tually man, and every other species of animal either existing or that may exist: But the genus animal is contained in man, and in other animals actually; for man cannot exist without being in actuality, and not potentially only an animal.”1

If we have recourse to Dr. Gillies for a little more light upon this question, we shall meet with a similar disappointment. According to him, the meaning of the phrases in question is to be sought for in the following definition of Aristotle :-"To say that one thing is contained in another, is the same as saying that the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its signification; and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its signification, when there is no particular denoted by the subject, to which the predicate does not apply."2 In order, therefore, to make sure of Aristotle's idea, we must substitute the definition instead of the thing defined, that is,

1

1 Ancient Metaphysics, vol. iv. p. 73. For the distinction betwixt containing potentially and actually, Lord Monboddo acknowledges himself indebted to a Greek author then living, Eugenius Diaconus. (Anc. Met. vol. iv. p. 73.) Of this author we are elsewhere told, that he was a Professor in the Patriarch's University at Constantinople; and that he published, in pure Attic Greek, a system of logic, at Leipsic, in the year 1766. (Origin and Progress of Language, vol. i. p. 45, 2d edit.)—— It is an extraordinary circumstance, that a discovery on which, in Lord Monboddo's opinion, the whole truth of the syllogism depends, should have been of so very recent a date-[It was, however, very old, and quite common.Ed.]

2 Gillies's Aristotle, vol. i. p. 73. "This remark," says Dr. Gillies, “which is the foundation of all Aristotle's logic, has been sadly mistaken by many. Among others, Dr. Reid accuses Aristotle of using as synonymous phrases, the being in a subject, and the being

truly predicated of a subject; whereas the truth is, that, according to Aristotle, the meaning of the one phrase is directly the reverse of the meaning of the other."—Ibid.

While I readily admit the justness of this criticism on Dr. Reid, I must take the liberty of adding, that I consider Reid's error as a mere oversight, or slip of the pen. That he might have accused Aristotle of confounding two things which, although different in fact, had yet a certain degree of resemblance or affinity, is by no means impossible; but it is scarcely conceivable that he could be so careless as to accuse him of confounding two things which he invariably states in direct opposition to each other. I have not a doubt, therefore, that Reid's idea was that Aristotle used, as synonymous phrases, the being in a thing, and the being a subject of which that thing can be truly predicated; more especially, as either statement would equally well have answered his purpose.--[But Reid was quite right, Gillies wholly wrong. See Reid's Collected Works, p. 684.-Ed.]

instead of saying that one thing is contained in another, we must say, that "the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its signification." In this last clause, I give Aristotle all the advantage of Dr. Gillies's very paraphrastical version; and yet, such is the effect of the comment, that it at once converts our axiom into a riddle. I do not say that, when thus interpreted, it is altogether unintelligible, but only that it no longer possesses the same sort of evidence which we ascribe to it, while we supposed that one thing was said by the logician to be contained in another, in the same sense in which a smaller box is contained in a greater.1

To both comments the same observation may be applied; that, the moment a person reads them, he must feel himself disposed to retract his assent to the axiom which they are brought to elucidate, inasmuch as they must convince him, that what appeared to be, according to the common signification of words, little better than a truism, becomes, when translated into the jargon of the schools, an incomprehensible, if not at bottom an unmeaning enigma.

I have been induced to enlarge, with more minuteness than I could have wished, on this fundamental article of logic, that I might not be accused of repeating those commonplace generalitics which have of late been so much complained of by Aristotle's champions. I must not, however, enter any farther into the details of the system; and shall therefore proceed in the next section to offer a few remarks of a more practical nature, on the object and on the value of the syllogistic art.

It is worthy of observation, that Condillac has availed himself of the same metaphorical and equivocal word, which the foregoing comments profess to explain, in support of the theory which represents every process of sound reasoning as a series of identical pro

positions. "L'Analyse est la même dans toutes les sciences, parce que dans toutes elle conduit du connu à l'inconnu par le raisonnement, c'est-à-dire, par une suite de jugemens qui sont renfermés les uns dans les autres."-La Logique.

SECTION II.-GENERAL REFLECTIONS ON THE AIM OF THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC, AND ON THE INTELLECTUAL HABITS WHICH THE STUDY OF IT HAS A TENDENCY TO FORM.-THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE POWER OF REASONING OUGHT TO BE REGARDED AS ONLY A SECONDARY OBJECT IN THE CULTURE OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

The remarks which were long ago made by Lord Bacon on the inutility of the syllogism as an organ of scientific discovery, together with the acute strictures in Mr. Locke's Essay on this form of reasoning, are so decisive in point of argument, and, at the same time, so familiarly known to all who turn their attention to philosophical inquiries, as to render it perfectly unnecessary for me, on the present occasion, to add anything in support of them. I shall, therefore, in the sequel, confine myself to a few very general and miscellaneous reflections on one or two points overlooked by these eminent writers; but to which it is of essential importance to attend, in order to estimate justly the value of the Aristotelian logic, considered as a branch of education.1

It is an observation which has been often repeated since Bacon's time, and which, it is astonishing, was so long in forcing itself on the notice of philosophers, That, in all our reasonings about the established order of the universe, experience is our sole guide, and knowledge is to be acquired only by ascending from particulars to generals; whereas the syllogism leads us invariably from universals to particulars, the truth of which, instead of being a consequence of the universal proposition, is implied and presupposed in the very terms of its enunciation. The syllogistic art, therefore, it has been justly concluded, can be of no use in extending our knowledge of nature.2

1 To some of my readers it may not be superfluous to recommend, as a valuable supplement to the discussions of Locke and Bacon concerning the syllogistic art, what has been since written on the same subject, in farther prosecu

tion of their views, by Dr. Reid in his Analysis [Account] of Aristotle's Logic, and by Dr. Campbell in his Philosophy of Rhetoric.

