sentative can hardly be blamed if he does not welcome such visits. There are always in every legislature men of high character, as well as ability, who can be trusted to

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to be controlled by either corrupt influences or the more insidious, but often none the less pernicious, influences of partisanship and personal advantage. But, have our legislatures as a whole been worthy of being trusted on important legislation with

Protests against the invasion of the state capital by delegations of citizens to influence legislation have appeared in press reports two or three times, at least, within the last year. One member is just quoted as strongly opposed to these attempts by the people to influence the legislative acts of their representatives, because, among other things, it implies a want of confidence in the legislative body, and because, if the people have representatives whom they cannot trust, they ought to send better ones. It is easy to see that an honorable and highspirited man, faithfully attending to his duties and honestly endeavoring to use his best judgment in the interests of the people, may naturally feel somewhat sensitive, and perhaps indignant, if a large body of his constituents follow him to the capital for the purpose of urging him to vote right on a pending measure. Obviously the visit

at the undisputed facts. For years, influences of some kind have been potent enough in Albany to procure and keep on the statute books a law to protect gambling on race tracks in obvious evasion, and in almost direct defiance, of the Constitution. Legislators swore to support the Constitution of the state, and, instead, voted to support the race-track associations, and protect the gambling which the Constitution prohibited. Year after year the public sentiment of the state proved powerless to change this scandalous situation. According to all the press reports, the prospect of redeeming the state from this disgrace this year would have been a hopeless one, except for the straightforward and uncom promising course of the governor, and an unusual rousing of the public. If citizens had all stayed at home and left the legislature entirely to itself, few will doubt that this betrayal of the Constitution in the

interest of the gamblers would have been perpetuated. Whenever any measure of reform is under consideration by the legislature, if the good citizens all stay at home and trust blindly to their representatives, while the secret work of those who are financially interested in the perpetuation of the evil aimed at is allowed to go on unopposed, the chances for reformed legislation in most legislatures will not be very promising. The suggestion that, if the people cannot trust their representatives, they should send better ones, is unmistakably good. That is exactly what should be done, but, until they get better ones, they need to give pretty sharp attention to the work which their present representatives are doing. While sensitive and honorable men in legislative bodies may not like the implications that arise from a visiting delegation of their constituents to urge legislation, their own personal sensitiveness ought not to weigh very greatly in the matter. If they are sincerely advocating the public interest, they ought to be heartily glad of reinforce

ments.

Boycotting Interstate Commerce.

A far-reaching decision in its effect both upon labor unions and upon interstate commerce is that of Loewe v. Lawlor, decided February 3, 1908, by the Supreme Court of the United States, Adv. S. U. S. 1907, p. 301, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301. The illegality of combinations which amount to a boycott has been so often decided by the courts that the general doctrine is well understood. It has been applied to a variety of conditions, and to different classes of people. One of the recent cases which holds that a boycott of a wholesale dealer by retailers for selling goods to a competitor whom they wish to put out of business is unlawful, is Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 976, 64 Atl. 1029. The decision is sustained by the authorities cited in the opinion of the court and in the annotations to the case. A boycott by a combination of employers of a blacklisted employee was held unlawful in Joyce v. Great Northern R. Co. 100 Minn. 225, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 756, 110 N. W. 975. This decision was based on a statute making such a combination illegal,

and this statute was held constitutional. These and other cases lay down a doctrine broad enough to apply impartially to people of every class. If labor organizations are to be protected against boycotts, they must concede that other persons ought to be protected from boycotts by them. They must be subject to the law which they invoke in their own favor. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Lawlor Case, has merely held that the plain provisions of the Federal anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, against combinations "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states" are applicable to all classes of people alike. The court had previously enforced this law against the great traffic associations, in United States v. Joint Traffic Asso. 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. ed. 259, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25, and against the great railroad combination, in the Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 48 L. ed. 679, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436. In the latter case the court said: "The act declares illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature, and whoever may be parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates in the restraint of trade or commerce among the several states." Unless, therefore, the court was to be guilty of partiality or favoritism toward labor unions as a class, in defiance of its own clearly and emphatically expressed doctrine, when dealing with combinations of capitalists, there was no escape from the decision that labor unions, as well as other persons, were subject to the act.

The effect of the labor-union boycott in this case to constitute a restraint of trade or commerce among the states was another question involved. But it was found that there was a combination to destroy an existing interstate traffic in hats by a boycott which prevented the manufacturers from making hats intended for transportation beyond the state, and prevented dealers from reselling the hats in other states, as well as from making further purchases. It was, therefore, a combination in restraint of trade and commerce among the states, though some of the acts involved were in themselves, taken separately, beyond the scope of Federal authority. As said by Mr. Justice Holmes in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 395, 49 L. ed. 523, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276, in holding that a combination of dealers in meat was unlawful: "It is

suggested that the several acts charged are lawful, and that intent can make no difference. But they are bound together as the parts of a single plan. The plan may make the parts unlawful." Therefore, the purpose and effect of the boycott being to destroy interstate business, it was brought within the condemnation of the anti-trust act of Congress.

The effect of this decision ought to be wholesome. Whatever questions may be in doubt as to the extent to which the power of Congress over commerce may reach, there cannot well be any question as to the power to protect such commerce from direct interference and destruction, whether by boycotts or otherwise. Intelligent and fair-minded men in the labor unions cannot fail to recognize the justice of the decision, whether they think it is helpful to their special interests or not. So many lines of business are of an interstate character that boycotts which will not violate the Federal law will be much restricted. One possible effect of the decision, therefore, may be to turn the labor unions toward practices that are free from illegality.

Additional Consideration for Completing Executory Contract.

An exception to the general rule that a promise of additional consideration for completing an existing executory contract in accordance with its terms is invalid because of the lack of consideration for the promise is made in the case of Linz v. Schuck (Md.) 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 789, 67 Atl. 286. In that case, after one who had contracted to dig a cellar abandoned his contract because of unforeseen and unantici

pated difficulties arising out of the unstable condition of the material through which it was necessary to dig, being a swamp-like mass of soft mud, and requiring great ad ditional expense to complete the contract, the owner of the premises promised additional compensation to induce completion of the contract, and this promise was up held without the necessity of any express rescission of the existing contract. The court said: "When two parties make a contract based on supposed facts which they afterwards ascertain to be incorrect, and which would not have been entered into by the one party if he had known the actual

conditions which the contract required him to meet, not only courts of justice, but all right-thinking people, must believe the fair course for the other party to the contract to pursue is either to relieve the contractor of going on with his contract, or to pay him additional compensation. If the difficulties be unforeseen, and such as neither party contemplated, or could have, from the appearance of the thing to be dealt with, anticipated, it would be an extremely harsh rule of law to hold that there was no legal way of binding the owner of the property to fulfil a promise made by him to pay the contractor such additional sum as such unforeseen difficulties cost him. But we do not understand the authorities to sustain such a rule. On the contrary, they hold that the parties can rescind the original contract, and then enter into a new one by which a larger consideration for the same work and materials that were to be done and furnished under the first contract can be validly agreed upon:" The court declined to approve the doctrine declared in Robinson v. Hurst (Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Hurst) 78 Md. 69, 20 L.R.A. 761, 44 Am. St. Rep. 266, 26 Atl. 958, that "a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration to support a promise to pay," but held that it was competent for the parties, by their voluntary and mutual promise, to waive their respective rights and obligations under the original contract, and substitute for it a new or modified contract, and that it would be only a technical distinction to say that there must be an express or actual rescission, where the parties, by substituting a new agreement, clearly showed an intention that neither should be held to the original contract.

The note to this case, and an earlier note in 34 L.R.A. 38, fully cover the numerous decisions on the subject, and bring out sharply the distinctions that exist between them. They show that the general rule undoubtedly is that the mere agreement to perform, or the actual performance of, an existing contract obligation, affords no consideration for a new promise on the part. of the party to whom the existing obligation is due, and that a new promise of additional consideration for completing the original contract is without consideration and invalid. But other cases, as well as that of Linz v. Schuck, have made exceptions to this rule, some of them on the ground of