans of that ministry and it is at once dissolved. It exists by the will of the House of Commons. How does this come about? From the fact that at the very time we emancipated ourselves from the kingly prerogatives of George III, so by the parliamentary reforms in Great Britain did that nation also emancipate itself and establish parliamentary liberty in England. It does not, therefore, become gentlemen to appeal to our ancient prejudices, so that we may not learn anything from that great and wise system of government adopted by our neighbors across the sea.

In the consideration of this question I shall touch upon three leading points: first, precedents from our own history; second, the constitution

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I place my warning voice, not so much against this measure, but using it as the occasion, against that truckling subserviency to the power of the Executive which will dethrone the people and make them fit tools for the corruption of an evil day. The exercise of arbitrary prerogatives may not be here enacted; no armed troops may enter here; no arrests may violate our privileges; but if they do not, the evil serpent of corruption may creep into our places and insinuate its cunning and thus corrupt the integrity of the Legislature. Members may here fall a victim to power, if not open and bold, secret and malevolent; and when that fall begins, where will it end except in the fall of our liberties? Recollect that in civil wars moral obligations are torn asunder, the peaceful habits of life and thought are disturbed and destroyed, and other virtues not so compatible with liberty,ality of the proposed measure as exhibited in the but always compatible with licentiousness, alone survive. When we have progressed so far on the path of military renown that the nation will begin to regard its best defenders as its foes, and the enemy of its corruptions as the enemy of its Constitution-then indeed will liberty have lost its last refuge, perhaps even here in this Hall of the people; and though, like its devotee, Algernon Sydney, it may move with serene eye, untroubled pulse, and unabated resolve, from this, its chosen forum, to the scaffold of its fate, we may yet mourn over its memory, or, disdainful of its executioner, soar away to some loftier code of justice and right, where equality and freedom can be realized in the splendor of a better vision.

Mr. GARFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I will not detain the House long on this subject. I know how difficult it is to get the attention of members, when they have just attended a place of amusement, to the consideration of a grave measure. I know how ungrateful a task it is to attempt to recall their attention after the exhibition to which the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Cox] has treated them. The gentleman's speech sufficiently proves that he has read his law on the subject from Sergeant Buzfuz, and his constitutional and legislative history from Tittlebat Titmouse, to whom he has just referred; for certainly the history of legislation, as reflected in the Journals of Congress, gives no support to his position.

early discussions and laws; and third, its policy.

The precedents cited by the gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. PENDLETON,] the chairman of the select committee, in his very able report, established beyond all question that in the early days of the Republic, under the Constitution, heads of Departments did come upon the floor of Congress and make communications. No man, I believe, has denied that; I think no gentleman can successfully deny it. My friend from Vermont, [Mr. MORRILL,] if I understand it, denies that they did

more than to meet the Senate in executive session. I am glad to see that the gentleman assents to my statement of his position.

I will now cite two examples where the head of a Department came on the floor of the House and made statements. If the gentleman will turn to the first volume of the Annals of Congress, page 684, he will find the following entry under date of August 7, 1789:

"The following message was received from the President of the United States by General Knox, the Secretary of War, who delivered therewith sundry statements"Some gentlemen may say those statements were in writing. I ask them to listen a little further: "who delivered therewith sundry statements and relating to the same."

papers

So that the Secretary of War came to the House of Representatives and made statements.

Mr. MORRILL. I will say to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GARFIELD] that I take that to mean nothing more than what the Private Secretary of the President now does every day. At that time the President of the United States had no Private Secretary, but he used the members of the Cabinet for that purpose, and for that pur

Mr. GARFIELD. I would like to ask my friend from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] whether the Private Secretary of the President ever makes any statements except the mere announcement of the message which he delivers?

I am glad, Mr. Speaker, that we can, for once, approach the discussion of a measure on its own merits, uninfluenced by any mere party considerations. I wish we might in the discussion of this subject be equally free from that international jealousy, that hereditary hatred, so frequently and unreasonably manifested against Great Brit-pose here only. ain. I have noticed on the faces of members of the House a smile of satisfaction when any speaker has denounced the proposal to copy any custom of, or borrow any experience from, the Government of England. No man on this floor is more desirous than myself to see this Republic stand erect among the nations, and grant and exact equal justice from Great Britain. I fully appreciate how little friendship she has shown us in our great national struggle, yet I will not allow my mind to be so prejudiced as not to see the greatness, the glory, and the excellence of the British constitution. I believe that, next to our own, and in some respects perhaps equal, if not superior, to our own, the constitution of Great Britain stands

Mr. MORRILL. I take it that that was all that was contemplated then. We daily have communications from the President, containing more than one document, statement, or paper.

