Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

EDINBURGH: T: CONSTABLE, PRINTER TO PER MAJESTY. OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

VOL. II.

TO THESE ARE PREFIXED,

INTRODUCTION AND PART FIRST

OP THB

OUTLINES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

WITII MANY NEW AND IMPORTANT ADDITIONS.

BY

DUGALD STEWART, ESQ.

EDITED BY

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.

EDINBURGH: THOMAS CONSTABLE AND CO.

LITTLE, BROWN, AND CO., BOSTON, U.S.

MDCCCLIV.

Sect. 1. [Of Intuition as opposed to Reasoning,]

[SUBSECT.] 1. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between

the Powers of Intuition and of Reasoning, .

[SUBSECT.] 2. Conclusions obtained by a Process of Deduction often

mistaken for Intuitive Judgments,

Sect. 2. Of General Reasoning, .

[SUBSECT.] 1. Illustrations of some Remarks formerly stated in treat-

ing of Abstraction,

[SUBSECT.] 2. Continuation of the Subject.-Of Language considered

as an Instrument of Thought,

[SUBSECT.] 3. Continuation of the Subject.–Visionary Theories of

some Logicians, occasioned by their inattention to the Essential

Distinction between Mathematics and other Sciences,

[SUBSECT.] 4. Continuation of the Subject. — Peculiar and Super-

eminent Advantages possessed by Mathematicians, in consequence

of their definite Phraseology,

Sect. 3. Of Mathematical Demonstration,

[SUBSECT.] 1. Of the Circumstance on which Demonstrative Evidence

essentially depends,

[SUBSECT.] 2. Continuation of the Subject.—How far it is true that

all Mathematical Evidence is resolvable into Identical Propositions,

[SUBSECT.] 3. Continuation of the Subject.--Evidence of the Me-

chanical Philosophy, not to be confounded with that which is pro-

perly called Demonstrative or Mathematical.—Opposite Error of

some late Writers,

Secr. 4. Of our Reasonings concerning Probable or Contingent Truths,

[SUBSECT.] 1. Narrow Field of Demonstrative Evidence. Of Demon-

strative Evidence, when combined with that of Sense, as in Practical

Geometry; and with those of Sense and of Induction, as in the

Mechanical Philosophy.--Remarks on a Fun lamental Law of Belief,

[an Expectation of the Constancy of Nature,] involved in all our

Reasonings concerning Contingent Truths,

[SUBSECT.] 2. Continuation of the Subject.-Of that Permanence or

Stability in the order Nature which is presupposed in our Reason-

ings concerning Contingent Truths,

[SUBSECT.] 3. Continuation of the Subject.-General Remarks on the

Difference between the Evidence of Experience and that of Analogy,

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »