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whatever. He avers that he had loaned to Charles Blass, defendant, said sum of $450, and that Olive Blass, defendant, was owing Charles, and, in consideration thereof, secured said loan from defendant to said Charles Blass by giving the mortgage to him; that the same is now wholly due and unpaid, and remains so except as the foreclosure has paid and satisfied the same. He avers that, at the time of the foreclos ure sale, one Peter D. Blass held and asserted against the 38-acre parcel of land two tax-titles or deeds from the auditor general of the state of Michigan, dated the 15th day of November, 1882, and the 1st day of February, 1883, for the unpaid taxes for the years 1879 and 1877; and that the deed of November 15th also conveyed to Peter D. Blass the 34-acre parcel in question in this suit; and that, since the date of said mortgage sale, the defendant has purchased and holds all the right, title, and interest of Peter D. Blass to said premises by virtue of said tax-deeds, or otherwise. He avers that he is ready to come to a full and fair accounting of the amount due on said mortgage with the complainant or any person entitled to the same, but he denies complainant's right thereto, and he denies his right to redeem therefrom, and denies that complainant has a right to the assignment thereof, or to be subrogated to the defendant's rights, and asks, under the supreme court rule providing for the same, that he may have the benefit of his answer as a cross-bill and affirmative relief given him, the same as if A cross-bill were filed by defendant. The case was heard upon proofs taken in open court, before the Honorable R. M. MONTGOMERY, circuit judge, who entered a decree dismissing complainant's bill, and giving relief to defendant upon his crossbill, from which decree complainant has appealed to this court.

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Complainant's proofs fail to make out any case for equitable relief. He has He has shown by the testimony of Robert Hunter, Jr., that the deed of parcel No. 1 was placed in his hands in escrow, and upon condition that it should not be delivered until after evidence was furnished to him showing that all the debts allowed by the commissioners against the estate of Alpheus Burch had been paid, and that he should then deliver the deed to Olive Blass; that he has not delivered the deed because evidence of the payment of the debts against the estate has not been furnished to him; that the deed has been in his custody all the time, subject to these conditions. The testimony conclusively shows that the debts have been paid only partially, and those by the administrator; that Robert Hunter, Jr., is still the administrator of the estate; and that he has Inventoried the lands described in parcel No. 1 as the property of the estate. The testimony shows that the deed from Alpheus Burch to Noah Burch was made in consideration of an agreement that Noah Burch should support and maintain his father, Alpheus, and his mother, Elizabeth, so long as they lived; and that, after going upon the lands described in the deed, and discharging his part of the agreement for a short time, a dispute between

| him and his father arose, and it was mutually agreed that the transaction in which the deed originated should be con sidered at an end; and that he thereupon surrendered the deed of the premises to his father, and made no claim under the deed since that time; and that, after he was appointed administrator, he found the deed among his father's papers, and it was then unrecorded; and that he (Noah Burch) does not know who placed it upon record. It is unnecessary to pass upon the validity of the arrangement made between Noah Burch and Charles and Olive Blass with reference to the payment of the debts by the latter. The conveyance was not intended to be absolute. Neither was the agreement absolute to pay the debts. If they had paid up every debt in full, then the deed was to be delivered; otherwise, not. Without deciding whether, under such an agreement as this, the creditors of the estate could maintain an action against Charles and Olive Blass to recover the amount due them, it is clear that such creditors would have no lien upon the land by virtue of such agreement to secure therefor such debts against the estate. Had the deed from Noah Burch to Olive Blass been delivered absolutely, under an agreement that she should pay all the debts proved against the estate of Alpheus Burch, the case would have presented some different features from those it now possesses. Then the question would have been presented whether a trust had been created in Olive Blass for the benefit of the creditors which they could enforce in equity. But the title never passed to her clothed with a trust, but it remains in her grantor unaffected by the mortgage she subsequently gave to Smith Blass. The testimony shows that the claims against the estate of Alpheus Burch allowed in favor of Parker and Weatherwax and Hunt and Hunter were both paid by Noah Burch, administrator,-the former in June, 1874, and the latter, August, 1873. This fact was conceded by complainant's solicitor upon the introduction of the testimony in open court. His claim, therefore, that he is a creditor of the estate by virtue of having purchased these claims falls to the ground, and all claims of an equitable lien upon parcel No. 1 falls with it The title of parcel No. 1 may be soclouded by the conveyances from Alpheus Burch to Noah, and from him to Olive Blass, as to seriously affect the sale of such real estate by the administrator. Indeed, the testimony shows that the administrator has obtained license to sell it and has been hitherto unable to do so. In such case it would be his duty, either of his own motion, or upon the motion of some creditor under the statute, to take the proper proceeding to clear the cloud from the title, and to set aside and cancel the two deeds, if the parties claiming through them, or in whose name the legal title stands, should refuse on request to quitclaim their interests. When this is done, the land appears to be of sufficient value to pay all claims against the estate. But a creditor cannot institute such suit, unless by leave of court after the administrator has refused. The complainant,

therefore, has failed to make a case as to ballots must be furnished by the secretary of parcel No. 1.

Parcel, No. 2 never belonged to the estate of Alpheus Burch. The bill alleges it to have belonged to Elizabeth Burch in her life-time. No question is made of the validity of the conveyance from the administrator of Elizabeth Burch to Olive Blass. The mortgage from Olive Blass to Smith Blass was executed in June, 1876, and was promptly recorded. The levy in favor of the Lowell National Bank was made April 27, 1881. It would therefore appear upon the face of the papers that the complainant's rights under the levy to parcel No. 2 are subject to the mortgage debt. Complainant claims that the mortgage was made for the purpose of cheating and defrauding the creditors of Alpheus Burch's estate. This charge is made upon information and belief, and the only support it has in the proof consists in the fact that on September 30, 1875, a note was made by Charles and Olive Blass to Sprague Bros., a part of the consideration for which the note was given being a part of the claim against the estate of Alpheus Burch allowed in favor of one Alburn Rolf; that a suit was brought on this note June 7, 1876, and the mortgage was executed June 17, 1876; and the attorney who drew the mortgage testified that he saw no money pass from Smith Blass to the mortgagors upon that occasion. From this testi. mony, we are asked, not only to infer fraud, but to find that this mortgage is wholly void, as made with intent to cheat and defraud the creditors of Burch's estate. The testimony will not warrant us in coming to that conclusion. It fails to show either fraud in fact, or a fraudulent intent. Moreover, it has repeatedly been held by this court that under such charge the complainant's bill should have been filed in aid of execution before sale. He cannot be permitted to sell the property under the execution with apparently a valid lien upon it, by which its marketable value is affected, and then afterwards proceed to set aside the incumbrance as a fraud upon his rights. There is no charge that the foreclosure by advertisement was not in all respects regular and valid. Subsequent incumbrancers in such case should redeem in accordance with the statutory provisions, and are not entitled to file a bill in chancery simply for the purpose of redeeming. It is true that complainant charged that the amount claimed in the notice of foreclosure sale was not due and owing upon the mortgage. This was denied by the answer, and the complainant has failed to substantiate his charge by proofs. From a consideration of the whole case, we think the decree of the circuit court should be affirmed, with costs; and it is so ordered. The other justices concurred.

(82 Mich. 532)

state, and no others shall be used or circulated. Booths must be constructed so that voters must pass through them on their way to the polls, and while in them be concealed from the view of all. One voter only may enter a booth at a time, and he is allowed sufficient time to select and prepare his ballot, after which he must deliver it to the chairman of the inspectors af election, in full view of all present. No one can be followed inside the railing containing the booths, except a gate-keeper and one challenger for each political party. The inspectors of election must keep the booths supplied with tickets of all political parties, and pasters or slips of candidates, if requested and furnished by them. Held, there is nothing in the law to prevent persons who are blind or otherwise disabled from receiving assistance in preparing their ballots outside the railing, nor, when unable to go alone, from being conducted to the polls by others. It will therefore not deprive any one of his constitutional right to vote, and is valid.

2. The provisions of the law are capable of being carried into effect by the exercise of common sense and reason in the selection of proper instrumentalities by the comptroller, (upon whom that duty is imposed,) and mandamus will issue to compel him to make the attempt.

3. The fact that the act is silent as to payment of the expense incurred in constructing the booths, etc., does not affect its validity, since the imposition of an active duty upon a municipal officer carries with it an obligation on the part of the municipality to bear the expense and provide for its payment.

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Mandamus.

B. W. Huston, Atty. Gen., (Alfred Russell and Don M. Dickinson, of counsel,) for relatur. C. S. McDonald and Edward Minock, for respondent.

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GRANT, J. The common council passed a resolution, requiring the respondent to take the necessary action to carry into effect the election law of 1889 (Act No. 263) at the coming election. He refused, alleging two grounds therefor: (1) That the act is unconstitutional and void; (2) that the booths and railings will cost a large sum of money, and no provision has been made by the law for paying the expense. Petition for mandamus is filed to compel action upon the part of respondent. The act is entitled "An act to prescribe the manner of conducting, and to prevent fraud and deception at, general elections in this state. Its validity is the only question involved. The provisions of the act do not apply to municipalities whose elections are governed by special enactment, except in so far as they relate to the ballot and booths to be used, as provided in sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 20, and 21. These provisions are therefore the only ones in controversy here. They read as follows: "Sec. 8. At every general or special election held in this state, after the passage of this act, each elector shall vote by ballot, and shall, in full view, deliver to the chairman of the inspectors of election a single ballot or ticket, on which shall be written or printed, or partly written and partly printed, the names of the persons voted

COMMON COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF DETROIT for, with proper designation of the office

V. RUSH.

(Supreme Court of Michigan. Oct. 14, 1890.) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-METHOD OF

BALLOTING-MANDAMUS.

1. Acts Mich. 1889, No. 263, regulating the method of conducting elections, provides that all

which he or they may be intended to fill. No ballot or ticket shall bear upon the outside thereof any impression, device, color, or thing, designed or liable to distinguish such ballot or ticket from other legal ballots or tickets, whereby the same

may be known or designated. No ticket | shall be used at any such election or circulated on the day of such election, unless furnished by the secretary of state for such purpose; and it is hereby made the duty of the secretary of state to procure and furnish, on application and payment to him of the actual cost, with ten per cent. added thereto by the state central committee, county or other managing committee of any political party or organization in this state, such quantity or amount of ballots to be used at such approaching elections as may be deemed necessary or convenient. All ballots to be of the same width and length. Sec. 9. It shall hereafter be the duty of the state central committee, county committee, or other managing committee of any political party or organization in this state, before each election in this state, to prepare and adopt by engraving or otherwise, a ticket vignette or heading, with an appropriate inscription, to be printed at the top of the ticket of the party, on the inside thereof, as a distinctive and characteristic heading thereto. Such vignette or heading shall not be more than two inches high by four and one half inches wide, and, in addition to the device adopted, shall set forth legibly the fact that the ticket is the regular ticket of the party with the name thereof. It shall also show the congressional, senatorial, and representative districts, and county where such ticket may be lawfully voted. Sec. 10. When such vignette and inscription shall have been adopted and prepared, an impression of the same, followed by the regular ticket of such party, printed so as to constitute a lawful election ballot, and sealed up in an envelope, shall be filed with the county clerk of the county where such election is to be held, at least ten days before the opening of the polls at such election. Such ballot shall be kept by such clerk on deposit, and from the time of said filing it shall be unlawful for any person to imitate, copy, or in any manner counterfeit the same. Any person violating the foregoing provision shall, upon conviction thereof, he punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the state-prison for the term not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. Sec. 11. Any person who shall knowingly print, circulate, distribute, or cause to be distributed, any ticket or tickets, ballot or ballots, having thereon the vignette, or any imitation of the vignette, or inscription of any ballot or ticket so filed with the county clerk, but containing the name or names of any candidate or candidates other or different from the name or names upon the ballot or ticket of such party so filed or deposited with said clerk, or who shall intentionally destroy or carry away any ballot or ballots, except for his own usein voting, which shall have been furnished by the inspectors of election for such purpose, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the state-prison not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court: provided, that nothing in this act

