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October, 1904, assigned to the First Sea Lord responsibility for advice in regard to preparation for war : and all large questions of naval policy and maritime warfare,' and gave him control of the Intelligence Department.

Since 1904 the principal changes affecting the Intelligence Department have been the separaton of the Mobilisation Brauch, the appointment thereto of an independent Director, and the establishment (in 1909) of a 'Navy War Council,' which was presided over by the First Sea Lord, and included in its membership the Directors of the Intelligence and Mobilisation Departments, the Assistant Secretary of the Admiralty (a civilian), and the Rear-Admiral in command of the War College. There bas been a considerable growth of numbers and cost of the Staff employed at the Admiralty since the Intelligence Department was established. Including naval attachés, twenty-seven officers and seventeen civilians are provided for in the current Navy Estimates, at a cost approximating to 22,0001. In addition, a considerable sum is spent on the salaries of officers and civilians employed in connexion with the war-courses of instruction at

home ports.

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Under the new arrangements the two sections of the Intelligence Department-Intelligence and Operations-are to be separated; each is to be supervised by a Director, and the Chief of the Staff is to preside over the three divisions guiding and co-ordinating their work. Mr. Churchill expressly says that 'the War Staff at the Admiralty will . . . be organised from the existing elements in the three divisions : the Intelligence division, the Operations division, and the Mobilisation division.' The divisions are to be equal in status ; each Director is usually to be a Captain in the Royal Navy; frequent Staff meetings are to be held and attended by the Chief and the three Directors, so that each Director is to be kept fully acquainted with the work of bis two colleagues'; one of the three Directors is to be always within prompt call night and day. It is also laid down that

The functions of the War Staff will be advisory. The Chief of the Staff, when decision has been taken upon any proposal, will be jointly responsible with the Secretary for the precise form in which the necessary orders are issued, but the Staff will possess no executive authority. It will discharge no administrative duties. Its responsibilities will end with the tendering of advice, and with the accuracy of the facts on which that advice is based. Decision as to accepting or rejecting the advice of the Staff wholly or in part rests with the First Sea Lord, who, in the name of the Board of Admiralty, discharges the duties assigned to him by the Minister [i.e. the First Lord in his distribution of business to the members of the Board]. When one compares these provisions for the future with the description of regulations for the Intelligence Department given by Sir Vesey Hamilton and quoted above, it will be seen that the work to be done by the War Staff will be identical in character with that which has been done previously; it will be divided into the same branches, each with its head; and all these branches will be supervised by a distinguished naval officer who is to be always of flag rank. In the past the Director of Naval Intelligence has usually been a Rear-Admiral. The powers assigned to the Chief of the Staff appear to be practically the same as those formerly exercised by the Director of Naval Intelligence : both of them by their Instructions are charged with purely advisory duties. The First Sea Lord remains responsible, as he has always been, and must be. One point now specifically laid down is that the First Sea Lord shall be authorised to give decisions

in the name of the Board of Admiralty,' while he is placed under no obligation to consult bis naval colleagues before deciding. It may be noted that no such obligation has been formally laid upon the First Sea Lord since radical changes in the Admiralty system were introduced by Sir James Graham eighty years ago. It is recognised (with regret) that the further change which was made by Lord Selborne in 1904 seriously affected the position of other naval members of the Board in relation to the First Sea Lord. On the other hand, everyone who has been conversant with the actual administration of Naval affairs will agree with an experienced ex-First Sea Lord (Sir Vesey Hamilton) when he describes the ordinary practice of the First Sea Lord as one in which he was 'assisted by his colleagues' in bearing the heavy load of responsibility inevitably placed upon him. Equally correct was his reference to the duty of the Director of Naval Intelligence as including the bringing to the notice of the Board all points touching preparation for war.' The last word must always rest with the First Sea Lord, who is certain to be senior to his colleagues, and whose primary duty it is to act as principal Naval adviser to the Government through the First Lord : but it must be an enormous advantage, even to the most able and experienced officer, to have at hand the power of consulting other Naval men whose experience and professional ability have led to their selection as members of the Board of Admiralty.

Mr. Churchill recognises the fact that established principles of organisation are to be developed in the establishment of the War Staff. He says, when describing its functions ::

It should not be supposed that these functions find no place in Admiralty organisation at the present time. On the contrary, during the course of years all, or nearly all, the elements of a War Staff at the Admiralty have been successively evolved in the practical working of every-day affairs since the organisation of the Foreign Intelligence Department in 1883.

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His intention is to combine these elements into an harmonious and effective organisation; to invest that new body with a significance and influence it has not hitherto possessed, and to place it in its proper relation to existing powers.' Mr. Churchill is of opinion that the personnel of the War Staff must be considerable in numbers, and that it must consist of officers representing most grades and every specialist branch, fresh from the sea, and returning to the sea fairly frequently. These conditions for appointment to the Staff of the Intelligence Department have held good in the past; all grades and specialisations have been represented in the Staff, and Naval officers serving thereon have come from and returned to the sea. It would appear, although it is not specifically stated, that the work and numbers of the Operations division are to be especially increased, and this would be in accordance with the opinion expressed by the Committee of the Cabinet and quoted above.

There must, of course, be universal agreement in the opinion that a thorough study of the operations of Naval war, and the preparation of plans of campaign to meet probable or possible contingencies, is essential to the maintenance of British supremacy at sea. Apart from that action there can be no trustworthy basis for estimating the Naval force which is required for the defence of the Empire ; because there will be no clear perception of the duties which the Imperial Navy may be called upon to perform, the numbers and types of ships required, the locality and equipment of Naval bases, and other matters which are of vital importance. These are, however, no new discoveries, nor has action in this direction been wanting in the past. It is not my duty or intention to attempt any defence of the past work of the Intelligence Department in regard to its study of operations and strategy: it would be an impertinence for me to appear in that rôle. My official duties, however, brought me during a long period into touch with this side of its work, and gave me familiarity with its extent and character. It may therefore be permitted me to say—from first-hand knowledge-in view of recent criticisms made by persons not fully informed in regard to the facts, that all the great programmes of shipbuilding carried out during my long period of service as Director of Naval Construction and Assistant Controller of the Royal Navy, were framed on the basis of elaborate plans of campaign. For these plans the First Sea Lord was primarily responsible, and in the preparation of them the Director of Naval Intelligence and his staff gave great and valuable assistance. This testimony will be corroborated by all who served in the Admiralty during the period mentioned It is, therefore, much to be regretted that statements should have been made of late in which it has been asserted that the study of Naval operations is now to be undertaken for the first time at the Admiralty in an effective or extensive manner. Mr. Churchill gives no ground for such statements in his Memorandum, and it has been shown that he realises what good work has been done in the past. The First Lord may be right in thinking that more requires to be done in this direction, and that the 'thinking department' requires to be strengthened. It is a very different thing, however, and an absolute misstatement of fact, to say that in the past there has not been a thinking department. If the history of the great shipbuilding programme introduced and carried by the late Lord Spencer is ever written, it will be found that it rested upon a complete scheme for the Naval defence of the Empire, its commerce and communications, against all possible attacks which could then be made upon them. This scheme included an Establishment' for the ships of various classes required by the Royal Navy, provision for manning and reserves for the fleet, arrangements for stores and coals, the creation and improvement of Naval bases, and other contributories to Naval power and Naval operations. The man responsible for this great plan was Admiral of the Fleet Sir Frederick Richards, G.C.B., then First Sea Lord. In its preparation his Naval colleagues on the Board and the Director of Naval Intelligence, as well as other heads of Departments, were consulted. As an instance of wise prescience and large views of naval strategy, the scheme will ever remain a great example of administration for those charged with the corresponding responsibilities. This scheme did not stand alone during my service at the Admiralty : other schemes were framed before and after its conception, and since my retirement it seems inconceivable that so well-established a procedure can have been abandoned or sensibly departed from. Mr. Churchill does not hint at such a change, but he thinks improvement possible and desirable; and he is right, as the responsible Minister, in giving effect to that conviction in what he may decide to be the

best way.

Details of his scheme cannot be considered or criticised until they have been thoroughly worked out and published. One or two important details have been made known already, bowever, and may be mentioned. Candidates for admission to the War Staff are in future to undergo a preliminary course of training at the War College, and the selections for service as Staff officers are to be made from amongst graduates of that College. A specialist branch of Staff officers is thus to be formed, corresponding to existing specialist branches in gunnery, torpedoes, and other duties. These Staff officers are to be employed at

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the Admiralty and on the staff of Flag-officers afloat. Regular periods of sea-going executive duty are to alternate with Staff duties in order that officers in that class may be kept up to the necessary standard as practical sea-officers. These statements, of course, must be read in connexion with the passage quoted above, in which the First Lord lays down the regulation that on the War Staff ‘most grades and every specialist branch' will be represented. Mr. Churchill also says that 'the formation of a War Staff does not mean the setting up of new standards of professional merit, or the opening of a road of advancement to a different class of officers.' These conditions must be rigidly enforced if the personnel of the Royal Navy is to maintain its high traditions for unity of feeling and purpose. Each grade and specialised class must retain equal opportunities for promotion and employment if its work is to be done efficiently, and lack of service on the Staff must never be allowed to be a bar. There can be no doubt also as to the advantage which will be obtained hereafter, eren when the new system of training for the Staff has been put into thorough working order, by making some appointments to the War Staff from amongst officers who have not been specially trained in the regular way, but are known to have special ability or knowledge acquired by personal study outside the ordinary course. These things will doubtless take care of themselves, but they are mentioned because they are already the subject of discussion in naval circles.

APPOINTMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL CIVIL LORD. Hitherto, with a single and brief exception, there has been one Civil Lord of the Admiralty, and that office has been held by a member of Parliament. The duties attaching to the office have included the control of appointments to and promotions in the civil staff of the naval establishments, Greenwich Hospital business

, dockyard and naval schools, and other miscellaneous subjects. The principal charge entrusted to this political member of the Board has been the supervision of the Department of Director of Works and of the naval works carried out under special Loan Bills during the last sixteen years.

The last-mentioned works have involved great extensions and improvements of dockvards, harbours, and naval bases, the total expenditure thereon being estimated at thirty millions sterling.

In March 1882 an Order in Council was issued, under which an additional Civil Lord was appointed. His qualifications were described as follows: He is to be possessed of special mechanical and engineering knowledge, as well as experience in the superintendence of large private establishments.'

It was also

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