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See, also, "Arbitration and Award": "Bonds"; "Indemnity": "Insurance"; "Interest": "Landlord and Tenant"; "Marine Insurance"; "Master and Servant"; "Mortgages"; "Partnership"; "Principal and Agent"; "Principal and Surety"; "Sale"; "Vendor and Purchaser." Of corporation, see "Corporations." Reformation, see "Equity."

What law governs, see "Conflict of Laws."

Plaintiff received an option from defendant to buy defendant's property within six months. Plaintiff did not do so, and the option was not extended, but plaintiff, with defendant's encouragement, continued to make efforts to obtain capital for the purchase, and after a considerable time succeeded, but upon his offering to comply with the option defendant declined. Held, that no binding contract ever came into existence. McConkey v. Peach Bottom Slate Co. (C. C. A.) 830.

Complainants, on October 2d, made an offer to buy defendant's property to one P., who was authorized to receive and transmit offers and replies. P. telegraphed the substance of the offer, but not the exact terms, to defendant, on the same day. On October 10th complainants made another offer to P., varying in some particulars. Before this was communicated to him, defendant, on October 11th, telegraphed P. that he would accept the offer in P.'s telegram of October 2d. P. then indorsed an acceptance on complainants' offer of October 10th. Held, that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties.-Kleinhans v. Jones (C. C. A.) 742.

Contributory Negligence. See "Master and Servant"; "Negligence."


See "Mortgages."


no proceedings have been taken to terminate its existence, it may maintain a suit for infringement of the patent, notwithstanding that defendant questions its corporate existence on the ground of failure to seasonably commence the corporate business.-American Cable Ry. Co. v. City of New York (C. C.) 227. Officers and agents.

A by-law of a New York corporation required that notice of the time and place of holding elections for directors "shall be published not less than 20 days previous thereto." Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. §§ 787, 788, provide that in computing the time for publication of legal notices, etc., the first day shall be excluded and the last included. Held, that the rule of the statute should be applied by analogy to the notices of election, and that a publication on the 8th was a sufficient notice of an election held on the 28th.-The_Vigilancia (D. C.) 781; The Seguranca, Id.; The Allianca, Id.; The Advance, Id.; Atlantic Trust Co. v. Proceeds of The Vigilancia, Id.

negotiating for the discount of the corporation's Where the treasurer of a corporation, while paper, was informed of a pledge by the presihis own note, held, that the corporation had acdent of the corporation of his stock to secure tual notice of the pledge.-Hotchkiss & Upson Co. v. Union Nat. Bank (C. C. A.) 76. Contracts.

poration without authority, and verore its ratiWhere a mortgage is made by officers of a corfication a lien accrues on the property sought to be mortgaged, the mortgage does not take precedence of such lien.-National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Co. (D. C.) 1006.

The fact that the stockholders in two corporations are the same, or that one corporation controls the other, does not make either corporation responsible for the contracts of the other.-Richmond & I. Const. Co. v. Richmond, N., I. & B. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 105.


Whether the provisions of Gen. St. Conn. § 1923, giving corporations a lien on their stock An officer of a responsible corporation should for debts due from the stockholders, applies, as not be held liable, alone, for acts of the corpo-debts arising from embezzlement of the cornoraagainst a pledgee by unrecorded transfer, to ration in infringement of a copyright, merely because he is such officer.-Stuart v. Smith (C. C.) 189.


See, also, "Banks and Banking"; "Insurance"; "Municipal Corporations"; "Railroad Companies."

What law governs contracts, see "Conflict of Laws."

Illinois act requiring trust companies to make deposit with state auditor before accepting trusts does not apply to a mere mortgage. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago & N. P. R. Co. (C. C.) 412.

Where a corporation has been organized, and has taken title to a patent (which action is apparently within the scope of its powers), and

tion's funds, quaere.-Hotchkiss & Upson Co. v. Union Nat.' Bank (C. C. A.) 76.

