mind is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This tranfition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it firft begins from an object, prefent to the fenfes, it renders the idea or conception of flame more ftrong and lively than any loofe, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arifes immediately. The thought moves inftantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impreffion prefent to the fenfes. When a fword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and pain ftrike me more ftrongly, than when a glass of wine is prefented to me, even tho' by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause fuch a strong conception, except only a prefent object and customary tranfition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind in all our conclufions concerning matter of fact and existence; and 'tis a fatisfaction to find fome analogies, by which it may be explained. The tranfition from a prefent object does in all cases give strength and folidity to the related idea.

HERE is a kind of pre-eftablished harmony between the courfe of nature and the fucceffion of our

8

ideas;

ideas; and tho' the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the fame train with the other works of nature. Custom is that admirable principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; fo neceffary to the fubfiftence of our fpecies, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow fphere of our memory and fenfes; and we should never have been able to adjust means to ends, nor employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding of evil. Thofe, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final caufes, have here ample fubject to employ their wonder and admiration.

I SHALL add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, that as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like caufes, and vice verfa, is fo effential to the fubfiftence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trufted to the fallacious deductions of our reafon, which is flow in its operations; appears not, in any degree, during the firft years of infancy; and at best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. 'Tis more conformable

to

to the ordinary wisdom of nature to fecure fo neceffary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the labored deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the mufcles and nerves, by which they are actuated; fo has the implanted in us an inftinct, which carries forward the thought in a correfpondent course to that which she has established among external objects; tho' we are ignorant of thofe powers and forces, on which this regular courfe and fucceffion of objects totally depends.

SECTION

[91]

SECTION

Of PROBABILITY.

VI.

THO

HO' there be no fuch thing as Chance in the world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the fame influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.

THERE is certainly a probability, which arifes from a fuperiority of chances on any fide; and according as this fuperiority encreases, and furpaffes the oppofite chances, the probability receives a proportionable encrease, and begets ftill a higher degree of belief or

* Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must fay, that 'tis only probable all men muft die, or that the fun will rife to morrow. But to conform our language more to common ufe, we should divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning fuch arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or oppofition.

affent