Mr. GARFIELD. My friend from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] has assisted me. He now makes the point that the expression "statements," here referred to, is merely the announcement of a message. I call his attention to the second case which I will cite, from the 689th page of the same

volume. On the 10th of August, 1789, the President sent in a message by the hands of General Knox, who delivered the same, "together with a statement of the troops in the service of the United States." He made to the House of Representatives statements about troops in the service, so that the statements referred to are not merely statements of the fact that he delivered a message of the President.

Mr. MORRILL. I do not like to interrupt the gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. GARFIELD,] but I must insist that his second instance does not prove the fact which he assumes. He will find, if he will proceed further on in the same volume, that when the question came up distinctly upon allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to come in here for once, and once only, it was then declared that it would be setting a new precedent, one which they could not tolerate, and which they did not tolerate, but voted down after discussion.

Mr. GARFIELD. The gentleman has helped to pioneer my way handsomely thus far. I'am coming to the very example to which he refers, and which I have examined with some care. I come now to my second point, the discussions in the Congress of the United States touching the constitutionality of the proposed law. There were discussions at five different periods, and only five, so far as I have found, touching this general subject, in the history of Congress. The first occurred in the First Congress, when it was proposed to establish Executive Departments.

On the 19th of May, 1789, Mr. Boudinot, of New Jersey, moved that the House proceed, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, to establish Executive Departments of the Government, the chief officers thereof to be removable at the will of the President. Under that resolution arose a full discussion of the nature of the offices to be created, by whom the officers were to be appointed, and by whom removed. The discussion covers forty or fifty pages of the volume before me, and embraces some of the very ablest expositions of the Constitution to be found in the early annals of Congress. After this long discussion the following results were arrived at, which will answer some of the points just made by my colleague from Ohio:

First, that the Departments were to be estab lished by Congress, and the duties and general scope of powers vested therein to be established by law; but the incumbents of these offices were to be appointed by the President, and removable at his pleasure.

It was clearly determined, in the second place, that these officers could be removed in two ways: first, by the President; second, by impeachment in the usual modes prescribed in the Constitution.

It was thus settled, in this great discussion, not, as is said by my colleague who has just taken his seat, that Cabinet ministers are the creatures of the President and responsible to him alone, but that their very Departments and the whole organization of them depend in every case upon the law of Congress, and they are subject to impeachment for neglect of their duties or violation of their obligations in those offices.

The second discussion occurred in the same year when the Treasury Department was established, and in that instance the discussion became more precise and critical, bearing more nearly upon the particular question now before us. A clause was introduced into the law establishing the Treasury Department, providing that the Secretary of the Treasury should be directed to prepare plans for the redemption of the public debt, and for all the different measures relating to his Department, and

"That he shall make report and give information to either branch of the Legislature, either in person or in writing (as may be required) respecting all natters which may be referred to him, by the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office."

The debate took a very wide range. It was objected by several members that the provision was unconstitutional, on the ground that the House was the only power authorized to originate money bills, and that such an enactment would put that power in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury. A very long discussion ensued on what was meant by "originating a bill." Some contended that to draft a bill was to originate it. Others that no proposed measure was a bill until the House had passed it; while others

again said that it was a bill whenever the House authorized it to be introduced. Finally, it was determined that there was nothing incompatible with the Constitution in allowing the Secretary of the Treasury to report plans and prepare drafts of bills. It was thus settled, and has been the policy of the Government till the present day, that the Secretary of the Treasury may properly draft bills and prepare plans, and present them to Congress. And it is still a part of our lawI have the provision before me

"That the Secretary of the Treasury shall make report and give information to either branch of the Legislature, either in person or in writing, as he may be required."

Let it be understood that in the First Congress of the United States a law was passed-approved September 2, 1789, by George Washingtonacted upon before in the House and in the Senate, by the men who framed the Constitution; which law provided that it should be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to report his plans in writing or in person, as either House might require.

Mr. MORRILL. I desire to ask the gentleman a question. When the Secretary had made out his plan in pursuance of the resolution by which he was authorized to make it, did not the House, on the very first occasion when it could take action on the subject, distinctly discuss the question and refuse him the privilege of reporting in person? Mr. GARFIELD. I am coming, in a moment, to that precise point.

The whole question of the undue influence which it might give to the Executive Departments to allow Cabinet officers to make their reports was fully examined; and after the fullest and freest discussion, which, even in a condensed form, covers some twenty pages of the book before me, the measure was passed without even a division, and became the law of the land.

tived, and it was resolved to empower the Committee of the Whole House to send for persons and papers in the case. On the following day the Secretary of War, General Knox, addressed a letter to the Speaker of the House, asking an opportunity to vindicate himself before the House. It was said by the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] yesterday, that General Knox was not permitted to come in. A discussion of the subject followed the presentation of his request. The House had not been satisfied with the report and recommitted it to the committee for further examination. After the recommitment of the report, the Secretaries were brought before the committee and examined, so that their testimony reached the House in that mode. The question was never put to the House whether they would or would not receive the Secretaries in the House, but whether they should adopt the report or recommit it and order the committee to take further testimony. They did the latter. The proposition to admit them to the House was not directly acted upon at all.

Before leaving this subject I must refer to the opinion of Mr. Madison as expressed in the debate of November 13, 1792, on the question of admitting the Secretaries to the House to take part in the investigation of General St. Clair. This was the only quotation, I believe, which the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] found to apply directly to the point at issue. It is true that Mr. Madison did say he objected to the House resolution on constitutional grounds. (See Annals, Second Congress, page 680.) But he did not state what those constitutional grounds were. It is a little remarkable that he who had in 1789 spoke and voted for the Treasury act authorizing the Secretary to report in person or in writing, as either House might direct, should declare only three years later that it was unconstitutional to let the

mation or testimony.

Perhaps, sir, a little light of history will help to explain Mr. Madison's singular position. My friend from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] will remember that within those three years Mr. Madison and Hamilton had became seriously alienated from each other, and the gifted authors of the Federalist were friends no longer. The great

party strife had begun, and they had taken opposite sides, Mr. Jefferson leading one party, Mr. Madison following, and Mr. Hamilton leading another, and his friends, the Federalists, follow

that Mr. Madison should have been influenced, like others, by personal feeling, or at least by his political differences with the Secretary of the Treasury. It is well known that his political opinions were greatly changed by the influence of Mr. Jefferson.

I now come to the point to which the gentle-Secretary come before the House to give informan from Vermont has referred, the third of the five discussions. On the 9th day of January, 1790, the House received a communication from the Secretary of the Treasury, stating that, in obedience to their resolution of the 21st of September previous, he had prepared a draft of a plan for funding the public debt, and was ready at their pleasure to report-it being settled in the law, as I have already said, that he should report in person or in writing, as he might be directed. The question was discussed, as the gentleman from Vermont noticed in his examination of the case yesterday. Mr. Gerry moved that the reporting him. It is not, therefore, very surprising should be made in writing. The question was discussed whether it should be made in writing, or orally, and the chief argument used in the case was that it would be impossible for members of Congress to understand it unless it was reduced to writing, so that they could have it before them. It was also said that the scope and bearing of the whole report would be so extensive that the human mind could not comprehend the whole of it, unless they could have it before them in a permanent shape. It was conceded by several who spoke that the House could have the report made in writing or orally, or in writing with accompanying oral explanations. The constitutional doubt was not suggested in that discussion. It was decided, without a division, not that he should not be permitted to come into the House, but that his report should be in writing. The law still stood, as it now stands, that he shall report in person or in writing, as either House may direct.

The fifth and last discussion to which I shall refer occurred on the 19th of November, 1792, on a resolution of the House directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report a plan for the reduction of the public debt. The question of the constitutionality of his reporting a plan at all again arose. The whole ground was again gone over Notwithstanding Madison's record in 1789, he opposed it; but the resolution was passed against him by the decisive vote of 31 to 25. So that even down to that day, after parties had taken their ground, after Madison and Hamilton had become antagonistic, after all the fierceness of personal feeling was awakened, still the House determined that the law should stand as it was enacted by the First Congress. As the result of all these discussions, the custom obtained to re