The provisions of Gen. St. Conn. § 1924, requiring a pledge of corporate stock to be consummated by transfer on the books, are for the protection of innocent parties, and actual notice is equivalent to transfer.-Hotchkiss & Upson Co. v. Union Nat. Bank (C. C. A.) 76. Members and stockholders.

sible timber land in common, and one of them Where two parties, owning a tract of inaccesowning additional tracts, joined in building a railroad to reach the lands, by means of a railroad company in which each took half the stock, and afterwards the one owning the additional lands purchased the timber rights of the other, and exhausted all timber in reach of the road as built, held, that the other party was not entitled,

as a stockholder in the railroad company, to enjoin it from building an extension to reach the additional tracts, on the ground that the extension was exclusively for the benefit of the owners of those tracts, who controlled the railroad directory, and against the interests of the stockholders.-Bucksport & E. R. R. Co. v. Edinburgh & S. F. Redwood Co. (C. C. A.) 972.

In general, a purchaser of corporate stock is not allowed to attack the prior acts and managements of the corporation.-United Electric Securities Co. v. Louisiana Electric Light Co. (C. C.) 673.

Liability for corporate debts.

A corporation caused all its stock to be assigned by the subscribers to A. and W., as collateral for advances. The stock was transferred to the names of A. and W. Subsequently all interest of the subscribers was assigned to dummies for A. and W. Held, that A. and W. became absolute owners of the stock, and liable to creditors of the corporation for the amounts unpaid on it.-National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Co. (D. C.) 1006. Receivers.

A court has no power to authorize the receiver of a merely private corporation to issue certificates to be a paramount lien on its property.Fidelity Insurance, Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co. (C. C.) 623.

A receiver of a corporation will not be appointed, when the extraordinary expenses incident thereto will probably render the company insolvent, if relief can be given by enjoining the management from further execution of contracts resulting in the diversion of corporate funds.-United Electric Securities Co. v. Louisiana Electric Light Co. (C. C.) 673.


It seems that the voluntary dissolution of a corporation while its creditors are pursuing it in the courts should be viewed with suspicion.Frank v. Wedderin (C. C. A.) 818.

Where a bill for dissolution of a corporation, and accounting, seeks to have full payment made to the complaining stockholder for his investment before any payment to the transferees of certain other stockholders, such transferees are necessary parties.-Watson v. United States Sugar Refinery (C. C. A.) 769.

A bill by a stockholder seeking dissolution of a corporation, and accounting, alleged that business had been suspended, "among other things," because of the worthlessness of a patent under which it had been carried on, but without stating that that was the controlling reason; that the officers were misapplying the funds, but without stating that any effort had been made to have the corporation bring suit; that the officers had tampered with the books. but without stating in what manner; that certain assets had not been entered in the books, but without charging concealment or intentional wrong. Held, that the allegations were too general and indefinite to justify granting relief.-Watson v. United States Sugar Refinery (C. C. A.) 769.


Where the amount of a decree is reduced on appeal for an apparent error in the commissioner's report, which was not excepted to below, such a reduction should not affect the costs.Western Assur. Co. v. Southwestern Transp. Co. (C. C. A.) 923.

When a judgment is reversed and the cause ordered dismissed because the record failed to show jurisdiction, all the costs, both of the circuit court and of the appellate court, should be taxed against plaintiff.-Sneed v. Sellers (C. C. A.) 729.


Acting county commissioners appointed under 1 Gen. St. Kan. par. 1577, have power to issue county warrants for ordinary expenses.-Board of Com'rs of Kearney County v. McMaster (C. C. A.) 177.

without a vote of the electors, to contract for County commissioners in Kansas have power, the erection of cells in a jail building.-Pauly Jail-Building & Manufacturing Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Kearney County (C. C. A.) 171.

Road-improvement certificates issued by persons purporting to act as road commissioners under Laws Kan. 1887, c. 214, for improvements on thoroughfares which are not in fact county roads, but are either located on private property or are streets within the limits of duly-organized cities, are not binding obligations of the county.-First Nat. Bank of Lansdale v. Board of Com'rs of Wyandotte County (C. C. A.) 878.


See, also, "Removal of Causes."

A term of a United States circuit court does not necessarily end at the opening of a term held at another place in the same district.-East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin (C. C. A.) 446.

Federal courts.

If it appears that, in any aspect a case may assume, the right of recovery may depend on a federal statute, and the right so claimed is not merely colorable, a federal question is involved, adequate to confer jurisdiction.-St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 2; St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., Id.

The federal courts have jurisdiction of an action on county warrants payable to certain payees or bearer, if the assignee who brings the action is a nonresident of the state in which the county is situated. - Board of Com'rs of Kearney County v. McMaster (C. C. A.) 177.

