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whole sum would have to be paid anyhow, because a contract would have to be made.

The SPEAKER. The Chair cannot answer as to that.

Mr. SCHENCK. The resolution is similar in its form to resolutions heretofore adopted for the purchase of national paintings.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will again report the resolution, that the inquiries of members may be answered by its language.

The Clerk again read the joint resolution. Mr. PIKE. I would like to see the purpose of this resolution carried out; but I desire to inquire of the gentleman from Ohio whether he would not consent to an amendment to subtract this amount of $25,000 from the appropriation of $40,000, which I understand has heretofore been made for a picture to be placed in the eye of the dome of the Capitol. It seems to me that such a painting would be a species of high art that it would be very uncomfortable to look at. With such a proviso as I have suggested, I should be very glad to see this naval painting executed by this excellent artist.

Mr. SCHENCK. I should have no objection to a modification of that kind.

On the motion to suspend the rules, there were, on a division-ayes 59, noes 40.

Mr. SCHENCK demanded tellers.

Tellers were ordered; and Messrs. SCHENCK and PRUYN were appointed.

The House divided; and the tellers reportedayes 69, noes 36.

Less than two thirds voting in the affirmative, the motion to suspend the rules was not agreed to.

MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION.

Mr. FERNANDO WOOD. I ask unanimous consent to offer a resolution, and if it be objected to I shall move to suspend the rules. The resolution is as follows:

Resolved, That it is the duty of the President to maintain, in every constitutional and legal manner, the integrity of the American Union as formed by the fathers of the Republic, and in no event, and under no circumstances, to proffer or accept negotiations which shall admit by the remotest implication the existence of any other federal or confederate government within the territory of the United States.

There being no objection, the resolution was considered and agreed to.

Mr. FERNANDO WOOD moved to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was adopted; and also moved that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table.

The latter motion was agreed to.

TRADE WITH REBELLIOUS STATES. Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise to make a privileged report from the Committee on Commerce, and I will state in one word the purport of the report.

The Committee on Commerce, who were charged with an investigation concerning trade with the rebellious States, have ascertained that the Committee on Commerce of the Senate are engaged in a similar examination; and for the purpose of saving expense, and having both committees pursue the same investigation, the Committee on Commerce of the House have directed me to ask the adoption of the following concurrent resolution:

Resolved, (the Senate concurring.) That the Committee on Commerce on the part of the Senate be joined to the Committee on Commerce on the part of the House in the investigations in which said Committee on Commerce on the part of the House are now engaged, under resolutions of the House of January 20, 1865, and January 25, 1865, in regard to trade with the States in rebellion, to constitute a Joint committee for the purpose of completing said investigation, and that the said joint committee have the same powers as the Committee on Commerce of the House now has on the subject of said investigation.

The resolution was agreed to.

Mr. WASHBURNE, of Illinois, moved to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was agreed to; and also moved that the motion to reconsider be laid on the table.

The latter motion was agreed to.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

A message was received from the Senate by Mr. HICKEY, its Chief Clerk, notifying the House that that body had passed a concurrent resolution providing joint rules for the government of the two Houses in counting the votes for President and Vice President of the United States, in which

he was directed to ask the concurrence of the House.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. STEVENS. I move that the rules be suspended, and that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the naval appropriation bill.

Mr. CHANLER. I ask the gentleman to yield

to me to submit a resolution.

Mr. STEVENS. I will when the naval appropriation bill has been passed.

The motion was agreed to.

The House accordingly resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, (Mr. SCHENCK in the chair,) and resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. No. 676) making appropriations for the naval service for the year ending June 30, 1866, the pending question being upon the amendment submitted by Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland, being to add the following to the bill:

Provided, That no money appropriated for the naval service shall be expended otherwise than in accordance with the following provision, so far as is applicable; that is to say, that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a Board of Admiralty, which shall consist of the vice admiral and one rear admiral, one commodore, one captain, one commander, and one lieutenant commander, over which the Secretary of the Navy or the officer highest in rank present shall preside; and when the subject under consideration shall appertain to the duties of any bureau in the Navy Department, the chief of such bureau shall be a member of the board, and entitled to sit and vote on the consideration of the subject.

SEC.. And be it further enacted, That the board shall deliberate in common, and advise the Secretary on any matters submitted by him relating to naval organization, naval legislation, the construction, equipment, and armament of vessels, navy-yards, and other naval establishments, and the direction, employment, and disposition of the naval forces in time of war. All such opinions shall be recorded.

SEC. And be it further enacted, That no vessel-ofwar shall be built or materially altered, nor any guns of new construction ordered or adopted, nor any engine for any vessel-of-war adopted or ordered, nor any permanent structure for naval service executed, until the plans, estimates, proposals, and contracts for the same shall have been submitted to the board, and its opinion and advice thereon communicated in writing to the Secretary; nor shall any patented invention be bought or adopted for the naval service without first the opinion of the board thereon having been taken; and all experiments decided to test inventions and naval plans and structures shall be conducted under the inspection of the board, or members thereof named by the Secretary, and submitted to the board for its opinion thereon.

SEC.. And be it further enacted, That all invitations for plans or proposals for any of the works above mentioned shall be prepared by the board, subject to the approval of the Secretary; and all bids or offers or proposals for the same shall be opened in the presence of the board, and the award inade by it, subject to the approval of the Secretary. SEC.. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary may add to the board, from time to time, other officers of the Navy eligible to the position of chief of bureau, not exceeding three, at any time, for consultation on any of the above subjects. The board may take the opinion of eminent practical engineers, mechanics, machinists, and architects in their respective branches of art or industry, when in their opinion the public service will be promoted by it, and pay them such reasonable compensation as the Secretary may approve.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the gentleman from Maryland, [Mr. Davis,] was entitled to the floor.

Mr. BLOW. I ask the gentleman to yield to

me.

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. BLOW. Mr. Chairman, the subject under discussion has been invested with extraordinary interest by the eloquence of the honorable gentleman from Maryland, whose acknowledged ability eminently fits him for the Herculean task which he has undertaken. I have listened to his statements and reflections with intense and painful interest, and with a regret far exceeding any that I have ever experienced upon this floor. 1 do not doubt the purity of the gentleman's intention; no one regards him more warmly or esteems him more highly than myself. But I do most emphatically condemn the taste and judgment || which induced him to attack the Navy of our country, and to suggest a remedy for fancied imperfections and failures in the midst of its greatest achievements, and at a time when every consideration of justice, patriotism, and policy should have prompted the statesmen of the two Houses to present the power and progress of this strong arm of our Government, and not to indulge in arguments and criticisms calculated to degrade it and our Administration in the eyes of the world.