The fourth discussion related to the defeat of General St. Clair. I will remind the House of the history of that case. In 1790 St. Clair was ordered to make an expedition against the Indi-ceive reports and information from the heads of ans in the North western Territory; his army was disgracefully defeated, and the case was referred to General Washington, who declined to order a court of inquiry, and the subject was taken up in the House of Representatives, and on the 27th of March, 1792, a committee was ordered to inquire into the causes of the failure of the expedition. On the 8th of May following, the committee made a report which reflected severely upon the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War. On the 13th of November, 1792, a resolution was introduced into the House, to notify the two Secretaries that on the following Wednesday the House would take the report into consideration and that they might attend. After a considerable discussion the resolution was nega

Departments in writing rather than in person. That custom has now almost the force of law. But while the Treasury act of 1792 remains on our statute-book we have a clear right to change the custom. I claim that by a simple resolution of the House of Representatives alone, we can now call the Secretary of the Treasury here to explain in person any plan or measure of his, and he is bound to come. The Senate can do the same for itself. The very law which establishes his office and builds up his Department makes its obligatory upon him to come when thus ordered. This is true only of the Secretary of the Treasury.

I hold it, then, fairly established that the measure before us is clearly within the scope of our constitutional powers; that it is only a question how

a thing shall be done, the thing to be done being already provided by law. The heads of Departments do now make known their plans and views; they do now communicate to the House all that this resolution contemplates that they shall communicate. It is only a question of mode. They now communicate with the pen. This resolution proposes to add the tongue to the pen, the voice to the document, the explanation to the text, and nothing more. It is simply a proposition to add to our facilities by having them here to explain orally what they have already transmitted in documentary form.

And this brings me to the third and last point I propose to examine in this discussion-the policy of the proposed change, on which, I admit, there is much room for difference of opinion. The committee have given a very exhaustive statement of its advantages in their report, and I will only enlarge upon a few points in their statement. And, first of all, the proposed change will increase

our facilities for full and accurate information as the basis of legislative action. There are some gentlemen here who doubt whether we have a right to demand information from the heads of Departments. Do we get that information as readily, as quickly, and as fully as we need it? Let me read an extract illustrative of the present plan. The President of the United States, in his last annual message to Congress, says:

"The report of the Secretary of War, and the accompanying documents, will detail the campaigns of the armies in the field since the date of the last annual message, and also the operations of the several administrative bureaus of the War Department during the last year. It will also specify the measures deemed essential for the national defense, and to keep up and supply the requisite military force."

Has that report been received? This message was delivered to us at the commencement of the present session; we are now within five weeks of its close; but up to this hour we have had no report from the Secretary of War, no official advice from him in reference to the "measures deemed essential for the national defense and to keep up and supply the requisite military force." We have been working in the dark, and it is only as we have reconnoitered the War Department, and forced ourselves in sideways and edgeways, that we have been able to learn what is considered essential for the national defense.

Had this resolution been in force, we should long ago had his report in our hands, or his good and sufficient reason for withholding it.

I call the attention of the House to the fact that our table is groaning under the weight of resolutions asking information from the several Departments that have not been answered. Who does not remember that at a very early day of the session a resolution introduced by a member from Indiana [Mr. HOLMAN] was unanimously adopted asking for executive information, and after four or five weeks had elapsed another resolution was adopted asking why the order of the House had been neglected and we had not been furnished with the information? But this also has fallen a brutum fulmen; we have received no anCould these things be if the members of the legislative and executive departments were sitting in council together? Should we not long ago have had the information or known the reason why we did not have it?

swer.

On the subject of information I have a word more to say. We want information more in detail than we can get it by the present mode. Forexample, it would have aided many of us a few days since, when the loan bill was under consideration, if the Secretary of the Treasury had been here to tell us precisely what he intended in regard to an increase of the volume of the currency under the provisions of the bill. We want to understand each other thoroughly, and when this is done it will remove a large share of the burdens of legislation.

One other point on the policy of the measure, and I am done. I want this joint resolution passed to readjust the relations between the executive and legislative departments, and to readjust them so that there shall be greater responsibility to the legislative department than there now is, and that that responsibility shall be made to rest with greater weight upon the shoulders of executive authority.