Diverse citizenship between the original parties will not give jurisdiction of a controversy between an intervener and defendant, citizens of the same state, where the property in controversy is not drawn into the court's possession.-United Electric Securities Co. v. Louisiana Electric Light Co. (C. C.) 673.

The federal courts do not acquire jurisdiction, by virtue of a merely colorable claim under a federal statute, nor because a federal statute must be referred to, to explain a contract or a local law.-St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 2; St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., Id. The fact that the title to lands in controversy was originally derived from the United States does not give the federal courts jurisdiction.St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 2; St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., Id.

The fact that a state has an interest in land, for the recovery of which an action of ejectment is brought against a city, which occupies it under a joint resolution of the legislature, does not make the action one against the state.-Wheeler v. City of Chicago (C. C.) 526.

Rev. St. § 915, does not confer on the United States courts jurisdiction of suits by foreign attachment, or jurisdiction over a nonresident not served with process, though state courts have such jurisdiction under state laws. - Central Trust Co. of New York v. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. (C. C.) 685.

Where a suit is brought in a federal court on behalf of an infant by his next friend, the jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of the infant, not that of the next friend.-Voss v. Neineber (C. C.) 947.

Where, after a bill by two plaintiffs, making proper allegations of diverse citizenship, is prepared, one of the plaintiffs dies before it is filed, and the interest of the remaining plaintiff is sufficient foundation for the suit, such remaining plaintiff is the only one, and the federal court has jurisdiction, and does not lose it by the subsequent intervention of the executrix of the deceased plaintiff, whatever her citizenship.Society of Shakers v. Watson (C. C. A.) 730.

A state law exempting a receiver appointed by a court of equity from garnishment applies to the state courts only.-Central Trust Co. of New York v. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. (C. C.) 685.

Question whether the federal courts will entertain garnishment against a receiver appointed in another state.-Central Trust Co. of New York v. Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. (C. C.) 685.

The federal courts have jurisdiction of a suit for infringement of a patent, notwithstanding that a license is set up in defense, the existence of which must be tried in trying the question of infringement.-Everett v. Haulenbeck (C. C.)


A federal court of equity cannot entertain a suit for partition of lands, where the plaintiff's title is denied, although a state statute permits courts of equity to take cognizance of questions of title in partition suits.-American Ass'n v. Eastern Kentucky Land Co. (C. C.) 721.

An appeal from a decree adjudging that a state statute fixing railroad rates is unreasonable, and therefore violates the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United

States, is within the jurisdiction of the supreme court, under Act March 3, 1891, § 5, subd. 6, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals.-Hastings v. Ames (C. C. A.) 726; Same v. Smith, Id.; Same v. Higginson, Id.

The mere fact that a defendant in ejectment is sued as comptroller of a state does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction, on the ground that the suit is against the state.-Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts (C. U.) 521.

Collateral or ancillary suits. federal court, and thereby withdrawn from the While property is held in the possession of a jurisdiction of state courts, such federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit in relation to such property, without regard to the citizenship of parties.-Compton v. Jesup (C. C. A.) 263.

A suit instituted in a federal court on the ground that the property affected by it is in the possession of that court, though dependent on and ancillary to the suit in which possession was taken, is so far collateral to it that the correctness of orders and decrees made in the original suit cannot be questioned.-Compton v. Jesup (C. C. A.) 263.

court, a party may be brought in by compulsory In a dependent or ancillary suit in a federal process, though his citizenship is such that it would defeat the jurisdiction if it depended on diverse citizenship.-Compton v. Jesup (C. C. A.) 263.

Following state decisions.

When a federal court has made a decision based on that of a state court construing a state statute, and the state court reverses its ruling, it is not the duty of the federal court to reverse its decision, as to the rights of parties in the same property. - National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Co. (D. C.) 1006.

A decision of a state supreme court sustaining the validity of a state statute under the constitution of the United States does not absolve the federal courts sitting in the state from exercising an independent judgment in regard thereto. Bradley v. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. (C. C.) 948.

Federal courts are not conclusively bound by a decision of the state supreme court that certain uses for which private property is authorized to which will justify the exercise of the power of be taken by a state statute are public uses, eminent domain.-Bradley v. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. (C. C.) 918.

Conflicting state and federal jurisdic


No objection can be taken to the possession by a federal court of property affected by a suit pending in it, on the ground that when possession was taken a suit was pending in a state court in relation to the property.-Compton v. Jesup (C. C. A.) 263.

Where a suit to administer the assets of an insolvent corporation has been commenced in a state court, a federal court is without jurisdiction of a similar suit, instituted, during the pend

ency of the former, by a party thereto.-Foster | one for which an offender arrested elsewhere v. Bank of Abingdon (C. C.) 723.

Where deputy marshals are imprisoned by state authorities on a charge of murder, based on the killing of a person while resisting arrest on process from a federal court, the latter court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, and, on the return, to summarily hear evidence and finally dispose of the charges against such deputies.-Kelly v. State of Georgia (D. C.) 652.

A person indictable in a federal court for murder and conspiracy had long resisted its process, both civil and criminal; had threatened to kill deputy marshals attempting to arrest him; and habitually carried deadly weapons On being summoned to surrender by a deputy who had a warrant for his arrest, he fired upon the latter with a magazine rifle, and, in an exchange of shots, was killed. Held, that the killing was justifiable; that the deputy had committed no offense, and was entitled to and would receive the protection of the federal court against any prosecution of state courts based on such killing-Kelly v. State of Georgia (D. C.) 652. Rules of decision-Comity.

A judgment and verdict at law in another circuit, sustaining a patent, is entitled to the same weight, on motion for preliminary injunction, as that accorded to a decree in equity at final hearing. Woodard v. Ellwood Gas Stove & Stamping Co. (C. C.) 717.


Where a judgment of conviction has been reversed because a sentence not authorized by law was imposed, and the cause has been remanded for further proceedings, the trial court has authority to impose the proper sentence.-United States v. Harman (D. C.) 472.

Where, upon an indictment for embezzlement under Rev. St. § 4046, a verdict has been taken on the issue of embezzlement only, without determination of the amount embezzled, and sentence of imprisonment only, without fine, imposed, and for such error the judgment has been reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings, the defendant must be discharged. -United States v. Woodruff (D. C.) 536.

Where one indicted in the District of Columbia for criminal libel was arrested in New York, and application was made, under Rev. St. § 1014, for an order for his removal to Washington for trial, held, that the proceedings thereunder were independent of those in Washington, and must conform to the state practice; that, therefore, the facts and circumstances showing criminality must appear by oath or affidavit showing probable cause; that the accused had the right to introduce evidence of want of probable cause; that the indictment, if clear and consistent in its statement of facts, was equivalent to an affidavit, and, if uncontroverted, was sufficient, but, if vague and contradictory, it was not equivalent to an affidavit.-In re Dana (D. C.) 886; United States v. Dana, Id.

The offense of criminal libel under the local common law of the District of Columbia is not

may be removed, under Rev. St. § 1014, to such District; nor do the acts of 1871 and 1874 give any authority for such removal.-In re Dana (D. C.) 886; United States v. Dana, Id.

One charged with issuing a free pass for railroad transportation, contrary to the act of February 4, 1887, will not be removed to a distant state and district for trial, where the indictment is fatally defective for failure to allege any use of the pass or transportation under it.-In re Huntington (D. C.) 881.


The tariff acts of 1883 and 1890 were intended to be exhaustive and to take the place of all prior legislation, and section 7 of the act of February 8, 1875, was thereby repealed.-Kent v. United States (C. C.) 536.

be strictly construed, and held, that "worsted Where language of a statute is explicit, it must dress goods" are not "manufactures of wool," but of "worsted."-Murphy v. United States (C. C.) 908.

on "manufactures of wool," does not include Paragraph 297, postponing reduction of duty manufactures of "worsted," and the distinction between "wool" and "worsted" stated in the earlier tariff acts still exists, though omitted in the act of 1894.-Murphy v. United States (C. C.) 908.

The lien of the government for the payment of duties upon any single consignment of goods extends to each and every part thereof, and where part of the goods are fraudulently withdrawn from bond, without payment of the duties due thereon, the collector may hold the remaining part for all the duties due.-Hendricks v. Schmidt (C. C. A.) 425.

To constitute a payment of duties upon any particular consignment of goods, there must be an intent both by the importers and the collector to apply the money to that consignment, and if a check is sent to pay duties on one consignment, and is received by the collector without notice thereof, and he applies it to a different consignment, this is not a payment of duties on_former.-Hendricks v. Schmidt (C. C. A.)


A commission paid on a sale between other parties previous to the sale of merchandise to any importer for importation is not a charge, within section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, but is part of the wholesale price of the goods.United States v. Kenworthy (C. C. A.) 904.

Under Rev. St. § 2902, and section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, the customs officers have authority to inquire into disputed items of commissions and charges.-United States v. Kenworthy (C. C. A.) 904.

In assessing duty, under paragraph 248 of the tariff act of 1894, upon ginger ale, imported in bottles, the value of the bottles cannot be added to that of the ale.-Dickson v. United States (C. C.) 534.


Diamonds cut, but not set, are dutiable at 25 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 338, Act Aug. 27, 1894.-United States v. Frankel (C. C.) 186.

It seems that paragraphs 24 and 560 of the tariff act of 1890 cover only such articles as are drugs, and that crude mosses, which are not drugs, are properly classified under paragraph 653.-Shaw v. Prior (C. C.) 421.

licensee under a patent are the same as those given to another, he should be allowed to prove that such royalties, though including different cash payments, are in fact made equivalent by other stipulations.-Bonsack Mach. Co. v. S. F. Hess & Co. (C. C. A.) 119.

Declarations and Admissions. See "Evidence."

Defective Appliances.

Ladies' kid gloves embroidered with more than three single strands are liable to a duty of 50 cents per dozen pairs, under Act 1890, par. 458, See "Master and Servant." in addition to the other applicable rates therein specified.-Wertheimer v. United States (C. C.)


Hemstitched handkerchiefs of cotton or other vegetable fiber, embroidered with an initial letter only, are not dutiable as "embroidered and hemstitched handkerchiefs," under paragraph 373 of the act of October 1, 1890, but as "handkerchiefs composed of cotton," etc., under paragraph 349.-United States v. Harden (C. C. A.) 182.

Under the act of 1894, "worsted dress goods" are dutiable at 50 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 283, Schedule K, and not at 12 cents per square yard, and 50 per cent.-Murphy V. United States (C. C.) 908.

Protest against classification.

A protest against the imposition of duty on moss, under section 4 of the tariff act of 1890, which claims that it should either be dutiable under paragraph 24, or free under paragraph 653, as the importers were unable to detect that it had undergone any process of manufacture, is sufficiently definite and precise, if the moss was free either under paragraph 653 or paragraph 560.-Shaw v. Prior (C. C.) 421.

Upon an importation of ginger ale in bottles, the collector added the value of the bottles to that of the ale for the purpose of assessing the duty. Held, that the question of the propriety of such action was one of classification, and not of valuation, and was properly raised by protest, not by notice of dissatisfaction.-Dickson v. United States (C. C.) 534.


For collision, see "Collision."

For infringement of patent, see "Patents for


B. loaded libellant's boat at Albany, and consigned it to himself at New York. it to another for export by a certain steamer, agreeing to deliver it "f. o. b. vessel where she lies." B. having sent the boat alongside the steamer, it was detained six days before the lumber was received, but it appeared that the same was obtained from the steamer specified. The was received as soon as the customary permit lumber was then libeled for demurrage. Held, that the lumber was liable, and that, in the absence of sufficient proof that B. followed the purchaser's orders as to the time of sending the boat alongside, B. was personally bound to indemnify the purchaser.-Salisbury v. Seventy Thousand Feet of Lumber (D. C.) 916.

See "Pleading."



Of alien, see "Aliens."

DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. See, also, "Executors and Administrators"; "Wills."

A statute legitimating bastard children on the marriage of the parents does not make the marriage relate back to the birth of the oldest child, so as to affect property.-Hatch v. Ferguson (C. C. A.) 43.

See "Wills."


In an action against a railroad company for To charitable uses, see "Charities." failing to carry lumber at a stipulated rate, damages claimed for inability to use the lumber in an uncut forest are too remote.-Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Bucki (C. C. A.) 861.

A verdict of $7,500 for painful and permanent injuries is not excessive.-Lowry v. Mt. Adams & Eden Park Incline Plane Ry. Co. (C. C.). 827.



Of corporation, see "Corporations."
Of partnership, see "Partnership."


As evidence, see "Evidence."

Due Process of Law.

Where a party is charged with falsely representing that the terms of royalty offered to one See "Constitutional Law."

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