shall be construed to interfere with the right of any elector to erase or insert any name or names upon such ticket, if done in writing, or by printed slips by the elector himself." "Sec. 20. In all townships containing one hundred or more electors, and in all voting precincts in cities and villages, the township board of each township, and the various officers whose duty it may be to designate and prescribe the place or places of holding general elections in the several cities, wards, election districts, and voting precincts throughout the state, shall, and in all townships having less than one hundred electors may, provide for, and cause to be erected in the room where elections are to be held, a railing or fence four feet in height, which railing or fence shall be placed through and across the center of the room, and shall cause a gate to be erected in said railing, and said gate shall be in charge of a gate-keeper appointed at the opening of the polls by the board of inspectors, and no person shall be allowed to be inside of said railing exccpt to vote, and, as soon as the elector has voted, he shall retire without, and shall not again be admitted within, the railing, and only as many electors as there are booths shall be allowed within the railing at one and the same time, and the electors shall be admitted in the order in which they shall apply. The entrance gate shall be erected or placed at one side of the room, and on the inside of the said gate a booth or temporary room shall be erected. At least one such booth shall be provided at each polling place, and not less than one for each hundred persons entitled to vote thereat, and one booth additional for any additional number of voters less than one hundred and more than twenty-five, with walls not less than six feet high, and in such a manner that, as the elector passes in at the gate to the room where the ballots or tickets are taken by the inspectors of election, he shall pass through said booth or temporary room, and be concealed from the view of the inspectors of election and those without the said railing while passing through said booth. Said railing shall also contain an exit gate at a convenient place for voters to pass out. Sec. 21. Before the opening of the polls of any elec tion within the provisions of this act, the inspectors of election shall cause to be hung up or deposited within the booth in the polling place, and in towns where no booths are provided, by placing on a table or desk near the polling place, in separate packages, tickets of all political parties, and pasters or slips for the several candidates, if desired and furnished by them, to be voted at sald election, for the use of electors, and the inspectors of election shall cause said tickets to be replaced when used, so that tickets chall be so hung up or on deposit during the entire time that the polls are open. The constitution of Michigan contains three provisions upon the subject,-sections 1, 2, and 6 of article 7. Section 1 provides who shall be an elector, and that the legislature may provide the way in which his vote shall be cast. Section 2 provides that all votes shall be by ballot. Section 6 provides

that laws may be passed to preserve the | voting places were overcrowded, and in purity of election, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise. Under these broad provisions, it has been frequently held to be the exclusive province of the legislature to enact laws providing for the registration of voters, and the time, place, and manner of conducting elections. It may regulate, but cannot destroy, the enjoyment of the elective franchise. Whether such regulations be reasonable or unreasonable is for the determination of the legislature, and not for the courts, so long as such regulation does not become destruction. Attorney General v. City of Detroit, 44 N. W. Rep. 388. Courts will not declare the law invalid, because its enforcement might result in the restriction of the right to vote, else the registry laws would have been held void. Yet these laws have been universally sustained, on the ground of wise and necessary regulation. In 1832. Chief Justice SHAW sustained them, on the ground that they tended to "promote peace, order, and celerity in the conduct of elections, and as such to facilitate and secure this most precious right to those who were by the constitution entitled to enjoy it." Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485. The princiThe principles then enunciated have been adopted by this court in numerous cases. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127; People v. Kopplekom, 16 Mich. 342; Attorney General v. Common Council, 58 Mich. 213, 24 N. W. Rep. 887. When power is conferred upon the legislature to provide instrumentalities by which certain objects are to be accomplished, the sole right to choose the means accompanies the power, in the absence of any constitutional provisions prescribing the means. The finding by this court that the law impeded, hampered, or restricted the right to vote, and is therefore void, would be a clear assumption of, and encroachment upon, legislative power, a substitution of our judgment for that of the legislature. It can only be declared void when it destroys the right. Its unconstitutionality can be determined by no other rule.

