FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-Continued.
purchaser for the benefit of the seller's creditors. Id. 226.
4. Averments that the debtor absconded after transferring
his stock of merchandise, that the provisions of statute
were not followed in making the conveyance, and that the
purchaser disposed of and transferred the property to
another defendant who is disposing of it, make out a case
of equitable cognizance. Id.
5. A waiver, being the intentional relinquishment of a known
right, is not to be inferred against a complaining creditor,
who did not know the circumstances or the fact that the
statute had been violated in making the sale of mer-
chandise. Id.
See EQUITY (4); ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (2).
FUTURE OR CONTINGENT INTERESTS-See CONTRACTS (7).
GARNISHMENT See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (3).
GASOLINE-See EVIDENCE (12); NUISANCE (1).
1. A valid gift of a mortgage or other chose in action may
be made by manual delivery without a written assign-
ment. Hoyt v. Gillen, 509.
2. Evidence tending to show the delivery of a mortgage and
note as an intended gift from decedent to defendant, held,
to warrant a finding that the gift was executed as claimed.
Id.
GRAND RAPIDS CHARTER-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1).
GUARDIAN AND WARD-See WITNESSES (4).
HEARSAY EVIDENCE-See EVIDENCE (4, 16, 18); MASTER AND
SERVANT (7).
HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER-See FIRES (1).
1. The objection that a road is open at one end only, is not,
as a matter of law, conclusive on the issue of public
necessity, in proceedings to lay out a highway. If there
is evidence for and against the necessity of the way and
the convenience to the public, the issue is for a jury under
proper instructions; nor is it essential that the highway
should be indispensable or imperative to the public. No
statute or rule of law determines that before a public
highway can be laid out it must have certain and definite
termini in other public highways. Rogren v. Corwin, 53.
2. Under Act No. 334, Pub. Acts 1913, establishing trunk line
highways and providing for State assistance in creating
and maintaining them, the counties of Branch, Calhoun
and St. Joseph were not entitled to petition the State
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS-Continued.
highway commissioner to establish a trunk line high-
way which was not part of the highway system desig-
nated in the act: the proviso in section 2 being intended
to apply to counties which disagree as to the course of
the trunk line highways. Mandamus will not issue to
require the commissioner to survey and furnish esti-
mates for such proposed line of highway separate from
or disconnected with the main or trunk lines. Luce v.
State Highway Com'r, 599.
See FIRES (1); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3); NEGLIGENCE
(1, 3).
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-See BILLS AND NOTES (1).
HOMESTEADS-See MECHANICS' LIENS (1-3).
HOMICIDE-See CRIMINAL LAW (7); EVIDENCE (17, 18).
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Conflicting testimony relating to the mental condition and
competency of decedent considered, and held, to establish
her capacity to execute a bill of sale of her household
furniture and certain notes, with the advice and assist-
ance of her attorney. Hannan v. Larsen, 595.
See BILLS AND NOTES (10-14); CONTRACTS (1); DAMAGES
(1-3); DIVORCE (1, 4); MECHANICS' LIENS (1, 2); MORT-
GAGES (2, 3); VENDOR AND PURCHASER (9); WITNESSES (3,
5, 6).
IMPEACHMENT-See BILLS AND NOTES (8); EQUITY (2); RAIL-
ROADS (3); TRIAL (7); WITNESSES (1, 2).
IMPLIED CONTRACTS-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (1).
INDEMNITY-See INSURANCE (6).
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-See NEGLIGENCE (4, 5).
INDORSEMENT ON INFORMATION-See WITNESSES (1).
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD-See MASTER and Servant (1,
3, 6-8).
INFANTS-See CORPORATIONS (3); NEGLIGENCE (1).
INFORMATION-See CRIMINAL LAW (9).
1. Complainant's bill for an injunction was demurrable on the
theory that he had another adequate remedy, upon aver-
ments contained in the pleading, that every legal question
involving his license to do transitory business and the
validity of an ordinance revoking it had been raised in a
case instituted in justice's court, in which the complain-
ant was charged with violating such ordinance of the de-
fendant municipality, which cause the complainant had
removed to the circuit court by writ of certiorari, and the
court having determined the questions involved adversely
to the claims of the complainant, who took no appeal.
Vernakes v. City of South Haven, 274.
2. An injunction to restrain defendant power corporation
from overflowing the lands of defendant, who had made
no complaint against the erection of the proposed dam,
merely claiming greater damages than defendant was
willing to offer, and who furnished material for the con-
struction of the dam, was properly refused by the court
of first instance, on the ground that the proprietor of the
land was estopped by his conduct from objecting to the
use of the dam, and would be entitled to damages only.
Morrison v. Queen City Electric Light & Power Co., 624.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (12); NUISANCE (1); SOLDIERS'
HOME (4); WATERS AND WATERCOURSES (2-5).
INSANE PERSONS-See CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS; CON-
TRACTS (7).
INSPECTION-See MASTER AND SERVANT (13).
INSTRUCTIONS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (4, 9); BILLS
NOTES (4); CRIMINAL LAW (3, 5-8); LOGS AND LOGGING (2, 3);
MASTER AND SERVANT (14); SET-OFF AND RECOUPMENT; STREET
RAILWAYS (2, 3); TRIAL (3, 6); WITNESSES (7).
1. After breach of a contract for the purchase of real and
personal property covered by insurance, and after the
vendee had assigned his interest in the policy to the
vendor, canceling the land contract and assigning all
interest in the policy to him, the defendant insurance
corporation, which had notice of the transaction, is held,
by an equally divided court, to be liable on the policy
upon which it had indorsed a clause stipulating that the
vendee held the property under contract, and the loss,
if any, should be payable to plaintiffs and vendee as their
interests might appear. MCALVAY, C. J., and STONE, OS-
TRANDER, and STEERE, JJ., dissenting, on the ground that
a material change of interest had occurred, avoiding the
policy. Gourlay v. Insurance Co. of North America, 286.
2. Where the evidence of an insured tended to establish that
he sent notice to defendant of his injury, pursuant to
the conditions of his accident policy, that he received a
reply signed by one of defendant's claim clerks, and that
the defendant cashed a check contained in his letter, the
court was not in error in holding that the sending of the
notice was established. Hummer v. Midland Casualty Co.,
386.
3. The provisions of such accident policy requiring notice as
soon as possible after suffering an injury, could not be
held, as matter of law, to have been intended only as
a protection against fraud and misrepresentation; and it
was plaintiff's duty to give notice as promptly as possible
after an injury to his eye; delay for five months or over
was not a compliance therewith. Id.
4. No reversible error was committed, on the trial, in re-
opening the case, after plaintiff closed his testimony, to
admit testimony of his physician to show the contents
of a letter which had been attached to the proofs of in-
jury, but which contained no facts prejudicial to the de-
fense. Id.
5. It was not erroneous to permit the attending physician,
who knew plaintiff's condition, to give his opinion that
plaintiff was incapacitated from attending to his business
during about three and a half months. Id. 387.
6. But plaintiff was not entitled, under a policy providing
that the insurer should pay an indemnity of $2,500 if
the injury resulted in the loss of an eye (or other similar
injuries) within 100 days from the date of the accident,
that in case the injury from the date of accident rendered
him continuously unable to perform any of his business
duties and resulted in the loss of one eye, he should be
entitled to a weekly indemnity of $25, to recover, in addi-
tion to the $2,500, the weekly indemnity so provided for,
when it appeared that the injury to his eye was not
serious, but by some mistake he obtained a medicine con-
taining caustic acid which caused further injury and re-
sulting blindness; and that he was not continuously dis-
abled from the date of his original injury. Id.
7. In the absence of provisions in the policy working for-
feiture in case notice of the injury was not given as soon
as possible, or in case proofs were not filed within the
time stated, the insurer might waive such conditions, and
a waiver was established by testimony that showed the
insurer had no intention of complaining about the failure
to give notice in the stated period, and was not prejudiced
by the neglect. Id.
8. Testimony that the loss of plaintiff's eye was caused by
the introduction into it of acid, that the proofs of loss
or injury were filed within 100 days from the date of the
accident, and within 60 days from the time that plaintiff
became satisfied what the result would be, held, to be
within the conditions of the policy. Id.
See VENDOR AND PURCHASER (6).
INTENT-See CONTRACTS (9); STATUTES; WILLS (1-3).
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT-See CONTRACTS (2, 5, 6, 8).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-See MASTER AND SERVANT (2).
Taking orders for intoxicating liquors which the vendor
later shipped from the city in which he was authorized
and licensed to do business, by freight or express, to
another township in which the accused took the orders,
was not an unlawful sale in the latter township, since no
sale was effected until he had selected the wares from his
stock, even though he, personally, collected payment.
People v. Perenchio, 314.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7, 8); CRIMINAL LAW (4); SALES
(1).
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER-See CRIMINAL LAW (7, 9).
ISSUE-See TRIAL (5).
ISSUES FOR JURY-See MASTER AND SERVANT (14).
JOINT DEFENDANTS-See ELECTION OF REMEDIES.
JOINT MAKERS-See BILLS AND NOTES (3).
JUDGMENT-See APPEAL AND ERROR (3, 6); ESTATES OF DECE-
DENTS (8); FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1, 2); INJUNCTION (1).
JUDICIAL NOTICE-See EVIDENCE (12).
JURISDICTION-See EJECTMENT; EQUITY (4); ESTATES OF DECE-
DENTS (2, 5-7); FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1, 2, 4).
A juror will not be held disqualified because he is an alien,
if the record permits an inference that he might be a
qualified elector. Also, the objection is not well taken,
after judgment in a civil action. Neal v. Neal, 115.
See CRIMINAL LAW (10, 13).
LACHES-See CORPORATIONS (3); EQUITY (1, 5, 6).
LADDERS, USE OF—See Negligence (3).
LAND CONTRACTS-See USURY (1); VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. Evidence that plaintiff's employer, after plaintiff had
joined a strike, notified him to quit and surrender up
the house and premises that he occupied as a part of his
employment, and thereupon sent men to put him out,
who, after advising him why they came, removed his
furniture to the street, and that the plaintiff cautioned
them against damaging it, but they injured the furniture
to the extent of $14.50, held, to be insufficient to show
excessive force or forcible entry and detainer, although
plaintiff's judgment for the damage done by their neglect
is allowed to stand. Lane v. Au Sable Electric Co., 26.
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