I am surprised that both the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] and the gentleman

the necessity of this their own self-respect and the popular expectation would coincide. If it be asked why this should follow any more than at present, I answer because their relations to this body would be entirely different from the relations which they at present hold to it. They are now but the agents of the President in the administration of the executive power. They are appointed by him; they are under his control; they report their proceedings to him; they are responsible to him for the discharge of their several duties. If they recommend measures it is to the President. If those measures are approved by the President he assumes the responsibility of them. If submitted to Congress and rejected, it is simply a rejection of so much of the policy of the President. No direct issue arises between Congress and the President's subordinates. In the new attitude which they would hold under the provisions of this bill the case would be entirely altered. They would stand here the personal representatives and advocates of measures advised and promoted by themselves. They must enter the lists and level their lances in defense of a policy of which they stand forth the personal exponents and champions. They must, in such a contest, abide the issue of the personal struggle into which they have entered, and if vanquished they must retire and give place to the advocates of different measures and the champions of a different policy. In our system the legislative is the strongest department of the Government. It preponderates vastly over the other two departments. No other department can successfully contend against it. In a battle between the Representatives of the people and the advisers of the Executive the victory may be declared before the contest is joined. If the advisers are beaten they must succumb.

Between the Legislature and men holding to it the personal relations which this bill contemplates there must exist accord. When that accord ceases they can no longer be useful and must depart. Thus, by the few words of this bill, are the President's clerks to be turned into a responsible ministry, charged with the conduct of public affairs in this House, originating, proposing, urging, defending measures; speaking to-day amid cheers from the ministerial benches, sitting down tomorrow amid groans and jeers from the opposition benches; now drumming up votes for a crisis, and exhausting for that purpose all the resources of promises and rewards; now rejoicing in a fresh lease of power obtained by a majority of two; again retiring in disgrace under the passage of a want-of-confidence resolution, and that, alas! without the consolatory recollections of a whitebait dinner, for I do not understand that the Potomac will supply that aristocratic delicacy. It is natural to suppose that officials, dependent as those will thus necessarily be upon Congress for the continuance of their power and importance, will look rather to that body than to the President for support, and that they will address themselves rather to the securing of votes and popularity there than to the independent discharge of the duties of the executive branch of the Government. A large part of the executive power and influence will thus be transferred to the House of Representatives. This leads me to consider what will probably be the effect of these changes upon the presidential office. When the official agents of the President shall represent him in Congress, and the amount of their influence and their duration in office shall both be measured by the extent of their following and by the majorities which they can command there, it would seem to be a natural and probable result of such an arrangement that the executive office itself must in the end become subject to the absolute control of Congress. By such an arrangement responsibility is transferred from the President to a recognized ministry, who become his brain, his voice, his hand; and they who have the responsibility, and who will reflect in the mutations of their political fortunes the fluctuating opinions of the Legislature, must have the power also, for responsibility and power go together. The executive responsibility is thus transferred primarily to the parliamentary representatives of the executive office, but ultimately and really to the Legislature, which controls their conduct. Thus, by a total subversion of the present system, the subordinates become the ostensible chiefs, the agents become the principals, and the executive office, which, by the

plan of the Constitution, was made, within its proper sphere of duty, like the department of the judiciary, to a great extent independent of the legislative department of the Government, must, if it do not become wholly dependent upon it, lose much of the independence and power with which it is now invested. How long, for example, can it be supposed that the power of the veto would survive the consummation of the changes which have been indicated, or the supreme command of the Army and Navy?

Sir, I am no advocate of any extension of the powers of the national Executive beyond the limits which are at present prescribed for them in the Constitution; neither do I believe, on the other hand, that liberty is to be secured and perpetuated by a concentration of all the powers of the Gov-. ernment in the hands of the legislative department. I have been taught by history that of all tyrannies that is the most irresponsible and hopeless. That proposition was well stated by Montesquieu when he said, "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body of magistrates.' If we would maintain our free institutions we must maintain the partition of power among the several departments which is made in the Constitution, and the only way in which that can be done is, as Mr. Madison declared, "by so contriving the interior structure of the Government as that its several constituent parts may by their mutual relations be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." In order to accomplish this "each department should," as he also says, "have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others." I believe in the soundness of this doctrine, and hence I do not believe in the plan proposed in the present bill. I do not believe in the wisdom of conferring authority upon the President to appoint members of this House; nor do I believe in concentrating in this House the power which by the Constitution belongs to the Executive. The measure proposed by the gentleman from Ohio is well adapted, in my opinion, to destroy those mutual relations which were established by the Constitution, and which have hitherto answered the purpose of keeping the constituent parts of the Government in their proper places. To what purpose," it was well asked by Mr. Hamilton, "do you separate the executive or the judiciary from the legis lative power, if both the executive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of the legislative?" Such a separation must be merely nominal, and incapable of producing the ends for which it was established.

been resorted to on the part of Congress for obtaining such information have always been found adequate for the purpose. Indeed it must be obvious upon the slightest reflection that the information obtained by the deliberate and written response of the heads of Departments to the resolutions of this House must be superior in value to the information proposed to be obtained by the plan of this bill by as much as a deliberately pre||pared written statement of facts is superior in precision and accuracy of detail to an oral statement based upon the mere memory of the person who utters it.