Frauds in elections produced the necessity of the registry laws; but these were not found sufficient to prevent the frauds and abuses which became so notorious that other means were found necessary to preserve the purity of elections. Fraudulent tickets were issued,-fraudulent in that they purported to be the regular party tickets, but in reality contained the name of some of the candidates of the opposite political party,-and thus voters were deceived into voting for candidates not of their choice, and contrary to their intention. The preparation and distribution of ballots by party agents furnished an excuse for large assessments upon candidates. Voters were supplied with tickets, and accompanied to the polls, by party agents, to see that the tickets furnished were deposited in the boxes. Voters became the subject of bargain and sale, and the purchaser accompanied the voter to the polls to see that the infamy was consummated by the deposit of the vote placed in his hands. Drunken men were taken to the polls, supported by their fellows. The

this way voters were kept from the polls
or deterred from voting. "Workers"
were employed, and paid by candidates
and party managers to peddle tickets;
and not always were they employed for
their most commendable qualifications,
or from the most worthy motives. Secret
organizations met on the night previous
to election, and furnished their members
with "vest-pocket" tickets,-a proceed-
ing foreign to the spirit of our govern-
ment. Intimidation of voters was openly
charged under the system under which
employers could stand in close proximity
to the polls, and distinguish what ticket
their employes voted. The expenses of an
election have become so great as to deter
many good men from accepting nomina-
tions. Such are some of the abuses that
grew up under the old system, rendering a
reform absolutely necessary to secure fair
and honest elections, good government,
and the perpetuity of our institutions.
To such an extent have these abuses been
carried that one of the eminent counsel
for relator felt justified in asserting in his
brief that "fraud in elections has become
a fine art and corruption of voters a pro-
fession;"
fession;" and the governor of the state
in his message in January, 1889, made it
the subject of earnest and special com-
ment. Senate Journal 1889, p. 18. The
secrecy of the ballot is the great safeguard
to the purity of elections. The vote by
ballot implies secrecy. This secrecy
should not be confined to the time of de-
positing the ballot. It should accompany
the voter through all the steps provided
for the preparation of his ballot. Only
in this way can he be freed from all intim-
idation, improper influences, reproach,
and animadversion. When all knowledge
of how he voted is the voter's own secret,
unless he chooses to divulge it, he is fully
protected, and a free and honest vote will
very uniformly be the result. Stringent
laws have been enacted in many of the
states upon this subject, and have been
universally sustained by the courts so
long as the right to vote was preserved to
all. In the attempt to remedy the evils
and abuses above mentioned, our legis-
lature enacted the present law. The law
must be liberally construed, and all doubts
solved in its favor. As was said in Ogden
v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 270: "It is but a
decent respect, due to the wisdom, the
integrity, and the patriotism of the legis-
lative body by which any law is passed,
to presume in favor of its validity, until
its violation is proved beyond all reason-
able doubt." The essential provisions
of this law are as follows: (1) All ballots
must be of the same width, length, and
color. (2) They must bear no marks or
devices on the outside whereby they may
be known or designated. (3) They must
be furnished by the secretary of state, and
no other used or circulated. (4) Booths
must be provided, so constructed that
voters must enter and pass through them
on their way to the polls, and while in
them be concealed from the view of all.
(5) One voter only is permitted to enter
the booth at a time, and he is allowed suf-
ficient time to select and prepare his ballot

say that all ballots shall be of uniform color and size, and the voter's rights are not even abridged or restricted by such requirements. It is of no consequence that expense must be incurred, and that the statute is silent upon the question of payment. Whenever an active duty is imposed upon municipalities, or public officers representing municipalities, the duty imposed carries with it the obligation on the part of the municipality to perform the act, bear the expense, and provide for its payment. We find nothing in the above provisions which is unconstitutional, and not within the exclusive province of the legislature. All the provisions found in the body of the act are germane to the object expressed in the title. It is apparent to all that, if honestly carried out, they will go far to prevent fraud and corruption, and purify our elections. It is the clear duty of the secretary of state to see that the tickets are printed and furnished; of the municipal authorities to provide the booths, and have them ready for use on the morning of election; and of the election board to perform the duties imposed upon them. Counsel have argued that the provisions are in the main directory, and not mandatory. This is not the proper occasion to discuss that question, nor to determine the effect of any neglect or failure to comply with the law. It is not to be presumed that any of the officers mentioned in the act will neglect to do their duty. We are certainly not called upon now to furnish an excuse for such neglect or failure by a judicial determination of what the effect thereof will be. The proper time for the determination of that question will be when some one claiming to have been damnified by such neglect or failure presents his case in this court. The parties directly in interest are then entitled to be heard. There will also be more time for investigation and deliberation by the court than is now afforded, in view of the near approach of the election, and consequent haste in preparing our decision. We therefore decline to now pass upon that question.

according to his own free will; having | choosing. But the people have a right to done which, he must then deliver his vote to the chairman of the inspectors, in full view of all present. (6) No one can be allowed inside the railing except the gate-keeper and challengers, provided by section 17,-one for each political party. (7) The inspectors of election must keep these booths supplied with tickets of all political parties, and pasters or slips of candidates, if requested and furnished by them. It is objected that the law deprives those who cannot read, the blind, and cripples who cannot walk, of the opportunity of voting. If such were the effeet, the law would clearly he void, for they are given this right by the constitution. We are cited to Rogers v. Jacob, 11 8. W. Rep. 513, as a case in point. But the statute there under consideration provided that the voter must resort to the booth, and there, unaided and alone, prepare his ballot. It is contended that under the act in question the result is the same, because no one is permitted to accompany the voter to the booth to assist him. It is to be regretted that the legis lature did not expressly provide for furnishing ballots to this class of voters. We must therefore carefully examine the act, to ascertain if it leaves no way for such voters to obtain ballots. It is clear that if voters are limited to the use of tickets provided in the booths, then some voters are disfranchised by the very terms of the law. But we do not think that the law necessarily bears that construction. There is no express prohibition against assisting such a person in the preparation of his ticket, nor against his obtaining a ticket outside the polling place for that purpose, noragainst assisting to a booth or the polls one physically unable to go alone. Such a case is not within the mischief aimed at, and we hold that under this law such a voter is entitled to receive assistance in the preparation of his ticket, and to receive and have his ticket prepared outside the polling places. This, we think, is in accord with that maxim of interpretation that a thing which is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, although not within the letter; and a thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention. Sisters of Charity v. City of Detroit, 9 Mich. 98, and cases there cited.

The voter has not the right guarantied him by the constitution to the exercise of his own fancy or whim in the kind of paper to be used, or the size of the ticket to be voted. Under such a right, he might present a ticket of such size that it could not be deposited in the box. By this act he is not deprived of voting for whom he chooses, nor compelled to vote for any of the regular party candidates. Printed ballots are in universal use. Written ballots are seldom, if ever, used. But should the voter desire to write a ballot, this act furnishes ample provisions for him to do so, and have his ballot counted. He may erase any or all the names upon any ticket, and write in any names he may choose. If he has no political affiliations, he may erase the heading of any ticket, and write a heading of his own

It is suggested rather than insisted that the law is inoperative and ineffectual, on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purposes for which it was enacted, and is futile without further legislation. The test for the determination of this question is, can the provisions of the law be carried out by instrumentalities within the reach of those intrusted with its execution? It must be clear to every capable and unprejudiced reader of the law that its provisions are not incapable of enforcement. It is not enough that the law does not expressly prescribe the means for carrying its provisions into effect. If men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, the law is valid, and the offi cers must proceed with its enforcement. All the instrumentalities for its proper enforcement exist, and the officers can and must use them.

We might with propriety decline to discuss the case further, as all else that we might say must relate to the methods to

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