Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

fortitude, and justice. Prudence respects the choice and pursuit of goods; temperance, the government of the appetites; fortitude, the endurance of that which is commonly esteemed evil; and justice, the offices of social life.2

All virtues, being the same in their origin and end, are mutually related and dependant; so that he who possesses one possesses all. As there is no medium between a right and a curve line, so there is no mean between virtue and vice; virtue and vice admit of no degrees, either of excess or defect. Virtue may be taught, and bad men may become good men. Virtue is to be sought for its own sake; not through the fear of punishment, or the hope of reward; for virtue, being a conformity to nature, is in itself happiness.3

Of actions which proceed from desire, some are good, some are bad, and others indifferent. Good actions are either κατορθώματα, actions in themselves right, or, καθήκοντα, those concerning which it may be asserted with probability, that they are convenient, and conducive to happiBad actions are those which nature and reason teach us to avoid. Indifferent actions are such as reason neither prescribes nor prohibits.*

ness.

Duties may be divided into three classes, as they respect God, ourselves, and our neighbour.5

The duties of religion are, to think justly concerning God, and to worship him piously. He thinks justly of God, who believes him to be the supreme director of human affairs, and the author of all that is good or fitting in human life. He worships God piously, who reveres him above all beings; who perceives and acknowledges him in all events; who is in every thing resigned and obedient to his will; who patiently receives whatever befals him, from a persuasion that whatever God appoints must be right; and in fine, who cheerfully follows wherever Divine Provi

2 Laert. § 92, 3. Stob. p. 167. 3 Laert. § 125—7. Stob. I. c. Fin. 1. iv.

Plut. de Stoic. Rep. t. v. p. 10. De

Laert. § 108. Cic. de Fin. l. ii. c. 17. De Offic. I. i. c. 3. 5 Epict. Ench. c. 17. Arrian. 1. ii. Diss. 14. I. iii. Diss. 2. ad Enchir. Anton. I. i. § 12. viii. 27. ix. 22.

Stob. I. c.

Simplic.

dence leads him, even though it be to suffering and death.6

The sum of a man's duty with respect to himself is, to subdue his passions of joy and sorrow, hope and fear, and even pity. He who is, in this respect, perfectly master of himself, is a wise man; and in proportion as we approach towards a state of apathy, we advance towards perfection. Virtuous self-command consists, not in preventing the casual impressions of external objects upon the senses, in which the mind is rather passive than active; but in not giving a voluntary assent to those passions, which external objects excite. A wise man may justly and reasonably withdraw from life whenever he finds it expedient; not only because life and death are among those things which are in their nature indifferent, but also because life may be less consistent with virtue than death. Since all duty arises from a conformity to nature, it may happen that a man may be in such circumstances, that to remain in life may be more contrary to nature than to depart. A wise man will, at the close of every day, take a retrospect of his words and actions, that he may confess his errors and amend. The first and noblest office of wisdom is, to examine ourselves, and regulate our dispositions and actions by the law of virtue. Hence will arise self-denial, and a contempt of pleasure. A wise man will never suffer himself to be diverted from his duty by any prospect of indulgence, or any fear of loss, pain, or death.7

The duty we owe towards others, is to love all men, even our enemies. A good man will love his neighbour from his heart, will refrain from injuring, and take pleasure in protecting and serving him. He will not think himself born for himself alone, but for the common good of mankind, and will shew himself kind to all according to his ability. He will think himself sufficiently rewarded by the consciousness of well doing, and will never cease to do good

Epict. 1. c. Arr. l. i. Diss. xii. 14. 16. Anton. 1. ii. § 11. 1. vi. § 43. Seneca de Tranquil. Animi, &c. passim.

7 Senec. de Ira. 1. i. c. 8. iii. 37. Arr. 1. iii. Diss. 2. 22. 25. Cic. Ac. Q. 1. i. Laert. § 130, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. iii. c. 17. Stob. 1. c. Anton. J. iii. § 1. 37. vii. 44. Plut. Rep. Stoic. I. c. Sen. Ep. 16, 17. 55. 58. 60. 68. 70. 77. 80.

although he has no witness of his good deeds, nor is ever likely to receive any applause or recompence for his beneficence. The wise man never remits the punishment due to a criminal through pity, which is a weakness not to be indulged; nevertheless, in cases where reason suggests sufficient grounds for clemency, he will not treat a delinquent with rigour. He will relieve the sick, assist the shipwrecked, afford protection to the exile, or supply the hungry with food, but with an undisturbed mind, and a cheerful countenance; disdaining all sorrow arising from sympathy, as well as from personal sufferings. No one is more ready than the wise man to exercise lenity and benignity, and to attend to the welfare of other individuals, and to the general interest of mankind.8

Concerning the whole moral system of the Stoics, it must be remarked, that, although it be highly deserving of praise for the purity, extent, and variety of its doctrines, and although it must be confessed, that in many select passages of the Stoic writings it appears exceedingly brilliant, it is nevertheless founded in false notions of nature and of man, and is raised to a degree of refinement which is extravagant and impracticable. The piety which it teaches is nothing more than a quiet submission to irresistible fate. The self-command which it enjoins annihilates the best affections of the human heart. The indulgence which it grants to suicide is inconsistent, not only with the genuine principles of piety, but even with that constancy which was the heighth of Stoic perfection. And even its moral doctrine of benevolence is tinctured with the fanciful principle, which lay at the foundation of the whole Stoic system, that every being is a portion of one Great Whole, from which it would be unnatural and impious to attempt a separation.

We must then conclude, that the Ethics of Zeno and his followers, however splendid, and in many particulars well-founded, deviated, as a system, from the true principles of nature, and had a tendency to produce artificial characters, and to encourage moral affectation and hypocrisy.9

* Anton. 1. iv. § 37. vii. 26. 44. ix. 28. xi. 8, 9. 13. Sen. de Clem. 1. ii. c. 6. 7. Conf. Gataker. Præloq, ad Anton. et Lipsii Manud. et Diss.

Vidend. Jons, 1. ii. c. 1. 18. Burnet. Arch. 1. i. c. 13. Heuman. Act.

SECT. II.

Of the Disciples and Successors of Zeno in the Stoic School.

AFTER having insisted so largely upon the life of Zeno, and the doctrines of his school, a brief account of his disciples and successors will suffice.

During his life, Zeno had many disciples, among whom may be particularly mentioned, Persæus, Aristo the Chian, Herillus, and Sphærus.

Persaus,10 the son of Demetrius, flourished in the hundred and thirtieth Olympiad." He was sent by Antigonus Gonata to Zeno, for the purpose of copying his writings, and for a long time remained with him as his companion and friend. On his return to Antigonus, he was entrusted with the charge of the citadel of Corinth; but he was probably more attentive to philosophy, than to civil or military affairs; for he suffered this important fortress to be taken by Aratus.

Aristo 12 of Chios, the son of Miltiades, wasan intimate associate of Persæus, and with him attended upon the lec

Ph. v. i. p. 741. v. ii. p. 168. Lipsii Manuductio ad Phil. Stoic. et Diss. de Phys. Stoic. Lugd. Bat. 1644. Scioppii Manud. ad Phil. Mor. Stoic. Gataker in Antonin. Heinsii Orat. de Phil. Stoic. Meursii Athen. I. ii. c. 29. Bochart. Sac. Geog. p. ii. l. i. c. 3. Voss. de Sect. c. xix. Morhoff. Polyhistor. t. ii. I. ii. p. i. c. 8. Crophii Diss. de Gymn. Lit. p. 49. Parker de Deo, Disp. vi. Fabricii Diss. de Cavillationibus Stoicorum in Syllog. Diss. Werenfels. de Meteor. Orat. Morini Diss. de Stoicis hirciscundiis. Vos. de Theol. Gent. 1. ii. c. 49. Otium Vindel. Mel. i. 11. Thomas de Exust. Mund. Stoic. De Stoicis subdolis Christ. imit. Temp. Helvet. t. iii. Buddæi Diss. de Error. Stoic. Ot. Vind. Diss. ii. De Fat. Stoic. ap Amoen. Lit. t. viii. Wolf. de Manich. ante Manich. § 36. Cudworth, c. iv. § 25. Zimmerman. Mus. Hist. Brem. v. i. Budd. Ann. Hist. Ph. p. 147. Epist. ad Schelhorn. Amoen. Lit. t. viii. Burgmann. Diss. de Stoa a Spinoz. Exculp. Windet de Vit. Funct. Statu. s. 3. Thomas Diss. de Morte. Obs. Hal. t. vii. Diss. de Sect. Elp. Hist. Misc. Berol. t. v. Thomas de Loco Anim. Sap. t. i. p. 70. Roetenbecchii Diss. de Stoic. et Arist. Moral. Werenfels. de Logomach. Erudit. Op. p. 461. Centner de Meteor Phil. Dantz. 1744. 8vo.

10 Laert. 1. vii. § 36. Suidas. Athen. I. iv. p. 162. A. Gell. 1. ii. c. 18. Pausan. Corinth. c. 8. p. 130. Ach. c. 8. p. 511. Plut. Vit. Arati, t. vi.

p. 296.

11 B. C. 260.

12

Laert. 1. vii. § 160—2.

tures of Zeno; but he discovered a disposition to loquacity, and a propensity to pleasure, which were displeasing to his master, whom he left, and went over to the school of Polemon. He soon after attempted, but with little success, to institute a school of his own. He was a violent opponent of the Academic philosophers, and particularly of Arcesilaus. The chief points in which he innovated upon the Stoic philosophy were, that there is a certain limit between virtue and vice, in which consists indifference; that all physical and logical studies are to be rejected; the former, as above all human comprehension, the latter as not interesting to human nature; that a wise man will not speculate on opinions; that the nature of the Deity is unknown; and that it is doubtful whether he is a percipient being. This last opinion seems rather to have been advanced in opposition to the Stoic idea of Deity, than to imply a general denial of the existence of God. Aristo probably conceived the questions concerning the nature of the universe, and of God, to be above the human understanding, and maintained, that the doctrine of Zeno, who asserted God to be a subtle ether, or fire, diffused through the world, was inconsistent with the notion of an intelligent nature. Eratosthenes, a Cyrenian, born in the first year of the hundred and twenty-sixth Olympiad,13 a man highly distinguished by his logical, mathematical, and philosophical learning, was his pupil. He was appointed by Ptolemy Philopater, keeper of the Alexandrian library.14

Herillus, the Carthaginian, submitted the correction of his morals to Zeno, and, deserting the school of pleasure, became his disciple. His peculiar tenet was, that science is the end of life; which he probably understood not, as Cicero every where interprets his opinion, the mere knowledge of abstract truth, but, as Laertius and Suidas explain it, that the conduct of life ought always to be conformable to truth. His followers are mentioned by Cicero as a distinct sect; but, if it existed at all, it was of short duration, and has left nothing worthy of remembrance.15

[ocr errors][merged small]

14 Laert. Cic. Ac. Qu. 1. iv. c. 30. 41. Nat. Deor. I. i. c. 14. Tus. Qu. 1. v. c. 30. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 1. vii. Suidas in Eratosthene. Sen. Ep. 89. 15 Lacrt, 1. vii. 165-7. Suidas in Tos. Tusc. Qu. 1. iv.

[blocks in formation]
« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »