actions should promote the enjoyment of life as much as remorse of conscience, legal penalties, and public disgrace, must increase its trouble, every one who follows the dictates of sound reason will practise the virtues of justice, equity, and fidelity. In society, the necessity of the mutual exercise of justice, in order to the common enjoyment of the gifts of nature, is the ground of those laws by which it is prescribed. It is the interest of every individual in a state to conform to the laws of justice; for, by injuring no one, and rendering to every man his due, he contributes his part towards the preservation of that society, upon the perpetuity of which his own safety depends. Nor ought any one to think, that he is at liberty to violate the rights of his fellow-citizens, provided he can do it securely, for he who has committed an unjust action can never be certain that it will not be discovered; and however successfully he may conceal it from others, this will avail him little, since he cannot conceal it from himself. In different communities, different laws may be instituted, according to the circumstances of the people who compose them. Whatever is thus prescribed is to be considered as a rule of justice, so long as the society shall judge the observance of it to be for the benefit of the whole. But whenever any rule of conduct is found upon experience not to be conducive to the public good, being no longer useful, it should no longer be prescribed.

Nearly allied to justice are the virtues of beneficence, compassion, gratitude, piety, and friendship. He who confers benefits upon others, procures to himself the satisfaction of seeing the stream of plenty spreading around him from the fountain of his beneficence; at the same time, he enjoys the pleasure of being esteemed by others. The exercise of gratitude, filial affection, and reverence for the gods, is necessary, in order to avoid the hatred and contempt of all men. Friendships are contracted for the sake of mutual benefit; but by degrees they ripen into such disinterested attachment, that they are continued without any

2 Laert. § 120.

3 Atque ipsa utilitas justi prope mater et æqui est. 4 Laert. § 150-152. Lucret. 1. v. 1135. 1197.

HOR.

prospect of advantage. Between friends there is a kind of league, that each will love the other as himself. A true friend will partake of the wants and sorrows of his friend, as if they were his own; if he be in want, he will relieve him; if he be in prison, he will visit him; if he be sick, he will come to him; nay, situations may occur, in which he would not scruple to die for him. It cannot then be doubted, that friendship is one of the most useful means of procuring a secure, tranquil, and happy life.5

The preceding summary of the Epicurean System of Ethics, which is drawn from authentic sources, cannot but appear to the reader a full refutation of the censures which have been passed upon Epicurus by many writers, as the preceptor of luxurious and licentious pleasures. Epicurus, it is true, represents pleasure as the ultimate end of living; but pleasure is, in his system, only another term for happiness. The truth is, the ancient philosophers, in their disputes concerning The End of Living, or, The Greatest Good, differed from each other more in words than in reality. The Stoics maintained, that virtue in itself is happiness; Epicurus taught, that the motive by which men are induced to practise virtue is the desire of happiness. Both taught, that it is impossible to be happy without virtue, and both supposed virtue to consist in a conformity to nature. The real difference, then, between their moral systems could not be material. If it be urged, that the physical system of Epicurus necessarily led him to refer all pleasures to the body; we answer, that, although Epicurus conceived the human soul to be a compound of atoms, he nevertheless ascribed to it those faculties which other philosophers termed spiritual, and considered man as a being capable of intellectual and moral action. He supposed happiness to consist in mental tranquillity, as well as in a freedom from bodily pain; herein preserving the common and natural distinctions between body and mind. He also conceived so intimate an union to subsist between the mind and the body, that whenever the latter is affected with pleasure or pain, the former necessarily receives the impression. It was, therefore, of little conse

3 Laert. § 148. 154. Cic. de Fin, I. i. c. 20.

quence, as far as concerned his moral system, to which part of human nature he referred the actions of the man; since, on either supposition, the actions were the same, and it was alike true, that a virtuous course of conduct was necessary to a happy life. Nay, it may be added, that, according to the Epicurean system, which made the sentient principle a part of the soul, all pleasure or pain must, strictly speaking, be said to be seated in the soul, and the body only be considered as the instrument by means of which the soul performs its functions. No objection, therefore, against the moral system of Epicurus can be fairly deduced from his physical doctrine concerning the soul.

After the death of Epicurus, the charge of his school devolved by will, as was before observed, upon his friend Hermachus. It was continued in succession by Polystratus, Basilides, Protarchus, and others; concerning whom nothing memorable remains. The sect subsisted, but in a depraved and degraded state, as will appear in the sequel, till the decline of the Roman empire.7

Laert. 1. x. § 25. Suidas.

7 Vidend. Heuman. Act. Phil. v. ii. p. 325. 369. 637. 643. Gassendus de Vita et Moribus Epicuri. Lugd. 1647. Op. t. v. Parker de Deo, Disp. i. s. 12. 14. Bayle. Rondelli Vit. Epic. Amst. 1693. Potter Arch. Gr. I. i. c. 9. Crophius de Gymnas. Lit. Ath. p. 55. Jons. de Script. l. i. c. 20. 1. ii. c. 13. l. iv. p. 513. Morhoff. Polyh. t. ii. l. ii. p. i. c. 7, § 5—10. Reimann. Hist. Ath. c. 29. Gataker in Præloq. ad Antonin. Gassend. Comment. in Lib. decim Laertii; et Syntagma Philos. Epic. Thomas. de Exustione Mundi Stoica. Diss. ii. § 26. Conringiana, p. 65. Malebranche Recherche, p. i. l. i. c. 5. § 2. Crousaz Logique, t. i. p. i. s. i. c. 4. Clerici Ars Crit. p. 2. sect. 1. c. 9. Werenfels de Logom. Erud. c. 4. 6. Charleton Physiol. Epic. Lond. 1654. fol. Lamy de Princip. Paris, 1680. 12mo. Scipio Aquilian, de Plac. Phil. ante Arist. c. 11, 12. Cudworth, c. v. sect. 1. § 48. F. Grandis Diss. Crit. et Phil. 1. Schwartz. Suppl. ad Germ. Hist. Phil. p. 247. Du Hamel Consens. Vet. et Nov. Phil. c. iv. $6. Burnet. Arch. 1. i. c. 13. Feurlin. Diss. de Modo Probandi Deum ex Consensu Gentium. Fabr. Syll. Scrip. de Ver. Ch. Rel. c. iv. vii. viii. Buddæi Theol. Mor. p. i. c. 2. § 5. Fab. Bib. Gr. v. ii. p. 808. 816. 820.Des Coutures sur le Morale d'Epicure, Par. 1685. La Haye, 1686. Stoll. Hist. Phil. Mor. § cxi. Struian. Bibl. Phl. Auct. a Kahlio. p. i. p. 17, &c. Hein. Comm. Acad. Berolin. 1744. p. 1.

CHAP. XVI.

OF THE PYRRHONIC OR SCEPTICAL SECT.

ANOTHER branch of the Italic school of philosophy yet remains to be noticed, if, indeed, a sect which professed no tenets could deserve to be ranked among philosophers the Pyrrhonic, so called from Pyrrho its founder. From the leading character of this sect, which was, that it called in question the truth of every system of opinions adopted by other sects, and held no other settled opinion, but that every thing is uncertain, it has also been called the Sceptical sect. On account of the similarity of the opinions of this sect and those of the Platonic school, in the Middle and New Academy, it happened, that many of the real followers of Pyrrho chose to screen themselves from the reproach of universal Scepticism, by calling themselves Academics; whence the appellation of Pyrrhonists fell into disuse, whilst the doctrine of Pyrrho had still many advocates.2

3

Pyrrho was a native of Elea. In his youth he practised the art of painting, but either through disinclination to this art, or because his mind aspired to higher pursuits, he passed over from the school of painting to that of philosophy. He studied and admired the writings of Democritus, and had, as his first preceptor, Bryson, the son of Stilpo, a disciple of Clinomachus. After this he became a disciple of Anaxarchus, who was contemporary with Alexander, and he accompanied his master, in the train of Alexander, into India. Here he conversed with the Brachmans and Gymnosophists, imbibing from their doctrine whatever might seem favourable to his natural disposition toward doubting; a disposition which was cherished by his master, who had formerly been a disciple of a sceptical philosopher, Metrodorus of Chios.

Every advance which Pyrrho made in the study of phi

1 Laert. l. i. § 17. 20. 1. ix. § 61. 69. Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1 i. c. 3. 19. A. Gell. I. xi. c. 5. Suidas.

2 Cic. de Fin. l. ii.

Laert. 1. ix. § 61. Suidas. Pausanias Eliac. 1. ii. Euseb. Pr. L. xiv.

losophy involving him in fresh uncertainty, he left the schools of the Dogmatists (so those philosophers were called, who professed to be possessed of certain know, ledge) and established a new school, in which he taught, that every object of human inquiry is involved in uncer tainty, so that it is impossible ever to arrive at the knowledge of truth.*

It is related of this philosopher,5 that he acted upon his own principles, and carried his scepticism to such a ridiculous extreme, that his friends were obliged to accompany him wherever he went, that he might not be run over by carriages, or fall down precipices. If this was true, it was not without reason that he was ranked among those whose intellects were disturbed by intense study. But, if we pay any attention to the respect with which he is mentioned by ancient writers, or give any credit to the general history of his life, we must conclude these reports to have been calumnies invented by the Dogmatists, whom he opposed. He spent a great part of his life in solitude; and always preserved a settled composure of countenance, undisturbed by fear, or joy, or grief. He endured bodily pain with great fortitude; and in the midst of dangers discovered no signs of apprehension. In disputation, he was celebrated for the subtlety of his arguments, and the perspicuity of his language. Epicurus, though no friend to Scepticism, was an admirer of Pyrrho, because he recommended and practised that self-command which produces undisturbed tranquillity, the great end, in the judgment of Epicurus, of all physical and moral science. So highly was Pyrrho esteemed by his countrymen, that they honoured him with the office of chief priest, and, out of respect to him, passed a decree by which all philosophers were indulged with immunity from public taxes. He was a great admirer of the poets, particularly of Homer, and frequently repeated passages from his poems. Could such a man be so foolishly enslaved by an absurd system, as to need a guide to keep him out of danger? Pyrrho flourished about the hundred and tenth Olympiad, and died about the ninetieth year of his age, probably in the hundred and twenty,

Laert. ib. § 58-61.

5 § 62, &c.

• B, C. 340,