specific and plain that the obligation shall remain in full force and effect, in case of appeal to the Supreme Court, if the judgment in said Court, with interest and costs, is not paid. We consider the condition more specific than the recital, which is a general one, and does not purport to set out in detail the exact terms or language of the order staying proceedings and requiring a bond. The condition of the obligation was one that the parties had a right to make and have made. There is no ambiguity about it. It must have been understood by the defendants, unless they failed to read it or have it read to them. It must control their liability rather than the recital. Whether it can be regarded as a supersedeas bond, or one required by any statute, or even by the order of the court, is immaterial. It was one that the defendant could agree to give, and the plaintiff could agree to receive. It was given and received and acted upon, and must be held to have been executed by both of the defendants with full knowledge of the terms and import of the condition therein. The bond was given for the benefit and advantage of O'Harrow, and he cannot now escape from his obligation. Rynearson v. Fredenburg, 42 Mich. 412. The affirmance of the judgment of the court below was a sufficient judgment of the Supreme Court to support the condition of the bond. The order of the court below is vacated and set aside, and the demurrer is overruled. The usual time will be granted to plead, if desired; costs upon demurrer below, and of this Court, to plaintiff. The other Justices concurred. 65 230 117 527 ANNIE BRICK V. AUGUST BRICK. Equity-Divorce-Decree by consent—Alimony. A decree for divorce and alimony entered by the consent of defendant by his solicitor, after issue joined and proofs taken in open court, is binding upon the parties, unless impeached for fraud or mistake. Appeal from superior court of Detroit. (Chipman, J.) Argued February 9, 1887. Decided February 15, 1887. Bill for divorce. Defendant appeals. Decree affirmed. The facts are stated in the head-note. Peter E. Park, for complainant. M. E. Breitenbach, for defendant. CHAMPLIN, J. In this case a decree was granted dissolving the marriage between the parties, and awarding alimony in gross to complainant. Defendant appeals from this decree, and complains especially of that part respecting alimony. It appears from the printed record that the decree below was entered by the consent of defendant by his solicitor. Such a decree is binding upon the parties, unless impeached for fraud or mistake, and no such claim is advanced on this appeal. It follows that the decree must be affirmed. As the complainant has filed no brief, costs will not be awarded. The other Justices concurred. In this case a rehearing was ordered, and the following opinion filed July 7, 1887: CAMPBELL, C. J. This case was heard and decided at the January term, the appeal being dismissed because the her.... appeared to be a consent decree. A showing was afterwards made that this entry was a mistake, and that the consent was merely to waive some matters of technicality. We therefore allowed a rehearing. Upon review of the facts, we think complainant made out such a case of personal violence and cruelty as justified the court below in granting a divorce. The alimony granted was the conveyance of defendant's interest in a lot of land. This is not a usual method, but we do not see that it does any wrong here. The property is of small value comparatively, and the circumstances of its acquisition render it quite just that complainant should have it. We are not disposed to disturb the decree, and it is affirmed. No costs beyond taxed costs are called for. The other Justices concurred. ISAAC PHELPS V. PALMER CHURCH. Bills and notes-Action against all parties liable thereon-Judgment 1. Under How. Stat. §§ 7345, 7346, a suit may be brought against all parties to promissory notes, including guarantors of payment, on a common-count declaration, with service of a copy of the note and its indorsements; and a judgment against any of the parties against whom plaintiff could have proceeded separately is authorized by How. Stat. § 7355. It is impossible, therefore, for any party, unless a joint contractor, to complain of failure to take judgment against any other party joined with him in the suit. 2. An indorsement of guaranty in blank is a complete act, and, if made by a payee or other party holding title, passes the title with the obligation. Case made from Kent. (Montgomery, J.) Argued February 9, 1887. Decided February 15, 1887. 35 231 157 2194 Assumpsit. Defendant brings error. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Frank L. Carpenter, for appellant. Thompson, Kennedy & Temple, for plaintiff. CAMPBELL, C. J. Suit was brought against defendant and one Rollin H. Pelton by declaration on the common counts, with the following note and guaranty appended: "$150.00. GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., February 25; 1882. "Six months after date I promise to pay to the order of R. H. Pelton, of Tallmadge, Ottawa Co., one hundred and fifty dollars at Savings Bank in Grand Rapids, Mich., value received, with interest at 8 per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually. PALMER CHURCH." Indorsed on the back: "For value received, I guarantee the payment, waive presentation and demand of payment at maturity, and will pay all costs of collection, with annual or pro rata interest at ten per cent. on this note till collected. "Rec'd int. to August 25, 1882." "ROLLIN H. PELTON. The defendants pleaded separately; Church setting up special defenses of fraud and no consideration and offset, and Pelton pleading the general issue. When the case came on for trial, defendant Church, when the note was offered in evidence, objected to its reception on the ground that the declaration was joint, and did not set out that this note was the sole cause of action, and that such an indorsement as Pelton made did not bring the case within the statute allowing several defendants to be concurrently declared on, and did not pass title in the note. This was overruled. After the case had been tried, and before judgment, plaintiff asked leave to discontinue as to Pelton, to which Church's attorney objected. Afterwards a stipulation between plaintiff's and Pelton's attorneys was filed for such discontinuance, and an order was entered by leave of court. A finding was thereafter made, and judgment rendered against Church. This finding was, in substance, that Church made and delivered the note to Pelton, and Pelton delivered it to plaintiff, indorsed as above set forth, with intent to pass the title, and bind himself as guarantor. No attempt was made to have any other facts passed on or incorporated, and no other facts were found, or, so far as appears, offered to be shown by Church. The judgment is brought into this Court by writ of error, and errors are assigned against the admission of the note in evidence under the pleadings, on the discontinuance, and on the effect of Pelton's indorsement. Under the statute, suit may be brought against all parties to promissory notes, including guarantors of payment, and the declaration may be on the common counts, with service of a copy of the instrument and its indorsements. How. Stat. §§ 7345, 7346. By section 7355 it is provided that the plaintiff need not include all parties in one judgment, but may have judgment against any of the parties against whom he could have proceeded separately. It is impossible, therefore, for any party to complain of failure to take judgment against some one else, unless that person is a joint contractor. Pelton did not occupy any such position here. He was a guarantor, and not a joint maker, and permission to discontinue as against him could not affect Church's liability. The statute was meant to remove, and not to favor, reliance on technical informalities; and, while we see nothing out of the way in this case, we should not feel justified in reviewing an order of discontinuance which is in accordance with justice, and cannot possibly harm the defendant not dismissed from the suit, who is a sole promisor. The claim that the paper did not pass to plaintiff is not well founded. The court found it did so as a matter of fact, and was so intended. The indorsement was made by the party to whose order it was payable. It is not necessary that |