ments, and announcing the exercise of powers of proselytism thus armed against the unwary and ignorant of our own communion. Neither do we ask for new laws to avert these new evils. Those enactments which the Protestant Parliaments of our realm have already furnished, independently of those statutes which the uniform policy and wisdom of the legislature, from the Richards to Elizabeth, have often placed and maintained in the Statute Book, even in the days of Queen Mary, amply suffice for the purpose. In this case we may, perhaps, be permitted to say "Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari," without the imputation of being deaf to reason, and bent on obtaining the civil power to put down a controversial adversary! Enough has been said to divest the charge of any foundation. The civil power exists; and we seek no more but less than the law affords us, of the protection due to our own faith and evangelical truth.

1

The only point on which we feel that some injustice has been done to the Papal party in this matter is the charge of its being an insidious movement. Lord John Russell clearly meant this term to apply to its initiative in this country by the traitors within our own Church, who, with the pay of a Protestant Establishment in their pockets, and Rome in their hearts, have been espousing her doctrines, imitating her forms, and inviting her aggression. This charge certainly does not apply to the Papal party and the following fact, which has been communicated to us on high authority, absolves them wholly from it.

Before the Papal letter left Rome the Pope, at an interview with Lord Minto, held out to him a paper and said, “ Here, Lord Minto, is something for you. This is a document, containing the appointment of a Catholic Hierarchy for England and Wales." Lord Minto thereupon smiled, bowed, and neither read the document or made any comment.

This was clearly a notification to Lord Minto, our representative at Rome, of the projected measure: though, on the other hand, the diplomatic silence of his lordship can be interpreted no otherwise than as an avoidance of any opinion, and of any act from which an opinion could be legitimately inferred. Neither can the inference be warranted, that the government at home were apprised sufficiently early to have protested against the issuing of the Papal letter, even if they had deemed it right to do so.

The remedy already most applicable to the case appears to us

1 The Pope was permitted to do certain things within this realm by usurpation, and not of right, until the reign of Henry VIII.-Lord Coke.

VOL. XIV. NO. XXVI.

to be the statute of the 13th of Eliz. c. 2, s. 3.1 It defines the precise offence committed by those who have obtained or used, or printed or published, the papal letter And though it is obvious that the offence is high treason, the punishment is in the hands of the crown, and that the royal discretion would be exercised with abundant mercy, there can be no question.

It is objected to further legislative prohibitions that if English Papal Bishops be declared illegal, so must the Irish and Colonial Papal Bishops. The simple and conclusive answer of the government to this will probably be, with reference to the latter, Rightly or wrongly, in hæc fœdera veni,'--to the former,' non veni.' There must be some limit to concessions.

If it be thought (as many do think) that it were wiser to enact fresh penalties, that course is clearly open to the government, and would meet with general response by the people. In no case will it, however, be sufficient alone to amend the phraseology of the statute of Geo. IV., so as to exclude the assumption of the mere name of bishop. It is now very immaterial by what title they are called. As vicars apostolic they will now have nearly the same episcopal prestige and power. THE SEND

ING OR USING HERE OF FRESH BULLS OR INSTRUMENTS FROM ROME GIVING FRESH POWERS MUST CONTINUE TO BE A TREASONABLE OFFENCE in all the length and breadth of the act of Queen Elizabeth, made when they understood how to draw statutes as they ought to be drawn, but with greatly mitigated penalties. Nothing less will meet the emergency, or abate the peril; nothing less will fulfil the sacred claims of religious liberty, and nothing less will content the expectations of the people against a measure so well denounced by the first minister of the crown as "A pretension by a foreign potentate to SUPREMACY OVER THE REALM OF ENGLAND! A CLAIM TO SOLE AND UNDIVIDED SWAY, INCONSISTENT WITH THE QUEEN'S SUPREMACY, WITH THE RIGHTS OF OUR BISHOPS AND CLERGY, AND WITH THE SPIRITUAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE NATION!"

1 We have said nothing about the 1 Eliz. c. 1, because it was clearly applied to the redress of a personal grievance touching the sovereign, and, however applicable in law, would not be so in fact. It is, however, not wanted, inasmuch as the later general statute more than suffices.

S.

Notes of Leading Cases.

EQUITY.

COPYRIGHT IN AN ALIEN-RESIDENCE IN ENGLAND-INJUNCTION WHEN TITLE DOUBTFUL.

Ollendorff v. Black, 14 Jur. 1080.

THERE are conflicting decisions at common law as to the right of a foreigner to support a title to copyright in this country. The case of Cocks v. Purday (5 C. B. 860), which we noticed amongst our leading cases in vol. ix., p. 239, distinctly lays down, without any restriction as to domicile, that a foreigner who is the author of a work which he has first published in England, and which has not been made publici juris by a previous publication elsewhere, has a copyright in that work in this country.

