When action is barred, see post, § 197. II. When cause of action accrues; etc. h. Torts; negligence; injuries to person or property; etc. ness caused by the operation of a perma- owner, or secreted it from him, does not nent electric light plant in the neighbor- begin to run until he returns the property hood arises when the sickness occurs, not to that vicinity, or openly and notoriously when the plant is put in operation, if the holds it, so that the owner may have a sickness is not a necessary result of the reasonable opportunity of knowing its operation of the plant, but arises from the whereabouts and of asserting his title. manner of operation. Parsons v. Uvalde Adams v. Coon, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 624, 36 Electric Light Co. L.R.A.1916E, 960, 106 Okla. 644, 129 Pac. 851. Tex. 212, 163 S. W. 1. (Annotated) § 137. Seduction. d. The statute of limitations begins to run against a cause of action against a physician for negligence in prescribing a drug which causes discoloration of the plaintiff's skin when sufficient discoloration appears to put him upon notice and inquiry as to the injury and not at the time the discoloration reaches its height and becomes permanently fixed. Hahn v. Claybrook, L.R.A.1917C, 1169, 130 Md. 179, 100 Atl. (Annotated) § 135. — injury to, or death of, employee. 83. Effect of fraud, see ante, § 129 b. a. A cause of action to recover damages for death under the Federal employers' liability act accrues when an administrator is appointed, and not at the time of death, within the meaning of the section providing that no action shall be maintained unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued. American R. Co. v. Coronas, L.R.A.1916E, 1095, 144 C. C. A. 599, 230 Fed. 545. a. A father's cause of action for the seduction of his daughter arises, so as to process. Demurrer to petition where action not brought within statutory period, see PLEADING, § 599 g. a. A right of action for false imprisonment, or for the malicious use or abuse of process, accrues in favor of a defendant in an action of trover who was arrested and thereto, and discharged under Ga. Civ. Code imprisoned under bail process ancillary 1895, § 4608, not upon termination of the action in trover, but at the time of discharge from imprisonment, and, if not brought within two years thereafter, is barred by the statute of limitations. Gordon v. West, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 549, 129 Ga. 59 S. E. 232. § 139. Usury. a. The renewal of a note tainted with b. The limitation period begins to run at time of accident, and not when disability is found to result, under a Workmen's Com-532, pensation Act providing that notice must be given within three months after the happening of an injury, and claim for compensation with respect to such injury made within six months after the occurrence of the same. Cooke v. Holland Furnace Co. L.R.A.1918E, 552, 200 Mich. 192, 166 N. W. 1013. § 136. Injury to property. usury is not a payment of the usury and limitation as to it does not then begin to run. Blakeley v. Adams, 66 L.R.A. 270, 113 Ky. 398, 68 S. W. 473. b. The statute of limitations does not be (Annotated)gin to run against a right to recover usury, a. Where one practises fraud and deceit upon another, thereby inducing acceptance by the latter of property in settlement of a debt much greater in amount than the value of the property, an injury is done to property, and not to the person, and the statute of limitations in reference to actions for injuries to property applies. Crawford v. Crawford, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 353, 134 Ga. 114, 67 S. E. 673. (Annotated) b. The statute of limitations as to lost personal property, or personal property in the hands of a thief, begins to run from the time of the wrongful taking or possession, and not from the time when the owner first had knowledge thereof, provided there was no fraud or attempt at concealment; and if such fraud or concealment exists, it must, in order to avail the owner, be the act of the thief or finder of the property. Adams v. Coon, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 624, 36 Okla. 644, 129 Pac. 851. e. The statute of limitations, as to personal property in the hands of a thief who has removed it from the vicinity of the in case of a series of usurious transactions, until they are closed. Slover v. Union Bank, 1 L.R.A.(N.S.) 528, 115 Tenn. 347, 89 S. W. 399. c. Under the provision in the Federal statutes for recovery of a penalty against a national bank to which usury is paid if the action is brought within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurs, the limitation period begins to run from the time money is applied with the knowledge and consent of the borrower, in satisfaction of usurious interest: and it is not necessary that the payments should have been sufficient to satisfy the original loan, with legal interest. McCarthy v. First Nat. Bank, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 335, 23 S. D. 269, 121 N. W. 853, aff'd in 223 U. S. 493, 56 L. ed. 523, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240. § 140. Crimes. When prosecution is barred, see post, § 199. a. The statute of limitations begins to run in criminal cases from the time when the crime is committed. Warren v. United States, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 278, 118 C. C. A. 191, 199 Fed. 753. II. When cause of action accrues; etc. h. Torts; negligence; injuries to person or property; etc. b. Continuance of the result of a crime Daniel v. Cherryvale, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 388, does not continue the crime, so as to pre-91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899. vent the running of the statute of limitations against a prosecution therefor. Warren v. United States, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 278, 118 C. C. A. 191, 199 Fed. 753. i. Suits relating to real property. § 141. Generally. Laches, see ante, I. b, 2. As to contracts affecting real property, see ante, II. b. Effect of ignorance, fraud, or mistake, see ante, II. g. b. When the purchaser of a railroad from a trespasser who has laid the track without right to do so takes possession, a new cause of action arises; and as to such purchaser the statute of limitations begins to run from that date. Harbach v. Des Moines & K. C. R. Co. 11 L.R.A. 113, 80 Iowa, 593, 44 N. W. 348. c. A right of action against an electric light company for unlawfully trimming shade trees growing in the street, to the injury of the abutting property owner, accrues when the trees are so trimmed, and not when the franchise to use the street Slawas granted the electric company. Fraudulent conveyances, see ante, § 121. baugh v. Omaha Electric Light & P. Co. Effect of coverture, infancy, or other dis-30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1084, 87 Neb. 805, 128 N. ability, see post, §§ 161-171. W. 505. As against remaindermen, heirs, etc., see ante, $$ 74, 75. When suit is barred, see post, §§ 200-203. d. Whenever a nuisance is of a permanent Title by adverse possession, see ADVERSE nature, and its construction and continuPOSSESSION. ance are necessarily an injury, the damWhen time required for prescriptive ease-age is original, and the statute of limiment begins to run, see EASEMENTS, §tations begins to run upon the construction of the nuisance. St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Barton, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 645, 92 12 h. Limitations as bar to action to enjoin material departure from restrictive covenants, see INJUNCTION, § 31 f. a. A good-faith claim of right, based on color of title, is sufficient to set in motion the statute of limitations in favor of one in possession of real estate, although a critical examination of the record would show defects in his title. Crawford v. Meis, 66 L.R.A. 154, 123 Iowa, 610, 99 N. W. 186. b. A right of action to establish an interest in property purchased at a judicial sale under an invalid title, for which purchase-money notes are given on receiving a bond for title, does not accrue until the notes are paid. Lindsay v. Cooper, 16 L.R.A. 813, 94 Ala. 170, i1 So. 325. § 142. As against joint tenant conveyance by cotenant. on a. To make a conveyance of the whole tract by one joint tenant operate as an ouster of his cotenants, so as to start the stat ute of limitations running against them. there must be a possession taken under that deed, attributable to it alone. McNeeley v. South Penn Oil Co. 62 L.R.A. 562, 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S. E. 508. § 143. Injury to property; nuisance; trespass; waste. Effect of coverture, infancy, or other dis- When action is barred, see post, § 201. a. Where an injury to land is treated as permanent in character, and a single action is brought for all present and prospeetive damages, plaintiff is bound by the limitations which the law places upon the enforcement of such remedy, although he could have elected to sue for temporary damages sustained within the statutory period preceding the bringing of the action. Me Ark. 406, 123 S. W. 382. e. When the injury from a permanent nuisance is direct, immediate, and complete so that the damage can be immediately measured in a single action, the statute of limitations will begin to run from the erection of the nuisance. De Geofroy v. Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co. 64 L.R.A. 959, 179 Mo. 698, 79 S. W. 386. f. A right of action against a railroad company for the erection and operation of water tanks upon its right of way to the injury of abutting property arises when the tanks are built and put in operation. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Edrington, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 988, 100 Tex. 496, 101 S. W. 441. g. A right of action for damages caused unnecessarily by negligent and improper construction of an improvement under the power of eminent domain accrues at the time when such damages occur, as it cannot be anticipated. Bunting v. Oak Creek Drainage Dist. L.R.A.1918B, 1004, 99 Neb. 843, 157 N. W. 1028. h. The limitation period for injury to property by the operation of an incinerator plant on adjoining property begins to run when the injury is done, not when the plant is completed. Jacobs v. Seattle, L.R.A. 1918E, 131, 100 Wash. 524, 171 Pac. 662. (Annotated) i. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against all actions for injuries to adjoining property, growing out of the negligent erection by a municipality of a bulkhead so as to constitute a continuing nuisance, at the time of its completion, but damages may be recovered for injuries which have accrued within the statutory period before the commencement of the action, although more than the statutory period has elapsed since the completion of the work. Doran v. Seattle, 54 L.R.A. 532, 24 Wash. 182, 64 Pac. 230. II. When cause of action accrues; etc. i. Suits relating to real property. j. The statute of limitations begins to run against a right of action to recover for the injury inflicted upon abutting property by the erection of a permanent structure in the street for the operation of railroad trains upon an elevated track at the time the structure is completed and permanent injury inflicted. De Geofroy v. Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co. 64 L.R.A. 959, 179 Mo. 698, 79 S. W. 386. k. That an elevated railroad track was intended to be, and was in fact, made a permanent structure, does not prevent its being a continuing trespass upon the easements of landowners abutting upon the street through which it is constructed, so as to take it out of the rule of limitations applicable to actions for continuing trespasses, and bar all remedy unless the action is brought within the time after its construction prescribed in case of a single trespass. Galway v. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. 13 L.R.A. 788, 128 N. Y. 132, 28 N. E. 479. 1. The statute of limitations against an action for obstruction of water by a railroad embankment runs from the time when the first injury was sustained, and not necessarily from the construction of the road. Ridley v. Seaboard & R. R. Co. 32 L.R.A. 708, 118 N. C. 996, 24 S. E. 730, later appeals in 124 N. C. 34, 32 S. E. 325, and 124 N. C. 37, 32 S. E. 379. m. The statute of limitations begins to run for the construction, without negligence, of a permanent embankment by a levee distriet across water courses, so as to cut off drainage from upper lands, at the time of the completion of the obstruction, although the injury to the crops planted on the upper lands is not manifested until a later period. St. Francis Levee Dist. v. Barton, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 645, 92 Ark. 406, 123 S. W. 382. n. Under Minn. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 2369, providing that no action for damages oceasioned by a milldam shall be sustained unless brought within two years, no action for damages for overflowing lands by the erection and maintenance of such a dam, which is a permanent structure, can be maintained unless brought within two years after damages are first sustained by reason of the dam. Priebe v. Ames, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 206, 104 Minn. 419, 116 N. W. 829. o. The right of action for damages to growing crops and personal property caused by the negligent construction and maintenance of a ditch and dam does not accrue, so as to start the running of limitations, until the property is injured or destroyed. Christensen v. Omaha Ice & Cold Storage Co. 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1221, 92 Neb. 245, 138 N. W. 141. q. The statute of limitations begins to run against a cause of action for injuries to neighboring land by seepage from an irrigation ditch constructed under statutory authority, in the usual and ordinary manner, from the date the lands are first visibly affected and injured by seepage which, together with its continuance from the same source, caused the injury for which the action was brought, and it is immaterial that the injury increases with the passage of time. Middlekamp v. Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Co. 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 795, 46 Colo. 102, 103 Pac. 280. (Annotated) r. A cause of action for damage to land by the negligent construction of railroad ditches whereby surface water is turned upon the land arises when the injury occurs, and not when the ditches are completed. Fremont, E. & M. Valley R. Co. v. Harlin, 36 L.R.A. 417, 50 Neb. 698, 70 N. W. 263. s. The cause of action for damages resulting from the flooding of land caused by the construction over a stream of a bridge with insufficient openings to carry the volume of water reasonably to be expected accrues at the time of the flooding, and not at the time of the construction of the bridge. Broadway Mfg. Co. v. Leavenworth Terminal R. & Bridge Co. 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 156, 81 Kan. 616, 106 Pac. 1034. t. The statute of limitations begins to run upon a right of action against a railroad company which, without authority, straightens the bed of a stream so as to accelerate the flow in such manner that its future injurious effect on the riparian land is certain from the time of the completion of the work, although the actual injuy is done only by gradual erosion and the overflow of the property in times of freshet. Turner v. Overton, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 894, 86 Ark. 406, 111 S. W. 270. (Annotated) u. The limitation period for injury to land on the opposite shore by deflection of the current of a river by the construction of a permanent dike to protect one shore begins to run from the completion of the structure, although the injury occurs by the washing away of the shore during periods of high water in successive years thereafter, a process as certain to continue as the annual rains and the flow of the water of a large river. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moseley, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 885, 88 C. C. A. 236, 161 Fed. 72. (Annotated) v. In case of injury to a mill owner by deposits of sand in the stream, lessening his water power, caused by the ereetion of a boom, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the injury, and not from the time of the construction of the boom. Pickens v. Coal River Boom & Timber Co. 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 354, 66 W. Va. 10, 65 S. E. 865. p. Notwithstanding the maintenance for Effect of prescription or laches, see NUI- a. The rule that the right of action for trespass to real estate accrues to the one II. When cause of action accrues; etc. i. Suits relating to real property. owning the property at the time the tres- L.R.A. (N.S.) 805, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849. pass is committed does not apply to the emp(Annotated) tying of a sewer system into a stream to the injury of a riparian owner, where the extent of the injury cannot then be for all time estimated, while subsequent change of the outlet and enlargement of the system materially increase the injury after the change in the ownership of the riparian property. Smith v. Sedalia, 48 L.R.A. 711, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S. W. 907. b. A lower riparian owner's right of action against an upper proprietor who casts refuse materials into the stream, by which they are carried to the land of the former to its damage, first accrues when the terial is deposited on his land, and not when it is cast into the stream. Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 167, 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S. E. 776. c. The statute of limitations begins to run against an action for injuries by the settling of church walls because of insufficiency of a retaining wall built by a railroad company when constructing its tracks in a cut alongside of the property, when the injury occurs, and not at the time of the completion of the wall. Church of Holy Commun ion v. Paterson Extension R. Co. 55 L.R.A. als. a. The running of the statute of limima-tations against a cause of action for removal of coal from a stratum beneath the surface of land by wrongfully extending a mine under lands of other owners begins only from the time of actual discovery of the trespass or the time when discovery was reasonably possible, at least to the extent of recovering compensation which would be allowable on a bill for an account in equity in a state where equity is administered through common-law forms of action. Lewey v. H. C. Frick Coke Co. 28 L.R.A. 283, 166 Pa. 536, 31 Atl. 261. c. The injury from the permanent sewer system of a hotel which is emptied into a stream so as to destroy it completely for the use of lower riparian owners is permanent, and not continuing, so that the damages must be recovered in one action, against which the statute of limitations begins to run when the injury is done. Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. McCray, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 465, 106 Va. 461, 56 S. E. 216. b. The statute of limitations begins to run against the right of a reversioner in a long-time lease to bring his action for damages for wrongful removal of coal from beneath the surface, when he discovers or might have discovered that the coal is being taken. Kingston v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 557, 241 Pa. 469, 88 Atl. 763. j. Municipal or county indebtedness. § 147. Generally. When action is barred, see post. § 204. d. A cause of action arises upon the first pollution of a stream by the flowage from a sewer system constructed by a municipality, and refuse from a refinery constructed by an oil company, which were permanent in their nature, and an action in which the injury is treated as a permanent one, as an appropriation of an interest in property, and in which al damages sustained and to be sustained are sought to be recovered, is barred if not brought within the statutory period thereafter; and is not taken out of the statute of limitations by the fact that high water occurring immediately after the construction of the sewer system and the erection of the refinery prevented the settling or accumulation of the refuse upon the plaintiff's premises for some time, especially not where it appears that the plaintiff knew of the character of the sewer system and refinery, and that there would be a constant and continuous flow of impurities into the stream which would necessarib. Failure to provide a special fund out of ly pollute the water. McDaniel v. Cherryvale, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 388, 91 Kan. 40, 136 which town warrants are payable does not Pac. 899. § 145. — injury to surface support or lateral support. a. The statute of limitations does not run in favor of a municipal, or quasi municipal corporation, upon its outstanding obligations evidenced by warrants, until the corporation has provided a fund out of which payment of the same may be made. Barnes 284, 78 Pac. 108, aff'd in 204 U. S. 623, 51 v. Turner, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 478, 14 Okla. L. ed. 652, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316. (Annotated) prevent the running of the statute of limitations if the town officials denied the validity of the warrants and refused to provide the fund for that reason. Howe v. Gunnison, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1276, 42 Colo. 540, 95 Pac. 283. a. The cause of action for an injury due to the subsidence of the surface over a mine arises, so as to start the running of the stat- c. The institution of a proceeding by manute of limitations, at the time of the remov-damus to compel the levy of a tax to pay al of the support, and not at that of the re- municipal warrants does not start the statsulting subsidence. Noonan v. Pardee, 55 L.R.A. 410, 200 Pa. 474, 50 Atl. 255. b. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action for injury to the surface by mining operations until some actual mischief has been done to it, regardless of when the mining was done. West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 23 ute of limitations running against the indebtedness evidenced by the warrants, where the municipal corporation has failed in its duty of providing a fund from which to pay them. Barnes v. Turner, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 478, 14 Okla. 284, 78 Pac. 108, aff'd in 204 U. S. 623, 51 L. ed. 652, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 316. II. When cause of action accrues; etc. j. Municipal or county indebtedness. d. The rule of law that the statute of fraud or concealment. Clapp v. Pinegrove, limitations does not begin to run in favor 12 L.R.A. 618, 138 Pa. 35, 20 Atl. 836. of a municipal organization on its outstanding warrants until it has money in its. Decedents' estate; executors and adtreasury to redeem them does not apply to ministrators. its ordinary bonded indebtedness, repre§ 151. Generally. to set new date from which limitations shall run, see ante, § 6 a. Effect of insanity or infancy, see post, §§ 167 a, 171 a. sented by negotiable bonds and interest Waiver of statute by administrator, so as coupons. Schoenhoeft v. Kearny County, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 803, 76 Kan. 883, 92 Pac. 1097. (Annotated) e. The limitation period for bringing an action against a county upon an obligation of another county from which it formed, payment of which is imposed upon it by statute, must begin at or after the date of the imposition of the obligation. Robertson v. Blaine County, 47 L.R.A. 459, 32 C. C. A. 512, 90 Fed. 63. was f. An obligation created by the passage of a new and independent act casting the burden of paying a county debt upon another county is within the rule that when payment is provided for out of a particular fund the debtor cannot plead the statute of limitations to a suit thereon, without first showing that the particular fund has been provided. Robertson v. Blaine County, 47 L.R.A. 459, 32 C. C. A. 512, 90 Fed. 63. k. Taxes, assessments, and tax sales. When action is barred, see post, §§ 208, 209. a. Where a cause of action arises after death, it is considered as accruing, for the purpose of the running of the statute of limitations, only from the time when there is some one in existence who is capable of suing, and if no one but the administrator can sue, the statute does not begin to run until administration is granted. American R. Co. v. Coronas, L.R.A.1916E, 1095, 144 C. C. A. 599, 230 Fed. 545. b. The appointment of a temporary administrator does not constitute representation upon a decedent's estate, within the meaning of a statute providing that the time between the death of the person and representation taken upon his estate shall not be counted against the estate, so as to cause the statute of limitations to begin to run against it upon the appointment of such administrator, although such administrator has statutory authority to sue to recover Kinnon, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 824, 137 Ga. 165. debts due the estate. Baumgartner v. Me(Annotated) 73 S. E. 518. e. Upon the granting of letters of administration upon the estate of a member of a banking partnership the statute of limitations begins to run against any claim upon his estate for payment of a certificate of deposit issued by the partnership, and the fact that the depositor had no notice of the death is immaterial. Re Gardner, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 685, 228 Pa. 282, 77 Atl. 509. § 149. Attack on tax sale or deed. When action is barred, see post, § 205. a. A statute limiting the time in which d. A claim against the estate of a deactions to attack tax deeds must be brought ceased person, not allowable in the adminisdoes not apply to prevent an owner in pos-tration proceedings because it is contingent session from setting up the validity of a tax deed for lack of jurisdiction in a proeeeding by the holder against him for the possession. Buty v. Goldfinch, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1065, 74 Wash. 532, 133 Pac. 1057. (Annotated) in character, is not affected by any statute of limitations while such character exists. South Milwaukee Co. v. Murphy, 58 L.R.A. 82, 112 Wis. 614, 88 N. W. 583. (Annotated) e. The statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. 1898, § 3860, providing that if the claim of any person against the estate of another shall accrue or become absolute after the time limited for creditors to present their claims, then such claim may be presented to the county court and proved at any time within one year after it accrues, bears on a right from the time there is a cause of action to enforce it. Re Hanlin, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1189, 133 Wis. 140, 113 N. W. 411. m. Judgment. § 152. Generally. |