I hope I may be permitted, therefore, in my own way to present another view of the Navy of the

United States; not going into useless details nor classifying our vessels as he has done to show how few are as perfect and as well suited to the age as they would have been with years to model and build them, but rapidly reviewing their main features and services, begging you to recollect that they sprung into existence with a rapidity the world, and indulging only in such statements which has never been equaled in the history of and assertions as will be supported by the evidence of the brightest and purest men in this land. I say in my own way, Mr. Chairman, for no report of the speech has been printed, and I have sought access only to those points referring especially to the monitors and the conflict with the Tennessee in Mobile bay; and my aim will be rather to place the Navy as it really is before the country than to follow the gentleman in all his disparagements of it.

The honorable gentleman who is leading this attack upon the United States Navy says-1 quote his own language

"The Monitor accidentally came into Hampton Roads as the Merrimac was trying to destroy, as it had already destroyed, some of our vessels. A collision took place. Neither party was destroyed; neither vessel was sunk; neither party was whipped, as the boy said, and the country ran wild over two guns in a cheese-box on a raft, not having done anything."

Such is the slur attempted to be cast upon a Department which so promptly and timely completed a vessel which preserved the character of the nation, the safety of its capital, and untold millions of its property. Let us go back for a moment and examine into the circumstances which rendered this combat the most famous of the war. The Merrimac, on the 8th of March, 1862, was the most formidable iron vessel in the world; she had on that day destroyed two of our frigates, utterly unable to cope with her; before her lay millions of property, which she proposed to destroy the next day, and then the Chesapeake could be cleared out, or, if her commander chose, every vessel in the Potomac between Fortress Monroe and Alexandria could be destroyed. Ay, more! our navy-yard here, with all its value to our Government at that critical period, would have fallen a victim to her irresistible power. If not this destruction, then her course in the Chesapeake would have cut off the gentleman's own Monumental city from the world. No communication could have existed between it and the capital except by railroad, and the army of Beauregard would have turned its course toward Washington instead of evacuating its long-held position when the news came to him that the brightest day in the history of the confederacy was succeeded by one that blasted all her hopes of naval supremacy and protection.

The little cheese-box, so insignificant as hardly to be seen by the side of her immense mailed antagonist, carried within her contracted walls the honor and genius of a great nation, and her two guns, an experiment yet untried by the great naval Powers of England and France, resounded through the world and said, what? Not that America was without a navy, without skill, genius, and the spirit of progress; but that the navies of those two nations belonged to the past, and were not able to dictate to the people who were struggling for freedom what course they should pursue toward rebels enlisted in the unholy cause of slavery. The gentleman has alluded to Admiral Farragut. I have asked this greatest of naval heroes the value of the contest between the Monitor and Merrimac, and whether if all the monitors since built on the same plan had been sunk into the ocean, costing, as my friend says, $13,000,000, the experience of that combat was not worth them all. He replied, with the comprehensiveness and patriotism that distinguish him, that such a result could not be estimated by dollars; in fact the moral weight of it was above all calculation. So much for the honorable gentleman's cheese-box. Such must have been the opinion of Secretary Chase also, for when the hour came that a great responsibility was to be taken, he did not hesitate to counsel the honorable Secretary of the Navy to persevere in creating such protection as this Monitor had proved to be.

Nor will I, Mr. Chairman, withhold from Captain Ericsson the gratitude we owe him; his genius has accomplished too much in this single instance for me to allude disparagingly to speculators and contractors. The gentleman is

ansparing; he condemns the Dictator on a rumor; damns the Puritan before she is launched, and disgraces the Dunderberg in the face of all that is claimed for her by her experienced builder, who has some character as a gentleman of honor, and a reputation as a constructor acquired by building some of the finest vessels that ever floated under any flag. My hope and belief is that the gentleman himself will one day own that he spoke rashly of this great vessel.

I will make no comments upon the statesmanship which so unjustly deals with a Department and its contractors, against which no single discreditable act can be brought, in the case, at least, of these vessels, remarking at the same moment, Mr. Chairman, that for four years all my time and all my thoughts have been devoted to protecting my Government against every man, high or low, that would take advantage of this trying time in its existence to build up a fortune for himself. I am no favorite with contractors or speculators. Congress, it is true, voted Captain Ericsson an immense sum. I had faith in the cominittee which recommended it. May I remind the gentleman that on that occasion he should have stood by his Government with his powerful influence?

I do not stand here, Mr. Chairman, to defend the monitor system of construction, or any other system of naval architecture. Their merits and defects have been the subject of essays from experts and officers of high standing in our Navy. Some of these I have carefully examined, and the exalted reputation of many of the writers must give great force, if it does not add conviction, to their arguments. But few of us are competent to decide this interesting question from our own knowledge of the principles underlying it, or from any experience which we ourselves have had with the vessels. We must necessarily take the testimony of those who have such knowledge, and who possess such experience. Fortunately we have this testimony, and we have it of such high character that it should carry conviction to the minds of all unprejudiced men. I beg the indulgence of the House while I introduce some of this testimony. For no other cause has the Navy Department been so much and so severely criticised as for the construction of the monitors, and believing myself that the administration of that Department has been eminently successful, I propose to show that in the construction of the monitors it acted with sound judgment, and was guided by the best lights it could obtain.

The gentleman from Maryland has severely animadverted upon the building of so many monitors immediately after the contest of the Monitor and Merrimac, without that careful investigation which was necessary to secure the Department and the country against the evils to result, and which the gentleman endeavored to show have resulted, from constructing vessels of no value

to us.

The plan for building the first monitor was submitted to a board of admiralty before it was adopted by the Department, and this board was composed of Admirals Smith, Davis, and Paulding. We may form some idea of the favorable opinion of the plan entertained by the board and of the prompt action of the Department by the following quotation from a letter written by her constructor (Ericsson) to the New York Herald upon the subject:

"A more prompt and spirited action is probably not on record in a similar case than that of the Navy Department as regards the Monitor. The committee of naval commanders, appointed by the Secretary to decide on the plans of gunboats laid before the Department, occupied me less than two hours in explaining my new system. In about two hours more the committee had come to a decision. After their favorable report had been to the Secretary, I was called into his office, where I was detained less than five minutes. In order not to lose any time, the Secretary ordered me to 'go ahead at once.' Consequently, while the clerks of the Departinent were engaged in drawing up the formal contract, the iron which now forms the keel plate of the Monitor was drawn through the rolling mill."

