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conceive them to be his equals, though we may call them such. Some have talked of this "distinction 99 as consisting solely of a difference "in the order of operation." Which means, we suppose, that all operate together or equally, but one first, and another following him. But he who is first, has still the superiority in our thoughts.

This division into parts, and inferiority among themselves, may be seen most clearly if we take the Trinitarian doctrine respecting the Son's death for sinners. If the Father was not another being from the Son when the latter was suffering death, we have left us the shocking alternative of one part of God dying, and another remaining in life; which severs the divine nature indeedwere it possible.

But we quit this theme now with the design to resume it in some future number, when speaking of the proper unity of Jesus Christ.

Let us bear in mind on this important subject the fact on which Unitarians found their doctrine concerning it. There is in the Bible a solemn, express declaration, that our God is one." There is no declaration there, that our God is three in any sense whatsoever. We abide by what is declared, and cannot give it up for propositions which have never yet been enunciated in the words of scripture, and which never will be, or can be.

THOUGHTS ON DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

THAT God is a Sovereign unlimited and absolute in dominion, and irresponsible to any other being, is a

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truth involved in the very affirmation of his existence and perfection. He cannot be otherwise. But one sometimes hears this truth alleged by way of apology for some supposed acts of God, which so strongly militate with our natural sentiments of right and wrong, as hardly to be reconciled even to the minds of those who attempt to vindicate them. The most appalling and distressing views of human destiny are derived from some vague notions about divine sovereignty. And unanswerable objections to several popular doctrines are often repelled without an answer by referring to this truth.

Now what are we taught by both reason and scripture on this point? In other words, what is the proper way of regarding the acknowledged fact of God's absolute, unlimited, irresponsible dominion?

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We have chiefly to remember, if we respect revelation or reason on this subject, that the Divine Sovereignty is not a bare occupancy of the highest possible elevation, not simply reigning, though with exclusive, uncontrolled sway. It is the supremacy of perfect justice, unmixed benevolence, and a wisdom which can never err. false doctrine on this point begins in narrowing the truth, making up a notion of sovereignty out of mere power, to the neglect of those moral qualities which in God, as in his creatures, direct, restrain, and render beneficent, that which else might indeed fill the universe with terror.

God can do whatsoever he pleases. But let us never -forget who He is,-nor from a vain desire to glorify his omnipotence, ascribe to this unrivalled Sovereign acts which derogate infinitely more from his perfection than any want of power, (were it possible that he should want power,) could God is indeed responsible to no other

being. He has no superior, and is exposed to no penalties. Absolute and without control, in the utmost sense we can imagine, from all without, this Great Being is yet a Law unto himself. He is good, and just, and wise, and these glorious attributes regulate every act of his power, and hold that power in as perfect control, as the elements of nature, and the steps of feeble man. We dishonor God when we think to exalt his supremacy by ascribing to his will any effects, which equity and goodness would not sanction.

All will agree that when we affirm that God can do whatsoever he pleases, we mean whatsoever is itself possible. Now there are other qualifications of this affirmation just as clear, and important to be made. The divine sovereignty does not consist in doing all his pleasure because it is his pleasure, and for no other reason. In our ideas of a thorough despot we always include this, of doing what he pleases because he pleases. And men never fail to condemn such a course. It would make any government on earth hateful to the subjects. Let us not then suppose in God what would disparage a mortal ruler, and render his dominion odious. He never does any thing merely because it is his pleasure, without any other reason. He is never arbitrary nor capricious. He has a motive besides his own mere pleasure in all the acts of his government. They do not vindicate but dishonor the ways of God to man, who attempt to excuse what they cannot but think apparently unjust, by saying God is a sovereign, he can do what he pleases, as he pleases and when he pleases. It is an insult to go further, and take refuge in mystery, when the supposed acts in the government of God, implied in certain doctrines, are

plainly and palpably arbitrary and cruel. This is to say that God can not only do wrong, but is fain to hide what he does from the creature whom he has made too upright to approve it. As God has always a reason for what he does besides his own pleasure, so that reason is always worthy of a wise, merciful, holy, and just sovereign. It is always a good reason, one which all good beings could not but approve, if they knew it; one which all created minds must acknowledge to be right.

And here it is very important to notice an evasion too common, but most unwise and even impious, if we regard the tendency alone, though undoubtedly not meant to be so, by those who make it. It is said that finite beings cannot know what would be wrong or cruel in God, because they cannot comprehend his perfections. And hence it is that such bad things are openly attributed to God as his acts, while all the time he is declared to be perfectly good. We reply, as it has often been answered before, that we can know what would be wrong and cruel in God. Else it is absurd to speak of God's moral perfections at all. For if we cannot know whereof we affirm when we say, such and such things would be cruel in the Sovereign and Protector of the world, we cannot know whereof we affirm when we say the Judge of the whole earth will do right. How can we say what he will do, if we are ignorant what he cannot do? Why does the Bible take the pains to declare to us, "the Lord is righteous," since we are no judges of the meaning of the term when thus applied? The fact that such declarations are made and even abound in scripture, proves that we can know what they imply and what would be implied in their opposites. We render a mere lip service to

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Heaven, if our powers do not extend to this knowledge. We are called upon in vain, to acquaint ourselves with God," unless we can ascertain what qualities belong to his acts, and what acts would imply the opposite qualities.

The truth is, we cannot indeed say, what the divine love and wisdom may prompt in all cases, because our minds cannot reach so far as to comprehend all the bearings and tendencies of particular things, nor all that which a wise and good being may consistently do in view of the whole case to be provided for. But we are competent to perceive that particular things, which we could not in reason and conscience approve if imitated on earth, cannot be among the decrees of God. We can

affirm in some instances without hesitation, that God will not, and could not do so; while we may not know all which he may or will do in all cases whatsoever. For example, the doctrine of Election and Reprobation, which teaches that God out of his own mere pleasure, and without respect to any thing done by them, had decreed before the world was made, that a certain number of mankind should be holy and happy, and the rest wicked and miserable, to all eternity; this doctrine we can say at once, is false, and unworthy of God. It is cruel and unjust to the last degree. Any imitation of it possible among men, such as a parent determining before his children are born, that he will provide only for a part of them, and cast the remainder out from his abode, that they may perish, would call forth universal abhorrence.

A milder but not less pertinent example may be found. in the following words of an able theologian,* in a recent

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