The precedent for the proposed action, which is supposed to be found in the act of 1789, fails in this, that whereas that act made it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury alone to make report and give information to either branch of the Legislature, in person or in writing, respecting matters referred to him by the Senate or House of Representatives, whenever he might be required so to do, this bill gives to the seven heads of the Executive Departments permanent seats in this body; and that, not for the single purpose of giving information, but for the purpose of participating in the debates of this House and influencing its action. I do not deny the power of the House of Representatives to seek information from any quarter to which it may see fit to apply for it. It is upon that principle it acts in allowing the claimant of a contested seat upon this floor to be heard, but the occasional exercise of that undoubted power is a totally different thing from adding permanent members to this House not elected by the people, and not possessing the qualifications demanded by the Constitution. Indeed, when the restrictive character of the act of 1789 is considered, together with the great caution which was taken to guard it against a construction which would authorize what is proposed in this bill, it furnishes the best possible evidence that the opinions of the statesmen of that day were adverse to the scheme which is now proposed. But the argument founded upon the alleged precedents for this action has been so completely answered and refuted by the gentleman from Vermont, [Mr. MORRILL,] that in my opinion no further argument upon that point is required.

It is well known that when the Constitution was formed several different plans were suggested in regard to the executive office and the executive power. One of them proposed a double Executive, consisting of two persons, between whom the power and responsibility of the office should be divided; another proposed a single Executive, hedged in by a council of State, whose assent should be necessary to render his acts valid. There was much public discussion before it was The feature of government embraced in the determined to give to the executive department present bill is evidently borrowed from the con- of the Government the form and place which it stitutions of England and other monarchical coun- now holds in the Constitution. But I am not tries. In those systems, in which the principle aware that it was at any time proposed to mingle obtains that the king is irresponsible and can do the executive with the legislative department no wrong, it is a wise invention to limit a power of the Government after the manner of this bill. which would otherwise be absolute; for it sub- It was, on the contrary, a fundamental idea, stitutes for him, in the persons of the ministers of agreed to by all and adhered to throughout, that State, individuals who are responsible for the ex- the success of the plan adopted and the perpetuercise of the executive power. The only question|ity of the system depended in no small degree which would vex the mind of a republican philos-upon keeping the different departments of power opher in regard to the excellencies of those systems would perhaps be this: of what use, then, is the king? But, sir, no analogies can be traced between those systems and ours. We have no

such fictions and stand in need of no such.aids.

By the Constitution the people have distributed the powers of the Government among several departments. They who exercise those powers are directly responsible to them for their acts. By making them responsible to each other, or by shifting the responsibility from one to another, or by mingling the powers which are severally delegated to each, we shall only introduce confusion into what is now a harmonious system, and unsettle at once the well-defined boundaries of authority and the foundations of the Govern

ment.

The argument, that a necessity exists for the introduction of this innovation upon the organic structure of the Government in order that Congress may avail itself of the best possible means of information in relation to the measures of legislation on which it may be called to act, is destitute of any solid foundation in fact. No such necessity exists. The means which have hitherto

as separate as possible, and in rendering them no further dependent upon each other than was proper for the creation of such necessary checks as were indispensable to prevent the concentration of too much power in either. How perfectly the framers of the Constitution succeeded in this, let the harmonious working in all its departments of this unparalleled plan of government for a period of more than seventy years attest. There is nothing in the political history of the world which can be compared with it. There is no miracle of art, no triumph of mechanical ingenuity, which can, in the beauty of its proportions, the renovation of its strength, the regulation of its power, and the harmony of its operations, furnish us with any analogies to this great and wonderful framework of government, which, until our recent troubles began, performed its functions more like the silent influences of nature than a human invention; which guarantied universal security and order, commanded everywhere authority and respect, filled a continent with peace, prosperity, and plenty, yet rested upon the shoulders of the people as lightly as the air they breathed.

