rent terms. The queftion ftill recurs, On what procefs of argument this inference is founded? Where is the medium, the interpofing ideas, which join pro popofitions fo very wide of each other? 'Tis confeffed, that the colour, confiftence and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the fecret powers of nourishment and fupport. For otherwife we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these fenfible qualities, without the aid of experience; contrary to the fentiment of all philofophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience ? It only fhews us a number of uniform effects, resulting from certain objects, and teaches us, that those particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with fuch powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with fimilar fenfible qualities is produced, we expect fimilar powers and forces, and lay our account with a like effect. From a body of like colour and confiftence with bread, we look for like nourishment and fupport. But this furely is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man fays, I have found, in all pft inftances, Juch fenfible qualities, conjoined with such secret powers: And when he fays, fimilar fenfible qualities will always be conjoined with familar secret powers; he is not guilty of of a tautology, nor are these propofitions in any respect the fame. You say that the one propofition is an inference from another. But you must confefs, that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonftrative: Of what nature is it then? To fay it is experimental is begging the queftion. For all inferences from experience fuppofe, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the paft, and that fimilar powers will be conjoined with fimilar fenfible qualities. If there be any fufpicion, that the courfe of nature may change, and that the paft may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes ufelefs, and can give rise to no inference or conclufion. 'Tis impoffible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; fince all these arguments are founded on the fuppofition of that refemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever fo regular; that alone, without fome new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue fo. In vain do you pretend to have learnt the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their fecret nature, and confequently, all their effects and influence may change, without any change in their fenfible qualities. This happens fometimes, and with regard to fome objects: Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument fecures 3 fecures you against this fuppofition? My practice, you fay, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite fatisfied in the point; but as a philofopher, who has fome share of curiofity, I will not fay fcepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me fatisfaction in a matter of such vaft importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even tho', perhaps, I have fmall hopes of obtaining a folution? We shall at least, by this means, be fenfible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowlege. I MUST Confefs, that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance, who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exift. I muft alfo confess, that tho' all the learned, for several ages, should have employed their time in fruitless fearch upon any subject, it may ftill, perhaps, be rash to conclude pofitively, that the fubject muft, therefore, pafs all human comprehenfion. Even tho' we examine all the fources of our knowlege, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may ftill remain a suspicion, that the enumeration is not compleat, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the present fubject, there are fome confiderations, which feem to remove all this accufation of arrogance or fufpicion of mistake. 'Tis certain, that the moft ignorant and stupid pea fants, nay infants, nay even brute beafts improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by obferving the effects, which refult from them. When a child has felt the fenfation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a fimilar effect from a caufe, which is fimilar in its fenfible qualities and appearance. If you affert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclufion by any procefs of argument or ratiocination, I may juftly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretext to refufe fo equitable a demand. You cannot fay, that the argument is abftrufe, and may poffibly efcape your enquiry; fince you confefs, that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hefitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the queftion, and confefs, that it is not reasoning which engages us to fuppofe the past refembling the future, and to expect fimilar effects from causes, which are, to appearance, fimilar. This is the propofition, which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend to have made |