On the other hand, the Court of Exchequer, in the more recent case of Boosey v. Purday (4 Exch. 145), has decided, that a foreigner residing abroad at the time of the first publication of his work in this country has no copyright in it here. The point has since come before a court of equity in Ollendorff v. Black, the case at the head of this note. The plaintiff, Dr. Ollendorff, who was an alien living abroad, having composed a work, published the same for the first time in this country. At the time of its publication, and for some time previously, he resided in this country, but it did not appear that he had lost his foreign domicile, or that his residence here had been otherwise than temporarily. A pirated edition of his work having been imported into this country from abroad, Dr. Ollendorff filed a bill for an injunction to restrain the selling of such edition. On motion for such injunction the question was, whether the plaintiff, being an alien, could assert a title to copyright in this country.

Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce granted the injunction, but without overruling Boosey v. Purday. In that case the author was an alien who had never been in this country during the first publication of his work, but in Ollendorff v. Black the

plaintiff was himself in England when the publication took place there. This was considered by his Honor to be a material circumstance distinguishing the case from the case of Boosey v. Purday, and which was sufficient to justify the course his Honor took, assuming even Boosey v. Purday to be law. It is evident, however, from what fell from the Vice-Chancellor, that his Honor disapproved of the decision of the Court of Exchequer in that case; and that he thought the decision in Cocks v. Purday to be the more correct view of the law. It is difficult to understand how the distinction can make a substantial difference; for if a foreigner domiciled abroad, but residing here during the short time his work is publishing, is to have a copyright in the work in this country, it cannot be sound law to hold that he shall not have such protection, if, instead of coming himself over to England, he transmits the work to an assignee in this country in order to be published here. It was argued in Ollendorff v. Black by counsel for the defendant, that at all events the legal right of the plaintiff to the copyright was so doubtful from the conflict of decisions at law, that the court would not interfere by injunction until the question of the plaintiff's legal title had been established in an action. The Vice-Chancellor, however, expressly dissented from the proposition that that was a sufficient reason for withholding the injunction, considering that the court has a discretion in every case, and that it is not bound by any rule to refuse an injunction merely because some doubt might be cast on the plaintiff's legal title. On this point the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor, which is important for the rule it establishes, was expressed as follows: "It has been said here that the legal right is doubtful, that the mere existence of the doubt is sufficient to prevent the court from granting the injunction. In that I do not agree. I believe that doctrine to be new in this court; for it would interfere theoretically and practically with its jurisdiction, daily exercised to a very great extent. The question of the legal right being in doubt is a matter for the serious attention of the court, and one to which it is right that weight should be given; but it is not a matter which renders it incumbent on the court to refuse the injunction. The court must be guided by a discretion exercised according to the exigencies and the nature of each particular case."

COMMON LAW.

COUNTY COURT-ORDER TO PAY BY INSTALMENTS EMBODYING ORDER FOR COMMITMENT.

Abley v. Dale, 14 Jur. 1069.

THE cases of Ex parte Kinning, 4 C. B. 513, and Kinning v. Buchanan, 18 L. J., C. P. 332, have established what is now well known, that an order made by a judge of a County Court, under the County Court Act, for the payment of a debt by instalments, cannot in case of default be enforced by committal to prison, without the debtor being first summoned before the judge to explain why he had not paid the same. The principle on which those cases were decided was, that a man is not to be punished without an opportunity of defending himself. That principle was further recognised and affirmed in the case at the head of this note, in which it was held, that if a judge of a County Court make an order on a defendant to pay a debt by instalments, and the defendant make default, the latter has a right to be heard in his defence before he is committed; and the order of commitment upon nonpayment cannot be embodied in an order to pay by instalments. The facts of this case differed from those in Ex parte Kinning and Kinning v. Buchanan, inasmuch as in the present case the debtor had been summoned on the first default, and a second order had been made for the payment of the debt; but the principle to which we have alluded as governing those cases equally applied to the present

one.

The action was trespass for false imprisonment, and the defendant pleaded as a justification that he had recovered against the plaintiff in a County Court a judgment for debt and costs payable by monthly instalments, and that the plaintiff had paid thereunder a certain portion of the amount, but had made default in payment of the residue; that the plaintiff was then summoned to answer concerning his estate and effects, and that he appeared and was examined by the judge, who adjudged that the plaintiff had sufficient means of discharging the debt, &c., and ordered him to pay it by certain other instalments, or that he should be committed to prison. The plea then stated a default in such last instalments, upon which a warrant was issued out of the court for the plaintiff's committal, under which the defendant justified. On demurrer to this plea it was attempted by counsel for the defendant to distinguish the case from the cases of Ex parte Kinning and Kinning v. Buchanan, on the ground that the plaintiff had, in the present case, been sum