It had, sir, but one wheel which in the roll of years could give way. That has broken, scaltering ruin and destruction around; but the fragments are being removed, a new one, stronger and better, let us thank God, than the old one, is about to replace it, as much stronger as justice is stronger than injustice, as much better as liberty is better than oppression. But I deny that the organism needs any repair of the kind now proposed. I deny that any necessity exists for it. No such necessity has been shown to exist. The proposition is for an alteration purely experimental. It is not demanded by any exigency of public affairs. It is not justified by any public necessity. It is calculated to confuse the boundaries which should define the distribution of power and to unsettle the balance of the Constitution. The existing arrangements of the Constitution in this respect have not been proven to be either injurious or inconvenient. Why, then, should we tinker at them, or substitute for a plan which has stood the test of time and experience the imaginary improvements of the anarchists of Montgomery?

Mr. Speaker, I do not desire to occupy more of the time of this House upon this subject. I will yield the floor for the remainder of my time to the gentleman from Iowa, [Mr. WILSON.]

Mr. WILSON obtained the floor.

The SPEAKER. There are twenty-five minutes of the time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. THAYER] unexpired.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. WILSON] to yield the floor at this time. If he will do so, then I will ask the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PENDLETON] to consent to have this subject postponed until I can report a bill from the Committee of Ways and Means.

Mr. WILSON. I will yield the floor for that purpose.

Mr. PENDLETON. I shall be pleased to do as suggested by the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means [Mr. STEVENS] if it shall suit the convenience of the House. Therefore, in order to test the sense of the House, I will move that the further consideration of this subject be postponed until one week from to-morrow, which I believe is the first day upon the Calendar which will be unoccupied by any special order, and that it be made the special order for that day. There is no vacant day to which I can postpone this subject until Friday of next week, which is private bill day. I desire to suggest to gentlemen

who are interested in the Private Calendar that to-morrow has been especially assigned for its consideration. I hope the convenience of the House will be consulted by postponing this subject till that time.

Mr. WEBSTER. 1 desire to say that there has been no day devoted to the consideration of private bills during this session.

Mr. HOLMAN. To-morrow has been set apart for that.

Mr. WEBSTER. Very well. I will make no objection to the postponement.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the sum of $38.000 be, and the same is hereby, appropriated, to be added to the contingent fund of the House, to enable the House of Representatives to fulfill its pledges and obligations heretofore made; and the same shall be audited and settled on such vouchers as shall be produced by the Clerk of the House.

Mr. STEVENS. That is the only alteration made in the bill. Some of the Senators said that when it was in the former shape they could not help seeing it, and therefore they objected to it. I now call the previous question.

Mr. HOLMAN. According to the order of the House this bill is subject now to the same rules as in the Committee of the Whole. It is therefore inconsistent with that understanding to call the previous question now. And I desire to move to strike out the feature of the bill which has just been read.

Mr. STEVENS. The gentleman can move to strike that out, and then I will call the previous question.

Mr. HOLMAN. That is not in accordance with the order of the House, that this bill shall be considered in the House subject to the rules in force in Committee of the Whole.

Mr. STEVENS. If the gentleman wants to debate the question for five minutes I have no objection, and will withdraw the call for the previous question for that purpose.

Mr. HOLMAN. I move to strike out section two of this bill. What I especially object to in that section is the proposition that this House is pledged to the payment of this additional twenty per cent. to the employés of the House. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. STEVENS,] in discussing this subject yesterday, referred to precedents which had heretofore occurred, by which the House, by its own act, had appropriated out of the contingent fund sums of money. There are probably such instances, but I think no case can be found where so large a sum as this has been appropriated on the one hand, or where, upon the other hand, it was so distinctly and fairly a proposition to increase salaries.

Here is an attempt on the part of one branch of Congress to appropriate $38,000, upon the idea that it has a right to act independently of the other branch of Congress in the appropriation of the public money. It is the most remarkable state of affairs that has ever presented itself in this House. I think the country owes something to the other branch of this Congress in resisting this assumption of power on the part of the House of Representatives. A pledge! Why the gentleman from Pennsylvania,[Mr. STEVENS,] it seems to me, insults the intelligence of the coun

The motion to postpone was agreed to.

DEFICIENCY BILL.

Mr. STEVENS. I now ask leave to report from the Committee of Ways and Means a deficiency bill, for the purpose of starting it here and have it go to the Senate.

The bill was read a first and second time. Mr. STEVENS. I ask that this bill be considered in the House, and at this time.

Mr. HOLMAN. I shall not object, provided the bill is considered, subject to the same rules and the same points of order as in Committee of the Whole.