On the 10th of March Captain G. J. Van Brunt, commanding the frigate Minnesota, gave the following testimony to the merits of this "cheesebox," as the honorable gentleman has sneeringly called her:

"At six a. m. the enemy again appeared, coming down from Craney Island, and I beat to quarters, but they ran past my ship and were heading for Fortress Monroe, and the retreat was beaten to allow my men to get something to eat. The Merrimac ran down near to the Rip-Raps, and

then turned into the channel through which I had come. Again all hands were called to quarters, and when she approached within a mile of us I opened upon her with my stern guns, and made signal to the Monitor to attack the enemy. She immediately run down in my wake, right within range of the Merrimac, completely covering my ship as far as was possible with her diminutive dimensions, and, much to my astonishment, laid herself right alongside of the Merrimac, and the contrast was that of a pigmy to a giant. Gun after gun was fired by the Monitor, which was returned with whole broadsides from the rebels, with no more effect, apparently, than so many pebble-stones thrown by a child. After awhile they commenced maneuvering, and we could see the little battery point her bow for the rebels, with the intention, as I thought, of sending a shot through her bow port-hole, then she would shoot by her, and rake her through the stern. In the mean time the rebels were pouring in broadside after broadside, but almost all her shot flew over the little submerged propeller, and when they struck the bomb-proof tower, the shot glanced off without producing any effect, clearly establishing the fact that wooden vessels cannot contend with iron-clad ones; for never before was anything like it dreamed of by the greatest enthusiast in mari

time warfare.

"The Merrimac, finding that she could make nothing of the Monitor, turned her attention once more to me. In the morning she had put an eleven-inch shot under my counter, near the water line; and now, on her second approach, I opened upon her with all my broadside guns and ten-inchi pivot-a broadside which would have blown out of water any timber-built ship in the world. She returned my fire with her rifled bow gun, with a shell which passed through the chief engineer's state-room, through the engineers' mess-room, amidships, and burst in the boatswain's room, tearing four rooms all into one in its passage, and explod ing two charges of powder, which set the ship on fire, but it was promptly extinguished by a party headed by my first lieutenant. Her second shell went through the boiler of the tug-boat Dragon, exploding it, and causing some consternation on board my ship for the moment, until the matter was explained. This time I had concentrated upon her an incessant fire from my gun-deck, spar-deck, and forecastle pivot guns, and was informed by my marine officer, who was stationed on the poop, that at least fifty solid shot struck her on her slanting side without producing any apparent effect. By the time she had fired her third shell the little Monitor had come down upon her, placing herself between us, and compelled her to change her position, in doing which she grounded; and again I poured into her all the guns which could be brought to bear upon her. As soon as she got off she stood down the bay, the little battery chasing her with all speed, when suddenly the Merrimac turned around and ran full speed into her antagonist. For a moment I was anxious; but instantly I saw a shot plunge into the iron roof of the Merrimac, which surely must have damaged her."

Under the same date Captain H. Y. Purviance, of the frigate St. Lawrence, states the following: "The Monitor, whose performance more than equaled the highest expectations, contributed most powerfully to the withdrawal of the Merrimac, and her earlier arrival would have prevented the unfortunate loss of our two defenseless frigates."

In a letter dated the 9th of March, 1862, Chief Engineer Stimers says, addressing Captain Erics

son:

"After a stormy passage, which proved us to be the finest sea boat I was ever in, we fought the Merrimac for more than three hours this forenoon, and sent her back to Norfolk in a sinking condition."

Lieutenant S. D. Greene, of the United States Navy, and executive officer of the Monitor, states, under date of March 27, to the Department:

"I received to-day your communication of the 25th instant. I do not consider this steamer a sea-going vessel. During her passage from New York her roll was very easy and slow, and not at all deep. She pitched very little and with no strain whatever. She is buoyant and not very lively. The inconveniences we experienced can be easily remedied. For smooth-water operations, such as she was engaged in on the 9th instant, I think her a most desirable vessel. The opinion of experienced seamen on board is the same as my own."

The Department had therefore the action of a board of admiralty recommending a trial of the monitor plan. It had the evidence of the remarkable invulnerability of the completed vessel in this contest. It had the testimony of all these naval officers, and the oral representations of many more in praise of the vessel, and it knew the disaster that would have resulted to us if the Merrimac had not been defeated. It knew that the Merrimac was not destroyed, and had no means of knowing whether she had been seriously damaged. It knew that other iron-plated vessels were being constructed by the rebels, and it knew the responsibility which rested upon it of providing for the increasing efforts of the rebels in the same direction. It had no other armored vessel afloat upon tide-water with which to compare the merits of the Monitor. Those on the Mississippi had been eminently successful under the skillful and gallant Foote, but they were not capable of being moved from harbor to harbor on the sea-coast. The iron-clads of Europe had not given satisfaction to the Powers which constructed them. Our own Ironsides had not yet been completed, and

was not for many months afterwards. The wants of the Government were immediate, were pressing, and were of the most extraordinary character. With all this testimony in favor of the Monitor, and the absence of any better plan being submitted and successfully tested, the Department was not only justified in Building as many monitors as Congress would pay for, but it would have been culpable in the highest degree not to have put them in the course of immediate construction. The wisdom of the decision of the Department to build these monitors was not only sustained by the state of facts at the time they were placed under construction, but the testimony which is borne by the highest officers of the Government in their favor since they have been completed and tried makes the action of the Department in this whole matter as invulnerable as are the vessels themselves. I propose as briefly as possible to present a small part of this testimony, but sufficient, I trust, to prove the truth of this

assertion.

Rear Admiral Dahlgren, in his report on ironclads, says:

"During the progress of the engineers toward Wagner the iron-clads played an important part, using their guns whenever an opportunity offered, as shown in the instances quoted on page 583. It may be readily conceived that, all things being equal, it was just as easy for the rebels to have worked toward our position as it was for our troops to work toward theirs. But there was a' serious difference in the fact that the canuon of the iron-clads, and also of the gunboats, completely enfiladed the entire width of the narrow island, and absolutely interdicted any operation of the kind on the part of the rebels. In addition, whenever their fire was bearing severely on our own workmen, a request from the general always drew the fire of the vessels; and I do not know that it failed to be effective in any instance.

"As a consequence the rebels were restricted to Wagner, and were powerless to hinder the progress of the trenches that were at last carried into the very ditch of the work, and decided its evacuation without assault."

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"The duties of the iron-clads were not performed under idle batteries. The guns of Wagner never failed to open on them, and fired until their crews were driven, by those of our iron-clads, to take shelter in the bomb-proofs. One of these cannon, a ten-inch, left deep dents on every turret that will not easily be effaced."

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"During the operations against Morris Island the nine iron-clads fired eight thousand projectiles, and received eight hundred and eighty-two hits. Including the service at Sumter in April and the Ogechee, the total number was eleven hundred and ninety-four." "The battering received was withont precedent. The Montauk had been struck two hundred and fourteen times; the Weehawken one hundred and eighty-seven times, and almost entirely by ten-inch shot. What vessels have ever been subjected to such a test?”

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"The speed of the monitors is not great, (seven knots,) but it is quite respectable with a clean bottom, and is fully equal to that of the Ironsides. Their steerage is peculiar, but when understood and rightly managed not ditheult of control. They pivot with celerity, and in less space than almost any other class of vessel." "The monitors could operate in most of the channels; could direct their fire around the whole circle, and were almost equally well defended on all sides.

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"The defects in both classes of vessels are susceptible of being remedied partially or entirely. The defense of the Ironsides could be made complete, and that of the monitors equally so."

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"The Ironsides is a fine, powerful ship. Her armor has stood heavy battering very well, and her broadside of seven eleven-inch guns and one eight-inch rifle bas always told with signal effect when opened on the enemy. Draught of water about fifteen and a half to sixteen feet. Speed six to seven knots, and crew about four hundred and forty

men."

As no other officer in the service has had so much experience with the monitors, and none are more competent to judge of their merits than this able officer, his testimony is entitled to the highest respect.

Admiral Porter's testimony of the seaworthiness and efficiency of the monitors at Fort Fisher is of such recent date and possesses such deep interest that it is doubtless fresh in the minds of the members of the House and need not be repeated.

In his letter to the Department, dated February 16, 1864, he says of the first monitor:

"I remember pronouncing that vessel a perfect success, and capable of defeating anything that then floated.' I was looked upon at that time as something of an enthusiast, as my opinions were widely at variance with those of some scientific gentlemen. The results have justified mu in forming a high estimate of the monitor principle."

In this connection the opinion of the able chiet of the Engineer corps of the Army is not without great interest. General Barnard says:

"I formed a high opinion of armored and turreted vessels built after Mr. Ericsson's designs, particularly as barbor-defense vessels; in fact coming to the conclusion that his plans furnish the best solution of the problem of constructing vessels for this purpose. I also believed that in the Dictator and Puritan we should have vessels capable of

encountering the heaviest seas, if not of keeping the sea a long time, and making transatlantic voyages, and that, from their armament and slight exposure to an enemy's shot, they would contend successfully with anything afloat."

To this testimony I might go on and add the testimony of Commodore Rodgers and other officers in the Navy; but enough has certainly been adduced to show that the Department has acted with good judgment in ordering the monitors, and to satisfy any unprejudiced mind that our iron-clads are not only not a failure, but constitute the hope, the pride, and the bulwark of the Republic. That they have faults I have no doubt, but they are better than anything our enemies have, and before they get anything to equal them the ingenuity of our constructors will have perfected the novel ideas of Captain Ericsson and others, and we will still be ahead of all competitors.

The Department has been assailed for not constructing more vessels of the Ironsides type instead of so many monitors. It is denounced for constructing monitors before their merits were fully established by other contests and trials besides that with the Merrimac. But the assailants of the Department forget that no contracts for ocean vessels have been made since the trial of the Ironsides, for the very good reason that Congress refused the necessary appropriation for the purpose. The plan of Mr. Webb for the Dunderberg and that of Mr. Whitney for the Keokuk were the only plans for ocean vessels approved by the board of officers appointed to examine and report upon them while the Ironsides was building. The eminent success of the Monadnock not only bears evidence to the ability of the officials of the Department, but to the wisdom of ordering the construction of four of this class, all designed in the Department and constructed in our own navy-yards. They are double-turreted vessels, built of wood, and heavily plated.

The gentleman told us on last Thursday that our iron-clad navy was a failure. Constructions that have grown up like magic under the inspiring touch of American energy and American talent, and which constituted the pride of our people and the bulwark of the nation against foreign arrogance; this best bower of the ship of State, upon which our faith was resting to hold us in safety from the hidden rocks and breakers of hostile shores, is declared to be a failure. These terrible engines of naval war that bear upon their mailed coats countless marks of shot and shell, that have been so carefully studied by the ablest engineers of enlightened Europe for the last three years, which have furnished models to be copied by Denmark and Sweden and Russia, after the most mature and careful investigations, are declared to be failures. We are gravely told that this iron-clad navy has accomplished nothing; that they have never silenced forts of any kind. Shade of the immortal Foote! are the glories of Fort Henry so soon forgotten? Have the dead on the decks of the DeKalb, the Cincinnati, and their consorts at Donelson, no place in the national memory? Are the fires which lighted the island scenery of No. 10 from a hundred iron throats, as the Carondelet and Pittsburg passed them, no longer remem bered? Is the desperate conflict with the rebel rams at Fort Pillow and at Memphis not written in American history? Was nothing done by the gallant Porter and the Essex, when the Arkansas was destroyed? Have the trophies of Arkansas Post no glorious reminiscences? Has the history of Vicksburg and Grand Gulf been lost in oblivion? Why did the old salamander, he of the iron heart, with the laurels of New Orleans fresh upon his brow, and the praises of a great nation for his gallant deeds still echoing over the land; why, I say, did our country's pride, the noble Farragut, deem it unsafe to attack Mobile until he had four of these iron-clads which are pronounced so worthless by the gentleman from Maryland? Did the four hundred and fifty-pounder that crashed through the side of the Tennessee effect nothing? Nor the one hundred and eighty-pounder blows of the Mississippi river iron-clads, when disabling her steering gear and closing her ports, effect nothing, when the lighter shots of the wooden vessels were falling harmless upon her? Will the gentleman from Maryland insist that the wooden vessels captured the almost impregnable Tennessee, when the published survey of the captured vessel made by Captains Jenkins and Alden, Commander Le Roy, and Chief Engineer

Wilkinson, shows exactly how the damage was inflicted that placed her at the mercy of the fleet? He sees no virtue in an iron-clad carrying hundreds of tons of armor to enable her to cope with our enemies unless she steers with all the facility of a pleasure yacht; and because one of the four ironclads which entered Mobile bay on the 5th of August had her turrets disabled in that fierce contest, he condemns the whole as worthless.

For the information of the honorable gentleman, and to correct any false impression as to the value of the four double-turreted vessels now holding the harbor of Mobile, I will ask the Clerk to read a portion of a private letter from a brave and skillful officer in the fleet at Mobile to the gentleman who designed and constructed those vessels on the Mississippi river. This officer holds the very important position of fleet engineer of the western Gulf blockading squadron, and knowing him well, I can bear my humble testimony to his purity of character as well as the value of his testimony. The Clerk read, as follows:

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WEST GULF SQUADRON, ENGINEER'S DEPARTMENT, December 15, 1864. MY DEAR SIR: * * I know you have been kept posted on our monitors by your many friends attached to them in our squadron. You have no doubt been informed that with a little effort we got the other two, namely, the Milwaukee and Kickapoo. I got the admiral to change off the Manhattan (Ericsson monitor) and the rebel ram Tennessee for them, and before this gets to you we shall have them at anchor within three miles of Mobile, the only vessels upon which we depend for an entrée to that harbor when we get ready to inake the start. They have grown so in favor with everybody that it almost amounts to an affection, particularly after the fight in Mobile bay.

