Q. B.] THE LEATHER CLOTH COMPANY v. HIERONIMUS. respondent in Ostend. Secondly, I certainly expected you would have informed Mr. H., junior, of it, and asked him how you were to send it in that case, as he had given the directions of sending the goods. On the 20th Sept., the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs as follows: The statement you sent me on the 28th June, shows a balance in your favour of £125 4s. 6d. You will remember the unhappy accident that has befallen your shipment of 28th Feb., and that it has not been my fault if, by your directing this shipment via Rotterdam instead of the way prescribed, via Ostend, it has been lost by gross average. I am, therefore, very sorry to be obliged to decline all responsibility respecting this shipment of 28th Feb., the amount of which is to be deducted off the above balance. £ 8. d. 125 4 6 52 4 6 Less At the trial it was objected on the part of the defendant that there was not evidence sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds of either an original or a substituted contract; but the learned judge ruled that taking the two letters along with the invoice, there was a memorandum in writing of the contract, signed by the defendant or his authorised agent, sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The only question left to the jury was, whether the defendant had ratified the substituted contract, whereby the route by which the goods were to be sent was changed. The jury found that the defendent had ratified the alteration, whereupon a verdict was entered for the plaintiffs for the amount of their claim. F. Turner now moved on behalf of the defendant for a rule calling on the plaintiffs to show cause why there should not be a new trial on the ground of misdirection. He contended that there was no evidence of a contract in writing signed by the defendant, by which the route via Rotterdam was substituted for that vid Ostend. The direction to send the goods via Ostend was part of the original contract, and of the original contract it must be admitted, according to the decision in Wilkinson v. Evans (L. Rep. 1 C. P. 407), that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. In that case, A. having sold some cheeses and candles to B., sent him an invoice of the goods, which B. returned with a note signed by him on the back to the following effect: The cheeses came to-day, but I did not take them in, for they were very badly crushed, so the candles and cheese is returned." The Court of Common Pleas held that the contents of the invoice were sufficiently referred to by the note on the back of it, and that the two together constituted a sufficient memorandum in writing of the bargain to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. But it is submitted that there ought to be similar evidence in writing of the substituted contract, and that there is no such evidence. The direction as to the route which the goods should be sent was an essential part of the contract which should be evidenced by writing. COCKBURN, C. J.-I think that there ought to be no rule in this case. The first point which is relied on as an objection to the ruling of my brother Archibald is that there was no written memorandum of the contract sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. There was no written contract when the goods were first ordered; the order given by the [Q. B. defendant's son was a verbal one; but on the 1st March the plaintiff sent to the defendant a letter containing an invoice of the goods, stating the price, and charging the defendant as purchaser. That satisfied the Statute of Frauds so far as regarded the plaintiffs. The letter further added that the goods were sent via Rotterdam, instead of Ostend; and to that the defendant made no objection whatever. The Rotterdam route, by the particular carrier named, had been the usual route, and it was only changed by the direction of the defendant's son on this particular occasion because when the order was given the port of Rotterdam was closed with ice. It turned out at the time the goods were ready, that the Ostend route by which it had been intended to send them, was no longer available, because the carriers bad discontinued to send by that route. The plantiffs therefore sent the goods by way of Rotterdam and communicated that fact to the defendants by letter. So the matter remained till the plaintiffs sent in their application for payment on the 28th June, several further orders having in the meantime been given by the defendant and executed by the plaintiffs, the goods being forwarded by way of Rotterdam. The reply to this letter sent by the defendant on the 5th July refers to and admits the order for the goods and the terms of the contract; and if no question had arisen as to the route by which the goods were forwarded, there would be no doubt that the letters and the invoice amounted to a memorandum in writing of the agreement sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. But it has been argued on the part of the defendant, that as the order admitted by the letter of the defendant was an order to send the goods via Ostend, by Messrs. Gaudet Frères, and the goods were not sent via Ostend, but via Rotterdam, the ratification of this substituted route was a new contract which required to be evidenced by writing