EDINBURGH T. CONSTABLE, PRINTER TO HER MAJESTY.

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND.

VOL. II.

TO THESE ARE PREFIXED,

INTRODUCTION AND PART FIRST

OF THE

OUTLINES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

WITH MANY NEW AND IMPORTANT ADDITIONS.

BY

DUGALD STEWART, ESQ.

EDITED BY

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.

EDINBURGH: THOMAS CONSTABLE AND CO.

LITTLE, BROWN, AND CO., BOSTON, U.S.

MDCCCLIV.

OF REASON, OR THE UNDERSTANDING PROPERLY SO CALLED; AND

THE VARIOUS FACULTIES AND OPERATIONS MORE IMMEDIATELY

CONNECTED WITH IT.

OBSERVATIONS on the VagueNESS AND AMBIGUITY OF THE COMMON PHILO-

SOPHICAL LANGUAGE RELATIVE TO THIS PART OF OUR CONSTITUTION

-REASON AND REASONING-UNDERSTANDING INTELLECT-JUDG-

MENT, &c.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF HUMAN BELIEF; OR THE PRIMARY

ELEMENTS OF HUMAN REASON.

SECTION 1. Of Mathematical Axioms,

[SUBSECTION] 1. [Their Nature,]

[SUBSECTION] 2. Continuation of the same Subject,

SECT. 2. Of certain Laws of Belief, inseparably connected with the

exercise of Consciousness, Memory, Perception, and Reasoning,

SECT. 3. Continuation of the Subject.-Critical Remarks on some late

Controversies to which it has given rise.-Of the Appeals which Dr.

Reid and some other Modern Writers have made, in their Philosophical

Discussions, to Common Sense, as a Criterion of Truth,

PAGE

1

23

24

36

40

51

CHAPTER II.

OF REASONING AND OF Deductive EVIDENCE.

PAGE

SECT. 1. [Of Intuition as opposed to Reasoning,]

70

[SUBSECT.] 1. Doubts with respect to Locke's Distinction between

the Powers of Intuition and of Reasoning, .

70

[SUBSECT.] 2. Conclusions obtained by a Process of Deduction often

mistaken for Intuitive Judgments,

76

[SUBSECT.] 1. Illustrations of some Remarks formerly stated in treat-

ing of Abstraction,

[SUBSECT.] 2. Continuation of the Subject.-Of Language considered

as an Instrument of Thought,

[SUBSECT.] 3. Continuation of the Subject.—Visionary Theories of

some Logicians, occasioned by their inattention to the Essential

Distinction between Mathematics and other Sciences,

[SUBSECT.] 4. Continuation of the Subject.-Peculiar and Super-

eminent Advantages possessed by Mathematicians, in consequence

of their definite Phraseology,

81

81

97

104

111

SECT. 3. Of Mathematical Demonstration,

113

[SUBSECT.] 1. Of the Circumstance on which Demonstrative Evidence

essentially depends,

113

[SUBSECT.] 2. Continuation of the Subject.-How far it is true that

all Mathematical Evidence is resolvable into Identical Propositions,

[SUBSECT.] 3. Continuation of the Subject.-Evidence of the Me-

chanical Philosophy, not to be confounded with that which is pro-

perly called Demonstrative or Mathematical.-Opposite Error of

some late Writers,

SECT. 4. Of our Reasonings concerning Probable or Contingent Truths,

[SUBSECT.] 1. Narrow Field of Demonstrative Evidence.-Of Demon-

strative Evidence, when combined with that of Sense, as in Practical

Geometry; and with those of Sense and of Induction, as in the

Mechanical Philosophy.-Remarks on a Fundamental Law of Belief,

[an Expectation of the Constancy of Nature,] involved in all our

Reasonings concerning Contingent Truths,

123

134

153

153

[SUBSECT.] 2. Continuation of the Subject.-Of that Permanence or

Stability in the order of Nature which is presupposed in our Reason-

ings concerning Contingent Truths,

157

[SUBSECT.] 3. Continuation of the Subject.-General Remarks on the

Difference between the Evidence of Experience and that of Analogy,

171