I feel happy to think that these vessels have come up to my expectations, and that I succeeded in carrying out my views and wisties, long since expressed, namely, to get them in the Mobile fight. They did it, and I am satisfied. Yours truly, WILLIAM S. SHOCK, U. S. N.

TO JAMES B. EADS, Esq. Mr. BLOW. I will state that I myself have heard Admiral Farragut speak in the highest terms of these vessels. He does not hesitate to say that they are absolutely necessary now to hold Mobile bay; that the management of the iron-clad Chickasaw was splendid, and that the strength and power of the Manhattan was terrific. I agree with my friend from Maryland that Farragut can go anywhere in a wooden vessel, but that is simply because he is an iron-clad himself. But I have still other evidence from an impartial naval officer who has always been regarded with favor by our countrymen, and who differs widely with the gentleman from Maryland in regard to these costly guns inclosed in a cheese-box. It is dated Claremont, January 11, 1865, is from the Prince de Joinville, and the extracts from it read as follows:

"The glorious action of the Kearsarge and Alabama, and the magnificent fight of Admiral Farragut, must be studied in all their details. The mode of fighting the forts adopted by Admiral Farragut was an act of genius, and his orders were carried out in the most beautiful manner. But the Tennessee was a very serious enemy, and it required the fifteen inch at close quarters to do it for her.

"The amount of resistance furnished by the Tennessee, and every other example of your war, show how useful ironclads are for harbor and coast defense. English, French, Italians, Turks, and Spaniards, are building very expensive sea going iron-clads, but with some misgivings, and I understand their misgivings. Build a gunboat of great speed, with a few lines of thickness in bed-plates in excess of those of the English and French iron-clads, and with one good big smooth-bore gun, and she will be a match for the whole fleet."

I like this letter. It shows a correct appreciation of our Navy and of the genius of our people. The gentleman from Maryland, not recollecting the unfortunate result attending a previous controversy on the subject of improved steam machinery, has alluded in rather unhandsome terms to that designed by the Department, and now being built for our new vessels-of-war. It is well known throughout the world that we are specially skilled in the planning and manufacturing of steam engines, and the completeness of our great constructions for the merchant and naval service is universally acknowledged. I beg to refer him to the report of the Naval Committee of the House who have so ably vindicated their industry and ability on this floor, and which is thus noticed by the Army and Navy Register in its issue of last Saturday, the 4th instant:

"The Naval Committee of the House are understood to have unanimously adopted the report of their chairman, Mr. A. II. KICE, on the subject of the resolution introduced during the last session, on the condition of naval machinery built by Mr. Isherwood, the chief of the Bureau of Steam

Engineering; the causes of the failure of the machinery of the Pensacola, from the plans of Mr. E. N. Dickerson, and the administration of the engineering department of the Navy, including the charges of fraud and incapacity. The report vindicates the management of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, stating that the machinery is in accordance with the latest improvements, and that the mode adopted of using the steam, with a very moderate measure of expansion, is in accordance with the most recent scientific researches and practical experiments, and has the indorsement of all able and experienced engineers. The comparison of his machinery with that previously constructed for our Navy, and for the French and English navies, and for the merchant marine, shows an incontestable superiority and a greater speed of vessels."

Mr. Chairman, the iron-clad vessels alluded to as having achieved the great victories that so strengthened the cause of the Union in the valley of the Mississippi, were mostly constructed by a man whose genius was brought forth by this rebellion and the necessities of the country, and whose future, if we are faithful to ourselves, will be as brilliant as his past has been patriotic and useful. I allude, sir, to the only genius of the day who is now conceded by the naval men of this country to be without a superior, if he has a rival-James B. Eads, of St. Louis, who has constructed twenty-one iron-clad vessels, whose successes are the pride of the whole nation.

Sir, if the entire monitor and iron-clad fleets constructed on the sea-board had failed, and nothing had been accomplished except what has been achieved by the western iron-clad navy, this country could well afford to forgive the errors which had caused such a failure in the magnificent result we have obtained through their agency West. If the twenty light-draught monitors now constructing, about which so much has been said, are failures, a result which I hope will never be established, I still contend that, taking all that the entire Navy has done, there are no services equal to it in the history of navies and navy struggles. Let those at home who are not satisfied with results which have startled England and France from their fancied security, enlighten us as to the exact method which they would have pursued under similar circumstances and in detail, and then we can be able to judge better of the errors complained of.

And are we to be told that this great country cannot in times like these go boldly into constructions and experiments, if you please, which promise at least success? Are we to stand still when our rebel adversaries, weak in money and mechanics, are duplicating their Merrimacs, Atlantas, and Tennessees? Is our Government to be held up to the criticisms of the world, and our own people to be the means of exhibiting every little failure made in this gigantic struggle? Are the men whose integrity, patriotism, skill, and devotion have never been doubted, to be pros-' trated the very hour when their labors are being crowned with success? Let us indulge the hope, sir, that such a result will not occur.

There are now in the Department plans of a steamer that it is claimed can run to the city of London and back again without coaling, and destroy within the time $500,000,000 of English property on the way and in that city, resisting all the engines of war yet devised by English skill and English gold. These plans have been submitted by one whose enterprises have ever been successful, and whose genius has been acknowledged by the highest naval authorities of our country.

My feelings and policy dictate that we should go on in the work of construction. Now, more than ever, do we need Ironsides, Monadnocks, and the Leviathan that can destroy the hopes of tyrants as well as their cities and forts. Let us not waste our time in idle disputes and unfriendly criticisms. Remember that Bull Run, Chickasaw Bluffs, Red River, and the two hundred thousand dead in Virginia, are passed over in the glorious victories and marches of Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas; and so must our errors of construction, if they really exist, be forgotten in the brilliant achievements which have immortalized Foote, Farragut, Davis, Porter, Du Pont, Dahlgren, and a host of other naval heroes.

But I pass, Mr. Chairman, with much pleasure from the discussion of points that I deeply regret were ever pressed upon us, and beg the attention of the committee to some considerations of grave importance.

We have achieved our present supremacy on the ocean as a result incident to the suppression of the rebellion. Possessing the domination of

Now, how are we prepared to build sea-going armored ships? With resources in iron and materials superior to those of England, the few private yards in this country are mere make-shifts compared with them. The combined capabilities of them all are not equal to one such as are to be found on the river Thames. What are our navyyards, and how are they prepared to meet the changes taking place in ships-of-war, and to meet the demands of a Navy which has grown in proportions until it is acknowledged to be superior to any other afloat? The Chatham dock-yard when completed will have an area of three hundred and eighty-nine acres, the whole of the ground being occupied by basins, dry-docks, ship-houses, and substantial steam factories. The New York navy

the seas, policy, interest, and humanity conspire
to prompt its retention. When we are able to
sweep the ocean and bid defiance to all whom in-
terest or passion might otherwise prompt to at-
tack us, we need not fear that our peace will be
molested. We have the highest possible motives
for maintaining this superiority; but with the
enormous ability to construct ocean steamers pos-
sessed by Great Britain at this day, we cannot
hope to do so without such immediate legislation
as will tend to increase our facilities for the con-
struction and repair of iron-clad vessels. The des
velopments of the war have shown that the Brit-
ish navy is to-day far inferior to our own. But
it is only so because of the immense additions
and improvements in construction that have been
made by us during the rebellion. These improve-yard, the most important we possess, covers an
ments are well known to England and France,
and if they do not at once adopt them it will be
only because they hope to get some that are bet-
ter, not because they will trust to those of the
past. In a very few years those nations, Eng-The Philadelphia navy-yard has a total area of but
land especially, will possess a navy quite as pow-
erful as our own, if we remain idle. "Eternal
vigilance is the price of safety."

At this day England is turning out from her immense private yards on the Clyde, the Thame, the Mersey, the Tees, the Tyne, and Wear, five hundred thousand tons of iron merchant vessels per annum. She is to-day duplicating the entire tonnage of our navy annually in iron steam vessels for the ocean, and this in her private yards alone. We are not able to build in all our private establishments together more than one sixth part of this tonnage. This is a startling fact that it is well for us to remember; but it is not the only remarkable truth which has been brought to our attention by the very able and interesting report of Chief Engineer J. W. King, United States Navy, and embodied in and published with the last annual report of the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. King was sent last summer by the Department to examine the dock-yards and iron-clad establishments in England and France, and I am glad to be able to say that every facility was extended to him by the Governments of those countries in the performance of his duties.

available space of about twenty-five acres, not
one fifteenth part as large as the Chatham yard.
It has one stone dry-dock, two ship-houses, and
other limited facilities for wood ship-building only.

surely come when one or the other of those great Powers feel that they are safe in precipitating it. A jealous regard for the condition and effectiveness of our naval establishment is the surest way of keeping the peace and inspiring those and all other great Powers with a wholesome respect for the American Republic. I apprehend that there are few members upon this floor who do not feel satisfied that our iron-clad navy has been the only obstacle to prevent the hostile designs of France and England from assuming a form that would have compelled a declaration of war with them.

When we contemplate the enormous cost of this war, estimated by many at not less than $4,000,000,000, we can form some idea of what the cost of a war with those nations would probably be. If we compare the cost of this war with the cost of our entire Navy, $280,000,000, which includes its maintenance for four years, we find the latter is only one fourteenth part of this outlay. And this will enable us to form some idea of the great economy of the Navy in a struggle like the present, when we compare the results it has accomplished with the cost of similar results when achieved by the Army. Nor has this $280,000,000 all vanished in smoke and cannonshot, in shoddy clothing or the commissary supplies that have been consumed; but it is to-day fending our foreign commerce, blockading rebellious shores, or battering down the strongholds of treason and bidding defiance to unfriendly Powers. These six hundred and seventy-one vessels, at the low average of $200,000 each, would represent a value of $134,000,000, or nearly one half of the entire outlay. The balance, $150,000,000 in round numbers, will represent the cost of maintaining it for four years—an average of $37,500,000 per an

nine acres. It would require forty-three such
yards to make one equal to the Chatham yard in
England. It has one wood floating-dock, and
two ship-houses, but not a steam factory, or any
preparations for either the construction or repair
of steam machinery. The Boston navy-yard, of
but small area, has one stone dry-dock, three ship-existing in substantial ships-of-war that are de-
houses, and is comparatively well prepared for
constructing and repairing vessels; while the yard
at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, is but little in
advance of that at Philadelphia. The Washing-
ton yard has greater facilities for building ma-
chinery than all the others, but has not a single
dock. Our navy-yards on the Atlantic coast
possess two stone dry-docks and two wooden
floating-docks, with other proportionate facilities,
while the British will soon have forty-four stone
dry-docks, beside unequaled resources in private
docks. On the river Mersey alone there are
twenty-four dry or graving-docks!

Apart from the limited facilities of our yards, they are in no way prepared, nor is there sufficient room in them, for building iron-clads. The Secretary of the Navy has frequently called attention to the subject, and the Department is much embarrassed for want of a proper yard, and the longer action in this matter is delayed the greater will be the difficulties and embarrassments that will arise to the Department, and the more imminent the danger to the country. Shall we allow this session to pass without deciding on so important a national measure-one in which the whole nation is interested, and in which no sectional or party feelings should or ought to inter

fere?

When we consider the manner in which our Navy, exclusive of iron-clads, has been improvised by the purchase of vessels from the merchant marine, we can readily see the great superiority which England would possess in drawing an increase to her navy from a merchant service which is increasing at the rate of five hundred thousand tons per annum in iron vessels under the stimulus of a demand which has resulted from her unfriendly conduct in giving aid and comfort to the enemies of this Government.

We learn from Mr. King's report the fact that England is far ahead of us in her ability to construct ocean iron steamers in her private yards; and that in her national establishments for the construction and repair of armored war vessels she is beyond all comparison superior to us. From his report it appears that there are in England seven naval or dock-yards; one of them, that at Chatham, is being extensively enlarged specially for the construction of iron-armored vessels-of-war, while another, situated at Portsmouth, is to be enlarged with like views. The total area of the British dock-yards exceeds five hundred and fifty acres, possessing thirty-six and a quarter acres basin accommodations, 32 stone dry-docks, and 31 ship-houses; and when Chatham and Portsmouth are completed, the ground covered by them all will exceed one thousand acres, containing 44 stone dry-docks and as many ship-houses; all other preparations being proportionate and comparatively gigantic. Besides these national works for the construction of fleets, the British have vast resources in the shape of iron-ship-yards and ironworks. It is seen that on the Clyde are 33 ironship-building yards, the productions from which in 1863 were 170 iron vessels with an aggregate of 120,700 tons. On the river Thames during the same year 117,000 tons of iron vessels were built; on the Mersey 80,000 tons; on the Tyne | 51,236; on the Wear 25,000, and on the Tees 15,000-making a total of 408,996 tons of iron vessels built in 1863; and it is estimated that during the past year, 1864, upward of 500,000 tons of iron vessels were constructed in the British dock-yards, exclusive of those built for the royal navy. Some of the private iron-ship-yards have large capitals, and are very extensive and complete in all respects. Mr. King's report informs us that the constructive capabilities of either of the great Thames yards are equal to 25,000 tons or ten heavy iron vessels in hand and progressing simultaneously. Such are the facilities possessed by the British for building and equipping ironclads. The Admiralty there could in the event of war, in addition to their own extensive dock-bitious designs of the French emperor, so boldly yards, command the services of more than 40 private iron-ship-building yards.

||

num.