in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and that there is no written evidence of it. I do not think that this argument is sound. In the first place I doubt whether the direction to deliver the goods to a particular carrier forms part of a contract of sale. No doubt the vendor undertakes to deliver the goods, and the delivery to a different carrier from the one pointed out by the purchaser would not be a delivery to him; but still a direction to send by a particular carrier is only a direction as to when and how the goods are to be delivered. Suppose goods were ordered to be sent by the Midland Railway Company, and that they were sent not by the Midland Company, but by the North-Western Railway Company, if they arrived safely, would it be competent to the buyer to refuse to accept them? This could hardly be maintained, as it is unimportant how they were delivered, so long as they were delivered safely. If the purchaser receives the goods, or if in any other way he has ratified the departure from the route originally indicated by him, he cannot afterwards object that there is a new contract which requires to be proved just as if it had been an original one. Whether the defendant did in the present case ratify the change of route was a question of fact for the jury, and I think there was sufficient evidence of ratification to support their finding. I think, therefore, that the verdict for the plaintiffs should stand, and that there should be no rule. BLACKBURN, J.-I am also of opinion that there should be no rule in this case. The contract was made originally by Mr. Hieronimus, jun., with the plaintiffs by word of mouth. On the 1st March the plaintiffs sent to the defendant a letter in the following terms: "Enclosed we beg to hand you invoice of W. H., 30/32, three cases leather cloth. This order came through Mr. Hieronimus, jun., who instructed us to send it through Messrs. Gaudet Frères, Ostend, but as those gentlemen have given up their Ostend route, we have sent it through Messrs. Hudig and Pieters, Rotterdam, as before." When that letter was signed by a duly authorized agent of the plaintiffs, there was clearly as regards them such a memorandum in writing of the agreement as was sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. After that letter was sent to and received by the defendant, according to the finding of the jury, he said by words, or by conduct equivalent to words or signs, that he had no objection to the substitution by the plaintiffs of the one route for the other. Up to that time there was nothing in writing signed by the defendant. After it was found that the goods had perished, if the now defendant had brought an action against the plaintiffs under the original contract for not sending them as originally directed, via Ostend, there would be no defence open to them under the Statute of Frauds, for their letter would have shown that they had contracted to send the goods via Ostend, But I think they would have had a good defence to the action on this ground that the now defendant, whether by word of mouth or by his silence, ratified the change in the route by which the goods were to be sent, that is by Rotterdam instead of by Ostend; and on that ground the action would have failed, though the substitution of the one route for the other was not in writing. It has been argued on behalf of the now defendant that it would have been necessary for the now plaintiffs to show the existence of something in writing signed by the defendant agreeing to the substitution of one route for the other. I do not see the necessity of that, and I do not think it would be necessary. But, though Mr. Hieronimus could not have been sued whilst matters stood so, we find that about four months afterwards he wrote a letter to the plaintiffs, in which he said: "In looking over your statement, I find that you have charged me for the goods which have been entirely lost by the sunk ship Ravinsburg, being sent via Rotterdam. You said in your letter, March 1st, that Mr. Hieronimus, jun., instructed you to send the goods through Messrs. Gaudet Frères, vid Ostend, but on account of their having given up the Ostend route, you sent, without any instructions, the goods through Messrs. Hudig and Pieters, Rotterdam. In the first place, I learn that Messrs. Gaudet Frères would not have refused the goods, although they seemed to have given up that line as they have a correspondent in Ostend. Secondly, I certainly expected you would have informed Mr. H., jun., of it, I asked him how you were to send it in that case, as he had given the direction of sending the goods." That is clearly equivalent to saying that all that was contained in the plaintiffs' letter of the 1st March-which is referred to at the beginning of this reply-was quite true. This reply, being signed by an agent of the defendant, there [C. P. fore completely satisfies the Statute of Frauds. But it was contended that this letter objected to the alteration in the route, and, therefore, that there was no evidence in writing of an assent to the alteration on the part of the defendant. The answer to this is: You verbally assented to the substituted mode. There is, therefore, no reason why the plaintiffs should not recover for the goods sold and delivered by them to the defendant. Mr. Turner confessed that he could cite no case in support of the proposition that the assent to the substituted mode of performing a term of the contract, must be evidenced by writing. It seems to me that writing was not necessary for the purpose. Assuming, then, that there was sufficient evidence of ratification of the substituted mode of performing the contract, on which point I think the verdict was right, I think the plaintiffs were entitled to succeed, and that there should be no rule. MELLOR, J.