No objection being made, it was ordered accordingly.

Mr. STEVENS. I think the House will dispense with the reading of this bill at length after I have stated what it is. It is precisely the bill which the House agreed to, including the amendments of the Senate for the California and Denver mints, &c.; all that we agreed to, except the clause in relation to the House employés. I have put that matter in such shape that it will not, I

this House to give a certain sum of money! If gentlemen have been induced to go into the public employment upon the assurance and belief that they were to receive this additional compensation, then it might all be well enough. But, in fact, such is not the case.

On the other hand it is not to be presumed-I do not care what precedents may be referred to, it cannot be presumed-that any intelligent citizen believes that this House, by its own act, can increase by twenty per cent., or any other per cent., the salaries and compensation of public officers. I regret that the subject of such an amendment as this, involving a principle like this, should be deemed of so much importance on the part of the House. Gentlemen do not seem to consider that the employés of this House, gentlemanly as they are and as I have always asserted them to be, who have performed their duties faithfully and well so far as my experience has extended, are extremely well paid, it seems to me, in comparison with other employés of the Government.

Let me mention a single case by way of illustration. One gentleman, connected with this House as a committee clerk, who during this session will perform service for the period of three months, who is not required to remain here an hour after l the expiration of the three months, will receive

for his three months' service the handsome compensation of $1,800; and yet the duties of a clerk to a committee are not, even during the session, of the most laborious character. Yet some gentlemen talk about the employés of this House being unable to support themselves on the pay which they now receive!

The compensation paid to the employés of this House is in wonderful contrast with the salaries paid in other departments of the Government. Many of the departmental clerks, with wives and children to support, receive but $1,200 or $1,600 per annum, and this, too, for service, not during only three months, but during the entire year. Yet as a mere matter of favoritism-a favoritism which is the more readily exercised because bestowed upon those with whom we are in daily intercourse-members of this House are willing to exhibit this remarkable spectacle of partiality as legislators. I do not think, sir, that it is becoming to this House to so entirely forget other employés of the Government in a favoritism toward the employés of this House, however much these gentlemen may be entitled to our respect and confidence for the faithful performance of their duties.

I trust, sir, that the House will strike out this item of $38,000, and that we shall not set the example of this partial system of legislation. I hope, especially, that gentlemen upon this side of the House, who have always, in their respective States, protested against partiality in legislation, will not be found giving their sanction to a proposition so abhorrent to every principle of Democ

racy.

Mr. RANDALL, of Pennsylvania. I desire, Mr. Speaker, to say only a single word in connection with this matter, for the subject was very fully discussed yesterday, and the judgment of the House on the question was very decidedly expressed.

Sir, I do not, as the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HOLMAN] appears to do, regard this as a political question in any possible aspect. I have no appeal to make to this side of the House on po litical grounds. My appeal in favor of this appropriation is to justice and just men, irrespective of politics. These employes of the House are, I conceive, entitled to the money which we propose to appropriate. The faith of this House has been pledged to pay them this money, and I have no idea of allowing the other branch of Congress to dictate to us in relation to matters which pertain solely to this House, and which should be under our own control. I am not acquainted with any principle of Democracy that warrants me in doing injustice. On the contrary, the Democracy which I have learned has taught me to be just to all men.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Speaker, I only wish to say that this is the same proposition which was yesterday sustained in this House by a vote of two to one, except that it is now put in such a shape as will enable the Senate, without inconsistency, to acquiesce in it.

Mr.SLOAN. Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. STEVENS] consent to an amendment? Mr. STEVENS. Let me first hear what it is. Mr. SLOAN. It is to substitute for the section as it stands the following:

That a sufficient sum be appropriated to pay all the cmployés of the Government, in the civil and military service, twenty per cent., in addition to the pay they are now receiving.

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield for the purpose of allowing the amendment to be offered?

Mr. STEVENS. I suppose the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SLOAN] is in fun. [Laughter.] Mr. SLOAN. I am not in fun. I think my proposition is no more than just.

Mr. STEVENS. I decline to yield, and I move that the debate now close.

Mr. HOLMAN. I submit that, if this bill is to be considered as in Committee of the Whole, as the House has ordered, the gentleman cannot call the previous question, or move to close debate while any gentleman has an amendment to offer. That is the principle universally applied in Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman is familiar with the rules, and knows that the committee rises and goes into the House to close debate.

Mr. HOLMAN. That cannot be done while an amendment is pending.