The Government has been and is still paying bounties to volunteers for the Army at the rate of $300 per man, and through the past three years local bounties have been paid in addition sufficient to average at least $300 more. These local bounties, although not paid by the Government, are nevertheless paid by those who must be required to meet the interest on the public debt and provide for its ultimate liquidation; hence the whole amount of these bounties, say $600 per man, come from the same fountain source, the people, and it is proper to estimate their total amount as part of the expenses of the war. But these bounties alone are but a small part of the cost of maintaining the Army, and yet the total bounties alone paid to the volunteers in one year for the Army would defray the entire expense of maintaining our splendid naval establishment for ten years. This, Mr. Speaker, is a fact well worth pondering over by the ablest statesmen. When war comes it involves the vast machinery of an army with its stupendous expenditures. Is it not the part of wisdom to put the probability of a foreign war as far beyond the regions of possibility as it is in the power of the nation to do when it can be done at a cost that is insignificant when compared with the cost of such a war-a cost that is as trifling when compared with the cost of war as is the premium we pay to the insurance company when compared with the loss we desire to be protected against? Such protection we gain by maintaining a Navy commensurate with the grandeur of the

The want of at least one complete navy-yard near the Atlantic sea-board, with these startling facts in full view before us, is a great national misfortune, and its immediate construction is de-nation, and capable by the power and efficiency manded by every consideration of interest, prudence, and policy. And yet there are gentlemen on this floor ready to vote defiant resolutions embodying the Monroe doctrine, and to march our armies into Canada, but who can go quietly to their homes and tell their constituents that they have faithfully discharged the trust confided in them, when they know we do not possess one single national establishment in the whole country for the construction of iron-clads, nor even the proper facilities for docking and repairing the armored vessels which now constitute our sole dependence, notwithstanding the Secretary of the Navy has time and again urged upon us the duty of providing these great national means of preserving our present Navy and providing for the inevitable necessity of its increase.

The unfriendly spirit manifested by England
during the last four years toward us, and the am-

developing themselves upon this continent, should
admonish us to be prepared for a conflict that will

of its construction and organization to protect the honor and advance the interests of the Republic. If our Navy be preserved by such facilities for repairs and construction as are absolutely demanded, and its development properly fostered, we need not fear but that American genius and enterprise will be amply sufficient to keep it through all time where it is to-day-in advance of all the nations of the earth. But let us be admonished by the fable of the turtle and the hare, and not believe that because we are now so superior to our competitors that we can afford to slumber and not expect to find them in advance of us when we awake. By American genius we have taught the Old World the worthlessness of many of their theories, and they will doubtless draw wisdom from our experience and the rapid development of facts that are constantly manifesting themselves in this present struggle. Twelve million dollars' worth of Armstrong breech-loaders in Great Britain were demolished when one blow of a Yankee four hundred and fifty pounder struck the rebel

iron-clad Atlanta. And it needed but one American armored ship in Hampton Roads to show England that

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"Ruined was her buckler and broken was her shield." Her boasted rule of the waves was as empty on that day as the command of her Danish king to those same waves a thousand years ago: "Thus far shalt thou come, and no further." Of her one thousand and four war vessels, but four remained to assert Britain's ocean supremacy. And the bombardment of Fort Sumter, with the much-abused monitors, if it did nothing more, taught our transatlantic neighbors that the new system, so much criticised and ridiculed in this Hall, was too invulnerable for their intermeddling to prove advantageous to them. That bombardment, if it did not capture Charleston, was so full of instruction to France and England that it saved us from an intervention, the result of which no statesman on this floor would dare to prophesy.

In the wonderfully rapid construction of our Navy the energies of the Department have been taxed to the uttermost point through all its official ramifications; and the powers of the people, through the contract system, have been strained to their greatest capacity, and the consequence has been a wonderful development of resources and a remarkable degree of inventive talent and capacity for naval constructions. The result of all this is before the nation and the world in the form of a Navy which has dealt the rebellion some of its worst wounds and maintained the honor of the nation. It is now the most potent in the world; surpassing in all the elements of effectiveness that of France or England. It now controls more than twelve thousand miles of inland waters, giving confidence and support to our armies, which are seldom beyond the reverberation of its guns, and at the same time successfully scours the ocean in pursuit of Anglo-rebel pirates, and maintains a blockade which is the wonder of the world.

the ablest talent in the service, and confidently
trusting his reputation to the keeping of the loyal
people of the land; turning neither to the right
hand nor the left to defend himself from the scur-
rility and misrepresentation which has assailed
him, he has devoted his talents and energies to
the consummation of this grand object with the
modesty which attends true merit. Measured by
the criterion of success, the only touchstone which
a nation involved in a mighty struggle will trust
in, the honorable Secretary has naught to fear.
The stupendous work accomplished by the Navy,
the soul-thrilling victories it has achieved, and the
remarkable good fortune which has attended its
undertakings during this rebellion, bear incontro-
vertible testimony to the statesmanship which has
directed its operations, and stamp the administra-
tion of that Department as eminently successful.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to
record my profound admiration of the splendid
gallantry and devoted patriotism that have been
displayed by the naval heroes who have defended
the honor of the national flag with a devotion and
bravery which has won for them the admiration
of the world. I have on several occasions, by my
votes in this Hall, manifested my gratitude to these
gallant officers and men who have done so much
to defend our land from the curse of treason, and
would now, if I felt that my humble powers were
equal to so grand a theme, delight to dwell upon
the glories with which they have enriched the
story of these perilous times. But, Mr. Chairman,

"What skillful limner e'er would choose
To paint the rainbow's varying hues,
Unless to mortal it were given

To dip his brush in tints of heaven?"
The brilliancy of those achievements will make
history more attractive than romance. Poetry
will draw from its absorbing record immortal
themes to gild its graceful numbers, and many a
youthful hero in the dim and far-off future will
feel the first impulse of generous emulation while
listening to the songs and tales which recite the
deeds of Foote and Farragut.

Mr. STEVENS. I ask the gentleman from
Maryland to allow me to move that the commit-
tee rise, in order to close debate.

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. I do not object to that.

This truly gigantic work has been accomplished without ostentation, and with an economy which has even extorted praise from the hostile and mercenary press of England, and, as our investigating committees have shown, with less fraud and peculation than any other undertaken by the Government. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the results that have been accomplished, the Navy || Department has been repeatedly assailed in the most unjust and unreasonable manner, and its able chief ridiculed and caricatured until one would suppose that his principal occupation had been to pass his official hours in comfortable dozing in an easy arm-chair especially provided for that pur-Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, pose by himself at the Department. Friend and foe to the Union have alike been led to believe that what was so persistently asserted by his defamers must be true.

Treason, in mistaken security, ridiculed the efforts of the old man of the sea to shut up a coast equal to one seventh of the world's circumference, and made thrice difficult by the rich fringe of || islands, bays, peninsulas, sounds and inlets bordering it from Cape Henry to the Rio Grande and whose endless labyrinths gave friendly shelter to smugglers and pirates; but it has now awakened amid the terrors of starvation and the hopelessness of despair to see this stupendous work accomplished.

England, self-styled mistress of the seas, folded her snowy hands to rest when she saw the drowsy || lids of the old Rip Van Winkle, but his Kearsarge guns in the British Channel have roused her from her pleasant slumbers. Winslow is crashing through British oak. Her trained gunners of the Excellent are struggling in the agonies of death, and Cherbourg bears witness to the petty larceny of the pirate's English consort-Britain's neutral Deerhound.

When the history of this war is written, Mr. Chairman, no prouder record of able administrative talent and comprehensive coöperation will gild its instructive pages than that which recites the management of the Navy Department during the last four years. The utmost efforts of ridicule and defamation have been exhausted in vain endeavors to weaken the confidence of the people and the President in the ability of its Secretary. From the moment of his installation this gentleman seems to have pursued, with a fixedness of purpose rarely witnessed, a policy having for its object the throttling of treason and the domination of the ocean. Calling at once to his council

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Mr. STEVENS. I make that motion. I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

So the committee rose; and the Speaker having
resumed the chair, Mr. SCHENCK reported that the

having had under consideration the bill (H. R.
No. 676) making appropriations for the naval ser-
vice for the year ending 30th June, 1866, had come
to no resolution thereon.

Mr. STEVENS. I move that the debate in
the Committee of the Whole on the state of the
Union on the naval appropriation bill be closed
in one hour after its consideration shall be re-
sumed.

Mr. PIKE. Let it be an hour and a half. Mr. STEVENS. The debate has now run on interminably. We have a great deal of work to do. I cannot agree to more than an hour.

ordinary fairness, or exhibited in the course of their discussion of it that they had read the bill and amendment which they rejected, and understood that which they attempted to induce the House not to adopt, I should not have indulged in a word of reply; for, sir, no fact I have adduced from the public record of this or the last session has been controverted or can be controverted by them; nor, indeed, if those facts stand is there any reply possible to the considerations urged by me. But instead of meeting the argument I addressed upon a measure introduced upon grave deliberation and referred to that committee for its consideration now nearly a year ago, both honorable gentlemen commenced their observations by remarking on the personal feeling and temper of my remarks.

Now, sir, whether that temper was that of a May morning, or of a November night, scarcely affects the value of the measure before the House. Whether I am pleased with or disgusted with the gentlemen who preside over the Navy Department is not an argument either for or against the measure I presented. My wrath did not sink the lightdraught monitors, and the puffs of the Boston Advertiser cannot float them. If the gentlemen meant to intimate, for the purpose of weakening the weight of any observation I made here, that the measure I introduced is prompted by any personal feeling relative to the gentlemen who control that Department, I desire to say it is their invention, and nothing else, which gives foundation to the suggestion. I have not the honor of an acquaintance with either of those gentlemen. I have neither asked, nor received, nor been refused any favor at their hands, and that is more than the two gentlemen [Mr. RICE and Mr. PIKE] upon the committee can say for themselves.

If I am in ill-temper, and that ill-temper is to affect the judgment of the House upon the argument I presented, it is only fair to say-though I mention matters of this kind with great reluctance that the devotion to the Department of the honorable gentlemen upon my right may be supposed equally to affect the weight of their arguments. And so far as the gentleman upon my left, [Mr. GRISWOLD,] who adduces his testimony to the efficiency of the machinery and the structure of the Dictator, is concerned, I may be permitted to say that the gentleman, if I am not misinformed, has had an interest in the construction of the iron-clads, which may naturally be supposed to warp his judgment upon that subject at least as much as my disgust biases mine. So that, when the collateral facts are made, I submit, be my temper what it might, my argument is entitled to weigh equally with the arguments of gentlemen upon the other side, irrespective of the temper that dictated or pervaded them.

Mr. PIKE. Will the gentleman yield to me a moment?

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. My time is limited.

Mr. PIKE. The gentleman says he has neither asked, received, nor been refused any favors at the hands of the Navy Department, and that is more than gentlemen upon the committee can say. Has the gentleman any evidence to sustain that charge?

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. I did not make the

Mr. PIKE. I do not want to make a speech,
but others do. Make it an hour and a quarter.
Mr. STEVENS. The gentleman from Mary-charge.
land is entitled to close the debate; when he closes
I want the debate closed.

The motion was agreed to.

Mr. STEVENS. I move that the rules be suspended, and that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the naval appropriation bill.

The motion was agreed to.

The House accordingly resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, (Mr. SCHENCK in the chair,) and resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. No. 676) making appropriations for the naval service for the year ending June 30, 1866.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the pending question was the amendment of the gentleman from Maryland, [Mr. DAVIS,] on which that gentleman was entitled to the floor; and that the general debate had been limited by the House to one hour.

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, had the gentlemen of the Naval Committee treated the proposition I had the honor to present with

Mr. PIKE. Impliedly.

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. All I said or meant to say is, that the inclination or enlargement of the gentlemen's hearts toward the Department as seriously impairs the argument and weight of their judgment as mine.

Mr. PIKE. I understood the gentleman to say that it was more than I could say that I had neither asked, received, nor been refused favors at the hands of the Navy Department.

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. If the gentleman says he has not, he has only to say so.

Mr. PIKE. It is not for me to say whether I have or not. I ask the gentleman upon what proof he makes that assertion.

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. I will take the gentleman's word for it.

Mr. PIKE. He has not my word for it one way or the other. I ask the gentleman for the evidence.

Mr. DAVIS, of Maryland. I suppose the House can understand why the galled jade winces. I have done with these interruptions.

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