-I am entirely of the same opinion; and I desire to add nothing to what has already been said. should be no rule. In Mr. Turner's argument ARCHIBALD, J.-I am also of opinion that there there seems to me to have been a confusion between the evidence of the contract itself and the evidence of its performance. In the letter of the 1st March from the plaintiffs, and the letter of the defendant of the 5th July referring to it, there was clear evidence in writing of a contract for the sale of the goods to be sent by Gaudet Frères. performed? It seems to me that there was eviThen comes the question, how was that contract dence sufficient to show, and the jury have so found the fact, that the defendant was content to have the goods sent in the old accustomed way, that is via Harwich and Rotterdam, through Messrs. Hudig and Pieters. The evidence of that was that for four months after the receipt of the plaintiff's letter of the 1st March, no objection whatever was made by the defendant. That, coupled with the fact of other orders being in the interval given by the defendant, and executed by the plaintiffs, satisfied the jury; and I am not at all dissatisfied with the finding of the jury as to that part of the case. I think there was no necessity that the consent to this variation in the mode of performing the contract should be in writing. Rule refused. Attorney for defendant, W. F. Stokes. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, Reported by ETHERINGTON SMITH and J. M. LELY, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Thursday, April 15. SANDELL v. FRANKLIN. Landlord and tenant-Date of commencement of tenancy where no date expressed in agreement creating it-Notice to quit. Where no date is expressed for the commencement of a tenancy in the agreement creating it, the ordinary rule that the tenancy commences from the date of the agreement will not take effect if a contrary intention be shown by the days fixed for the payment of the rent. The plaintiff was tenant to the defendant under an agreement dated 20th Dec. 1872. No date was expressed for the commencement of the tenancy, C. P.] DONOGHUE v. MARSHALL-WILBY v. ELGEE. but the rent was to be payable quarterly, and the first payment to be made on the 25th March. The plaintiff gave notice to quit upon the 24th June 1874, and brought ejectment thereon. Held, that such notice to quit was good, and a rule to set aside a verdict for the plaintiff refused. THIS was an action of ejectment tried before Denman, J., and a common jury at the Middlesex sittings after Hilary Term, when it appeared that the defendant was tenant to the plaintiff under an agreement containing the following words : : Memorandum of an agreement made this 20th Dec. 1872, between H. W. Sandell of the one part, and A. Franklin of the other part, as follows: The said H. W. Sandell doth agree to let, and the said A. Franklin doth agree to take, all that messuage, tenement No. 305, Gray,s-inn-road, for the term of one year certain, and so on from year to year until half a year notice to quit be given by or to either party, at the yearly rent of £50, to be paid quarterly, first payment to be made on the 25th March next. Upon the 24th June 1874 the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to quit, but it was contended for the defendant that the tenancy began from the date of the agreement, so as to entitle him to a notice to quit upon the 20th June. The learned judge ruled that the tenancy began on the 25th Dec. 1872, so that the notice to quit was good, whereupon a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, with leave reserved to move the court to set aside the same on the ground that the notice to quit was bad. Gibbons, for the defendant, now moved accordingly, and cited Doe d. Cornwall v. Matthews (11 C. B. 675.) Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I think that there should be no rule. I understand the question to be, whether a notice to quit given on the 24th June and expiring on the 24th December, was a good notice under this agreement. [Extract from agreement read, down to "to be paid quarterly."] Now if the document had stopped here, I should have agreed with Mr. Gibbons. But we have the further words, "first payment to be made on the 25th day of March." I think that these words are clear to show that the intention of the parties was that the tenancy should commence on the 25th December. BRETT, J.-The only evidence before us is the agreement itself, and I think the true construction of it to be as stated by my Lord. ARCHIBALD, J.