2 On this point it would be a mere waste of time to enlarge, as it has been

To this observation it may be added, That, if there are any parts of science in which the syllogism can be advantageously applied, it must be those where our judgments are formed in consequence of an application to particular cases of certain maxims which we are not at liberty to dispute. An example of this occurs in the practice of Law. Here, the particular conclusion must be regulated by the general principle, whether right or wrong. The case was similar in every branch of philosophy, as long as the authority of great names prevailed, and the old scholastic maxims were allowed, without examination, to pass as incontrovertible truths. Since the importance of experiment and observation was fully understood, the syllogistic art has gradually fallen into contempt.

1

A remark somewhat similar occurs in the preface to the Novum Organon. "They who attributed so much to logic," says Lord Bacon, "perceived very well and truly, that it was

of late explicitly admitted by some of the ablest advocates for the Organon of Aristotle. "When Mr. Locke," I quote the words of a very judicious and acute logician-" when Mr. Locke says, 'I am apt to think, that he who should employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little of that mass of knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature;'-he expresses himself with needless caution. Such a man will certainly not discover any of it. And if any imagined that the mere brandishing of syllogisms could increase their knowledge, (as some of the schoolmen seemed to think,) they were indeed very absurd." (Commentary on the Compendium of Logic used in the University of Dublin, by the Rev. John Walker. Dublin, 1805.)

To the same effect, it is remarked by a later writer, with respect to Lord Bacon's assertion, "that discoveries in Natural Philosophy are not likely to be promoted by the engine of syllogism;"

"that this is a proposition which no

one of the present day disputes; and which, when alleged by our adversaries as their chief objection to the study of logic, only proves that they are ignorant of the subject about which they are speaking, and of the manner in which it is now taught." (See an Anonymous Pamphlet printed at Oxford in 1810, p. 26, [by Coplestone ?]) Dr. Gillies has expressed himself in terms extremely similar upon various occasions. (See, in particular, vol. i. pp. 63, 64, 2d edit.)

This very important concession reduces the question about the utility of the Aristotelian logic within a very narrow compass.

1 "Ce sera un sujet éternel d'étonnement pour les personnes qui savent bien ce que c'est que philosophie, que de voir que l'autorité d'Aristote a été tellement respectée dans les écoles pendant quelques siècles, que lors qu'un disputant citoit un passage de ce philosophe, celui qui soutenoit la these n'osoit point dire transeat; il falloit qu'il niât le passage, ou qu'il l'expliquât à sa manière." -Dict. de Bayle, Art. Aristote.

not safe to trust the understanding to itself, without the guard of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil, but became a part of it: For the logic which took place, though it might do well enough in civil affairs, and the arts which consisted in talk and opinion, yet comes very far short of subtlety in the real performances of nature; and catching at what it cannot reach, has served to confirm and establish errors, rather than open a way to truth."1

It is not, however, merely as a useless or inefficient organ for the discovery of truth, that this art is exceptionable. The importance of the very object at which it professedly aims is not a little doubtful. To exercise with correctness the powers of deduction and of argumentation; or, in other words, to make a legitimate inference from the premises before us, would seem to be an intellectual process which requires but little assistance from rule. The strongest evidence of this is the faculty with which men of the most moderate capacity learn, in the course of a few months, to comprehend the longest mathematical demonstrations; a facility which, when contrasted with the difficulty of enlightening their minds on questions of morals or of politics, affords a sufficient proof, that it is not from any inability to conduct a mere logical process that our speculative errors arise. The fact is, that, in most of the sciences, our rea

1 As the above translation is by Mr. Locke, who has introduced it in the way of apology for the freedom of his own strictures on the school logic, the opinion which it expresses may be considered as also sanctioned by the authority of his name. (See the Introduction to his Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding.) I cannot forbear remarking on this occasion, that when Lord Bacon speaks of the school logic as "answering well enough in civil affairs, and the arts which consist in talk and opinion," his words can only apply to dialectical syllogisms, and cannot possibly be extended to those which Aristotle calls demonstrative. Whatever

praise, therefore, it may be supposed to imply, must be confined to the books of Topics. The same observation will be found to hold with respect to the greater part of what has been alleged in defence of the syllogistic art by Dr. Gillies, and by the other authors referred to in the beginning of this section. One of the ablest of these seems to assent to an assertion of Bacon, "That logic does not help towards the invention of arts and sciences, but only of arguments." If it only helps towards the invention of arguments, for what purpose has Aristotle treated so fully of Demonstration and of Science in the two books of the Last Analytics?