Part Second. PARTICULAR EXAMINATION OF THE INTUITIONS. BOOK I. PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. CHAPTER I. BODY AND SPIRIT. Page Sect. I. The Mind begins its Intelligent Acts with Knowledge. The Simple Cognitive Powers 119 Sect. II. Our Intuitive Cognitions of Body. 122 Sect. III. Some Distinctions to be attended to in regard to our Cognition of Body 133 Sect. IV. The Qualities of Matter known by Intuition. 145 148 CHAPTER II. ANALYSIS OF OUR PRIMITIVE COGNITIONS. Sect. I. (Preliminary.) On the Nature of Abstraction and Gene Sect. IV. On Mode, Quality, Property, Essence 173 Sect. X. (Supplementary.) The Various Kinds of Power known by THE EXTENT, TESTS, AND POWER OF OUR NATIVE BELIEFS BOOK III. PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS. CHAPTER I. THEIR GENERAL NATURE, AND A CLASSIFICATION OF THEM 214 231 . 236 GENERAL VIEW OF THE MOTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. Sect. I. The Appetencies, the Will, and the Conscience 279 288 CHAPTER II. CONVICTIONS INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISES OF CONSCIENCE. Sect. I. Convictions as to the Nature of Moral Good Sect. II. On Sin and Error Sect. III. Relation of Moral Good and Happiness 290 297 302 Sect. II. On the Origin of our Knowledge and Fleas Sect. V. On the Necessity attached to our Primary Convictions. 322 326 334 340 345 351 Sect. IV. On the Conditioned and the Unconditioned Sect. V. (Supplementary.) The Antinomies of Kant 388 taphysical System 390 BOOK II. METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE SCIENCES. CHAPTER I. Page DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEMONSTRATIVE OR FORMAL AND 395 Sect. II. Natural Theology. The Theistic Argument 427 Page 166, line 5 from foot, for “Abrici” read “Ulrici.” Page 246, line 7 from head, for "A is not A" read "A is not Not-A." INTUITIONS OF THE MIND. INTRODUCTION. AIM OF THE WORK AND METHOD OF INQUIRY. ACCORDING to one class of speculators, the mind derives all its knowledge, judgments, maxims, from observation and experience. According to another class of thinkers, there are ideas, truths, principles, which originate in the native power, and are seen in the inward light of the mind. These last have been called by a great number of names, such as innate ideas, intuitions, necessary judgments, fundamental laws of belief, principles of common sense, first or primitive truths; and diverse have been the accounts given of them, and the uses to which they have been turned. This is a controversy which has been from the beginning, and which is ever being renewed in one form or other. It appears to me that this contest is now, and has ever been, characterized by an immense complication of confusion; and confusion, as Bacon has remarked, is more difficult to rectify than open error. I am not, in this treatise, to plunge at once into a thicket, in which so many have lost themselves as they sought to find or cut a way through it. But my aim throughout is to ascertain what are the actual laws or principles in the mind denoted by these various B |