-I am of the same opinion. No doubt, in the absence of anything to show a different intention, an agreement commences from its date, in the case where no date is expressed for its commencement. But here the different intention is sufficiently shown by the periods named for the payment of the rent. Rule refused. HUDDLESTONE, J., concurred. Friday, April 16. DONOGHUE v. MARSHALL. Breach of promise to marry at time certain-Renunciation before time arrived-Declaration as if after time arrived—Amendment at trial. An action for breach of promise to marry at a time certain may be maintained, upon renunciation of the promise, before the time fixed has arrived. In an action for breach of promise to marry, the [C. P. At the trial before Mr. Joyce, Q.C., sitting as Commissioner at the Kingston Spring Assizes upon 3rd April 1875, the agreement to marry was proved, but it appeared that the marriage was first fixed for May 1874, at which period it was postponed at the instance of the defendant until May 1875. In Feb. 1875, however, the defendant renounced the contract by telling the plaintiff that the engagement must be considered at an end, whereupon the plaintiff brought her action at once. The learned commissioner amended the pleadings by adding a accordance with the decision of the Exchequer count upon the renunciation of the contract in Chamber in Frost v. Knight (L. Rep. 7 Ex. 111; 41 L. J. 78, Ex. ; 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 77), and directed a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff for 251., being the amount of damages found by the jury, reserving leave to move generally, and in particular on the ground that the amendment ought not to have been made at the trial. Edmund Thomas, for the defendant, now moved accordingly. It must be admitted that the authority of Frost v. Knight (ubi sup.), is conclusive that the declaration as amended could not be demurrable. But it is contended that the amendment being made at the trial was made too late, inasmuch as it prevented the defendant either traversing the breach or paying money into court. In Bradward v. Forshaw (10 W. R. 760) it was said by the Court of Exchequer that it "would be far better to require no pleadings at all than to allow pleadings which could only operate as a snare." [BRETT, J.-The judge may always amend a declaration so long as he does not either substitute a new cause of action or make the declaration demurrable.] The plaintiff would have been no gainer by the marriage. [Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.-The merits appear to be with the plaintiff.] The COURT (Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Brett, Denman, and Archibald, JJ)., refused the rule. Rule refused. Attorneys for the defendant, Hicklin and Washington. Friday, April 16. WILBY V. ELGEE. Married woman—Loan by, during life of husband IOU to wife after husband's death-Original debt barred by Statute of Limitations-Subse quent promise to pay in consideration of for bearance to sue- -Whether consideration good. The forbearance to prosecute a doubtful claim is such a consideration as will support a promise. The plaintiff, being a widow, had lent the defendant 201. during the life of her husband, who died in 1867, the defendant giving the plaintiff an IOU for the amount two days after the husband's death. In 1871 the defendant wrote to the plaintiff's agent, who had threatened to sue him, deprecating legal proceedings, and offering either to pay the loan off by easy instalments, or to pay reasonable interest. Neither of these propositions was definitely accepted on the part of the plaintiff, but the plaintiff did not sue the defendant until 1874, when the original debt was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and the jury found that she had forborne to sue in consequence of the promises of the defendant, whereupon a verdict was entered for the plaintiff. Held, that the forbearance to sue was a sufficient consideration for the promise of the defendant, and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to accept definitely either proposition of the plaintiff and a rule to enter the verdict for the defendant refused. DECLARATION for money lent and for interest upon money due and forborne at interest, and for money due upon accounts stated. Pleas, never indebted and the Statute of Limitations. Issue thereon. The cause was tried before Brett, J. and a common jury, at the Guildhall sittings after Hilary Term 1875, when the following facts were proved : The plaintiff was the widow of a billiard marker at Ventnor, and the defendant was the station master at that place. The plaintiff, during the life of her husband, who died on the 14th July 1867, had lent the defendant 201., and upon the 16th July 1867, the defendant had given her an I O U for that amount. This I O U the plaintiff had, soon after receiving it, handed over to one Alexander, an undertaker, in part payment of the expenses of her husband's funeral. Alexander did not appear to have made any application to the defendant until Sept. 1870, when a correspondence was commenced, of which the following letters are material: Alexander to the defendant. 28th Sept. 1870. I have to apply to you for the sum of 201. upon your IO U given to Mrs. Wilby, which she has handed to me as part payment of the funeral expenses of her late husband Same to same. 10th Oct. 1870. [Similar to above, with threat of legal proceedings.] Defendant to Alexander. 12th Oct. 1870. Yours of the 10th inst. received respecting Mrs. Wilby's claim upon me. It is totally out of my power at the present time to liquidate the whole or even part of the same; but on the contrary, it would much alter my position and possibly prove my ruin. . . . I am in the anticipation of a better position, which your proceedings against me would entirely debar me from, and should I be successful Mrs. Wilby's claim shall have my first consideration. Meanwhile, you as a stranger to me, I shall be pleased to pay a reasonable interest on the amount; but do, I beg once more, not think of law as it will entirely crush me. . . . [The letter concluded with a suggestion that Alexander should show it "to Mrs. Wilby, and tell her the claim had not been forgotten by the defendant, and should be liquidated at the earliest opportunity possible."] Same to same. 6th March 1871. I can assure you at present it is utterly out of my power to do anything. I am willing to endeavour to pay it off by easy instalments; they must be small as my salary is quite nominal . . . or I am willing to pay you any reasonable interest to let the matter remain for the [C. P. present. Let me beg of you to accept one of my propositions, for I really cannot see you will do any good by issuing process, but, on the contrary, you may lose me my appointment, and the chance of payment then would be more remote. The defendant had paid no part of the loan or interest. The writ was not issued until the year 1874. The learned judge told the jury that the plaintiff had, in respect of the original loan, a cause of action reasonably sufficient, and that if the jury believed that she acted upon the letters of the defendant to Alexander, and forbore to sue the defendant in consideration of his promises to pay as expressed in such letters, they were to find for the plaintiff. The jury found for the plaintiff, whereupon a verdict was entered for the plaintiff for 231., with leave reserved to enter a verdict for the defendant, the pleadings to be taken as amended, if necessary, by the insertion of a special count upon the promises to pay in consideration of the plaintiff's forbearance to sue. Bray, for the defendant, now moved accordingly. The money lent was the husband's money, and could never have belonged to the plaintiff. After the death of the plaintiff's husband it belonged to the representatives of the husband. There was therefore nothing in respect of which the forbearance to sue could be exercised. Further, the proposition of the defendant was in the alternative, and as neither of the alternatives was accepted there was no binding contract. Upon this point he cited Mozley v. Tinkler, 1 Cr. M. & R. 692; M'Iver v. Richardson, 1 M. & S. 557. He also argued that the contract of the defendant, if any, was with Alexander, and not with the plaintiff. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I am of opinion that no ground has been shown for disturbing the state of things arrived at, and that, therefore, there should be no rule. [Facts stated.] It is evident that no action could have been brought upon the IO U, as such an action would have been barred by the Statute of Limitations. The plaintiff's case must be taken to be that certain letters of the defendant contain promises to pay in consideration of forbearance to sue, which promises are not barred by the statute. Now the first letter is dated 12th Oct. 1870. [Letter read.] It may be that this letter alone would not contain a sufficient promise to deprive the defendant of the protection of the statute, as containing no promise to pay in any event, but it is important as showing that Alexander was not being dealt with in a separate capacity. The whole of the letter is inconsistent with such a supposition. There is therefore evidence to show that as between the defendant and the plaintiff Alexander was the plaintiff's agent, and that the defendant dealt with him as such. This is corroborated by the second letter, dated 6th March 1871. [Letter read.] This letter is in effect a statement made to the plaintiff through Alexander. And I think that the two letters, coupled with the forbearance of the plaintiff to sue after having received them, form a sufficient consideration to support the promise upon which the plaintiff now brings her action. But Mr. Bray meets this by saying that if there had been a debt, there might be also a sufficient promise to pay it, but that there was, in fact, no existing debt at all. There was no forbearance to sue, he contends, because there was no right of action to forbear. Now, I do not feel satisfied that this was not the plaintiff's own money. But, however that may be, it is undisputed that an IO U was given to the plaintiff in respect of it, in her individual capacity, after the death of her husband. This is evidence of an original debt to the plaintiff herself. But, further, it has been held upon very good grounds (a) that the compromise of a disputed claim made bonâ fide is a good consideration for a promise, even although it should ultimately appear that the claim was unfounded, so that whether the money lent was the plaintiff's own or not is immaterial. Upon all grounds, therefore, as well as upon each ground separately, I am of opinion that the points made for the defendant fail, and that this rule ought to be refused. DENMAN, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think that the letters of 12th Oct. 1870, and 6th March 1871, taken together, amount to evidence of an agreement that in consideration that the plaintiff would forbear to sue, the defendant would pay both principal and interest. That the original consideration was good, the IOU is ample evidence. I have entertained some doubt as to whether the agreement was not with Alexander, and not with the plaintiff; but as Mrs. Wilby's claim is named expressly by the defendant, I think that there is ground for saying that the transaction was one between the plaintiff and defendant through Alexander. ARCHIBALD, J.-I think that there is no ground for disturbing this verdict, which rests upon an amended declaration that the defendant promised to pay in consideration of the plaintiff forbearing to sue. The IO U was given after the husband's death, but that being barred by the statute there is needed evidence of a fresh promise to pay. I do not think that the letter of the 12th Oct. affords such evidence, as it contains only a promise to pay in the event of getting an appointment. A further letter contains an offer to pay interest or to pay the principal by instaiments. Mr. Bray contends that these were offers in the alternative, and that one of the alternatives ought to have been accepted. But I do not agree with that contention. I think the mere forbearance to sue was evidence of a fresh agreement on the part of the plaintiff, and that the mere giving of the IO U raised a liability the forbearance to enforce which was evidence of a fresh agreement on the part of the defendant. The proposition of the defendant must be taken to have been accepted by the plaintiff. On all grounds, therefore, the verdict was good. BRETT, J.-I am of the same opinion. Rule refused. Attorneys for the defendant, Wood, Street, and Hayter. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Reported by H. LEIGH and CYRIL DODD, Esqrs., Barristers at-Law. Friday, Jan. 22. FROST v. BROOKE AND OTHERS. Practice-Interrogatories when money has been paid into court. When money has been paid into court by the defendant in an action to recover damages for (a) See Collisher v. Bischoffeim (L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 449); Cook v. Wright (1 B. & S. 559; 30 L. J. 321, Q. B.; 4 L. T. Rep. N.S. 704). [Ex. personal injuries caused by the defendants' negligence, interrogatories as to the nature and extent of the injuries sustained, and generally as to the damages are permissible. THIS was an action to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through the fall of a race stand erected by the defendants, who were the committee of management of the Lincoln races, which occurred when the plaintiff was upon the stand. The defendants paid money into court, thereby admitting their liability to compensate the plaintiff. The plaintiff replied damages ultra. The interrogatories proposed to be administered by the defendants to the plaintiff were referred by Amphlett, B. from judges' chambers to the court. Cause was, by the direction of Amphlett, B., shown on behalf of the plaintiff in the first in stance. Mellor, on behalf of the defendants, submitted that particulars, not being on oath, did not give sufficient information to the defendants to enable them to form any opinion as to the proper sum to be paid into court, and, further, that in order to meet the plaintiff's case the defendants ought to be allowed to interrogate the plaintiff as to its general nature. Dodd argued that no interrogatories were permissible where the defendant was not seeking to esta blish a substantive case, but was merely seeking, as in the present case, to rebut the plaintiff's case. He cited: Jourdain v. Palmer, 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 600; L. Rep. Wright v. Goodlake, 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 120; 3 H. & Dobson v. Richardson, L. Rep. 3 Q. B. 778; 9 B. & S. and urged that these latter cases were consistent with this view. Secondly, that the present interrogatories went beyond any that ought on any principle to be allowed; that though no money was paid into court in the case of Peppiatt v. Smith (33 L. J. 239, Ex.; 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 139), yet the reasoning there was applicable to the present case; that the second interrogatory was in fact asking the patient for the results of his doctor's reports, and that, as in the Court of Exchequer, such reports were privileged from inspection, the results of the reports ought also to be protected from disclosure. The names, too, of the medical men and attendants ought not to be asked. The closing part of the eighth interrogatory was virtually asking for the argument of the plaintiff upon his trade loss. BRAMWELL, B.-We think the interrogatories are admissible if altered by striking out the questions as to the names of the medical men and attendants. Particulars are not a sufficient guide, not being on oath, to enable a defendant, in a case like the present, to judge of the proper amount to pay into court. PIGOTT, B., concurred. The interrogatories, as allowed, were as fol lows: accident occurred, in what way did you fall, state how, so 1. On what part of the stand were you when the far as you can tell, you received the injuries you com plain of? Did you after the accident walk home, or how did you get home? 2. State as far as you can the nature and extent of such injuries, and in what way you were affected thereby. 3. Were you seen by a medical man after the accident, and if so, how soon after the accident, and where, on |